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The thesis provides the first description and analysis of long-term economic change and
development in the Peninsular Malaysian State of Perak from about 1800 to 2000.
Although a considerable number of studies have been undertaken on the colonial
economy of Perak focusing on tin and rubber production, given the vital importance of
these commodities and of Perak's position in the British imperial enterprise, very little
research has been done in relating the state's pre-colonial status and its colonial
development to post-independence transformations.
The thesis coordinates and re-evaluates the material on colonial period concentrating
particularly on the available statistical dataandthe relations between tin, rubberand rice.
It then links colonial developments with contemporary change by examining the three
key economic elements of land, labour and capital, and utilises a considerable amount of
government economic data on the recent period. It also considers the relations between
the policies and practices of the colonial and post-colonial state and processes of
economic development. It argues that the role of the state, though different and
changing, has been vitally important in promoting and underpinning economic
transformations from British intervention in 1874 until the present. The major change
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FROM NATURAL ECONOMY TO CAPITALISM: THE STATE AND
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN PERAK, MALAYSIA c.l 800-2000
1.1 The state and economic development
Before introducing my Perak case-study, I need to provide some indication of the
concepts which have informed my thinking, approach and analysis in the examination of
state intervention in economic processes. In my view, the relationship between the state
and economic development is of crucial importance if a developing country like Malaysia
is to emerge and be transformed from an economically dependent to a modern nation.
Even so, economic development has been, and continues to be a central goal for all
governments. From early scholars such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, John
Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter, competing conceptions of economic
development and transformation have proliferated and have been debated at length by
contemporary scholars.1 But, in my view, no one perspective or approach is totally
satisfactory, particularly with reference to the developing world. This is because of the
variations in the political, economic, social, cultural and historical circumstances of
individual countries.
]A considerable literature is available which examines major theories in development, see for example
Martinussen, J. (1999). Society, State &Market: A Guide to Competing Theories ofDevelopment, London
and New York: Zed Books Ltd; Hunt, D. (1989). Economic Theories of Development: an Analysis of
Competing Paradigms, Savage, Maryland: Barnes &Nobles Books; Ahiapor, J.C.W.(1990). Multinationals
and Economic Development: An Integration of Competing Theories, London: Routledge; Peet, R. and
Hartwick, E. (1999). Theories ofDevelopment, New York: The Guilford Press.
Let me commence with definitions. The term 'state' is used in a number of ways and is
frequently mentioned as an institution of importance in the development process. More
often, no specific and agreed definition of this term is given. In some cases 'state' is used
to denote 'the government' while in others the tendency is to conceive it as an
independent institution, which functions in relation to the resolutions made by rational
decision-makers. It is also referred to in its role as an important initiator and catalyst for
growth and development. Barnett (1988) suggests that more frequently the term 'state' is
used in either one of two ways: first, the Milliband view which emphasises the state as
the embodiment of the ruling class and its associated administrative, political, and legal
arrangements which assume the task of 'protecting and preserving private property and
the power of the bourgeoisie'; and second, the Poulantzas view which places weight on
the state as an apparatus acting in the interests of the ruling class.2 Martinussen (1999)
on the other hand argues that the term 'state' can be described along a continuum from
the state as society-centred to the state as relatively independent of society.3 In a
Weberian ideal-type perspective, Migdal (1988) defines the state as 'an organisation,
composed of numerous agencies led and co-ordinated by the state's leadership (executive
authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all
the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a
given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.'4 In this thesis I conceive of the
'state' as referring to the governing authorities of the territory and whatever resources are
utilised by these authorities in pursuit of their policies. I do not conceive of it in social
2Barnett, T. (1988). Sociology and Development, London: Century Hutchinson Ltd., pp.131-2.
3Martinussen (1999), pp.221-2.
4Migdal, J. S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.19.
class terms. Importantly, the state is also regarded as a principal agent and catalyst of
development.
Defining 'economic development' requires us first to consider the term 'development'.
While in specific terms it means the utilisation of societal productive resources to
improve the living standards of the poor segment of the society, in a broader perspective
the term signifies the general improvement in economic, social, cultural, and political
condition of a given unit, body or country; all these dimensions are linked in a complex
manner.5 No consensus has been reached onthe term; it has been defined in a variety of
ways so that a survey in the mid-1980s shows 72 different meanings attached to it.6
However, the term 'economic development' is usually employed to refer to the
continuous process of creating wealth which in turn entails the utilisation of the crucial
productive factors of capital, land, labour, natural resources and technology to generate
goods and services in accordance with the supply and demand of markets. The role of
the economic 'developer' is therefore directed to participating in the creation of national
wealth for the benefit of both consumers and producers. This can be achieved by
facilitating either the expansion of job opportunities or the tax base or the efficient
redeployment of local resources such as land, labour, resources (such as minerals) and
capital.
5See Peet andHartwick (1999), p.l.
6Riggs (1984) citedin Martinussen (1999), p.35.
7See Malizia, E., 'Redefinition of Economic Development' in Economic Development Review, Vol. 12,
Spring 1994.
In some definitions, economic development is viewed as comprising a process of
increasing income per capita, either real or potential.8 The World Bank until the early
1970s used this approach. There are also those that define it as the increase in both the
total as well as per capita income and products together with social improvements.9 A
more widely accepted notion is one which defines economic development as a process in
which 'the real per capita income of the country increases over a long period of time -
subject to the stipulations that the number of people below an absolute poverty line does
not increase, and that the distribution of income does not become more unequal'. The
success of this process will only be achieved when there is a more balanced income and
property distribution that allows overall societal development.11 One element that is
common in most, if not all, of the definitions, however rests on the agreement that
economic development is a continuous process. Its long-term nature and the ever-
changing world therefore require that governments should always be prepared to adopt
fresh and proactive approaches to counteract development problems and obstacles as they
occur.
The economic development that has taken place in most of the developing world was
much influenced by the development of capitalism as an integral part of colonialism and
international mercantilism. Presented as a system of commodity production, capitalism
gives emphasis to the importance of exchange values that have a definite economic
8Robbins, Lord (1968). The Theory of Economic Development in the History of Economic Thought,
London: MacMillan and Co Ltd., p.151; see also Rostow, W. W. (1960) The Stages ofEconomic Growth,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Lewis, W. A. (1955). The Theory of Economic Growth,
London: Allen & Unwin.
9Galbraith, J. K. (1964).Economic Development, Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress, pp.1-12.
i0Meier, G. M. (1989). Leading Issues inEconomic Development, NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, p.6.
"Cardoso, F. H. (1979). Towards a NewStrategyfor Development, New York: PergamonPress.
relation and requirethe presence of a market wheregoods are exchanged. Thereis also
a clear separation between the ownership of production and the individuals performing
those production functions. Profits gained from the sales are reinvested in economic
production and, in the process, expand capitalist wealth and the scale of activities. At a
lower level, the availability of goods in the market stimulates the consumers to seek
improvement in their income; and the market also permits more profit to be made by
capitalists via new and technologically improved products. The expansion and the
aggregate contributions of all capitalist activities generate economic development in
capitalist countries. In the developing countries, the system of regulated capitalism is
more often adopted compared to what is usually called 'laissez-faire capitalism'. Despite
its overall ability to improve the living standards of the majority of the population,
capitalism also has its critics who draw attention to such matters as the exploitation and
impoverishment of the working class.13 The development of capitalism in developing
nations has also often been with the support and the assistance of the state.
Another issue that requires clarification when assessing economic development and
transformation is the structure of the state itself, in this particular case 'state capitalism'.
It is not the capitalist economy that determines whether the state should be formally
labelled as capitalist; rather it depends strongly on the state's objectives in organising
structures which enable the functioning of a capitalist economy.14 In other words, the
12;Giddens, A. (1971). Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
p.46; Sweezy, P. M. (1968). The Theory of Capitalist Development, New York and London: Modern
Reader Paperbacks, pp.56-9.
13For a cultural critique of capitalism, see Leeman, W. A. (1977). Centralized and Decentralized Economic
Systems, Chicago: RandMcNally College Publishing Company, p.321.
14Strinati, D. (1979), 'Capitalism, the State and Industrial Relations' in Crouch, C. (ed.)(1979). State and
Economy in Contemporary Capitalism, London: CroomHelm, p.193.
established structures will then enable competitive capitalism to develop. Jaguaribe
(1973) suggests that state capitalism can only work with the full backing of both the
urban and rural segments of the middle class in the modernising sector which is then able
to face up to the traditional upper-class and their allies.15 While the state remains the key
driver for economic development, the involvementof the private sector is not suppressed.
The post-World War LT period saw the emergence of competing theories of economic
development from both the classical and neoclassical schools of thought. Within these
theories, emphasis has always been focussed on the importance of capital, human
resources, and technology. Schumpeter's (1934) main contribution, for example, has
been the distinction between 'economic growth' and 'economic development' along with
the crucial presence of entrepreneurial functions in order to succeed.16 Other conceptions
that have contributed towards broadening our understanding of the processes of economic
development, to name a few, include those of Rostow's (1960) "stages of growth",
Nurkse's (1953) "balanced growth", Lewis' (1955) "modernisation", Hirschman's (1958)
"unbalanced growth", Frank's (1967) "metropoles and satellites", Amin's (1976) "centre
and periphery", and Wallerstein's (1979) "capitalist world system".17 In the 1980s the
concept of the developmental state began to gain popularity among scholars in explaining
development processes. Some of its central features include the need to create and
15Cited inRoxborough, I. (1979). Theories ofUnderdevelopment, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan
Press Ltd., p.24.
1Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The Theory ofEconomic Development, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1See Rostow, W. W. (1960). The Stages ofEconomic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Nurkse, R. (1953). Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, Oxford: Blackwell;
Lewis, W. A. (1955). The Theory of Economic Growth, London: Allen & Unwin; Hirschman, A. O.
(1958). The Strategy ofEconomic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press; Frank, A. G. (1967).
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press; Amin, Samir
(1976). Unequal Development, Sussex: Harvester Press; Wallerstein, I. (1979). The Capitalist World
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
regulate economic and political relationships to enable sustainable industrialisation
activities, and the encouragement of public-private cooperation in economic development
which correspond well with Malaysian experiences. This conception however places
economic growth, productivity and competitiveness as the most important items on the
agenda of the state without appropriate consideration given to other elements such as
income distribution and social welfare. The emphasis is therefore concentrated on
important private interest groups, particularly big business.
The division between a free enterprise capitalist system on the one hand and a socialist
system on the other, also gives rise to a third system which comprises a mixture of both
systems. A free enterprise capitalist system has the least state intervention in the
economy while a socialist system the most. The mixed economic system calls for some
state intervention, and its level may vary from case to case. The free enterprise capitalist
system has been the main focus of classical and neo-classical economic proponents, who
since the 19{ century, have argued continuously for the detrimental effects and
consequences of state intervention in economic development. Although among them
different approaches towards the issue were taken, they were of the opinion that the
government's role in the economy should be minimal. The assumptions made are that
markets are naturally and universally efficient mechanisms that enable individuals to seek
maximum gains and the spirit of the enterprise will promote growth. The state has only
18See Evans, P. B., 'Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy
Perspective on the Third World State' in Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1989; Woo-Cumings, M.
(1999) The Developmental State, New York: Cornell University Press; Ha-Joon Chang, 'The Economic
Theory of Developmental State' in Woo-Cumings (ed.)(1999). Johnson (1982) in his concept of the
capitalist developmental state, however, emphasized the need to achieve social goals as part of state
economic development. [Cited in Martinussen (1997), p.239; also Ziya Onis, 'The Logic of the
Developmental State' in Comparative Politics, 1991, October.]
to come up with effective public policies to give full expression to the free operation of
markets. Where this happens, developmentoccurs; when it is obstructed, notably by state
intervention, development suffers. The existenceof rent seekers also represents apolitical
and economic threat to the operation of efficient markets in a free enterprise capitalist
system.
Adam Smith (1776), the founder of classical economics, in his famous book The Wealth
of Nations argued strongly for the limited role of government in economic
development.19 His notion of government was restricted in its role to the provision of
internal and external security, and its limited participation and responsibility towards
public works and the establishment of state institutions to facilitate governance.
Individuals are the ones who should be encouraged to pursue wealth accumulation, which
in turn benefits all. Even with such a concept Smith believed that the ultimate objective
of government is to strive to provide prosperity for the state or commonwealth. Given
this objective, the state as a non-market organization is obliged to undertake, in most
cases, administrative and infrastructuraldevelopment projects including the provision and
maintenance of security and justice, information, and basic public services.20 Being a
strong proponent of the laissez-faire approach, Smith acknowledged the efficacy of the
government's role in protecting rights. This notion too has been emphasised by North
(1981) and Eggertsson (1990) who argue that the increase in economic wealth for the
,9Hawkins, E. L. (1905). An Abstract ofAdam Smith's Wealth ofNation, 3rd Edition, London: Simpkin,
Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., p.57.
KruegerrA. O., 'Government Failures in Development' in Journal ofEconomicPerspectives, 4(3), 1990.
pp.9-24; Brunner, K., 'The Poverty of Nations' in Business Economy, 1985, January, pp.5-11.
population via minimal transactional costs could be achieved by establishing appropriate
91
structures ofproperty rights by the state.
Milton Friedman's (1962) notion of the role of government also concentrates on the
citizen's freedom from internal and external security threats which embraces the
preservation of law and order, the enforcement of private contracts, and the
encouragement of the development of competitive markets. It is suggested that the
private sector will provide the necessary checks-and-balances on the powers of the state
sector thereby preserving both the freedom of speech and of thought.
At the other end of the continuum in the global economy are those inclined towards a
socialist system; one major category of this is the central command economy where the
production inputs and outputs as well as investment decisions are made through the
powers of the government; another is known as market socialism where central
governments operate certain socialist principles of redistribution and state involvement,
including sometimes the establishment ofcommunes or cooperatives, but within a market
system. The appropriate examples of the two systems are the former Soviet-type
command economy and the kibbutzim (communal farms) of Israel for market socialism.
As these systems are outside the scope of my research no further elaboration will be
needed.
21See North, D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. Norton;
Eggertsson, T. (1990). Economic Behavior andInstitutions, Cambridge University Press.
22Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism andFreedom, Chicago: The Universityof Chicago Press, pp.2-3.
23For detailed description of the workings of these economic systems, see Leeman, W.A. (1977).
Centralized and Decentralized Economic Systems, Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co.
The third global economic system combines both the extremes, and is more generally
known as the mixed economy. While the classical and neo-classical supporters are
against this approach, the proponents of Keynes supported the expansion of state
involvement in the economy. While economic development in itself constitutes a
continuous process, the drive to pursue such development activities has to come from the
state. While this may not be true in all countries, it is, however, relevant to developing
countries and, in particular, the Malaysian case under study. Only then will the economic
transformation of society from 'traditional' to 'modern' via state-directed structural
changes and the introduction and implementation of secondary and tertiary economic
activities help accelerate the transformation process. State-led economic development at
least is capable of focussing its activities on the needs of society as a whole and, at the
same time, has access to the state apparatuses as mechanisms in the accumulation,
redistribution and targeting of resources such as capital and, therefore, as catalysts for
growth anddevelopment.24
Within the framework of analysing state involvement in economic development,
particularly from the colonial period onwards, the relationship between state and
economy has become increasingly central because it was at this time that capitalism was
introduced to the non-capitalist world. The analysis of state-directed economic
transformation, within this context, recognises that the "the state and economy cannot be
24Along with it, however, political leaders can also become increasingly involved in economic affairs and
use state apparatuses to achieve politically-defined economic objectives, see Clark, C. and Lemco, J. (1998)
(eds). State and Development, New York: E. J. Brill, p.l.
25This is not to say that the capitalist mode of operation was non-existent at all during the pre-colonial
period; it existed in all historical societies but was ofminimal importance until later in human history.
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seen as undifferentiated totalities".26 State economic transformation can only be achieved
by the interplay between the two: while its distinct structures and processes comprise the
economy, the state on the other hand consists of state apparatuses that in most cases are
differently related to one another in the functions performed. The state alone cannot
perform all the functions for capital accumulation in advancing the capitalist economy.
In an ideal operation of capitalism the support of the state in economic processes is not
required, as internal mechanisms ensure its continuity free of state involvement.27 The
situation in most nations in the developing world, however, is far from ideal and therefore
state involvement has becomeimportant for achievingeconomicdevelopment.
In contrast to the early period of economic development in the West where the
involvement of the state was more of providing the appropriate economic environment
that would facilitate private capital formation, the developing countries in general, at least
in the early stage of their development, did not have these capacities. Market efficiency,
which is essential for private enterprises to be the drivers of state economic development,
was lacking. The inadequacy of the economic conditions and the fragility of private
enterprises therefore justified the approach of most of the developing world for state
intervention in the economy in orderto regulate the market andto ensure sustainability in
the long run. The inability of private enterprises to satisfy the accumulation and
transformation of capital required in the "take-off or "big push" stage in the economic
development process has forced thestate to assume responsibility.28
26Strinati(1979),p.l94.
27Ibid., p.192; Sweezy (1968), p.349.
28See Rosenstein-Rodan (1984), 'Notes on the "Big Push'" in Meier, G. M. (1989). Leading Issues in
Economic Development, New York: Oxford University Press, p.281; Mason, E. S. (1958). Economic
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The continuum so far has focused on the three broad approaches to state development
either via the free market, central command, or the mixed economy. The discussion
points to the strong need in the developing countries, including in Malaysia, for a mixed
economy approach to achieve economic growth and development. Along with the
predisposition to adopt the mixed economy approach for development, other conceptions
or paradigms tend to be employed with the objective of enhancing the analysis of
developing countries. The focus on each of the concepts changes over time as a result
of the various debates in development studies which included debates about economic
growth, modernisation, andunderdevelopment anddependency.30
This is where we need to address the issue of uneven development, hi a narrow
perspective uneven development is seen as the 'unequal access to natural, social, political
and economic resources' in a spatial sense. However, in a broader perspective, uneven
development should be seen as a manifestation of the dynamic processes that produce
unevenness in the functioning of the complex interrelationships of economic, political,
and social conditions. The existence and persistence of uneven development is most
evident in a capitalist society because capitalism itself is an unevenly developing
system. It is not simply the variation in the types and quantities of socio-economic
Planning in Underdevelopment Areas: Government and Business, New York: Fordham University Press,
Chapter 2; Sweezy (1968), p.293.
29Seefh.l.
Other than those stated above there were also others such as increased welfare and human development,
dialectical transformation, capacityand development by people, sustainabledevelopment, developmentand
security, and development as history.
3iO'Connor (1989) cited inParnwell, M. J. G. (1996). Uneven Development in Thailand, London: Ashgate
Publishing House p.2; Dixon, C. and Drakakis-Smith, D. (1997), Uneven Development in Southeast Asia,
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.2.
32Duncan, S. and Goodwin, M. (1988). The Local State and Uneven Development: Behind the Local
Government Crisis, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.61.
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activity that differ from place to place to produce imbalances but also of the uneven
process of development that derives from the particular character of capitalism itself.
Smith (1986) explains that uneven development is the result of the 'continual struggle of
opposed tendencies towarddifferentiation and equalization'33 andboth are inherent in the
way capitalism works as an economic and social process. Differentiation occurs as a
consequence of the division of labour and the direction of investment where different
amounts of surplus can be produced for the same amount of labour. Simultaneously,
there are also pressures for equalization of the conditions of production and in the
development of productive forces. The state often assumes an important role in
intervening in the process of uneven developmentin the attempt to achieve a more 'even'
or 'balanced' result. However, at times, its intervention itself can create unevenness.
The issue of unevenness is also related to the concept of dependency34 in the structure of
the global system which acts to constrain developing countries. The concept first
appeared in development studies in LatinAmerica. It rejected liberal theories that argued
for the capacity of all countries, given time, to achieve development and for the interests
of the developedworld in assisting developing countries in such efforts.35 Instead Andre
Gunder Frank and others argued that it is precisely the 'underdevelopment' of the poor
countries that leads to the 'development' of the developed countries; in other words,
developed countries depend on the underdeveloped regions for their further
33Smith (1986), p.99 cited inParnwell (1996), p.3.
34While some scholars have considered this perspective asa theory, others like Cardoso, one ofits foremost
proponents, have resisted this interpretation, see Jomo, K. S. (1988). A Question of Class: Capital the
State, and Uneven Development in Malaya, Monthly Review Press/Journal of Contemporary Asia
Publishers, p.319.
35Frank, A. G. (1966). 'The Development ofUnderdevelopment' inMonthly Review, September, pp.17-31.
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development. A number of scholars including Amin (1976) and Cardoso and Faletto
(1979) subsequently refined the basic concept of dependency but the primary
propositions remain. Generally, the dependency paradigm isbased on four assumptions:37
first, the effects on the development of the economies and societies of the developing
world ('the periphery') have been the outcome of their being producers of raw materials
and consumers of industrial commodities produced in the developed world; second, the
economic and political power of the developed world ('the centre') has ensured that this
division of labour will always remain in place;38 third, the 'distortion' of the domestic
economies of developing countries is a consequence of their enforced incorporation into
the global economy, including foreign intervention in the periphery's economies in the
form of multinational corporations; and fourth, transmission of these economic effects
also produces reactions in the social and political domains of dependent countries. The
form of dependence that has influenced these transformations in the developing countries
has usually been analysed in the context of 'imperialism' or 'colonialism'. Dependency
presupposes that it is the structure of the global economy, primarily within the capitalist
system, that conditions the socio-economic development of the dependent countries.
The economic transformation of the developing world viewed in terms of concepts of
uneven development and dependency is still relevant today; the reliance of developing
countries on the developed world is obvious. Developed countries have the upper hand
in opting for more beneficial international economic agreements and policies. The call
See Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, NY: Monthly Review
Press.
37These assumptions are drawn from Clark and Lemco (1988), p.4.
More recently, the expressions 'the North' and 'the South' have been used to describe the developed and
developing countries respectively.
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from leaders of the developing countries for a more balanced distribution of benefits in
the world economy in an effort to minimise global uneven development and dependency
has so far achieved very mixed results. Economic liberalisation, which forces developing
countries to open their economies, has produced a massive inflow of foreign capital to
exploit the available economic opportunities. For the developing host country, it can
generate growth but it also usually increases uneven development and dependence on
external parties. It is left to the developing country to systematise and control the balance
of the outcome to meet national development objectives. The role of the state has become
ever more important in this process, as the World Bank in its 1997 report observes that
globalisation can be a threat to weak or capriciously governed states, and at the same time
it is also capable of fostering development and economic well-being.39 The ability of
developing countries to achieve development on a level playing field of globalisation
remains to be seen unless appropriate concessions are granted by developed countries.
I have outlined the concepts of 'the state', 'economic development', the triad of 'free
enterprise capitalism', 'the mixed economy' and 'socialism', as well as 'uneven
development' and 'dependency'. These concepts help us analyse the transformation of
what has come to be referred to as Malaysia in its movement from what I call a 'natural
economy' to one characterised as 'state capitalism'. Let me now introduce the Malaysian
case.
39World Bank (1997b), WorldDevelopment Report 1997, New York: Oxford University Press, p.ll.
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Map 1.1.1: Malaysia
1.1.1 The Malaysian Case
Certain territories which now comprise Malaysia (the former Malayan Peninsula, the
Straits Settlements of Penang (Pulau Pinang) and Malacca (Melaka), and the Northern
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak (see Map 1.1.1) have been players in the world
economy for a considerable period of time. The establishment of the Malacca Empire in
the 15t century and the importance ofMalacca as a trading port, dealing mainly in spices
and minerals can probably be seen to mark the beginning of Malaysia's active
involvement in global trade.40 Subsequent developments then strengthened this status
with the establishment of otherports, such as Singapore and Penang, within the Straits of
Malacca. British colonialism in the Malayan Peninsula advanced its economic connection
with the world market through the export of tin and rubber and the import of Western
industrial and consumer products. At independence in 1957, tin and rubber represented
40Jomo(1988),p.4.
16
85% of total export earnings41 in the Federation of Malaya.42 The vicissitudes of
commodity prices during both the colonial and particularly post-colonial periods had a
considerable impact on national income and conveyed a warning to the Malay(si)an
government of the need to diversify the economy and become less dependent on tin and
rubber. Much has been achieved since then, for much of the almost 50 years since
independence, Malaysia has been a moderately successful, middle-income, commodity-
producing, and net oil-exporting country. It has done this by addressing the problems
engendered in transforming a 'colonial economy' based on natural resource exploitation
into a post-colonial, diversified economy. Indeed, during the 1960s the heavy dependence
on rubber had begun to decline as diversification into tobacco, cocoa, and oil palm had
taken place. In the early 1970s state-supported industrialisation programmes, largely
based on foreign direct investment in the import-substituting manufacturing sector, began
to expand rapidly. At the same time export-oriented and labour intensive production of
textiles, garments and electronic products began to take shape. A change in emphasis
occurred in the 1980s when state-sponsored programmes in the automobile, cement, and
steel sectors saw the country's participation in heavy industries.
From the era when primary commodity export provided the main revenue to the
development of export-oriented industrialisation, one feature that has been persistently
present in the country's development is its dependence on the outside world in the form
41Dixon, C. (1991). Southeast Asia and the World Economy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.183.
42 The former British-administered Federated and Unfederated Malay States and the Straits Settlements of
Penang and Malacca were brought together at independence as the Federation of Malaya in 1957.
Subsequently the British Crown colonies of Sarawak and British North Borneo (Sabah) were incorporated
into a wider Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Singaporejoined briefly from 1963 to 1965 before becoming
an independent Republic.
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of capital, technology, and markets.43 During the colonial period and post-independence
1990s this dependence also includes foreign labour. While these important factors are
interrelated with each other in economic production it is the market, representing the end
of the production process, that is most crucial, without which the whole process would
not have been initiated in the first place. The country's population growth from 8.2
million in 1960, to 13.8 million in 1980, and 23.3 million in 200044 only provides a
relatively small market for mass consumption and the economic growth of industrial and
consumer products. The search for new product destinations in the global markets has
now become the main challenge for the country in order to expand its economic
development.
On the domestic front, economic development in independent Malaysia has been heavily
influenced by the colonial legacies of uneven development, dependence, economic
inequality, and social division. Most evident has been the ethnic division that developed
during the colonial period. The urban industrial sector and cash crop production was
excluded from the Malays until independence, who were concentrated mainly in food
production.45 At the same time sections of the Chinese and Indian migrant population
took advantage of the urban sector to advance their economic mobility by way of
commerce, education and the professions. The first 12 years of the post-independence
period saw these divisions widen.
43For a comprehensive economic history of Malaysia, see Drabble, J. H. (2000). An Economic History of
Malaysia, cl800-1990, Basingstroke: MacMillan Press Ltd.
44Figures for 1960 and 1980 from Ibid., Table 6.1, p.90; for 2000 the figures are from Department of
Statistics, Malaysia (2000). State/District Data Bank, Kuala Lumpur, p.l.
45Alatas, Syed Hussein (1977). The Myth of the Lazy Native, London: Frank Cass; LimTeckGhee, 'British
Colonial Administration and the "Ethnic Division of Labour" in Malaya' in Kajian Malaysia, 2, 2,
December, 1984.
Economic inequality, which had emerged from the early colonial period, was even more
obvious during the post-independence period. In the 1950s foreign interests dominated a
wide spectrum of the economy. European-owned companies controlled 60% of imports,
60% to 75% of exports, 60% of tin output, and 84% of large rubber estates covering areas
larger than 500 acres each.46 The Chinese largely controlled the majority of thebalance.
Independence saw the gradual reduction of the European stranglehold on the economy
and witnessed the transfer and dominance of the Chinese in the economy of Malaysia.
The combined effects of these social divisions and the economic disparities that caused
the Malays to be left far behind eventually reached their height in the late 1960s with the
May 13l , 1969 race riots. This incident paved the way for the New Economic Policy
(NEP) to be adopted that addressed ethnic imbalances and the elimination of ethnic
identification with economic function.47
The NEP, a 20-year programme until 1990, focussed its attention principally on the
Malays since they were the most affected in terms of low economic achievement and
poverty. The policy caused aggravation to the other ethnic groups that felt unfairly
treated, and it also attracted various critics. The largely Malay-dominated government,
however, felt that the policy, based on positive discrimination, would be able to reduce
the disparities among the ethnic groups and maintain political stability. The target was
set at reducing the incidence of poverty from 49% in 1970 to 16% of all households by
46Puthucheary, J. J. (1960). Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy, Singapore: Eastern
University Press, pp.xv, 26-7, 85-86.
47Malaysia (1976). Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, p.2.
48For example, see Mehmet, O. (1980), 'Managed Industrialization and Poverty Redressal Policies in
Malaysia', The South East Asian Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp.219-32; and Chandra Muzaffar
(1989). The NEP: Development and Alternative Consciousness, Penang: Aliran.
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1990. The scale of the income disparity in 1970 can be depicted as follows: the mean
monthly household income of Malays, Chinese, and Indians were RM172, RM394, and
RM304 respectively; 74% of Malay households were considered poor, followed by 17%
Chinese and 8% Indians; and 86% of the total poor households were located in the
Malay-dominated rural areas.
On the economic front, the bumiputera50 share of corporate equity was to be raised from
2.5% in 1970 to 30% at the end of the period. Various strategies were utilised to
accomplish the target objectives of the NEP which include the following: the use of
ethnic quotas for access to state assistance, civil service recruitment, tertiary education
and training, as well as business opportunities. In raising the incomes of the poor,
particularly in the rural areas, various public organisations, primarily orientated towards
land settlement and agricultural development, were established. Such public
organisations include, for example, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA),
the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), and the Rubber
Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA). On the business side, the
government's involvement saw the establishment of a range of agencies and enterprises,
at both the federal and state levels, primarily on behalfof the bumiputera.51 Examples of
some of the better known agencies are Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Heavy
Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional
49Extracted from Dixon (1991),p.182Table 5.8(b).
5C]Bumiputera literally means son of the soilor the indigenous community, whoare predominantly Malays.
^Proliferation of public enterprises in Malaysia wereas follows: 22 in 1960, 109in 1970, 656 in 1980,and
1014 in 1985, see Khoo Boo Teik (2001). 'The State and the Market in Malaysian Political Economy' in
Rodan et. al. (eds.). The Political Economy of South-East Asia, 2nd Edition, Melbourne: Oxford University
Press, p. 185.
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(PROTON), Petroleum Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), and the state economic
development corporations (SEDCs). Adecade and a halfafter the implementation of the
NEP the government felt that a reasonable number of Malay entrepreneurs and
technocrats with business experience had been produced and they were ready to transfer
some of these state assets 'held in trust' on behalf of the bumiputera to the private sector
under privatisation policies.52 In 1991 the National Development Plan (NDP) replaced
the NEP and gave more emphasis to economic growth rather than restructuring, but at the
same time the ethnic dimensions of the former policy continued. At the close of the
century the NDP had shown considerable achievement in combating poverty.53
However, on the equity side Malaysian ownership had declined but the foreign shares
witnessed a marked increase, enabling Malaysia to achieve further growth and accelerate
the recovery from the 1997 financial crisis affecting Asian countries more speedily.54
Malaysian government policies since independence have produced mixed outcomes. The
policies to correct economic imbalances were based upon a continuous expansion of the
economy with the goal that no one ethnic group lost out. Concerns for the negative
consequences of the policy, particularly towards Chinese enterprises, were not as serious
as first thought.55 Economic growth allowed the closing of disparities with the
distribution ofnewly created economic wealth, while the redistribution ofexisting wealth
was kept to the minimum. The combination of redistributive policies and economic
From 1986 to 1988 seventy-one public establishments underwent this programme. [Wong Tok Kin (1989)
cited in Dixon (1991), p. 189]
In 1999 the incidence ofpoverty had declined to 7.5%. [Malaysia (2001), p.50]
Both the bumiputera and mm-bumiputera ownership had reduced from 66.1% in 1990 to 59.4 percent in
2000; foreign ownership had increased markedly from 25.4% to 32.7% [Ibid., p.53]
55Eyre (1997), p.135; Share ofcorporate ownership by 'other Malaysian' had increased from 34.3% in 1970
to 46.2% in 1990. [Malaysia (1991a). The Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000, Kuala Lumpur:
Government Printers, p.49]
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growth created an expansion in themiddle class segment among all ethnic groups. While
theupper and themiddle class fared well in the process, economic imbalances still persist






Map 1.1.2 States in Malaysia
1.1.2 The Perak Case
While the discussion so far has concentrated on Malaysia as a country, it comprises 13
federated states, one of which is Perak (see Map 1.1.2). Covering an area of 21,006
square kilometres Perak is the second largest state in the Peninsula. It is located along
the country's western coast; bordering it in the north are Kedah and Thailand, on the
northwest is Penang, on the east are Kelantan and Pahang, on the south is Selangor, and
on the west is the Straits ofMalacca (see Map 1.3.1).
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Map 1.3.1 The State of Perak
In many historical writings different explanations are given for the possible origin of
'Perak'.56 The two most common versions relate specifically to the word perak, which in
the Malay language means 'silver'. It is said that the name either originated from a
silvery reflection resulting from the "glimmer offish in the water" or the silvery colour of
56For example, see Maxwell, W. E. (1884). 'The History ofPerak from Native Sources' inJournal ofthe
Straits Branch ofthe Royal Asiatic Society (JSBRAS), 14, 1884, pp.305-21; Wilkinson, R. J. (1924). Papers
on Malay Subjects: History Part II, Kuala Lumpur: Federated Malay States Government Press; Buyong




tin which could be found in the area at the time. The third and least common version
suggests that the name came from Tun Perak, aBendahara51 ofthe Malacca Sultanate.
The official political history of Perak begins with the installation of Sultan Muzaffar
Shah 1 as the first Sultan in 1528.58 He was the son of Sultan Mahmud Shah of Malacca.
Until today Perak remains the only Malaysian state that boasts a royal house descended
directly from the old ruling house ofMalacca. The possession ofrich tindeposits served
to put Perak under constant external threat from other competing powers. The Dutch,
Bugis, Achehnese and Siamese had all attempted to invade Perak during the 16* to 18*
centuries with the main objective of monopolising the tin trade. The first formal British
presence in the state originated from its intervention in 1826 to prevent Siam (now
Thailand) from annexing Perak.59
The state became more prominent in Malayan history with the discovery of large tin
deposits in Larut and Taiping in the 1840s which brought a large influx of Chinese
immigrants resulting in turn in the birth ofa multi-ethnic society. The exploitation of tin
also created an unstable social, economic and political environment - competition among
powerful territorial chiefs, power struggles among the successors of the Perak throne, and
clan and secret society rivalry among the Chinese tin-miners for control of the tin
51Bendahara is a senior position in ancient Malay government which approximates the position of prime
minister in modem times. Tun Perak was the most famous and had served several Sultans in the late 15
century.
58For brief historical surveys of the Perak Sultanate, see Khoo Kay Kim, 'Succession to the Perak
Sultanate' inJournal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMBRAS), 56(2), 1983, pp.7-29
and Khoo Kay Kim, 'ThePerak Sultanate: Ancient and Modern' inJMBRAS, 59(1), 1986, pp.1-26.
59Khoo Kay Kim (1972). The Western Malay States 1850-1873, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
pp.32-3; Mills, L. A. (1966). British Malaya 1824-67, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, pp.157-
163.
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deposits. This continuous instability gave the British a window of opportunity to
intervene for the second time in 1874. This significant event in Perak history with the
signing of the Pangkor Treaty saw the appointment of a British Resident to advise the
Sultan, and, in effect, control all administrative and political affairs in Perak, except for
those pertaining to Malay customs and religion.
In 1896 Perak became a member-state of the Federated Malay States (FMS) along with
Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang. Towards the second-half of the nineteenth
century the introduction of rubber cultivation helped expand further the commodity
exports of Perak. A second wave of immigration took place. However, this time a large
influx of Southern Indian immigrants were brought in as estate labourers. Perak's
population therefore became increasingly diverse, and its economy more closely
integrated into the world market. British colonial rule in Perak was interrupted in 1942
until 1945 when the whole country was under Japanese occupation. After the war British
colonial rule resumed and only ended on 31 August, 1957 when the Federation of Malaya
(including Perak) was granted independence and then the wider Federation of Malaysia
created in September 1963.
Although Malaysia is centrally governed and this provides the direction of national
development programmes via policies such as the NEP and NDP, the constituent states
are responsible for adhering to these general visions by implementing approaches that are
deemed appropriate at the local level.60 The aggregate rate of success achieved by
^Constitutionally, the central government is responsible for finance, education, health, external affairs,
defence, and civil and criminal law. The states control land, agriculture and forestry.
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Malaysia since independence has not been shared equally by all the states. Most
noticeable is the economic progress attained by the states on Malaysia's west coast as
compared to those on the east coast and in East Malaysia. Perak, one of the states on the
west coast, has benefited from such success. Similar to the Malaysian case, Perak built
its economy and prosperity on primary commodity exports from the colonial period until
the 1980s when tin lost its pre-eminence in the world market. Since then the patterns of
economic activity in the state began to change considerably. Manufacturing and the
service industries have replaced tin mining as the primary economic activity; in the
agricultural sector oil palm has replaced rubber; and timber production as an export item
has levelled in the 1990s at about a million cubic metres annually.61 From a total
contribution of46.1% towards Perak's GDP in the 1970s the importance of these primary
industries gradually declined to 22.4% in 1996.62 The manufacturing sector has seen the
inflow of foreign direct investment into Perak with the establishment of industrial units in
various parts of the state, with early concentrations in Kinta and Taiping districts. The
development later expanded to Manjung and Kerian as well as Batang Padang districts,
mainly in those areas bordering the state of Selangor. The intensification of this sector
also saw a boom in the construction industry in these districts. These secondary activities
had almost doubled their GDP contribution from 18.6% to 33.1% during the same period.
Tertiary economic activities, including those relating to tourism and its related activities
too had seen a marked increase from 35.3% to 44.5%. These historical data clearly
demonstrate the shift in development emphasis in Perak from raw-commodity
dependence to manufacturing and services.




As with other states and countries the economy of Perak is also sensitive to, and has been
influenced by, global market conditions. The Asian financial crisis had serious
consequences for Malaysia and the region, and so did market liberalisation in such
neighbouring countries as China and Vietnam offering better comparative advantage in
terms of labour and costs. The last few years have seen some of the multinational
compames in Malaysia either relocating their operation to these new markets or
rationalising their operations due to decreasing demand, rising production costs or severe
global competition. The stage of economic development characterised as labour-rich and
capital-scarce, based on low-cost and labour-intensive production, is over. The shift in
the development emphasis in Perak, however, has not lessened its dependence on global
markets, despite relieving it of the enormous economic pressures imposed by global price
fluctuations in a limited number ofprimary commodities.
This shift in emphasis has also occasioned the need for socio-economic policy
adjustments. The initiatives taken by Perak to combat poverty as part of the national and
state programmes since independence have achieved considerable results with a
substantial reduction in poverty incidence from 43.0% in 1976, to 19.9% in 1987, and to
4.5% in 1997.63 Distribution of poverty in the 9 districts of Perak was not even. For
example in 1987, Kerian, Kinta, and Larut Matang topped the list with 23%, 16.4% and
"Figure for 1976 from EPU, Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985, Ipoh, p.5; 1987 figure from
EPU, Perak (1993). Bank Data Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan (Perangkaan Asas), Mac, Ipoh, p.lll; and
1997 figure from EPU, Perak (1999a). Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998,
Ipoh.p.38.
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13.4% respectively while at the bottom end were Hilir Perak (7.7%), Manjung (5.4%)
andBatang Padang (3.1%).64
To move forward in economic development, Perak had to make various adjustments to
balance both its economic achievements as well as wealth distribution in its multi-ethnic
society, particularly since the inception of the NEP. The shifts in economic activities
have also required the labour force to adapt accordingly and this has led to changes in the
employment pattern in the state. There has also been some spatial redistribution of
economic activities because of the imbalances between the economic sectors and between
districts. In the case of Perak its success, if one were to compare the economic situation
in 1970 with the situation towards the end of the century, has largely overshadowed its
other economic setbacks. However, it is only when compared to some of the other
Peninsular Malaysian states such as Selangor, Penang, and Johor that one begins to
realise that more could have been done in developing Perak, particularly in attracting
foreign investment.
1.2 The study
This study focuses on the transformation of Perak's economy from a pre-capitalist or
'natural' one to a modern post-colonial capitalist system. Perak saw the first formal
external intervention of a European power and the subsequent imposition of a British
colonial administration which was later extended to cover the whole of Malaya (later
Malaysia). The history of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Malay(si)a has
4EPU, Perak (1991a). Taklimat Pembangunan Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, September, Ipoh, p.24.
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witnessed the increasing involvement of the state in economic affairs. Through the
production and export of much sought-after commodities, particularly tin and rubber,
Perak was increasingly incorporated into the world economy. The pre-capitalist system
of production was slowly undermined and replaced by the capitalist system of
production. Nonetheless, Perak progressed at a much faster pace than any other territory
in the country. Post-colonial national economic progress has seen different economic
approaches undertaken in Malaysia, from the market-led approach in the 1950s and
1960s to a mixed market/regulatory policy from the 1970s, and then to a state-centred
strategy increasingly from the 1980s, including economic diversification and
industrialisation. During the period of independence other Malaysian states have
managed to challenge Perak's dominance. Perak's economic position has declined due to
several factors including the adoption of policies of industrialisation and modernisation
which have favoured other states, particularly Selangor andPenang, the move away from
a resource-based economy, and the responses to changes in the world economy. The
changes in these patterns of economic activities require examination and explanation in
order to understand the relations between state intervention and the economy in Perak in
the context ofchanges in the global economy.
Second, despite the importance of Perak's contribution to Malay(si)a's economic
progress very little recent advanced research has been undertaken on this subject.
Furthermore, the state, in the sense of the national government, as a pivotal institution
influencing the process of development, needs more detailed examination. Migdal points
out that the 'danger in taking the state for granted is that we begin to assume states in all
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times and places have had a similar potential or ability to achieve their leader's
intentions'. 5 These available studies to date either concentrate on Malaysia andconsider
Perak as a constituent part of the wider nation, or are state-specific but usually in a very
narrowly focused discipline, mainly concentrating on the colonial era. Examples of the
former can be found in most of the publications on the economic history of Malay(si)a,
including those by Andaya, Bastin and Winks, Dun J. Li and Gullick,66 while examples
of the latter are those of Wong Lin Ken, Lim Teck Ghee and Lee Kam Hing among
others. As no detailed and recent contemporary research has been carried out on the
economic development of Perak, this study attempts to integrate historical studies with
recent data in order to present an analysis of economic transformation in Perak from the
colonial period to the end of the 20th century. It also reflects the desire to broaden the
relevance and importance of state involvement in economic development processes, and
to use this perspective to understand the economic history of Perak, embracing both the
colonial and post-colonial period.
This comprehensive study therefore traces the economic development path undertaken by
Perak from the pre-colonial era, through the colonial period to the present. The changing
mode of production, where the accumulation of capital increasingly took centre stage,
had other structural implications for the society at large. These changes, which were the
65Migdal(1988),p.l7.
66See Andaya, B. W. & Andaya, L. Y. (1982). A History of Malaysia, London: McMillan; Bastin, B. &
Winks, R. W. (comp.), (1966). Malaysia: Selected Historical Readings, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press; Dun J. Li (1955). British Malaya, New York: The American Press; and Gullick, J. M. (1963).
Malaya, London: Ernest Benn Limited.
67See Wong LinKen(1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, Tuscon: TheUniversity of Arizona Press;
Lim Teck Ghee (1976). Origins of a Colonial Economy: Land and Agriculture in Perak 1874-1897,
Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia; and Lee Kam Hing (1978), 'A Socio-Economic History of
Perak 1920-1939', in Lee Poh Ping & Lee Kam Hing (1978). Some Socio-economic Aspects of Perak
Society, Malaysia, No.6, Joint Research Project, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan.
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consequence of Western European capitalist expansion, were made possible by the
establishment of a global market and also through different forms of colonial
intervention.68
Chinese entrepreneurs, who were the earlymajor capital investors in the colonial period
in Perak and otherMalay States, and who were already engaged in production primarily
in the tin mining sector from the mid-19th century, saw their dominance overtaken by
British entrepreneurs both in the mining and later in the plantation sector. In the post-
colonial period British capital investments in Perak began to decline and once again fell
progressively in the hands of the Chinese. Wealth redistribution initiatives were then
undertaken by the post-colonial Malaysian state from 1970 to achieve an economic
balance among the different ethnic groups. At the same time these initiatives encouraged
foreign direct investment in Malaysia, including Perak, which saw changes in the
structure of capital investment. For example, quotas were imposed for access to state
assistance and business opportunities, and incentive schemes such as tax holidays were
introduced for the foreign investors. In the 1980s Perak began to participate in the
expansion of the Malaysian economy as a profit-seeking capital investor through the
establishment of public enterprises. This is in contrast to the earlier notion that state-
managed industries were organised not for direct profit but in order to correct ethnic-
related economic imbalances.
68Roxborough, I. (1979). Theories ofUnderdevelopment, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press,
p.42; Wallerstein, I. (1983). HistoricalCapitalism, London: Verso Editions, p.56.
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However, the investment of capital to organise production for the market obviously
requires labour to be made available. Throughout the various historical periods under
consideration the rise and decline of commodity sectors have forced labour to become
more mobile and responsive to change. These transformations, which were driven by the
needs and demands of the market, have led to changes in the ethnic distribution of the
labourforce in Malaysia. Themovement of members of a particular ethnic group into the
sectors dominated by other groups has increased since the mid-1970s. Most notable is
the gradual shift in bumiputera participation into the manufacturing and commercial
sectors. In 1980, 7.9% of the total bumiputera workforce was involved in the
manufacturing sector, which was dominated by the Chinese; in the commercial sector it
was 5.8%. In 1995 these figures rose significantly to 19.5% and 12.3% respectively.69
These changing trends of labour force distribution will also be examined.
As a multi-ethnic state, mainly as a consequence of the immigration of Chinese and
Indian labourers to meet the shortages in the tin and rubber industries in the late 19th and
early 20l centuries, Malaysia has experienced changes in patterns of employment after
the decline in these industries. It was also the existence of a multi-ethnic society which
forced the state to compromise in the sharing of political power among the different
ethnic groups at independence and demanded balanced socio-economic adjustments to
maintain political stability.
The long-term economic transformation of Perak will be examined by analysing several
inter-related issues; first, the change in the role of the state in its relationship to the
69EPU, Perak (1986a), p.25; EPU, Perak (1998), p.61.
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economy; second, the change in the societal structures and trends in selected sectors of
the economy as a result of the change in the roles and policies of the state; and lastly, the
extent to which and the ways in which the state has re-orientated and re-organised the
economy after the demise of tin and the decline in the rubber industry. Most, if not all, of
the economic changes that have taken place were both the cause and effect of the
different roles played by the state during these different periods and the policies and
strategies adopted. The basic framework of this study therefore does not rely strictly on a
specific concept of development but rather a combination of concepts focussing on
economic growth, development, dependency and uneven development, and the role of the
state in the transformation process. In a broad sense, this study provides a detailed social
and economic history of Perak concentrating on key factors of economic production i.e.
capital, labour and land, in contrast to an abstract ideal-type study which examines
general processes of economic transformation. Specific questions to be addressed
include the following: How has Perak addressed its colonial legacy in relation to the
emphasis on primary commodity exploitation and export? Has Perak made sufficient
adjustments in the use of capital, labour and land in facing the challenges of the changing
national and global economic environment, given the different levels of state intervention
in the Malaysian economy? Has the structure of the post-independence state of Perak
succeeded in achieving the objectives laid out at both the local and federal levels and at
the same time lessened the disparity ofuneven development and economic dependence?
hi carrying out the study, two interrelated approaches have been deployed in tracing the
economic transformation of Perak. The first approach, in two parts, comprised the
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collection of relevant primary and other data from various sources, and secondly, a
historical description and analysis of all three periods under consideration. With regard
to Perak, the availability of limited pre-colonial statistical data was the most conspicuous
difficulty but the presence of adequate non-statistical data helped alleviate the problems.
This period is important as it provides a backgroundand a startingpoint for assessing the
nature and direction of subsequent changes. Data for the colonial and post-independence
periods were more abundant. However, these were not without limitations. While a
reasonable amount of data was available for the colonial period in Perak, the availability
of post-independence data was made difficult because of the gradual steps taken by the
federal authorities to publish statistical data on a national rather than local basis. In
certain instances the breakdown of statistical data by state is unavailable. While some of
these data were obtained from library collections and archives in both Malaysia and
Britain, others were obtained from reports and publications of various government
agencies at both local and federal levels.
Interviews were also carried out with selected individuals who were directly involved in
recent economic development activities in Perak. These include current and past state
officers and leading personalities both from the private and public sectors. Attempts to
interview the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Perak however proved futile due to his
busy schedule. As the interviewees were from diverse backgrounds and the study focused
on broad state development issues, the interviews were carried out as free-flow dialogues
rather than rigid question-and-answer sessions. However, to keep within the intended
objectives, these interviews were carried out within a broadly predetermined framework.
34
The limitation of these interviews was that they could only provide complementary
information on the post-independence period, particularly from the 1980s onwards, and
not earlier.
The organisation of the thesis is divided into nine chapters including both the
introduction and the conclusions. The remaining seven chapters cover the three periods
under study; Chapter 2 focuses on the pre-colonial period, providing background to the
colonial encounter, while three chapters each consider economic development in the
colonial and post-independence periods. For obvious reasons the bulk of the material
covers the latter two periods with emphasis given to changing patterns and processes in
the use of land, labour and capital.
The significant changes that took place during the colonial period are presented in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 3 examines the wider economic transformations brought
about under British colonialism while Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate respectively on the
strategic roleof rice and thentheexploitation of tin andrubber in the expanding capitalist
economy. Chapter 6 discusses the role of the post-independence state in economic
development in Perak up to 1980. The impact on Perak's economy as the result of the
decline in tin mining and rubber cultivation is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8
considers the changing role of the state from 1981 to 2000 in reorganising Perak's
economy. Chapter 9 assesses the changing role of the state in economic transformation
in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Perak, by focussing on key historical factors
and processes. It also suggests possible future lines of enquiry.
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC PRODUCTION IN PRE-COLONIAL PERAK (BEFORE 1874)
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines socio-political organisation and economic development in pre-
colonial Perak.1 It is also necessary to analyse those factors and events that influenced
the development of the economy and to focus on social and political structures, peasants
and the 'natural' economy, trade, rice and tin, and also the role of the state in economic
production. The political economy of pre-colonial Perak needs to be understood before
considering the transformations that took place beyond this period.
A few preliminary remarks, however, need to be made. First, within a span of three-and-
a-half centuries, since the official establishment of the state in 1528 to British
intervention in 1874, the economy of Perak underwent various developmental stages.
Major growth was only visible towards the end of the 18th century and more so in the 19*
century. Second, the slow growth was attributed to the nature of the traditional economy
and the social and political structures of that era. Third, the availability of tin and its
production was the main reason for the accelerated growth in the later part of the pre-
colonial period. Fourth, the pre-colonial economy itself, particularly during much of the
early part of the period, did not encourage the need for surplus production among the
masses, as there was no need to do so. Despite the prevalent economic structure pre-
'Pre-colonial Perak in this study refers to the period from 1528 to 1874 i.e. from the year the state was
founded through to the year of the Pangkor Treaty, the start ofBritish colonialism in Perak.
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colonial Perak was still linked to the outside world. The dealings were mainly with the
West, particularly through tin exports. It was, however, not a dynamic link.
This analysis will be brief, as the intention is to set the stage for further discussion on
transformations during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Within the limitations of
this study, it is not feasible to scrutinise every aspect of Perak's pre-colonial political
economy and only certain elements relevant to the general argument of the thesis willbe
presented, mainly with reference to the changes brought about as the result of foreign
intervention in the economy and the introduction of outside labour and technology. It is
also not intended to reinterpret historybut to provide an introductory discussionbased on
the available literature.
2.2 Social and political structures
The social andpolitical structures of pre-colonial Perak had beenmuchinfluenced by the
traditions and practices of both Malacca and Acheh. The former was due to the fact that
the first ruler of Perak in 1528, Sultan Muzaffar Syah, was the eldest son of Sultan
Mahmud Syah, the last ruler of Malacca. Acheh, on the other hand, controlled Perak in
the late sixteenth century.2 At its apex was the hereditary ruler, the Sultan, who
2Various articles have been written on the genealogy of the Perak royal line based on the historical
manuscripts 'Silsilah Raja-Raja Perak T. Among others, see Maxwell, W. E., 'Notes on Two Perak
Manuscripts' in JSBRAS, 2, 1871, pp.181-191; Maxwell, W. E., 'The History of Perak from Native
Sources' in JSBRAS, 14, 1884, pp.305-21; Winstedt, R. O., 'The Early Rulers of Perak, Pahang, and
Acheh' in JMBRAS, 10(1), 1932, pp.32-44; and Ceridwen, A., 'The Silsilah Raja-Raja Perak T. An
Historical and Literary Investigation into the Political Significance of a Malay Court Genealogy' in
JMBRAS, 74(2), No. 281, 2001, pp.23-34.
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symbolised the unity of the state andhad the duty to preserve it.3 His supreme power on
all matters was legitimised by custom and religion. The Sultan made all the major
appointments and he alone had the powers of life and death within the state. The person
ofa Sultan was sacred and his sacredness was expressed and embodied in his regalia. He
was entitled to the greatest respect and all his public appearances were surrounded by
ritual and ceremony.
The tradition of hierarchical positions in the Perak Sultanate,4 which is believed to be
influenced by Hindu prerogatives, was based on the symbolic importance of divisions
into four. As such, the main office bearers of the state were organised in multiples of
four. Beneath the Sultanwas the RajaMuda being first in line to the throne.5 Then came
the first four chiefs (orang besar-besar) of the first rank, eight of the second, sixteen of
the third, and thirty-two of the fourth. Although the number of chiefly offices seemed
large, in reality, power was located in the first two ranks, and among all the ranks a
definite social gradation existed. There was variation in functions, which include being
attached to the istana (palace) that required them to perform ceremonial duties and act as
advisers to the Sultan, or being appointed as territorial (jajahan) chiefs responsible for
3For a detailed discussion, see Gullick, J. M. (1958). Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya,
London: Athlone Press, University of London.
4See Winstedt, R. O. (1961). The Malays - A Cultural History, London: Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd.,
Chapter 4; Gullick (1958), pp.89-91; Dartford, G. P. (1958). A Short History ofMalaya, London: Longman,
p.78; Wilkinson, R. J. (1924). Papers on Malay Subjects: History Part II, Kuala Lumpur: FMS
Government Press, p. 66; also Abd Halil Abd Mutalib, lAspek-Aspek Sosial dan Ekonomi Masyarakat
Negeri Perak Pada Pertengahan Abad ke-19' in Jernal Sejarah, Kuala Lumpur: University ofMalaya, Vol.
10, 1971/72, pp.64-68.
5Since the 1820s the succession to thePerak Sultanate hasbeenbased on rotation among members of three
royal families, all whom were children of Sultan Ahmaddin, see Khoo Kay Kim, 'Succession to the Perak
Sultanate' in JMBRAS, 56(2), 1983, p.ll; Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Perak Sultanate: ancient and modern' in
JMBRAS, 59(1), 1986, p.l 1; Khoo Kay Kim (1972). The Western Malay States 1850-1873, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, p.30.
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local level administration.6 Those below the second rank were minor chiefs whose titles
and functions were less clearly defined. Among the first four chiefs of the first rank, the
most senior was the Raja Bendahara who stood second in line to the throne. The Raja
Bendahara was the only chiefly office held by the royal family; this position was
established during the second half of the 18th century and was introduced by Sultan
Iskandar. Prior to this shift of power, individuals from an aristocratic family held the
position of Bendahara.
In the Malay States including Perak, the functions of the Sultan did not carry many
administrative responsibilities.7 This was probably due to the geography of the state and
the difficulties in communication, especially in the inaccessible and remote hinterland
regions. Apart from external or foreign-related matters and defence, which were in the
hands of the Sultan, the state administration was largely in the hands of the appointed
chiefs (orang besar-besar) who were themselves district chiefs controlling different parts
of the Perak River and its tributaries.
The delegation of authority to the district chiefs was given in the form of kuasa, which
allowed the recipient special powers and privileges to act on behalf of the Sultan. With
the authority given, the district chief became a master in his own district (jajahan). Most
significant was the authority to collect taxes on products entering and leaving his domain.
The revenue came from tolls charged on trade goods passing along the river in both
directions, taxes on crops, and also from fines collected from sentences passed in cases
6Khoo KayKim(1972), p.15.
7Gullick (1958), p.54; Kennedy, J. (1967). A History of Malaya AD1400-1959, New York: St. Martin's
Press, p. 125.
39
tried. The revenue earned by the district was regarded as the personal income of the
chief. In return for the appointment, the chiefwas required or upon demand by the Sultan
to send a lump sum gift or a share of the district revenues. In Perak, it was made known
that the Sultan was entitled to $6 per bahara8 on all tin exported from any district. The
Sultan, on the other hand, also received revenues in the same manner as a chief from his
own district. Theoretically this system gave the Sultan greater command over and access
to revenues than any of the district chiefs.
Wealth was seen as the basis of power which in turn became a means to attract
supporters. More supporters meant that more income could be generated for the chief,
especially in terms of taxes.9 The chiefon the other hand had large expenses in running
his household. Of utmost importance were the expenses needed for the upkeep of his
private army of retainers for the maintenance of law and order within the district.
Perak Malay society, as in other Malay States, was stratified into two broad socio
economic categories, comprising nobles or the ruling class and the subjects or rakyat
(commoners), though there were status gradations within these. The distinction between
these two categories was clearly marked: intermarriage was discouraged and only in
exceptional cases could a subject rise to a noble position. The nobles themselves were
further divided according to hierarchy from the Sultan downwards. At every level the
nobles had particular privileges and exemptions. In most cases the organisation and
Gullick (1958), p. 97 in the despatch from the Governor of SS to Secretary of State for the Colonies dated
26 April 1875. The currency used was the Straits dollar.
1 bahara = 400 lb.
9Abd HalilAbdMutalib (1971/72), p.65.
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precedence of nobility were based on the principle of birth and family descent. Those
who were ranked highly were related to the Sultan and they could claim their right to
various chieftainships. At the lower end of this class were those who had been absorbed
into the noble class and not born into it. These were generally the wealthy traders and
superior warriors of Acehnese, Javanese, Arab and Bugis descent.
At the other end of the social stratification category was the rakyat, which formed the
base of the political and social structure of the state. It comprised ordinary kampung
(village) people, whose economy was primarily dependent on subsistence agriculture,
cultivating rice, fruits and vegetables. Fishing and hunting activities were also carried
out to further supplement the diet. However, daily activities were also subject to village
authority especially to that of the penghulu (village headman) and the needs of the district
chief. Perak as one of the larger Malay States had kampung scattered widely throughout
the state, and in most cases the rakyat might not even have had the chance to see the
Sultan.
In the pre-colonial period two institutions greatly affected the life of the rakyat; these
were kerah (corvee labour) and slavery.10 These two institutions were the vehicles used
by the district chiefs to ensure that, apart from those who were volunteers, they would
have sufficient human resources to carry out works either for the community as a whole
or for their own personal benefit. The tradition of kerah was a system whereby the chief
I0For detailed discussion, seeAminuddin bin Baki, "The Institution of Debt-Slavery in Perak' in Journal of
the Malaysian Historical Society, Vol. 26, 1983, p.22-29; Winstedt (1961), p.52-56; Gullick (1958), p.98-
105.
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could call for compulsory labour from those rakyat in his district.11 This forced labour
might include a contribution to working in the fields, collecting forest products, building
and manning stockades, cleaning the river or even for the construction of the village
mosque.12 These labourers, mobilised by the penghulu, might be called upon for duties at
any time and for any length of time. While performing the kerah, workers would not be
paid wages except that, under normal circumstances, food was provided. The kerah
system, which also ensured the maintenance of the ruling class, was often onerous and
demanding as there were times when the call and duration for duty interfered with the
individual work routines of the rakyat.
The other institution was that of slavery.13 Although slavery existed during the pre-
colonial period the practice was not widespread to warrant it being designated as a third
category of status within the social stratification system.14 Slaves were divided into two
categories: debtor-bondsmen and ordinary slaves.15 The status of debtor-bondsmen was
higher in that they were ranked as freemen and acknowledged as members of the society
of their masters. Despite having to do the same duties as the debt-bondsmen, the ordinary
A detailed description of this system can be found in Maxwell, W. E., 'The Law and Customs of the
Malays withreference to theTenure of Land' inJSBRAS, 13, 1884a, pp.108-111.
I2Swettenham, F. A. (1929). British Malaya, London: Allen &Unwin, pp.142-3.
Extensive documents pertaining to slavery and its abolition in Perak can be found in Straits Settlements
(1882a). Correspondence Respecting Slavery in the Protected Malay States, London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, July; Straits Settlements (1882b). Further Correspondence Respecting Slavery in the
Protected Malay States, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, November; and Straits Settlements
(1884). Correspondence Respecting the Protected Malay States, Including Papers Relating to Abolition of
Slavery inPerak, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, August.
In 1879 there were 1,670 slaves and 1,380 debt-bondsmen in the state, giving a total of 3,050. This
represents about 6% of the total Malay population, see Straits Settlements (1882a), Enclosure 1 in No 8
p.19.
For a detailed description of these two categories, see 'Minute on Slavery Among theMalays in the State
ofPerak' in Straits Settlements (1882b), Enclosure 2 in No. 4, pp.16-21; see also Philip Loh, 'TheBritish
Approach to Slavery in the Straits Settlements and the Malay States 1819 to 1910' in Journal of the
Historical Society, KualaLumpur: University ofMalaya, Vol. Ill, 1964/65, p.5.
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slaves had no prospect of status redemption; only by an act of grace from their master
could they be redeemed. As Islam does not allow enslavement of a Muslim by another
Muslim, the ordinary slaves were therefore those of non-Muslim descent and were
Africans, Bataks and aborigines.16 They were either war captives, 'infidels' who were
captured by force, and in the case of Africans, they were purchased at Mecca by Malays
11
who went there for pilgrimage, or others who were found guilty of grave crimes. The
debt-bondsmen in theory were supposed to be able to redeem themselves by paying off
their debt. In practice, however, very rarely did this happen due to either inability to
repaythe debt or to the fact that the debt-bondsmen themselves preferred to stay, as their
basic living needs were provided by their masters.
The main reason for debt-bondage was the need of a member of the rakyat for money
who consequently approached the chief for a loan. A grace period was normally given
for failure to make scheduled repayments. Repeated failures to repay compelled the
borrower to become the chiefs debt-bondsmen.18 Once declared as a debt-bondsman the
debtor had to carry out all orders given to him until the debt was repaid. If the borrower
was married, his whole family also acquired the status of debt-bondspeople and were
taken into the chiefs household. All work carried out by them either in the house, field
or in any other place as instructed was never set against the sum owed. Any money given
to the debt-bondsmen during his stay at the chiefs house was added to the debt. It was,
therefore, quite impossible for a debt-bondsmen to repay his loan in this circumstance.
I6Ibid., p.19. It is envisaged that the Africans andBataks werefew as compared to the aborigines.
l7Aminuddin (1983), p.22.
18Straits Settlements, (1882a), Enclosure7 inNo. 2, p.10; Maxwell, W. E., 'Laws relating to slavery among
Malays, with extracts from Perak Code and MalayanLawsof Johore' in JSBRAS, No.22, 1890,p.254.
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At the other extreme were those single individuals who deliberately wanted to become
debt-bondsmen. These individuals were looking for reasonably good treatment from their
masters, a place to live, protection, and also possible access to women in marriage.
The existence of kerah and slavery, however, provided an ideal means for the chief to
secure the supply of labour to be used in any way he deemed appropriate. In an era when
there were only two distinct levels in the social stratification system, having a large
number of followers only increased the chiefs prestige and status.19 Therefore, it was
important that appropriate treatment be given to the rakyat including those involved
under the kerah or to those tied to slavery. Although in the extreme, excessive
oppression, cruelty, or injustice did take place, this only worked against the chiefs own
interest.
Such then, in brief, were the social and political conditions in pre-colonial Perak. The
Sultan enjoyed the highest position and dignity, but did not posses total power over his
subjects and territory; with the vast size of the state, power was spread between the
district chiefs. It was in the district chiefs' interests to see that their population increased
or at the very least was maintained as they provided the source of income and the basis of
local power. The kerah and slavery, particularly debt-bondage, by and large placed the
rakyat in a dependent condition and, despite the fact that the practice of debt-bondage
was not appropriate to the teachings of Islam, no corrective measures were taken because
those in authority were the very same people who benefited most from the system.
^Straits Settlements (1882b), Enclosure 2 inNo. 4, p.17.
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2.3 Peasants and the 'natural economy'
The size of the population of the state during the 'pre-colonial' period is difficult to
establish because it is based on sporadic information available to Strait Settlements
officials, as well as from the notes and writings of occasional travellers. One of the
early records by Tome Pires, a Portuguese who lived in Malacca, described Perak in the
early 16l century as being a small main settlement with a Malaypopulation estimated to
0 1be about 200 people. Being a vassal territory of Malacca then, Perak paid yearly tribute
in the form of tin. A hundred years later the population had grown to about 5,000
people;22 in 1835/36 the population was estimated to be 35,000 people;23 and in 1870,
prior to the British intervention in 1874, it was said to be roughly 70,000, including about
40,000 Chinese in Larut.24 The local Malay population of the state was mainly
concentrated along the Perak River and its tributaries as it provided them with the main
means of communication 'especially as they [the Malays] were by nature essentially a
sea-going and boating people'. Apart from the local Malays the rest were immigrants
from Sumatra, the majority of whom were Minangkabaus. There were also Bugis from
the Celebes (Sulawesi). Towards the end of the 18th century, the Chinese began to
20Sadka, E. (1968). The Protected Malay States 1874-1895, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press,
p.3.
21Cortesao, A. (1944). The Suma Oriental ofTome Pires, London: HakluytSociety, Vol II, p.261; Andaya
& Andaya (1982), p.60.
22Andaya & Andaya (1982), p.60.
23Ooi Jin-Bee (1963). Land, People andEconomy inMalaya, London: Longmans, p.106.
24Gullick, J. M. (1987). Malay Society in the late 19' Century: The Beginning of Change, Singapore:
Oxford University Press, p.367.
25McNair, J. F. (1972). Perak and the Malays: Sarong and Keris, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
p.16.
26Kennedy (1967), p.124; Bastin & Winks (1966), p.91.
Minangkabau was a kingdom in the Padang Highlands of Sumatra noted for its matrilineal social system.
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establish a presence in Perak, mainly for tin prospecting.27 This population eventually
became verymuch larger from the 1820s dueto the development of tin mining.
The Malay peasant economic structure during the pre-colonial period was largely
subsistence-oriented or a 'natural' economy.28 Ecosystems were of two broad types:
hunting and collecting, and crop cultivation and animal husbandry.29 hi both forms the
primary objective of production was to meet the needs and requirements of one's family.
The first type also comprised units, which were both directed towards production and
consumption. In the second type of ecosystem thepeasants' principal activity comprised
rice growing - either wet rice, cultivated in flooded fields or dry rice under shifting
cultivation.30 Apart from rice growing, the peasants fished the rivers, reared livestock
such as buffalos, chickens and goats, cultivated fruits and vegetables, and collected forest
products. Although rice cultivation was the principal occupation of the peasantry there
were also those who were involved intermittently in tin mining activities. For centuries
Peninsular Malaya (including Perak) had produced tin and gold. Tin mining was
important since it helped the state to pay for imported goods and supported the political
system. Nonetheless, despite the importance of mining, it was marginal to the main
27Wong Lin Ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press,
pp. 17-8.
28The contention here is that 'natural' economy refers to an economic system wheremoneywasnot used in
the transfer of resources. Jomo, however, argued that the assertion of 'natural' economy in Malaya could
only be accepted if accompanied with a time frame i.e. prior tothe establishment ofthe Malacca Sultanate,
see Jomo (1988), p.29, en54.
29Syed Husin Ali (1981/ The Malays: Their Problems and Future, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, p.76;
Abd Halil (1971/72), p.66.
30Discussion of rice agriculture will be dealt with in Section 2.5.
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subsistence agricultural activity, which took precedence, and which did not provide a
sufficient labour force for increased and sustained production of tin.31
The Malay communities during the pre-colonial period were not completely self-
sufficient. They needed specialised non-food products such as weapons, cloth, woven
mats, nets and traps for fishing. In a visit to Perak in 1826, James Low wrote that 'the
goods most in request are blue cloth of cotton, Acheen [Achehnese] dresses, opium,
tobacco, salt, salt-fish, gambier and minor articles'. These products were imported and
it was in fulfilling these needs that the Malays became involved in a limited way in the
exchange economy in which they had to produce surplus commodities. The involvement
gradually increased towards the colonial period.
Labour was provided by the production unit comprising either a nuclear family or, if the
need arose, an extended family. For most of the early pre-colonial period production was
devoted to meeting immediate needs; there was no effort to produce surplus since the
environment did not demand exchange and there was also an absence of exchange
channels. This gradually changed, particularly during the early 19th century when tin
mining, agricultural production, and trade were more developed and the need for surplus
production became persistent beyond the peasants' immediate subsistence. Surplus
production also attracted the same amount of exaction by the chief or ruler to the amount
3ILim Teck Ghee (1977). Peasants andtheir Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941, Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.4.
32Gullick (1958), p.20; Drabble (2000), p.12.
33Cited in Gullick (1987), p.124.
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of a tenth in agricultural produce34 and $6 per bahara for tin exported.35 The balance of
these surpluses was bartered or traded. The exchange that occurred was on a small scale,
not centralised and was generally between neighbouring villages.
Perak was one of the larger Malay States but had low population prior to British
intervention. The low density and scattered population coupled with the importance of
nuclear family labour accounted for the low level of productivity. Indigenous people
during most of the early part of the pre-colonial period evaluated wage labour for others
as of low social status and equivalent to servitude. The numerous incidences of civil
war and the demands made by the chiefs for labour and goods further discouraged the
peasants from farming on a larger scale.37 The existence of the kerah system and the
shifting cultivation practised by a section of the population were appropriate forms of
production at that time.
In the pre-colonial period the Sultan held sovereignty of the land.38 However, in 19th
century Perak, the state became increasingly decentralised; it was divided and ruled by
powerful territorial chiefs. Although the knowledge of past indigenous customs on the
land system is very limited since the Malays generally did not document their customary
laws39, peasants usually held only occupation and rights of use to land.40 These rights






38For the practices of the Malays towards landdealings during the pre-colonial period, see Maxwell, W. E.,
'The Law and Customs of the Malays with reference to the Tenure of Land' mJSBRAS, 13, 1884a, pp.75-
220.
39Wilkinson, R. J. (1908). 'Malay Law' in Papers on Malay Subjects: Law, Part 1, Kuala Lumpur: FMS
Government Printers, p. 1.
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gave them reasonable security of tenure but the ruler, or in certain cases the territorial
chief, could revoke these rights if he so wished. The abundance of land and the small
population provided ample opportunity for any peasant to undertake farming as long as
they were Muslims; securing more land was just a matter of one's ability to clear and
work the land.41 However, limited bythe supply of family labour and the fact that it was
not essential to do so, the peasants did not wish to secure surplus land. The approach
adopted towards agricultural production also meant that the economic activities of the
peasants would always be individualised with activities carried out either on an individual
basis orby the family for its own livelihood.42 The practice of shifting cultivation during
the pre-colonial period was much encouraged by the fact that the peasants did not own
the land but merely had rights to use or cultivate it.
Closely interrelated with the political structure and the economic environment of Perak
during the pre-colonial period was the absence of capital accumulation among the
peasantry and the ruling class. What existed was wealth accumulation among the ruling
class where usury, which was highly lucrative and operated in conjunction with the
institution of debt-bondage, was seen as an important means to secure and maintain status
and position.43 Although usury was a source of income for theruling class, it is doubtful
if it was that important, as the institution of debt-bondage was not seen as that widespread
40Roff, W. R. (1967). The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, p.10;
Wong, David S. Y. (1975). Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States, Singapore: Singapore
University Press, p. 13.





in the state. The primary source of wealth for the ruling class came from taxation of
and control over trade. For the peasantry, wealth accumulation from production was
discouraged because of risk of expropriation by the ruling class, and the existence of the
kerah system, which disrupted the peasants' daily agricultural operations. This
discouragement eventually led the peasants to produce surpluses only for trade for other
consumption items. There were no incentives for savings or wealth accumulation and
thus the peasants lived in constant insecurity and deprivation. It was the deprived living
conditions more often than not which ledpeasants into debt-bondage.
Pre-colonial Perak was, in a broad sense, characterised by a 'natural' economy with no
capitalist relations of production. Although the abundance of land and ready access to it
by cultivators, which in turn was determined by one's ability to cultivate, seemed very
encouraging for production, there was never a need to produce much beyond one's
immediate needs. The need for a larger population to increase productivity and surpluses,
therefore, did not arise. What took place in pre-colonial Perak was the outcome of the
interplay between the environment, politicalconditions, and the land tenure system of the
time.
2.4 Trade
Trading activities are known to have existed in Perak even before the state was
founded.45 Therefore, trading activities were already present since the beginning of the
'"Seem. 14.
45Several kingdoms were said to have existed, and disappeared, in areas where Perak is today, the most well
known being the Gangga Negara. It is said that during those times brisk trading activities took place in
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history of Perak. A continuation of this trend is evident in that in the early 16th century
TomePires mentioned Bruas, a settlement inPerak, as an important trading location.46 It
has also been mentioned that Perak was one of the earliest entrepots in the Malay States
in the 17th century.47 The efforts to control trade commodities also sawnumerous eastern
and Western foreign powers trying to colonise the state throughout the pre-colonial
period. Perak's main exports then were tin and elephants. Others included rattan, wax,
betel nut, arak (fermented drink), locally made gunpowder, and iron.49 Occasionally
some rice was produced for export but in most cases this was imported to meet the local
population's needs. Tin, however, continued to be in great demand by foreign powers
and even more so from the early 18th century. In return for exports, Perak imported
goods that were not produced locally for consumption; most popular were cloth, salt,
tobacco, gambier, chinaware, tools such asparang, keris, gold thread, andspices.50
In the pre-colonial era, trade and commerce were largely in the hands of foreigners,
mainly Europeans, Arabs, Chinese and Indians. For the Chinese and Indian merchants it
was the establishment of free trade in Penang that had attracted them to the Malay
States while the Arabs took the opportunity and used their socio-religious status to gain
these kingdoms, for examples, see deSilva, G. W. (1939,). Popular History ofMalaya and the Netherlands
Indies, Kuala Lumpur: Kyle, Palmer & Co, p.95; Sheppard, M. C. (1959). Historic Malaya, Singapore:
Eastern University Press Ltd., p.3; Winstedt (1961), p.121; Kathirithamby-Wells, J., (ed.) (1990/ The
Southeast Asian Port and Polity, Singapore: Singapore University Press, p.30.
46Cortesao (1944), Vol. II, p.261.
47Andaya, B. W. (1979). Perak, The Abode ofGrace, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.60.






concessions and facilities to trade. Among the local inhabitants of Perak involved in
trading activities were primarily the members of the ruling class and to a minor extent,
the peasants.
The ruling class' involvement in trade was important as it provided them with a
substantial proportion of their income from taxation. There were also cases where
members of the ruling class themselves were involved directly in trade. Winstedt
mentions that 'big transactions were kept in the hands of the rulers...',53 although Jomo
has claimed that the involvement of rulers in commerce was not common since their
'commercial involvement often meant little more than lending a person's name, and
therefore the prestige and privileges derived from that person's position, to a commercial
enterprise actually runby others'.54 Nevertheless, what was certain was the ruling class's
monopoly of trading rights, which facilitated the acquisition of material resources as
personal income. Ruling class involvement in trade was more often concerned with the
exploitation of monopolistic advantage for material return rather than with taking part in
the market as traders. How the wealth was obtained was a relatively unimportant matter:
be it by force, "legitimate trade", monopoly or even gambling or magic.55 Wealth
accumulated from these rights over trade was also often used by the ruling class to add





55Milner, A. C. (1982). Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the EveofColonial Rule, Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, p.20.
56Syed Hussin Ali (1981), p.77.
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Peasant involvement in trade during the greater part of the pre-colonial period was
marginal. Tome Pires indicated how the 'ordinary' Malays came in smallperahu (boats)
to trade items such as tin, rice, chickens, sugar cane and areca nuts.57 In the inland the
peasants were involved in the trading of forest products whose market value depended on
their rarity and the secrecy that surroundedtheir collection.58 With this demand for forest
products an internal trading network linking the interior and the coast was therefore
formed, ha addition, the presence of certain metals (base and precious) provided
opportunities for the relatively isolated region to develop trade potential. The early 19th
century then witnessed the inflow of Chinese mining communities into Perak; this further
enhanced the opportunity for peasant involvement in trade, particularly in food-related
products.
Even though both the rulingclass andthe peasants were involved in trade duringthe pre-
colonial period, further expansion, however, did not occur. As such the overall increase
in trade did not lead to the emergence of substantial Malay involvement. Towards the end
of thepre-colonial period the introduction of a monetary mechanism59 couldhave further
facilitated trading activities. The ruling class saw the accumulation of wealth and control
over desirable trade goods not as an end in itself but as a means to increase prestige and
power.50 Among the ruling class the potential to challenge their power and influence
"Cortesao (1944), volII, p.261.
58Andaya & Andaya (1982), p.ll; Perak was also known to have various species of palms that had
commercial value, see Bird, I. (1967). The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, pp.262-4.
59Although not recognised as the official currency ofPerak, the dollar was already in use in the Malay
States since its formal introduction in the Straits Settlements in 1867. For the development of the currency
system in Malaysia, see Chiang HaiDing, 'The Origin of the Malaysian Currency System (1867-1906)' in
JMBRAS, 39 (1), 1966, pp.1-18.
60Drabble (2000), p.21.
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encouraged them to accumulate as much wealth as possible, therefore preventing
substantial concentration of wealth in the hands of others, including the peasants.61 As for
the peasantry, further expansion of trade andcommerce was discouraged by tax exactions
imposed by the ruling class. On the other hand, Winstedt indicated that the presence of
the Dutch, Portuguese, and laterBritish monopolists was the reason that hampered Malay
enterprises and damaged Malay trade.62 Within the state, the persistence of intra-state
low-level warfare had also contributed to the failure of trade expansion among the
indigenous population. In addition, the limited trade expansion among the Malays in pre-
colonial Perak was due to the lack of political and economic autonomy among those
outside the ruling elite. These circumstances faced by the indigenous population failed to
provide fertile soil for trade to prosper.
2.5 Rice and tin
Two of the main activities that played important roles in the economic lives of the
populace as well as in the development of pre-colonial Perak were rice cultivation and tin
mining. The Malays of Perak, like those from otherMalay States, were strongly attached
to agriculture and many of the social, cultural, and religious preoccupations of pre-
colonial Malays were derived from and revolved around rice cultivation.63 Although
Malay traditions indicated that the Siamese first introduced rice cultivation to the
northern Malay States in the fifteenth century64, there have been considerable doubts
6{Milner (1982), p.21; Drabble (2000), p.21.
62Winstedt(1961),p.lG5.
63Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.43.
Cooke, E. M. (1961). Rice Cultivation in Malaya, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press Ltd, p.ix; Cheng
SiokHwa, 'The Rice Industry ofMalaya: A Historical Survey' inJMBRAS, 42(2), 1969, p.130.
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raised about this claim based on the evidence that rice agriculture in the Malay
Archipelago has a longhistory.65
The evidence of the history of tin mining in pre-colonial Perak, on the other hand, is
scanty. Therefore, it was not known when tin was first mined and exported; more data
only began to appear at the beginning of the 19th century. For Malaya, Arab writers
mentioned the presence of tin as early as the 9th century;66 and according to Chinese
historians, tinbegan to appear as a trade item in the 13th century. In Perak, the early tin-
miners during the early 19th century were said to be Malays, although this activity was
only carried out during the slack periods of the agricultural cycle.67 At the turn of the
century tin production in Perak was estimated to be about 9,000pikul a year and in 1826
production of 6,000 pikul a year was said tobe the output in 'quiet times'.68 Tin mining
only gained momentum in the 1840s with the discovery ofrich tin fields in the Larut area
and the mass immigration of Chinese miners into Perak.
The importance of rice cultivation to the Malays was best summed up by Wilkinson who
said, "Agriculture is the soul of Malay life...[The Malay] is essentially a planter; his
festivals are seasonal, his joys and sorrows depend on the crop; and his whole life is
regulated by the rice-planting industry."69 Although rice was the staple food of the
Malays, Low's claim that they could not exist without their bendang or rice field seems
Hill, R. D. (1977). Rice in Malaya: AStudy in Historical Geography, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press, p. 13.
66Yip Yat Hoong (1969). The Development of the Tin-mining Industry of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur:
University ofMalaya Press, p.55.
67Hill(1977),p.26.
68Anderson and Low cited inKhoo Kay Kim (1972), p.34.
69Wilkinson(1924),p.66.
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to be an exaggeration. In Perak, as elsewhere in Peninsular Malaya, there were two
broad categories of rice agriculture: the first was that of wet padi71, grown in a field on
low-lying flat land and near a water source; the second, known as dry padi, was usually
grown in ladang (swiddens) consisting of an area of felled and burned forests.
The two types of cultivation had different social impacts on the peasants. Although the
first mode generally required the peasants to be permanent settlers, the second mode gave
peasants an option. They could either be permanent settlers or mobile depending on the
new location of land to be cultivated as ladang necessitated movement to a new patch of
land after two or three harvests. These two cultivation methods also entailed differences
in land preparation. Wet padi required at least three years lead time in preparing the land
before the first planting while dry padi could be planted once the trees were felled and
burned. Among the peasantry, dry padi was more popular, but whichever methods were
applied "it can be said that the cultivation ofpadi has served as a basis for the grouping of
people in kampungs (villages) and that the padi cycle has moulded the distinctive rhythm
of the Malaysubsistence economy".74
Generally, in terms of rice production, the peasantry produced just enough for their own
consumption, after taking into account the share needed as agricultural exaction.75 Perak
70See Low, J. (1972). The British Settlement ofPenang, Singapore: Oxford University Press, p.80.
71The terms 'rice' and 'padi' wereoftenused interchangeably. 'Padi' means rice in the husk while 'rice' is
the grain when unhusked.
72Dry padi is alsoknownas hill padi or huma.
73Scholars, however, indicated that ladang peasants were strictlymobile in nature, for example, see Ooi Jin
Bee (1963), pp.248-268; Gullick (1987), p.125-7; McNair (1972), p.71.
74Lhn TeckGhee (1976), p.43.
75Hill (1977), p.26.
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used to be self-sufficient in rice;76 the Dutch record - Batavia Dagh-Register - did not
contain a single record of the state importing rice during the early 19th century.77 The
agricultural practices in rice production were technologically well adapted and efficient
to the prevailing environment then. Traditionally, rainwater was the main water source
of supply in wet padi production, and as a large sinking capital was required to build
dams and channels, the peasants found this a disincentive.78 Dry rice production during
the pre-colonial period, on the other hand, had gained popularity for easy mobility or
flight especially under circumstances like damaging political events, civil wars, and
oppression. Therefore, there was constant movement of settlers and a reluctance to
invest resources in permanent facilities. Another development that took place in 19th
century Perak was when rice production began to increase rapidly in Krian, but it was
without a permanent increase in its settlements.80 This increase was based on migrant
cultivators from Penang who came to Krian during the rice cultivation season and
returned to Penang during the off-season.
As agriculture represented an important element in Perak Malay society, economy, and
culture, it is therefore essential to understand the customary land tenure system, although
the knowledge of this past indigenous institution is limited and commonly expressed in
?6Sufficient rice production was attained in 1839 to feed its population of about 35,000 people [Frederick,
M., 'Social Aspects of Malay Society 1819-1879', B.A. thesis, Singapore: University of Malaya, 1961,
p.18].
77Cited in Hill (1977), p.30.
78Gullick(1958),p.28-29.
79Sadka(1968),p.4.
80Hill (1977), p.94; Jackson, J.C, 'Rice Cultivation inWest Malaysia' inJMBRAS, 45(2), 1972, p.90.
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metaphorical sayings and expressions.81 In the pre-colonial Malay States there was no
concept of private possession or ownership ofkind,82 and in Perak the customary rules of
landholding were divided into two broad categories: tanah mati ("dead land") and tanah
hidup ("living land"). Any land that had not been appropriated or had been abandoned
by the cultivator was known as tanah mati. This categorisation was applied equally to
both prior cultivated and virgin land, particularly in the dry padi cultivation cycle.
Continuous cultivation and long occupation of land led to the concept of proprietary
rights; therefore, all tanah mati did not carry such rights. Rights to land were
usufructuary whichwas the right to usebut not own, as we understand it today.84 As land
was abundant, tanah mati was available for the taking for those wishing to occupy and
cultivate it, as long as they were Muslims.
Tanah hidup, on the other hand, referred to land that had been cleared and was under
cultivation. Provided that the land was occupied, the right to use it remained absolute as
long as the stipulated exaction of one tenth of produce was paid85 in the first instance to
the territorial chiefs on behalfof the Sultan. In the case of abandonment of wet padi land,
however, it required a period of three seasons before the cultivator's rights were forfeited
and the land reverted to the status of tanah mati. Customary rules towards land planted
with fruit trees designated a longer period ofproprietary right. Despite abandonment, the
property rights of the previous cultivator remained as long as the fruit trees survived.
81For detailed discussion on the subject, see Wilkinson (1908), pp.1-45; and Hooker, M. B. (1967). A
Source Book ofAdat, Chinese Law and the History of Common Law in Malayan Peninsula, Singapore:
University of Singapore Press Hooker, p.l.
82Hill(1977),p.45.
83LimTeck Ghee (1976), p.5;Wong (1975), p.10.
84Jomo (1988), p.l 1.
85Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.6.
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Within these customary rules there were also supplementary rules to cover incidental
matters such as the restriction on taking up land at a higher elevation than any existing
cultivated land, though lower patches were allowed for cultivation provided they did not
interfere with existing farming activity.
The pre-colonial customary landholding system underwent various modifications
throughout the period as pressure on land increased, rights to land became increasingly
complex, and also 'dealings' in land ownership started to emerge. The doctrine that land
belongs to the Sultan was based on his rights to levy exactions on agricultural produce
and the disposal of unoccupied land.87 By the time the British intervened in Perak, the
customary rules were well developed to include out-and-out transfer, "letting", and
"security transactions".88
Despite the importance of rice cultivation, some peasant farmers were also involved in
SO
supplementary tin mining activities. Up until the discovery of tin on the island of
Bangka in 1711, the main source of supply in the Malay Archipelago came from the
Malayan Peninsula.90 There was no expansion in the uses of tin in the Peninsula apart
from in the manufacture of oil lamps, cast-net chains, musical instruments, and weapons.
It was only when tin became an important commodity in the West that the market
suddenly expanded. In those countries where the demand either in terms of quantity or
86See Rigby, J., (ed.) (1929). Ninety-nine Laws ofPerak, KualaLumpur: FMSGovernment Press.
87Lim TeckGhee (1976), p.7.
88Wong (1975), p.l 1.
89For detailed discussion on the development of tin in Malaya, see WongLin Ken (1965). The Malayan Tin
Industry to 1914, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press; and Yip Yat Hoong (1969). The Development
ofthe Tin-miningIndustryofMalaya, Kuala Lumpur: University ofMalaya Press.
90Yip (1969), p.56;Wong(1965), p.3.
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quality could not be met locally, they had to turn to other countries for their supply, and
various Western powers had attempted to 'monopolise the tin trade first by the
Portuguese after the conquest of Malacca in 1511 ...\91 The establishment of the Straits
Settlements between 1786 and 1819 provided the British with a base to penetrate the
Malay States in search of tin. The most significant stimulus for the demand for tin in
Malaya came from the expansion of the British tinplate industry at the beginning of the
19th century,92 which could not bemet bysupplies from the Cornish tinmines inEngland.
At about the same time more areas of tin deposits were found in Perak and this saw the
increasing integration of the state and Malaya into the world economy.
Tin mining in Perak was not extensively developed before the 1840s. The discovery of
tin in the Larut Valley, a narrow tract of land between the Perak watershed and the sea,
by Long Jaafar, thena territorial chiefand later a Mentri 93provided the stimulus for local
expansion and began to change the structure ofproduction. As the state's population was
small and expertise was lacking, there was an immediate need for labour and
entrepreneurial ability to exploit the newly discovered commodity. Malay labour was
provided as kerah (corvee), but when agriculture demanded, the supply of labour in tin
mining diminished. On the invitation of Malay territorial chiefs, Chinese immigrant
labourers began to arrive in Perak.94 The majority of these came from the maritime
provinces of Kwantung and Fukien in southeastern China95 andbrought with them more
economical and technically efficient methods of mining. The Chinese population in Perak
91Wong (1965), p.3.
92Ibid, pp.4-6.
93Literally means minister but within the pre-colonial context the term referred to the post ofState Justiciar.
94Wong(1965),p.2L
95Ibi&, p.42; Sadka (1968), p.22; Gullick (1987), p.6.
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began to soar. From a mere 400Chinese in the state in 1818, comprising both miners and
traders, the figure grew rapidly, hi Larut alone the figure grew from three immigrants in
1848 to between 20,000 to 25,000 in 1862 and by 1872 there were reported to be 40,000
Chinese miners.96
This large-scale immigration of Chinese created problems for the Malay state. The
numbers had escalated so fast that the immigrants had begun to outnumber the local
population not only in Larut but also in Perak as a whole. These immigrants, who were
either Hakka or Cantonese, were also members of secret societies such as the Hai San and
Ghee Hin. Intense rivalry between them was inevitable,97 especially where mining land
was granted for exploitation without specific boundaries. The Mentri of Larut had only
40 administrators at his disposal to undertake the task of overseeing the large Chinese
population.98 Under such conditions it was difficult to maintain law and order as well as
political stability. Rivalries among Malay territorial chiefs were also intense over the
succession to the throne and the right to collect revenues. Among the Chinese, the rivalry
developed into large-scale rioting in 1862 and lasted for about a decade. It was these
disturbances that the British used as one of the reasons to intervene in Perak in 1874.
Another driving force that had intensified the development of tin mining in Perak and
elsewhere was the increasing price of tin in the European market, hi 1840 the price was
96Yip (1969), p.58; Wong(1965), p.18;Sadka (1968), p.23.
97Anonymous, 'Some Account of the Independent Native States of the Malay Peninsula' in JSBRAS, 6,
1880,p.l62.
98Sadka(1968),p.27.
"Khoo KayKim (1974), p.92; Yip (1969), p.59.
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£62 per ton andby 1872 it had risen to £152 per ton.100 In Perak, from a reported annual
export of 3,000 bahara in 1830, the volume increased to 11,000 bahara in 1871.101 The
Chinese were not granted property rights in mining land, only temporary rights of
exploitation while the Malays did not have sufficient capital to run large tin mining
operations. Therefore, in the early part of the 19th century the modus operandi was that
the Chinese advanced the necessary capital to the Malays who in return would receive all
the tin produced.102 However, by mid-century Straits Settlements103 Chinese capitalists,
particularly from Penang, were allowed to open and operate mines with their own capital.
In close association with investments in tin were those in rice and opium trading as well.
It was the excess capital and declining trading profits in the Straits Settlements that
compelled the Chinese capitalists to seek more productive avenues elsewhere and they
consequently turned to Perak.
Therefore, up to British intervention in 1874 the large influx of labour and capital
invested in tin mining had made the industry a wholly Chinese affair. It was said that the
vital factors explaining Chinese supremacy in tin mining rested on their entrepreneurial
skills and their organisational capacity in secret societies and technology.104 The rapid
growth of this industry accelerated trade in Perak. The inflow of capital from the Straits
Settlements and the increasing presence of foreign traders had also influenced the local
Malay society in, for example, the methods used among the chiefs in the government in
100Wong(1965),p.29.
10!Sadka (1968), p.21.
Conversion: 1 bahara = 3 pikul = 4001bs.
102Wong (1965), p.20; Andaya & Andaya (1982), p.138.
103The Straits Settlements comprises a collection of British colonies in Southeast Asia governed under
unified administration formed in 1826. Within Malaya they comprised Penang, Singapore, Malacca,
Province Wellesley, and Dindings. The crown colony status was dissolved in 1946.
104Wong (1965), p.40; Andaya &Andaya (1982), p.136.
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commercial transactions when dealing with finance. However, the economic changes that
tookplacehad a minimal impact on the Malay peasantry. Ricecultivation and tin mining
coexisted in relative harmony in the state economy, and the Malays and the Chinese
generally kept to their separate ways under separate organisational arrangements. The
Malays continued to live in their kampung while the majority of the Chinese resided in
theirmining kongsi105 houses.
2.6 The role of the state in economic production activities
In pre-colonial Perak the form of government was multi-tiered and decentralised. The
role played by the state in all aspects of state economic activities was influenced and
shaped by the way it was structured. Therefore, the district chief became the "key
institution" in the political system106 and influenced all economic production activities in
the state.
The existence of land rent and the exaction of one-tenth of agricultural produce were
often mentioned in most scholarly writings on Malay States during the pre-colonial
period. However, Sadka indicates that this was not generally the case in Perak.107 There
were cases where taxes were levied on every male in Perak and also evidence that taxes
were levied inconsistently according to the district chiefs directives. These taxes,
however, were only related to poll tax and had no connection with land rent or exaction
on agricultural produce. The revenue of the Sultan and district chiefs was very much
Kongsi houses were large dormitories situated near tin mines, each capable of housing twenty to a




dependent on taxes imposed on imported as well as exported goods. The abundance of
raw materials, especially tin, and the physical geography of the state with its scattered
population meant that the option of collecting revenue through custom points was the
best practical method. In an era where rivers were the main means of communication,
taxation on riverine commerce became a favoured system. With this system of taxation
and the absence of land rent, theoretically the state could have indirectly encouraged
agricultural production, which would cost relatively less. However, there was no need to
do so in a 'natural' economy. Even if surplus production was encouraged, other factors
prohibited the expansion of these activities. With the low density and scattered
population, land-abundance was the main feature of pre-colonial Perak. Even if
productivity could have been enhanced among the small population, the existing tax
structure that imposed taxes on all exports, including agricultural produce, would have
discouraged surplus production. This was in addition to the appropriation by the ruling
class, which "essentially involved the direct use of coercion, without much recourse to
ideological (legal) legitimisation".109 'State policy' was therefore in parallel where excess
agricultural production among the peasantry was discouraged and had limited them to
subsistence only. Any small surplus, if any, was used mainly for cultural festivities. This
coherent 'policy' was partly attributed to the fact that taxes produced revenues that were





In labour supply, kerah (corvee) exactions affected the majority of the inhabitants,
specifically the peasants. Although the existence of the practice was acknowledged, the
frequency, however, was not known; therefore the severity of its impact to peasants'
production activities was very much dependent on its frequency. In slavery and debt-
bondage, although the practice was not widespread,110 it contributed to surplus
production to a certain extent but it benefited only the masters who were either the
district chiefs or other members of the ruling class. The existence of debt-bondage also
had some economic effect on the state. As in slavery, debt-bondage could act as an
investment, which was convertible into wealth accumulation through sale.111 The main
problem concerning kerah was the arbitrary nature of the limit and length of each task
imposed on the rakyat. As most rakyat were subject to kerah exaction,112 the economic
activities of the rakyat were, in a way, restricted. The kerah exaction when utilised in the
public interest and imposed infrequently, was beneficial to society but it was the misuse
of such a system by the ruling class that disrupted the economic activities of the
peasants. hi a period when state and personal revenue belonged to the same
authoritative figure, it was difficult for such a person not to be seen as misusing such
authority for his own benefit.
Wealth accumulation in pre-colonial Perak was mainly based on revenues derived from
taxes and usurious activities, which could, in turn, be used as production capital. When
noSeem.l4.
Gullick, however, asserted that the gain from the investment was converted into capital, see Gullick
(1958), p.101. This was not really possible since production capital was, by and large, almost non-existent
during much of the pre-colonial period in Perak.
Exemptions were granted to aristocrats who were part of theruling class as well as to some commoners;
for details see Ibid., p.109.
1,3Swettenham (1929), p.142-3.
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state and personal revenue were located and muddled up within the same authority, the
available capital was not used to 'develop' the state but rather to enhance the status of the
district chiefs. When tin mining activities gained momentum towards the mid-191
century investments in the industry by the ruling class began to take place. Although
these investments were presumably on a joint-venture basis, in reality it was the
investment capital from Straits Settlements' Chinese that helped set the venture in
motion. In return the ruling class received a share of the profits from the partnership.
Although these arrangements provided benefits for both parties, "it was apparent that
economic initiatives were passing into alien hands",114 and, therefore, this did not help
expand economic activities among the local population. The contribution to the state can
mainly be seen in the amount of tax collected.
Therefore, the issue of defining and delineating the locus of power and authority in the
pre-colonial state of Perak created a problem in defining the role it played. As in many
other Malay States, the district chiefs had 'total' power in governing their respective
territories. It was to the extent that even those responsibilities which were in theory
exercised by the Sultan were in practice implemented by the district chiefs. This
eventually led to variations in administration and the roles played by the state. The lack
of a clear distinction between 'public' work and personal interest further aggravated the
problem. In the absence of land rent in Perak, which could have promoted economic
activities, all other factors indicated that the role of the state in economic production was
directed towards the exploitation of the indigenous population; it worked to the advantage
of the district chiefs and the ruling class, and was not spread through the entire society.
'Kennedy (1967), p.154.
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Undoubtedly, the existence of kerah and slavery had negative consequences for the
masses. However, its existence enabled the state, because of its control over the rakyat,
to facilitate a limited amount of'development' due to its authoritative nature.
2.7 Summary and conclusion
The feudal structure of pre-colonial Perak, in general, led to an economy that was
subsistence in nature. The structure of the Malay state was closely interrelated with the
pre-capitalist system; it was a system mainly characterised by production for use. 5
However, production for exchange was not totally absent nor was the economy entirely
self-contained. Among the peasantry, production was highly localised in small units and
exchanges did occur sporadically for items of necessity, which they did not produce
themselves. On a larger scale, production for exchange took the form of trade
monopolised by the ruling class exercising patrimonial authority in accumulating
economic benefits. The concentration on production for use was also due, to a small
degree, to the difficult physical environment of Perak at that time, the rare occurrence of
established markets, the isolation of inland settlements from primary economic centres,
and the small overall scattered population.
The availability of technology and innovation in production during that period was low,
including those of the main activities of agriculture and mining. This resulted in an output
that was neither quantitatively large nor easily expandable. During the early 19th century
when large-scale immigration of Chinese came into Perak to work in the tin-mines,
115Scott, J. C. (1976/ The Moral Economy of the Peasant, NewHaven: YaleUniversity Press Scott, p.13.
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radical changes in technology took place with the introduction of hydraulic devices in tin
mining production. This technology was a modification of that used to irrigate rice fields
in southern China. Interestingly if the same technology had been introduced in its original
or in a modified form to suit local conditions probably the landscape of rice cultivation
and production could have changed earlier rather than later.
In order for an economy to grow, intensities have to be generated both internally and
externally. For Perak, economic internal intensity had to come from at least two
elements: the need for an increase in both population and production capital, given their
scarcity. The requirement of land for use was never an issue since it was in abundance,
which therefore created little incentive to economise except in areas where inhabitants
were reluctant to move further away. Pre-colonial Perak also had huge deposits of
natural raw materials, which were capable of enhancing economic activities. The key
element for future economic development was the availability of tin, which had an
external market and was increasingly sought after by international users. While tin
contributed as the main surplus to production, secondary to it was the importance of
forest products, which were also in demand. Rice cultivation, on the other hand, also
remained as an important traditional economic activity.
The growth of population in pre-colonial Perak was minimal considering the large area of
the state and the economic opportunities available, hi the mining sector, labour was not a
critical concern since labourers were brought in from South China by Chinese tin-miners.
It was in the labour-intensive agricultural sector that there was an increasing need for
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human resources. Despite the immigration of foreigners from surrounding regions who
were willing to take up agriculture, the numbers were not sufficient to intensify
agricultural activities.
Within the framework of pre-colonial Perak the mechanisms for and interests in capital
accumulation were lacking without which economic expansion could not be realized.
The availability of some kind of capital accumulation among the ruling class, mainly
from taxes, usury and financing of small tin mines prior to the immigration of the
Chinese, was not used for further capital accumulation. Usually, surpluses were treated as
wealth rather than capital accumulation and were put to other uses in enhancing status,
prestige and power.
The external intensity came mainly from trade. This acted as a principal influence to
instigate change and economic growth. Perak was located on the main trade route
between Europe and Asia. The establishment of the Straits Settlements - Penang (1786),
Singapore (1819) and the acquisition of Malacca from the Dutch in 1824 further
influenced and compelled Perak's involvement in the global economy. The 19th century
saw increasing involvement of foreign capital, especially from the Straits Settlements,
and also the growing importance ofcommodity export production, notably tin.
Throughout the 'pre-colonial' period the political and economic systems were closely
integrated. The 'pre-capitalist' Malay state was founded largely on an agricultural
population, on an ethnically homogeneous constituency of the Malay stock, and on a
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politico-ideological system focused on the Sultan and his immediate supporters. Politics
and economics were closely intertwined and evolved around pre-capitalist authoritarian
rules. Due to the external pressures put upon the state to encourage economic growth,
reinforced by the Western search for new markets and avenues for capital investment, by
the middle of the 191 century pre-colonial Perak was no longer able to resist the early
penetration of capitalism. The economic development achieved in pre-colonial Perak was
modest but at the expense of the rakyat; it was based on the personal interests of the
ruling elite. Therefore, another key element for future economic development required a
clear distinction between the government (ruler) and the economy. However, by the time
the British intervened in Perak in 1874 the state already had export production in place.
This had been primarily developed by immigrant labour under the auspices of Malay
chiefs, adopting new technology and production capital from the Straits Settlements.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES
IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1874-1957)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter delineates and analyses the political economy of Perak during the colonial
period. Specific transformations that have taken place will be presented in order to
demonstrate how Perak was incorporated into the world system and the consequences of
this process. Further industry-specific analyses of the rice, tin and rubber sectors will be
presented in chapters 4 and 5.
The Pangkor Engagement in 1874 marked the official beginning of British colonial
history in Perak. It was the first stage ofpolitical penetration into the Malay States by the
British.1 In economic terms, however, the interrelationship between Perak and the West,
including Britain, commenced earlier because of the export of tin from Perak to the West
during the pre-colonial period. Although the Engagement merely stated that the State of
Perak was to accept a British Resident whose advice was to be sought and acted upon in
Although 1874 has been widelyaccepted by many scholars such as Cowanand Maclntyre, and others as
the beginning of British intervention in Perak and other Malay States, Khoo Kay Kim, on the contrary,
strongly argued against this and considers the Pangkor Engagement as the beginning of the establishment
of British administration in the Malay States, see Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Origin of British Administration in
Malaya' in JMBRAS, 39(1), 1966, pp.52-91; Cowan, C. D. (1961). Nineteenth-Century Malaya: The Origin
of British Political Control, London: Oxford University Press; Maclntyre, D., 'Britain's intervention in
Malaya: The origin of Lord Kimberly's instructions to Sir Andrew Clark in 1873' in JournalofSouth-East
Asian History, 2(3), pp.47-69; also Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Pangkor Engagement of 1874' in JMBRAS, 47(1),
1974, pp.1-12. Tihnan, on the other hand, saw the Engagement as the beginning of bureaucratic transition
in Malaya, see Tilman, P. O. (1964). Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya, Durham: Duke University Press.
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all matters, with the exception of those concerning Malay religion and custom, he was
also vested with the powers to regulate the collection of all revenues and administration.
The intervention of the British in Perak also marked the beginning of a new economic era
for the state. Lim (1977) asserted that the colonial government provided vital incentives
for the economic development of the Malay States, and indeed major transformations
took place in eight decades of colonialism. The introduction of a different system of
authority also led to significant changes in their political structure. In terms of the
economic structure, the Malay States became one of the major world suppliers of raw
materials and at the same time became increasingly dependent on outside labour and
technology. In the social dimension, there was a change from a primarily Malay society
to a multi-ethnic population. These changes were brought about by a 'new' style of
government, which actively promoted a market-driven economy.
3.2 Social and political structures
The British intervention required the establishment of a systematic administrative
structure in the state.4 Modelled on the British system, such an orderly system was
deemed crucial if government rule was to be enforced, economic exploitation to be
2It was also arguedthat, in practice, the Engagement also amounts to loss of sovereignty for Perak and the
opening of the door to immigrants, commercial capital as well as international finance, see Wang Gungwu,
'1874 in our history' in Peninjau Sejarah, Journal of theHistory Teachers' Association ofMalaya, Vol. 1,
No.l, 1966, p.14.
3Lim TeckGhee(1977), p.13.
4Chai Hon-Chan (1967). The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, p.9.
Hugh Low, the third British Resident of Perak, however, acknowledged the existence of a traditional
system of local government and strongly supported its preservation under British rule [Sadka (1968),
P-113]
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further intensified, and capitalism to prosper. Previous experiences in other colonies had
taught the British the advantages of indirect rule and governance through the indigenous
leaders, in Perak's case, the Malaypenghulus5 and the Sultan.
The first test for the British in maintaining law and order was to combat slavery. In the
eyes of the British, slavery was seen as an obstacle to economic development because it
was regarded as archaic and incompatible with capitalist economy. Slavery was
considered as an oppressive mode of labour control that discouraged high productivity
and enterprise6 whereas the British favoured a free wage labour system. In Perak, the
number of slaves was not large and was estimated to be around 3,000 in 1874 with almost
equal numbers of males and females, held by both royalty/nobility and commoners.7
However, the British were faced with determined and sustained Malay opposition, and
abolition posed chronic political and administrative problems. The strategy of pursuing
the issue unhurriedly but persistently finally resulted in its abolition in 1883,8 though not
without difficulty.9
The abolition of kerah took even more time because of the opposition of the district
chiefs. Unlike slavery, where the ruling class and the rakyat both had access to the
system, kerah was only available to the former. By 1882 the kerah institution in Perak
had gradually changed into a combination of a poll tax system and a fixed duration of
5Penghulu (village headman) was the only position from the pre-colonial government that was retained
under British administration and acted as the link between the government and the rural Malays.
6Jomo(1988),pp.7-10.
7Aminuddin Baki (1983), p.29; Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.292; see also fn.14 inChapter 2.
8Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.12; Gullick, J. M. (1992). Rulers and Residents, Singapore: Oxford University
Press, p.44; Sadka (1968), p. 111; see also fh.13 in Chapter 2.
9The strategies adopted bythe British towards the abolition ofslavery inPerak can be found inPhilip Loh
(1964/65), pp.1-14.
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corvee labour. Further changes were made throughout the phasing out of the system and
by 1891 it was abolished altogether.10
The abolition of both kerah and slavery had important impacts on small-scale cultivators
as well as the state. In the case of slavery, the slaves became free and were able to pursue
any economic activity they wished; with kerah, its abolition meant that peasants were
able to concentrate on productive activities without interruption. The traditional basis of
production for the upper class was therefore replaced by a system of 'free' wage labour,
which, on the whole, underpinned economic growth for the rakyat as well as the state.
The establishment of British rule in Perak also involved a number of changes in the
political structure. The preservation of the Sultan's status and his symbolic position was
important to maintain a facade of Malay rule, though he was removed from active
involvement in the government as there was a shift of power to the British Resident.11
The Pangkor Engagement also demonstrated the British ability to determine the
appointment of the Sultan. They supported the candidacy of someone who would come
under theirinfluence andbe sympathetic to British policy.12
hi the implementation ofBritish indirect rule in Perak, the ruling class suffered more than
1 'X
the Sultan. They found themselves increasingly marginalized in the new government.
Under the Engagement, both the Sultan and his chiefs lost their rights to collect taxes and
10For detailed discussion ofthe abolition ofthe kerah system, see Lim Teck Ghee (1976), pp. 68-9.
uSadka(1968),p.l56.
12For example, during the Pangkor Engagement itself Sultan Ismail, by custom, was to succeed to the
throne but was replaced by Sultan Abdullah with the assistance of the British.
13Gullick (1992), p.l.
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duties. The district chiefs had also been almost entirely removed from their line of
authority; most of them were given positions in the State Council. However, their
influence was restricted to Malay social matters that were raised in Council business.
The chiefs from districts that were rich with natural resources, such as tin suffered even
more. Both the Sultan and the district chiefs, however, were compensated with monthly
allowances from the state treasury for their loss of tribute.
The sidelining of district chiefs from the state administration resulted in the emergence of
a new type of leader14. Under the new system, the position of district officer was initially
filled by the British. Most notable was the use and deployment of penghulus in
administering the state at thelocal level.15 This policy was seen as in line withthe British
intention to preserve and develop the traditional system of government and at the same
time to keep the state's expenditure under control16 in maintaining peace and order.
Therefore, the role ofpenghulus changed drastically during the colonial period. As part
of their duties, they were also involved in land matters following the introduction of the
colonial land policy, which saw individual landholdings introduced and land become a
commodity. Their appointment, which was previously under the domain of the Sultan,
was transferred to the British Resident.
14Ibid, p.100; Lim TeckGhee(1976), p.150.
15During colonial government the jurisdiction of penghulus was expanded to cover the mukim or sub-
district rather than a single village as in the pre-colonial period. For a brief description of the penghulus
involvement in state administration during the colonial period, see Kratoska, "Penghulus in Perak and
Selangor: The rationalization anddecline of a traditional Malayoffice' inJMBRAS, 57 (2), 1984, pp.31-59.
16In contrast to the pre-colonial period, penghulus in the Federated Malay States since the start of the
colonial period were salaried andreceived between $15 and$30a month, seeIbid, p.34; Jagjit Singh Sidhu
(1980). Administration in the Federated Malay States 1896-1920, KualaLumpur: OxfordUniversity Press,
p.152.
l7Sadka(1968),p.ll3.
"Gullick (1992), p.185;Drabble (2000), pp.93-4.
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Within the framework of indigenous participation in state administration, the British also
established two institutions which were to have a considerable impact on the social status
of the Malays. The first was the creation of the State Council and the second, the Malay
Administrative Service (MAS) by the FMS government. Apart from encouraging Malay
participation, these two institutions were also used as a vehicle to provide the former
ruling class with a place in the new regime.19 The participation of Perak Malays in the
British administrative system was demanded by the Malays themselves rather than
invited.2
The establishment of the Perak State Council in 1875, on the surface, was designed to
assist the British Resident in all matters pertaining to the business of government. With
the growth in population of both the Malays and the Chinese, it was also a means of
bringing together both the Malay chiefs and a small number of Chinese leaders to address
certain administrative problems. In the first two decades of the colonial government, the
*y iState Council was the key institution in gathering support from across the community.
However, there was a growing resentment among its members, especially amongst the
Malays, due to the priority given to European and Chinese capitalist interests in British
policy. In practice, important state matters such as economic planning, fiscal policy and
also land tenure were in the hands of the British. The British left the State Council
primarily with a limited range of Malay social matters and the implementation of the
policies that had already been decided upon; the Council was designed to 'maintain the
19Ibid,p.l.
20See Jagjit (1980), pp.152-8. This was contrary to the view of Lim Teck Ghee who asserted that Malay




fiction of Malay rule'. It did, however, provide a channel of communication between
the rakyat and the government. Despite the lack of participation in shaping state
economic development programmes, the State Council remained 'an essential instrument
of government under the Residential system'.
If the State Council was established to assist the British Resident and to provide advice
on state policies, the MAS, established in 1910, was designed for direct Malay
participation in state administration. The policy was to provide appropriate education and
training to help theMalays qualify for government appointments.24 Thepositions of state
and district officer once held only by the British were gradually transferred to the Malays.
The establishment of the Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) in 1905 emphasised the
significance of colonial education policy, the main objective of which was to create a
professional cadre of Malay administrators.
As for the rakyat, colonial rule relieved them of the onerous and demanding institutions
of slavery and kerah. Colonial rule also meant that the two-class social stratification of
the rakyat and the ruling class disappeared. New social classes emerged which were
closely tied to economic status and achievements as a result of the introduction and
utilisation of wage labour and the means of production directed to profit generation. The
abolition of kerah and slavery also provided the Malay population of Perak with
22Lhn TeckGhee (1977), p.11; Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.16.
23Sadka(1968),p.l76.
24Gullick(1992),p.l01.
25For the history that leadto the formation of MCKK, see Jagjit (1980), pp.142-152.
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opportunities for social mobility. The old habit of total obedience towards the 'former'
ruling class was gradually undermined,26 although not towards the Sultan.
The introduction of a new land tenure system to replace customary land dealings
provided the basis for the new capitalist economy. The Malays began to be exposed to
the concept of land as a commercial and marketable commodity. This provided an
opportunity for them to enhance their economic position. It, however, resulted in pressure
onthe Malay peasantry and loss of land27 to the non-Malays which eventually gave rise
to the Malay Reservation Enactment in 1913.28 With the restrictions imposed by the
Enactment that disallowed land sale to non-Malays, Malay land became less valued
compared to that outside the reservations. Although the policy to protect the Malays from
landlessness was noble, it placed them at an economic disadvantage. The boom in the
price of rubber during the second decade of the 20th century, however, helped to counter
the problem as peasants began to take up the part-time planting of commercial crops to
boost their income.
The movement of Chinese labourers into Perak that had begun during the pre-colonial
period continued and gathered pace; after 1874 the colonial government continued to
promote this mode of labour supply as more tin mines were opened.30 Towards the end
of the 19th century, immigrants from Java were also brought into Perak who later settled
26Gullick(1992),p.337.
27For further discussion on thisissue, seeSection 3.6Land under colonial rule.
28See Lim Teck Ghee (1977), pp. 106-116.
Ibid.; The impact of rubber on the peasantry during the colonial period is discussed in Section 5.4.
30For colonial labour policy on the tin industry, see Yip Yat Hoong (1969) The Development of the Tin-
mining Industry ofMalaya, KL: University of Malaya Press; for the rubber industry see Parmer, J. N.
(1960). Colonial LabourPolicy and Administration, NY: JJ Augustine; see also Section 3.5 on the influx of
foreign labour for both industries.
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as rice cultivators in the areas of Lower Perak and Krian. In addition, the sudden surge
in the demand for rubber in the early 20th century resulted in immigrant labourers
migrating from southern India to work in the rubber plantations. By 1920 there was also
an increasing proportion of transient migrant labourers settling in Malaya, including
Perak.32 The three main ethnic communities of Malays, Chinese, and Indians coexisted
and were linked through market exchange but they were largely economically and
politically separate in a plural society.33
British rule in Perak transformed pre-colonial society based prominently on kinship and
personal ties with the introduction of Western administrative and judicial values. Such
transformation encouraged a market-driven economy to prosper. New forms of
occupational specialisation, and administrative and social organisation were introduced
and the economy increased in scale and diversity. The British, therefore, fostered the
emergence of a modern state in Perak.
3.3 The exchange economy
Pre-colonial Perak was characterised by a subsistence economy though this does not
mean that there were no material exchanges. Although production was mainly for use,
necessary material goods that were not produced locally were obtained through exchange.
Gullick (1958) states that the economy was 'by no means a closed and self-sufficient
31Wan Hashim (1988). Peasants under Peripheral Capitalism, Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, p.72; Sadka (1968), p.328.
32Gullick(1992),p.333.
33We should also note, as we shall see later, that the three major ethnic groupings have emerged from
complex mixes of 'Malay', 'Chinese' and 'Indian' populations, and these three ethnic labels are very
simple referents, which have been used to capture this complex reality.
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system' and he points out that the limited exchange economy, which placed monetary
values on material goods, was already present as part of the Malay culture.35 However,
the majority of the transactions were still based on barter and surplus production was not
a primary objective. British colonialism gradually changed this. Given the paucity of
information, it is not possible to trace the beginnings of the exchange economy in Perak.
However, on a global scale, the influence of the Industrial Revolution that originated in
northwestern Europe began to spread to other parts of the world. Perak was located along
the vital commercial route between Southeast Asia and Europe and British colonialism
further facilitated the movement of cheap manufactured goods from Europe. The
introduction of imported 'modern' goods and services accelerated the development of an
exchange economy36 in Perak. The introduction of money as a medium of exchange
further encouraged the development of capitalism.37
At the local level, the changes implemented during the colonial period had also
stimulated the exchange economy among the peasants.38 The encouragement given by
the colonial government to foreign capital, particularly from the British and Straits
Chinese capitalists, meant that exchange channels which were previously limited, became
more widely developed. This, coupled with the increasing production of tin and later
34Gullick (1958), p.20; OoiJinBee(1959), p.172.
35Gullick(1987),p.l24.
36LimTeckGhee (1977),p.l35.
Gullick (1958), p.20 referred to exchange values expressed in Straits dollars. For the development of
currencyduring the pre-colonial and colonialperiods, see Lim Chong Yah (1969). Economic Development
ofModern Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: OxfordUniversity Press, pp.221-5; also Chiang Hai Ding (1966), pp.l-
18.
38Frederick (1961), p.9 contends that the introduction ofmoney was one ofthe factors that disrupted Malay
life, saw the beginning of the collapse of the peasant economy, and that forced many traditional institutions
to give way.
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rubber,39 resulted in the expansion of trade with the Western world and the growth of
secondary activities including the development of the financial sector.
One of the major factors that had forced changes in the peasant economy was the
introduction of the colonial land tenure system that gave emphasis to the concept of
private landholding and ownership. Land was regarded as (and still is) a commodity with
a monetary value and could therefore be bought and sold. The prospect of land being
used as collateral had started to become apparent during the late pre-colonial period and
the introduction of the new tenure system only further strengthened its occurrence. This
brought a new dimension to the inhabitants of Perak in contrast to the pre-colonial
economy in which land was the prerogative of the Sultan. Private ownership allowed
them to sell land to raise money to be used as production capital or to pay off loans.
Along with the changes that took place in the land alienation system, the British also
introduced an agricultural policy based on the parallel development ofboth native as well
as plantation cultivation. While the plantation policy was a success, native agricultural
policy was not. Although it was intended that the peasant economy would focus on the
cultivation of rice, other factors emerging from market forces and the physical
infrastructural transformation of Perak prevented this from happening. The colonial
government's directives to restrict cultivation only to rice, fruits and vegetables were not
39For the development of the tin andrubber industries during the colonial period, see Chapter5.
40Jomo(1988),p.ll.
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adhered to because small farmers were drawn into commercial agriculture and
commodity exchange.41
In the new economic order, peasants' attitudes towards production changed, along with
the removal of traditional constraints on labour. Labour was diverted into market-based
activities, particularly in those areas close to tin mines or commercial centres where
income-generating opportunities abounded. The emphasis on production for exchange
had also contributed to the undermining of the Malay concept of gotong-royong (mutual
help). At the same time rice cultivation began to play a less central role due to its
relatively low returns. Although it provided the staple food, the surplus if any, only
allowed the peasants to improve their income marginally43 while other available
productive activities such as the planting of cash crops, for example, gambier, pepper,
and tapioca could provide faster and better returns.44 The increasing population of Perak
also created an ever-increasing demand for food products, including rice, for sale in the
market place.
While rice cultivation had been the main activity pursued, the introduction of rubber
planting in the early 20th century intensified peasant commodity production as it fitted
well with the peasants' limited resources and provided better returns.45 The response
from the peasants was so dynamic that by 1910 peasant rubber smallholding had already
41For a detailed account ofthe peasantry during the colonial period, seeLim Teck Ghee (1977), pp.229-35.
42Mokhzani Abdul Rahim (1973). 'Credit in the Malay Peasant Economy', Ph.D. Thesis, London:
University of London, p.429.
43Sharom Ahmat (1984). Tradition and Change in a Malay State: AStudy of the Economic and Political
Development1878-1923, MBRAS, Monograph No. 12, p.176.
44Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.135; Kratoska, P. H. (1975). The Chettiar and the Yeoman, Occasional Paper
No.32, Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.8.
45Ibid,p.231.
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dominated a large section of the commercial economy in the agricultural sector. With
this, larger and more regular income consumption patterns began to change.
Another development that further exposed the population of Perak to the exchange
economy was new capital investment undertaken by the colonial government, particularly
for the construction of railways and roads. Communication, therefore, became more
efficient with easier movement of goods to fulfil new demands in consumption.46 Along
with it came the import of technologies for the production and maintenance of transport,
and the development ofknowledge and skills to maintain and operate the equipment.
3.4 Foreign and local investment
During the period between 1874 to 1957 Perak became increasingly dependent on the
outside world for consumable products and was integrated into a wider capitalist
economy. The important role in generating economic growth was played by local and
foreign investment.
The increase of control by the British over Malaya led to rapid economic development
based primarily on the exploitation of raw materials and the market for manufactured
goods from the West. Thus, the capitalist industrializing 'metropole' became linked to the
Malayan 'satellite'. The capitalists* decision to invest in Perak was based on the usual
consideration of profits and security within the framework of a reliable, smooth
46For a detailed historical description of infrastructural development, especially roads and railways, see
AmarjitKaur(1985). Bridge and Barrier: Transport and Communications in Colonial Malaya 1870-1957,
Singapore: Oxford University Press.
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functioning, developing capitalist economy. In this section, the development and
transformation of local and foreign investment47 that took place in Perak during the
colonial period in the tin mining and rubber-growing sectors will be examined.
Tin mining had long pre-dated British intervention in Perak. The Malays were known to
be the early tin-miners. However, it was only after the arrival of Chinese entrepreneurs
from the Straits Settlements that a rapid increase in investments and the commercial
production of tin took place, even though during the initial stage 'they [the Chinese]
remained cautious andrefrained from direct involvement in production'.48 Right from the
beginning, the Chinese seized the opportunities created by the colonial administration.
There are no statistics available pertaining to their total investment during the initial
years. However, given the basic technology involved in Chinese tin production, it can be
inferred that investment in capital fixed assets was low. Production was extremely
labour-intensive and shortage of labour therefore necessitated more foreign labour from
South China to be imported under the credit-ticket system;49 this system required heavy
upfront capital investment on the part of mine-owners.
Chinese investment in tin mining in Perak did not come from Mainland China but was
primarily from Chinese in the British colony of Penang. These were immigrants who had
Foreign investment in this section relates to capital brought into Perak from outside Malaya while local
investment comprises private capital investments raised within Malaya. The issue of investments, however,
can only be presented in terms ofscale and trend, as complete data are not available.
48Jomo(1988),p.l61.
This system refers to the importation of Chinese foreign labour whose passage was paid by coolie-brokers
and later transferred to mine-owners. The immigrants, in exchange, had to provide services to the mine-
owner for a specified period to settle the debt. This system became common towards the end of the 19*
century. Prior arrivals were unassisted and voluntary. For details of the system, see Yip Yat Hoong
(1969); also Chai Hon-Chan (1967), pp.102-27; Jomo (1988), p.162.
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arrived much earlier and had established themselves as merchants and traders. They had
accumulated significant wealth and were ready to divert it into the tin mining industry.
So far, no estimate of the size of Chinese investment in Perak's tin mining has been
carried out. However, we can examine the following figures to obtain a rough idea of the
scale of investment in the early years of mining: by the late 1880s the number of Chinese
immigrants in Perak was about 80,000 people;50 about half of these were on the credit-
( ri cry
ticket system; and the price of each credit-ticket immigrant was between $20 to $29.
Therefore, the amount of upfront investment required just to bring in part of their labour
needs alone amounted to between $800,000 and $1,160,000, excluding other production
investment needed for the mining operations. This was at a period when Larut was on
the verge of maximum production and Kinta was just coming on stream, later to become
the largest tin producing area in the world. The credit-ticket system, however, declined
in popularity towards the end of the 19th century,53 partly due to the excessive cost
charged by coolie-brokers and partly due to opposition by the Chinese government,
which eventually saw its abolition in 1914.
At the beginning of the 20th century a new system of tin mine operation known as the
tribute or hun system54 emerged. New mines were opened by groups of immigrant
labourers who by then had fulfilled their obligations under the credit-ticket system and
50Fermor, L. L. (1939). Report upon the mining industry of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Government Press
p.22.
3lYip Yat Hoong (1969), p.75.
52Ibid., The price of a credit-ticket immigrant was Malayan $17-$20 in 1876 and increased to $29-$30 in
1890. It is therefore appropriate to assume that the price between both years was somewhere in between as
demand for labourers was on the increase.
53Perak Government Gazette 1894 (PGG), p.152.
54This system is based onprofit-sharing among all involved in the tin extraction operations with the leader
commanding a bigger share. See Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.113; Yip Yat Hoong (1969), pp.80-1; Jomo
(1988),p.l67.
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were 'free' labourers. In the FMS, by 1903, almost 50% of the 186,337 Chinese
immigrant labourers were working under this system55, which led to a change in the
investment structure of tin mines. The rest were employed either as wage earners or were
under contract. The initial high capital investment on labour input was no longer required
as almost the entire workforce were 'shareholders'. The Chinese mining system finally
declined as the extraction techniques employed, which relied on easily accessible
deposits, were becoming unsuitable. Towards the end of the 1920s Chinese dominance
was replaced by Western enterprises.
Western involvement in tin mining was slow to start. This delay was attributed to the
mismatch between the needs of the industry and the Western technology brought in
during the early stage. Western technology, along with a broad organisational structure,
promoted high operating costs56 that were unable to compete with the Chinese. Despite
the assurance given by the colonial administration on the stable political situation as well
as incentives offered to the Western capitalists, such as large grants of mining land given
to initiate mining activities, it was not until the 1880s that there was a response.
Swettenham57 reasoned that this situation was such because 'British capitalists declined
to risk even small sums in the Malay States till years after the enterprise and industry of
the Chinese had established and developed the mines'.58 Although only scanty
information is available on Western companies operating in the tin mimng industry in
55Chai Hon-Chan (1967), tableonp.122.
56Allen, G. C. and Donnithorne, A. G. (1962). Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya, London:
George Allen &Unwin Ltd., p. 151.




Perak prior to 1900, the first Western enterprise to be established was a French company
known as Societe des Mines d'Etains de Perak in 1883.59 The first British enterprise to
venture into tin mining was the Gopeng Mining Company, floated in 1892 with Cornish
capital.60 By the end of the century both companies were the only two Western
enterprises operating in Perak,61 though two other companies had been established but
had closed their operations down for unknown reasons. The total investment of foreign
companies in Perak prior to 1900 cannot be estimated. However, it was reported that
between 1882 and 1900 a total of 47 British tin mining companies were registered in the
FMS with a total authorised capital of £4.8 million and an estimated issued capital of
£1.9 million.62 Some of these companies did not even commence actual operation and
for those that did, they failed to survive the competition from the Chinese and the low tin
price during the period 1894 to 1898.63 It was not known for certain why only four, out
of 47 companies registered, were in operation in Perak. It could, however, be due to the
overwhelming presence of the Chinese in the state that these companies decided to
operate in other Malay States.
Post-1900 foreign investment in tin mining is better documented. The revival of the tin
price at the beginning of the 20th century that surpassed the £100 per ton mark saw
59Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.164; Yip Yat Hoong (1969), pp.96-7. From 1886 onwards this company was
amalgamated with another French company, and known as Societe des Etains de Kinta with a combined
capital of 3 million francs, see Rawlins J. S. D., 'The French enterprises in Malaya' in JMBRAS, 39(2),
1966, p.53.
60Ibid.,p.l65;Ibid.,p.97.
61Parry (1898), pp.25-6cited in YipYat Hoong (1969), p.97.
62In Tinland, Vol. IV, No.9, August 1908, p.138 citedin Yip Yat Hoong(1969), pp.98-9, Table 1-8. These
figures contradicted the view of Tregonning, based on the reasons for British intervention in the Malay
States that there was almost no British capital investment in the Malay States up to 1896, see Tregonning,
K. G. (1964). A History ofModernMalaya, London: Eastern Universities Press Ltd., p.143.
63SeeTable 5.3.1 in Section 5.3.
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foreign investment, particularly British, begin to increase. By 1939, there was a total of
129 European companies operating in the FMS.64 Again, although complete data on
investment by foreign companies engaged in all modes of tin production is unavailable,
the total issued capital in dredging compames operating in Perak during the period 1900-
1957 provides an indication of the level of investment (see Table 3.4.1).




Siamese Tin Syndicate Ltd.
Pengkalen Ltd.
Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd.
Kamunting Tin Dredging Ltd.
Taiping Consolidated Ltd.
Johan Tin Dredging Ltd.
Southern Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd.
Tanjung Tin Dredging Ltd.
10 Kinta Kellas Tin Dredging Ltd.
11 KramatTin Dredging Ltd.
12 Kg. Lanjut Tin Dredging Ltd.
13 Kuala Kampar Tin Fields Ltd.
14 Larut Tin Fields Ltd.
15 Lower Perak Tin Dredging Ltd.
16 Southern Kinta Consolidated Ltd.
17 Sungei Bidor Tin Dredging Ltd.
18j Austral Amalgamated Tin Ltd.
Place of Registration Year Issued Capital
London 1901 £ 2,150,375
London 1906 819,600
Redruth 1907 270,919
London 1911 £ 1,852,445
London 1912 668,750
Kuala Lumpur 1917 £ 1,027,000
Ipoh 1920 15,869
London 1925 £ 1,441,667
London 1925 371,667
London 1926 105,000
Kuala Lumpur 1926 330,000
Kuala Lumpur 1928 800,000
Kuala Lumpur 1928 615,000
Kuala Lumpur 1928 60,000




Source:Collatedfrom Yip Yat Hong (1969). The Development ofthe Tin-mining Industry ofMalaya, Universityof Malaya
Press, pp.349-350.
The data presented in Table 3.4.1 require several comments. First, five of these
companies also had mining operations in other states in Malaya or in Thailand. Second,
the amounts mentioned are confined to issued capital and they exclude reinvested profits.
Third, although almost half of these companies were registered in Malaya, they were
S4Yip YatHoong(1969), p.291.
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essentially considered foreign, as local ownership only ranged from 4.1% to 38.8%.65
The first and third observations suggest that the total investment by foreign tin dredging
compames is overstated and the second understated. However, it is likely that between
1900 and 1957 the total investment of foreign dredging companies alone amounted to
more than £13 million, excluding other methods of tin extraction as well as
investment in the pre-1900 era. These figures give a clear indication of the substantial
foreign investment in tin mining in Perakduring the colonial period.
Despite the colonial government's concentration on the production and export of tin, it
was also concerned to develop plantation agriculture. Foreign capitalists, especially from
theWest, were encouraged to invest in this sector as well. The incentives were primarily
in the form of grants for large tracts of land and special premiums and land rents. In
some cases, no premium was demanded, coupled with free land rent for the first few
years.66 It was sugar cultivation that first attracted both local and foreign capitalists in the
mid-1870s, primarily to Krian. About a decade later coffee became important and
towards the end of the 1890s European planters acquired 35,000 acres for coffee,
although only 1,500 acres were cultivated.67 It was also reported that during the same
period 76 estates were in existence covering 71,636 acres, though only a quarter were
actively cultivated (see Appendix l).68 Within the period of 1900-10 both these crops,
however, declined in importance due to the dramatic price fluctuations and competition
65Ibid.,p.352, Table V-3.
The following terms were offered to prospective planters: lease or leases in perpetuity for 1,000 acres in
oneblock or in blocks of not less than 500 acres each. No premium charged anda quit rent of 20 cents an
acre after 2 years ofoccupation. If desired, apremium of$3 anacre and no quit rent (PGG1891, p.419).
67LimTeck Ghee (1976), p.117.
680wnership breakdown is as follows: 33 Europeans, 39 Chinese, 1 Indian, 1 Malay, and 2 mixed
ownership. Although the number of European estates is less than the Chinese, in terms of acreage
European estates, onaverage, were almost double the size of Chinese estates, see PGG 1898, pp.434-5.
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in the world markets. At the point at which colonial agricultural development policy was
deemed to have failed, it was rubber, which provided a new impetus and helped
counterbalance the concentration on tin production. This development also provided a
significant contrast to the tin economy because from the initial stages European
capitalists were dominant in this industry. Due to the attractive price of the commodity
and easy maintenance of the crop Malay smallholders also took up cultivation and were
later joined by the Indians.
The funds for investment in the rubber industry were provided for from different sources
for different groups of cultivators. Foreigners were primarily involved in estates.69 The
Chinese and the Indians were involved in estates as well as smallholdings, while the
Malays were limited only to smallholdings. Foreign capital investment, mainly from the
Europeans, came in primarily via merchant houses that were actively promoting
investment in the London capital market.70 They acted as the link between the investors
overseas and the plantations, and often the merchant houses themselves managed the new
ventures. Chinese investment was divided into two categories: the first consisted of
Chinese capitalists who had accumulated capital from tin mining and reinvested it in the
rubber industry and the second comprised smallholders who undertook cultivation
either as the main or as a supplementary activity. The Indians who were involved in
rubber estates for the most part tended to be associated with Chettiar financing activities
69A rubber estate is defined officially in the Rubber Statistics Handbook as 'land, contiguous or non
contiguous aggregating not less than 100 acres in area planted with rubber or on which planting of rubber is
permitted, and under a single legal ownership'; similar definition is applicable to smallholdings except that
the area is less than 100 acres.
70AUen &Donnithorne (1962), p.112; Ramasamy, P. (1994). Plantation Labour, Unions, Capital, and the
State in Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.17. Apart from the British,
French, Belgian and American capital was also invested in the rubber industry in Malaya.
71LimChong Yah(1969), p.115.
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whose funds originated from India.72 As for the Malays, their involvement in the
subsistence economy left them little or no capital for investment in the rubber industry
during the colonial period.73 While those with capital opened new land, those without
would substitute part of their own cultivated area with rubber trees.
As in tin mining, the growth of investment in the rubber industry was phenomenal (see
Table 3.4.2). From 1905 to 1909 the total acreage increased almost six-fold. Although
no segregation was given for estates and smallholdings, the major acreages belonged to
European estates because at this time smallholder rubber cultivation was in its early
stages. In terms ofbringing an estate to maturity the estimates of the capital costs for this
period was between £20 to £60 peracre.74 Taking it further, in 1921 total estate holdings
Table 3.4.2 Perak: Rubber acreage, 1905-1909
Year 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
Acreage 11,934 29,612 46,167 56,706 68,278
Sources: Chai Hon-Chan (1967). The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, p. 155; Lim Teck Ghee (1977). Peasantsand theirAgriculturalEconomyin ColonialMalaya
1874-1941, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.95.
in Perak were 231,893 acres75 andthe estimated capital expenditure then was £70 to £100
per acre.76 Using these estimates, the capital investment in 1909 would be between £1.4
72Tan Tat Wai (1982). Income Distribution andDetermination in West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, pp.270-1, 280; Lim Chong Yah (1969), p.l 12. Chettiar financing was known to have
existed in the pre-colonial period as well.
73Lim Chong Yah (1969), p.115.
74Allen & Donnithorne (1962), p.l 11 estimated the cost to be £21 to £25 per acre depending on location;
Drabble, J. H., 'The Plantation Rubber Industry in Malaya up to 1922', JMBRAS, 1967, p.54 estimated £20
per acre; Drabble, J. H. (1973). Rubber inMalaya, 1876-1922: The Genesis oftheIndustry, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, pp.98-100 revised his estimates to £60 per acre; Thoburn, J. T. (1977). Primary
Commodity Exports andEconomicDevelopment: Theory, Evidenceand a Study ofMalaysia, London: John
Wiley & Sons, pp.63-4 also presented the same issue in the context ofMalaya for the period 1905-22.




million and £4.1 million; and in 1921 between £11.5 million and £16.4 million.
However, this simple assumption also carries a drawback in that when the rubber price
was high such as in 1910 when it fetched £1.05 per pound, it is likely that the opening of
new land by estates was financed by reinvestment ofprofits rather than by new inflows of
funds from abroad. At other times when prices were lower it is probable that only part of
the investment was met by foreign investment. On the other hand, it is also crucial to
remember that the contribution by smallholders in the rubber industry was high. By 1921,
for example, smallholders represented 48% of the total rubber cultivated area of 447,186
acres78 in Perak. These were local cultivators whose capital expenditure per acre would
not be as high as estate operators because title-holders or family members generally
provided the labour. Nevertheless, their investment inputs should not be underestimated.
In addition, at a macro-level, Mills estimated total foreign investment in the Malayan
rubber industry towards the end of 1930 to be between US$248 and US$277 million.79
The Rubber Growers Association, whose members comprised mainly British companies
and agency houses, also reported that the total book value of issued capital in 1941 was
almost £65 million or about US$260 million.80 Towards the end of the colonial period in
Malaya, Europeans controlled 83% of the estates followed by Chinese 14% and Indians
3%.81
77In arriving at the capitalexpenditure figures for 1921 the acreage for 1909 hasbeendeducted sincethese
estates had reached maturity.
78September 1921 Census of Rubber Areas, FMS cited in LimTeckGhee (1977), p.175.
79Mills(1958),p.28.
30Stahl (1951), p.106 citedin Parmer (1960), p.9.
81Puthucheary (1960), pp.26-8.
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Although emphasis had been given to tin mining and agriculture especially rubber, there
were also other crops cultivated in the plantation sector such as oil palm, which was
introduced in the late 1910s. However, it was not of major economic importance then.
Other industries such as banking and finance, shipping, insurance, land transport,
communications, general contracting, and retail businesses also made a contribution to
the development of the economy but primarily based on the two commodities, tin and
rubber. It is difficult to quantify these investments, specifically in Perak. For a general
estimate of the total outstanding business investments across Malaya made by the West,
Cailis (1942:56) estimated it to be US$194 million in 1914, which increased to US$447
million in 1930, but reduced to US$372 million in 1937.82 It was also estimated that
about two-thirds of the 1937 investment figure was in rubber plantations and one-sixth in
tin mining.
The presence of the colonial administration in Perak had served substantially in
expanding the export economy.83 As for the private sector, both local and foreign, the
accumulated wealth and reinvested profits from commerce had provided the initial capital
for investments.84 Later, corporate flotation overseas, especially in tin and rubber,
became important. This period also saw the growth of both secondary and tertiary
industries in the state but this was limited to the major export-related industries.
Divisions in the economy also accompanied these developments: foreigners dominated
82Cited in Allen & Donnithorne(1962), p.290.
On the other hand, the Chinese gross investment in Malaya in 1937 was estimated to be £50 million, see
Quah Chooi Hon, "The Chinese in Malaya (1786-1941)' in Journal of the Historical Society, Vol. 4,
1965/66, Kuala Lumpur: University ofMalaya, pp.74-82.
83This assertion is put forward as tin and other products, except rubber were already export items prior to
colonial administration in Perak.
84Thoburn (1977), p.59; Jomo(1988), p.151; Drable (2000), p.54.
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much of the international trade whilst the Chinese were dominant in the local commodity
circuits. The Malays and Indians were not dominant due to their inability to raise large
amounts of capital. The extent of inward investment brought about by both local and
foreign capitalists was enormous during the colonial period, and it was private enterprises
that became the main engine of economic growth and development, integrating Perak
inextricably into the global economy.
3.5 Population and the influx of foreign labour
The Industrial Revolution in the 18th century had generated the need for raw materials
and the mineral wealth of Perak, as one of the reasons for British intervention in the state,
has been mentioned. However, sufficient labour was essential to exploit these natural
resources, but it was usually in short supply. Colonial powers would generally turn to
their other colonies or to other territories to meet this production factor shortfall. At the
beginning of the British administration, the population of Perak was about 70,000 and
with the vast size of the state, the population was deemed grossly insufficient for
economic development. In meeting these challenges, the growth of population became
an important issue to be dealt with if transformation of the state from a traditional to a
modern state was to be achieved. This section, therefore, briefly examines demographic
growth and issues relating to it.
From the census first carried out in 1879 to the independence of Malaya in 1957, a period
of 78 years, the population of Perak multiplied more than 14 times (see Table 3.5.1).
Similar to other states in Malaya the main factor in this rapid growth in Perak was not
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due to a natural increase but through immigration, particularly of Chinese and Indians.85
The annual growth rate of the Malay population between 1891 and 1957 was 2.3%, the
Chinese 2.7%, and the Indian a substantial growth of 3.8%. By 1901, the Chinese
population had gained numerical superiority over the Malays. However, immigration was
also an important source ofMalayincreasein Perak due mainly to the availabilityof land
and incentives offered by the colonial government to boost agricultural development
activities. The majority of the 'foreign' Malays came unassisted from different parts
Table 3.5.1 Perak: Population growth, 1879-1957, selected years
Year Malays Chinese Indians Others Total
1879 n.a n.a n.a n.a 80,984
1891 106,393 95,227 15,143 1,056 217,869
1901 145,034 151,192 35,037 2,515 333,778
1911 203,791 219,435 74,771 4,362 502,359
1921 244,270 227,602 134,215 5,082 611,169
1931 280,247 332,584 163,940 8,889 785,660
1947 360,631 444,509 140,176 8,622 953,938
1957 484,530 539,334 178,623 18,959 1,221,446
Sources: Del Tufo (1949). Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population,
Federation of Malaya, Appendix C, p.585; Department of Statistics Malaysia (1959).
1957: State ofPerak, Report No.8, p.l.




of the neighbouring Netherlands East Indies (later Indonesia) and established settlements
throughout Perak, mainly based on family and kin ties.87 The Javanese settled mainly in
the Lower Perak and Krian areas, the Banjarese in Selama and Lower Perak, Sumatrans
85,Thepopularityof Perak being an importantdestination for foreigners during the last two decades of the
19 centurycan be seen from their arrivalsand departures as presented in Appendix2.
For detailed information on immigration in the Federated Malay States during the early colonial period,
see Sadka (1968), pp.324-331; for the whole colonial period covering Malaya, see Lim Chong Yah (1969),
Chapter 7; and covering both periods, see Tengku Shamsul Baharin (1964). 'The Indonesians in Malaya',
M.A. Thesis, United Kingdom: University of Sheffield.
The in-migrationof Malays from various parts of the Netherlands Indies to Perak pre-dated the colonial
period, see Othman Mohd Yatim, "Orang-Orang Melayu di Jajahan Dindings (Perak): Satu tinjauan
tentang asal-usul dan corakpenghidupan mereka' in Malaysia inHistory, Vol. 20, No.1, June 1977,pp.8-
20; also Jackson (1972), pp.79, 90.
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in Kinta, and the Pattanis in Ulu Krian and Ulu Perak.88 Official records from 1888 to
1902 show that the net in-migration of 'foreign' Malays totalled 12,400 (see Appendix
3). With regard to migration within the Malayan Peninsula, most of the Malays came
from Kedah and Perlis to settle in the rice cultivation areas of Krian, Kurau and Selama
while theKelantanese settled in almost alldistricts in Perak.90 These immigrants from the
'Malay world' basically shared a common religion and way of life, an agricultural
economy and political culture in the sense of having monarchical structures, and, to a
certain extent a common language. They therefore eventually became assimilated within
the local environment and later became identified as Malays without the distinction
between 'local' and 'foreign'.
During the early years of the British administration when tin production was actively
pursued, the Malays were incapable of meeting the shortage of labour. The local Malay
population was then small and when Malay immigrants began increasing, they too were
not involved in the tin mining industry.91 The working conditions in the industry were
unattractive to the Malays, and the colonial government did not encourage their
participation. The statistics for 1921 revealed that 57.3% of the Perak population were
active in the agricultural sector, about three-quarters comprising Malays.92 Almost three
decades later the population census of 1947 also showed that the concentration in this
88Sadka(1968),p.328.
Tlowever, the actual number is definitely much higher as the figure above relates to those immigrants
coming in to Perak through the ports ofTeluk Anson and Port Weld only; see also fh.91 below.
90Ibid.
9lReports Encouraging the Cultivation ofRice (1892), p.4 cited in Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.71.
In 1891 alone an estimated 2,743 immigrants entered Perak all ofwhom were foreign Malays except 152.
92Calculated from Nathan, J. E. (comp.) (1922). The Census ofBritish Malaya 1921, London: The Crown
Agent for the Colonies, Table XXXII.
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sector remained about the same at 58.3%.93 By 1957, agriculture continued to be the
primary occupation of the Malays with the main concentration found in the rice and
rubber cultivation sub-sectors.94 But compared with the 1947 census, it was also during
this period that the Malays were gradually expanding their involvement in the non-
traditional sectors of the economy, especially in building and construction, commerce,
and transport and communication. Most apparent was the increasing Malay involvement
in the public service, especially in security and defence.
The migration of Chinese to Perak was already evident before the arrival of the British,
primarily due to the mining industry, though the intensity was very much subject to the
demand and price of tin.95 After intervention, the flow of Chinese immigrants was
increased as a result of the British policy to accelerate economic growth. Table 3.5.2
shows the numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants by year of first arrival to Perak.96
Although by 1947, the total of Chinese immigrants in Perak was 153,361 it is suspected
that this is substantially below the actual figure. Firstly, during the height of tin
production in the pre-1900 period Larut alone was reported to have had already some
40,00097 Chinese immigrants. Secondly, it excluded immigrants who had arrived inother
states and later moved to Perak. The flow of Chinese immigrants also corresponded
closely to the economic demands of the industry.
"Calculated from Del Tufo, M. V. (1949). Malaya: Areport on the 1947 Census ofPopulation, Table 79.
Population Census of 1957 is also available but direct comparison is not possible due to category changes
made to the sectors.
94For a detailed breakdown according to industry, see Department of Statistics, Malaysia (1959b).
Population Census 1957, ReportNo.8, State ofPerak, pp.58-69.
95For the development during most ofthe colonial period, see Quah Chooi Hon (1965/66), pp.74-82.
96Immigration of Chinese to Malaya was estimated to be at least 5 million during the 19 century and a
further 12 million between 1900-1940 of which the majority had returned to China (Ibid., p.76); the scale
of Chinese arrivals and departures into Perakbetween1888and 1902can also be seen in Appendix 3.
97Gullick(1987),p.367.
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Table 3.5.2 Perak: Chinese and Indian immigrants by year of first arrival
Year Chinese Indians






Not known 3,506 1,928
Total 153,361 62,561
Source: Collated from Del Tufo (1949). Malaya: A Reporton the 1947 Census ofPopulation, Government
of the Federation ofMalaya, p.346, Table 51.
The involvement of the Chinese in the Perak economy was relatively diversified. The
majority of them were active in commerce especially shopkeeping and labouring.
Changes that took place within the colonial period saw their gradual decline in
agriculture and tin mining and their increase in the manufacturing, commerce, transport
and communication, and service sub-sectors. By the end of the colonial period, the
Chinese were the dominant players in the economy leaving the Malays and Indians
behind.
The growth of the Indian population in Perak was closely associated with the
development of the rubber plantation industry. The Indians mainly comprised labourers
brought into Perak to work in the rubber estates in rural areas as well as in the Public
Works Department.98 The dominance of Indian immigrants in the rubber estate sector is
shown in Table 3.5.3. While the immigration of Chinese was a response within their
community to the vicissitudes of the demand for labour, the immigration of Indians was
based more on an inter-government agreement. Government subsidies were provided to
98Indian labour participation in the tin mining sector was small. For example, in 1906 therewere only about
7,000 of them working in tin mines throughout the state (PGG 1907, p.10).
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facilitate Indian immigration." From a total of 15,143 Indians in 1891, the population
had grown to 178,623 in 1957 (see Table 3.5.1). The most remarkable increase was in
Table 3.5.3 Perak: Estate population by race, selected years
Year Malay Chinese Indians Others Total
1911 12,732 16,403 33,122 n.a n.a
1921 5,401 6,648 75,840 1,030 88,919
1931 2,402 7,171 75,362 1,019 85,954
1947 5,999 12,956 60,979 674 80,608
Sources: Collated from Nathan (comp.) (1922). The Census of British Malaya 1921, London:
The Crown Agent for the Colonies, Table LVI1I; Vlieland (comp.) (1932). British Malaya: A
Report on the 1931 Census, London, Table 22; Del Tufo (1949). Malaya: A Report on the 1947
Census ofPopulation, Government of the Federation ofMalaya, Table 111.
1921 when the population almost doubled compared to the previous decade. This
corresponded well with the expansion of rubber estates; in 1909, there was 68,278100
acres of land planted with rubber and in 1934 estates covered 553,040 acres.101 This is
despite the fact that war took place between these years and large numbers of immigrant
labourers were thrown out of employment. Immediately afterwards, the rubber rush
began again and the Indian population grew rapidly. Another reason for the increase in
the Indian population was the practice of estate employers replacing Chinese labourers
with Indians to keep production costs down, as the latter were cheaper to employ. By
1938, the inter-government immigration arrangement ceased officially, which saw the
decline in the recruitment of Indian labourers from southern India.
Overall immigration and emigration in Perak were sensitive to economic conditions and




Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p. 15.
Chai Hon Chan (1967), p.155.
Grist, D. H. (1936). An Outline ofMalayan Agriculture, Department of Agriculture, Straits Settlements
and Federated Malay States, p.74.
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large number of immigrants who willingly came to Perak provides an indication of the
economic prosperity of the state as well as the outcome of the liberal policies adopted by
the colonial government. By the end of British administration, as population growth kept
rising, a rapid rise in production was needed and new employment opportunities were
created to absorb the increasing labour force. The pre-colonial, unspecialised, largely
subsistence-based mode of production had changed to a market system based on wage
labour and capital. One of the important consequences of colonial economic policy was
the large foreign immigration to the state and the establishment of a multi-ethnic society.
The phenomenal growth in population was also closely linked to the colonial land policy
to which we now turn.
3.6 Land policy during the colonial period
Under British administration, the traditional land use and tenure system had to change to
suit the demands and requirements of the emerging market economy. The use of land as
collateral that had emerged during the late pre-colonial period inevitably became more
prominent during the colonial period. During the early stages of British administration,
the tin mining industry was already capable of high production and provided revenues to
enable the state to finance its administrative structure and economic development. The
abundance of land in relation to demand provided the British with extremely favourable
conditions for the introduction of a new land policy. This section, therefore, examines
the changes that took place among the peasantry with the introduction of the new land
policy.
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The colonial land policy was derived from the Australian Torrens system. In its
formation no attempt, however, was made to include any of the Malay customary land
rules within the new system as these were viewed as unsuitable for the operation of a
capitalist economy. As such, the new system undermined the position of the Malays and
the disagreement that arose 'must have symbolised the struggle between British
civilisation andOriental anarchy'.103 Ofutmost importance wasthe change in the concept
of land as a factor of production to a commercial commodity available for exchange or
sale.
Pre-colonial land rights were based on the premise of land worked on and there was no
limit to the size of the cultivated area. Instead, in the colonial period all parcels of land
were alienated with specific ownership allotted to them either to an individual or group of
individuals or enterprises, particularly to those involved in mining and rubber growing.
The scale at which land had been applied for and alienated was remarkable (see Table
3.6.1). The balance was designated as state land. Under this new land policy, the Malay
peasants could not cultivate any vacant land as before and those without land ownership
were either forced to rent from others or seek employment elsewhere as wageworkers.
This changing structure of land ownership therefore resulted in limitations on land
availability and competition for land among the peasants. While foreign capitalists were
i02For a detailed examination of the development of land policy specifically for Perak during the early
colonial period, see Lim Teck Ghee (1976); and for all Malay States, see Wong (1975); also Wilson, H. E.,
'The Evolution of Land Administration in the Malay States: A Survey of British-Inspired Changes' in
JMBRAS, 48(1), 1975, pp. 120-133.
103Ibid.,p.l56.
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able to obtain state land for their large economic ventures104 and the immigrant settlers
were offered land by the government administration,105 the local inhabitants could only
acquire land either through purchase or inheritance. In any case, acquisitions were almost
certainly made by members of the Malay upper class as purchasers. In other cases, they
were the result of land foreclosed by creditors for loans not paid against the land used as
collateral.
Table 3.6.1 Perak: Land alienated for mining and agriculture 1889-1902
Year Mining Agriculture
No. of titles Acres No. of titles Acres
1889 1,090 11,995 32,925 145,674
1890 1,322 21,958 35,905 152,192
1891 1,687 28,525 39,993 140,555
1892 1,842 32,069 41,222 154,097
1893 2,073 36,262 40,795 138,962
1894 3,356 39,901 47,358 157,209
1895 2,864 50,912 49,787 180,958
1896 3,750 67,553 52,652 208,254
1897 4,390 84,301 54,860 231,691
1898 4,931 91,043 55,925 223,217
1899 5,603 100,894 59,363 244,215
1900 5,668 108,824 60,966 257,802
1901 5,888 117,330 49,518 269,333
1902 6,179 122,514 41,175 211,086
; PGG 1894, p.333; PGG 1895,
p.39; PGG 1900, App. C, p.35;
Sources: PGG 1890, p.480; PGG 1891, p.342; PGG 1892, p.295; PGG 1893, p.431
p.385; PGG 1896, p.506; PGG 1897, p.642; PGG 1898, p.432; PGG 1899, App. C,
PGG 1901, App. C, p.39; PGG 1902, App. C, p.27; PGG 1903, App. C, p.28.
The economic boom, especially due to the development of rubber cultivation during the
early 20th century, created a demand for land at an unprecedented level.10 Although a
proportion of purchasers were genuine rubber growers, a considerable number were
acquiring land for speculative purposes. Malay peasants, some of them for reasons of
104In 1891 alone 22 applications for 36,000 acres, mostly from European planters, were submitted to the
state government (PGG 1892, p.295).
105For example, from 1886 to 1891 a total of 4,932 acres comprising 1,651 lots were awarded to Malay
immigrants in government land schemes at Lower Perak to promote agriculture, particularly rice cultivation
(PGG 1892, p.724); similarly in Batang Padang a total of 700 acres were granted to foreign Malays to
cultivate coffee and pepper (Ibid., p.297).
106LimTeck Ghee (1977), pp.114-5.
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hardship, were also influenced materially by the new market economy and therefore were
willing to dispose of their holdings. The scale of land disposal became of considerable
concern to the British and therefore the Malay Reservation Act 1913 was enacted to
protect Malay landholdings.108 Despite its noble intentions, this Act too had its
drawbacks. The objective of preserving Malay landholding was a success but within
Malay society itself this Act inadvertently helped to establish a trend of 'one's possession
becomes someone's dispossession' and the emergence of land concentration and
landlordism among wealthy Malays. The Act too was blamed for the depreciation of land
values under Malay reservations as it commanded low security value for credit purposes.
The Act also stipulated that land transfers and ownership could only occur within the
Malay community, which in turn limited its potential value in the market. Furthermore,
the landed property market among the Malays was not as vibrant because of their lower
economic standing. On the other hand, the non-Malays were not directly affected, except
for the restrictions from purchasing Malay reserved land, and were benefiting from the
high value for their landholdings either through sales or for credit collateral purposes.
Officially, the colonial land policy was supposed to stabilise the indigenous population
by changing them from shifting to permanent cultivators.109 By doing so, the population
could be better controlled and administered. With the end of shifting cultivation, this
policy also resulted in the majority of the Malay peasants becoming illegal cultivators,110
107For development of the MalayReservation Act 1913, see Ibid.,pp. 106-116.
108As an example, the net sales transactions of Malay landholdings to non-Malays in Perakin 1911 was 541
holdings, 741 holdings in 1912, and this further escalated to 1,337 holdings in 1913, see Jagjit Singh Sidhu
(1980),p.l64.
109Gullick (1992), p.197; Jomo (1988), p.86;Official state order to discourage ladang (shifting) cultivation
was passed on January 16, 1890, see Order in Council No. 6 of 1890 (PGG 1890, Vol. 3).
noJomo (1988), p.86.
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largely because they did not possess land and were too poor to purchase it. The new land
policy too created land shortages because large areas were earmarked and developed into
either mining zones or estates, which gradually caused the decline of available land both
in terms of quantity and quality.111 Under the new policy, the peasants were left with
nothing except those lands that were already in their possession. This created land hunger
among them. Furthermore, the infrastructural and financial support was not sufficient to
attract Malay peasants towards sedentary agricultural activities. However, since options
were not available, the majority of them had to turn to their traditional occupation of rice
cultivation whilst looking out for other better economic opportunities.112 This is evident
from the active involvement of Malay peasants in cash crop production, particularly in
the rubber smallholding sector.
Other consequences of the colonial land tenure system were the growth of joint
ownership as well as the subdivision and fragmentation of land.113 While jointownership
did not create difficulties for economic production unless joint owners disagreed among
themselves, subdivision and fragmentation could result in uneconomic production
practices themselves. The subdivision of land eventually resulted in parcels of land that
were too small to work on and economies of scale were lost.114 Fragmentation also meant




113For detailed discussion about these three consequences in relation to Malaya, see Jomo (1988), pp.87-
108.




In the economic development of Perak, the colonial government's contribution to
improving the socio-economic standing of Malay cultivators was delayed, although not
totally absent, because during the early colonial period attention was heavily concentrated
on the economic exploitation of tin. The government did, however, embark on initiatives
to provide rural infrastructural facilities such as the Krian Irrigation Scheme116 and other
smaller schemes and settlements to assist peasants in rice cultivation activities from the
end of the 19th century. These initiatives were also in line with the dualistic agricultural
policy, which distinguished peasant food production, mainly rice, for local consumption
from capitalist cash crop production for export. In both instances where land was the
primary factor of production, glaring differences existed as to the measures taken and
practices adopted in the pursuit of colonial policy objectives. Cash crop production,
which mainly comprised estates, was provided with better access, location, soil quality,
and infrastructure such as roads and railways.117 The provision of cheap land concessions
to capitalists and low agricultural land taxation for immigrants to settle in Perak was not
made available to the peasants. Heavier land tax was in fact imposed on the peasants as
I 1 Q
compared to the estates. Colonial land policy therefore placed Malay peasants in a very
disadvantaged position compared to capitalists and immigrants.119
In sum, the introduction of the new land policy in Perak was part of the colonial
administration's support for a market economy and demonstrated the important
116For early reports on the development of this scheme, see Murray, A. (1898). Report on the Krian
Irrigation Scheme, Perak, Malay Peninsula, Taiping: Perak Government Printing Office; and
O'Shaughnessy, R. G. (1898). Final report on the Krian Irrigation Scheme, Perak, Malay Peninsula,
Taiping: Perak Government Printing Office.
117Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.157.
118Ibid.,p.l28.
In general, 'immigrants' refer to the Chinese and Indians. Malay immigrants were assimilated into the
Malay indigenous community.
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intervention of the state in directing and regulating economic development. The pre-
colonial Malay land system did not encourage progressive wealth accumulation.
However, the colonial Malay Reservation Act, in support of a policy to encourage the
capitalist economy, further marginalized the Malay peasants, and, although colonial land
policy was deemed 'liberal' and an incisive instrument for the development of Perak as a
whole, it worked to the detriment of the indigenous people. Those who gained from such
policies were those capitalists and immigrants who had the capacity to invest and profit
from them.
3.7 Role of the state in economic exploitation
The establishment of British administration in Perak saw a fundamental change in the
role of the state in relation to the economy. In the pre-colonial period, administration was
based on precedents and laws closely related to Islam, and customary practices, and was
decentralised in character. This was replaced by a largely centralised government headed
by a British Resident.
In promoting the market economy as its main objective, the centralisation of the state
administration was crucial for the control of all policies undertaken during the colonial
period. These policies and their implementation, based on Western concepts and
practices, were directed to the preferential treatment of foreign capitalists rather than
smallholders. While the British were fully committed to the economic exploitation of the
state, they neglected and marginalized the peasantry who were mainly restricted to the
production of cheap rice. The absence of provisions to assist smallholders in holding on
106
to their land further aggravated the situation. The growth in the native agricultural sector,
therefore, at least in the first two decades of colonial rule, was barely the product of
colonial policy but the 'spontaneous response to the growing demand for food
products'. A more positive policy towards the native agricultural sector was only
adopted from the late 1890s after rice imports had caused a severe drain on state
revenue.121 hi the rubber industry, policies were also undertaken to inhibit the
involvement of peasants, but these attempts, especially the provisions disallowing rubber
planting among peasants, failed due to the lucrative income from rubber. hi further
strengthening and expediting economic exploitation, the state also served as a provider of
capital for agricultural development. The state's Planters Loan Fund, for example, had,
during the first decade of the 1900s, extended loans for the amounts of $36,000 and
$75,000 to Kuala Kangsar Plantations and Sengali Estate Kinta respectively. The
peasantry, on the other hand, were only offered, in most cases, not more than $100 each
under the Agricultural Loan Fund, which saw 454 loans being disbursed during the
period 1909 to 1911.124 While foreign capitalists had access to substantial state loans, the
local population had only limited access and, therefore, were not involved in any
medium- or large-scale agricultural projects.
No capitalist economy is able to prosper without an adequate labour supply, hi this
context, the colonial state encouraged immigration primarily to serve the tin mining and
120Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.134.
121See Chapter 4 for the development of the rice industry during the colonial period.
122See Chapter 5 for the economic exploitation of tin andrubberduring the colonialperiod.
123Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.96,en.l 1.
124Ibid., p.86; seealsoChai Hon-Chan (1967), pp.161-2.
125Lim TeckGhee(1976), pp.64, 76, 94-5.
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rubber plantation sectors, but also to support the public works sector. The labour policy
too resulted in ethnic segregation and foreign dominance in relation to the economy of
the state as a whole. In addition, while there were Chinese and to a certain extent Indian
business activities, they were overshadowed by the much larger foreign companies,
mainly British, which had access to considerable capital, political influence, and
advanced technology. The role undertaken by the state in initiating economic
development was significant, although it was private enterprise that had a more dominant
role in realising it.
The colonial policy of providing infrastructural facilities further enhanced the economic
exploitation of the state.126 The entire railway system was fully financed by the state.
The first railway line in Malaya was built in Perak, linking Taiping and Port Weld, to
facilitate the transportation of tin more efficiently for export. This network was then
expanded to cover the whole state from north to south linking all the neighbouring states.
Early expansion was carried out westwards to link Ipoh to Telok Anson, an important
port during the period; and the rail system that ran in parallel to the road system was
designed to pass through key mimng locations. As early as 1900 there were already 114
miles ofrailways and over 586 miles of cart roads in Perak. The development ofrubber
was also concentrated close to these transport facilities.
The role of the state therefore focussed on policies that facilitated the exploitation of tin
and rubber. However, this was not a feasible long-term strategy because it resulted in the
I26See fh. 46.
I27Yip YatHoong (1969), p.115.
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creation of an extremely trade-dependent economy based overwhelmingly on two main
export commodities. Nevertheless, an ordered government and unified administration
were established and they promoted rapid economic progress which otherwise would
have been slow and hesitating.
3.8 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has delineated and highlighted those aspects of Perak's colonial history
which bear directly on the problems that the state faced in the post-colonial period. The
transformation of the political and economic structures that occurred during the colonial
period manifested the role played by the state in administering and promoting economic
development, and the consequent changes in the character and structure of Perak society.
At least three major developments took place in Perak during British colonialism. The
first was the clear distinction and separation between the ruler (Sultan), who became
essentially a symbolic figure head, and the government in the state administration in
contrast to the pre-colonial period when both were one and the same; second, strong
emphasis was given to the promotion of the market-driven economy from the previous
feudal system; and third, the introduction of the colonial land system that recognised land
as a commodity. Other subsequent changes that took place were either directly or
indirectly associated with these three major developments.
The primary colonial objective in Perak was the exploitation of tin and rubber for profit,
which were the major commodities that supported the expansion of the export economy.
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The previously limited exchange characteristics of the state were, therefore, changed to a
full-blown exchange economy. Accompanying it was the development of the secondary
and tertiary industries that were absent during the pre-colonial period. The land policy
introduced at the beginning of British colonialism further supported the expansion of the
market economy. At the same time, the expansion of the export economy too resulted in
an increase in trade, both in terms of scale and diversity. The rise in population via
immigration became inevitable to support the human resource requirement of the state.
The expansion in the economy saw state revenues increase significantly from $226,233 in
1875 to $36,181,719 in 1919, an increase of about 160-fold within a 35-year period.128
During the colonial period, a significant flow of capital, both foreign and local, was
invested in Perak, particularly in the tin and plantation industries. To further facilitate
economic expansion, infrastructural development was also carried out. However,
colonial infrastructural and other developments in Perak were justified only insofar as
they facilitated the economic process. The total investment in both the administration
and infrastructure was relatively small compared to the profits reaped and repatriated,
particularly from 1900 to 1942.
An important development in Perak during the British colonialism period was the
emergence of private enterprises that served as the main engines of growth and
accelerated the expansion of the economy. At the end of British colonialism in 1957 the
natural resources that had played such an important role in Perak's position in the world
economy began to lose their status. Reserves of tin were diminishing and both tin and
128See Appendix 4.
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rubber faced serious competition in the global market in terms of price and substitutes.
Dependence on these two primary export commodities, with only limited industrial
capacity and very little other economic activity, created problems towards the end of the
colonial period in terms of economic adaptability, ethnic segregation and regional
inequalities, and posed particular problems for Perak, as a state, closely integrated into
the world markets and heavily dependent on the primary commodities of tin and rubber.
hi sum, the role of the British colonial state in Perak for more than eight decades was
inclined towards facilitating the exploitation of her natural resources. However, in doing
so, the British too had created the conditions for a viable market economy to prosper,




THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF RICE IN AN EXPANDING CAPITALIST
ECONOMY DURING BRITISH RULE
4.1 Introduction
The notion of colonialism in itself requires that in the end it should benefit the
colonial masters themselves. In the case of Perak, the modus operandi was manifested
coherently through the agricultural policy. As Lim has stated "the transformation of
Perak from a Malay negeri to a British protectorate responding to the demands of
Britain's political and economic interest can be seen clearly in the agricultural
development in Perak".l Although the dual agricultural policy emphasised the
importance of both export-oriented as well as native agricultural production, the
efforts expended on both were imbalanced with export-oriented agricultural
production receiving much of the attention.
Traditionally subsistence producers, the Malays were very accustomed to rice
agriculture. The ability to adapt well to the constraints placed upon them by the
surrounding environment generated a peasantry that was 'quite efficient in terms of
ecological circumstances'2 in rice production.3 During the colonial period, the British
recognition of this expertise was probably one reason why the Malays were directed
only towards the rice sector when the colonial administration wanted to promote its
basic food self-sufficiency policy. The Chinese and Indian immigrants were
encouraged to do the same but without any pressure placed upon them. The
^im Teck Ghee (1976), p.ix.
2Jomo(1988),p.55.
The methods of rice cultivation, however, were also influenced by the cultural origin of the cultivator
who, for the most part, consisted of immigrants from the Malay Archipelago, see Jackson (1972),
pp.76-96.
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restrictions and policies introduced in general presented a blow to the peasantry rather
than enriching it. The overall result too was not a success. From 1876 until the end of
the first decade of the twentieth century rice imports remained between 22% to 27%
of the total import trade of Perak. While this represented a narrow margin of
fluctuation, in terms of volume and monetary value it was relatively substantial, as
total import trade had seen a tremendous increase within the period. This significant
increase in rice imports too had raised concerns for the colonial government to
institute new policies and strategies.
This chapter therefore, focuses on the strategic role of rice during the colonial period
with emphasis on the state's requirement for rice, policies and legislation enacted for
it, the infrastructural development for promoting rice production, and the role of the
state in rice agriculture. Examining these issues helps to understand the economic
transformation that took place as a direct result of the role played by the state in rice
production, the success of the policies implemented and differential ethnic
participation in state economic activities.
4.2 The increase in population and the need for rice
In Section 3.5, we have seen that population growth in Perak during the colonial
period had been rapid. Population had grown from about 81,000 in 1879 to over 1.2
million people in 1957 and in a little over two decades from 1879 to the turn of the
century had increased by more than a quarter of a million. The major part of this
increase was the result of foreign immigration to service the expanding tin mining
"See Section 4.2
5See Appendix 5.
6See Table 3.5.1 in Section 3.5
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industry as well as rubber estates and public works. To a much lesser extent the
immigrants were also expected to contribute to the expanding food sectors such as
rice and coconut agriculture. In terms of daily diet, the indigenous Malays and the
Chinese and Indian immigrants had one element in common: all three ethnic groups
had rice as their staple food, which eventually put pressure on the supply of and
demand for the commodity. Rice production in the state did not increase in tandem
with the rapid increase in population.
The cultivation of rice was promoted due to this increase in population and at the
same time such official encouragement also sought to improve the income of the
peasants. Sullivan states that in the late 19th century rice production in Perak was
sufficient to cater for domestic demand.7 This, however, could only be true if it
referred to the indigenous local population, as rice production was largely to meet
subsistence needs. As a state, the rice supply was inadequate. The corresponding
escalation in rice consumption due to the increasing population had to be met by
importing cheap rice from Siam (now Thailand) and Burma (now Myanmar). In the
new colonial capitalist economy the rapidly growing population in the non-
agricultural sectorhad to be fed. As earlyas 1876Perak importedrice worth $180,620
from a total import trade of$831,375.8 Almost two decades later in 1895 rice imports
stood at $2,609,303 out of a total import trade of $9,581,372.9 Over this period rice
importshad increased by about 5% but within a much larger volume of total imports.
The dependence on imported rice therefore became apparentand it worsened, as local
production could not cope with the increase in demand. Table 4.2.1 below confirms
7Sul1ivan, P. (1982). 'Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak* in
JMBRAS, Monograph No. 10, p.23.
8PGG 1889,p.395;PGG 1897, Appendix M, p.663.
9PGG 1895,Appendix B, p.503; PGG 1897, Appendix M,p.663.
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the condition the state was in with regard to its dependence on imported rice. Over the
25-year period from 1876 to 1900 the rice import value increased at an average of
12.6% per annum and by the end of the century it had increased by almost 20-fold.
During the first decade of the twentieth century Perak's dependence on imported rice
did not change much. As a percentage it remained between 20% to 25% of total
imports.10 However, from 1934 to 1938 the percentage haddeclined tobetween 12%-
16% but in terms ofvalue it had remained atan average of $5.5 million a year.11
Table 4.2.1 Perak: Rice imports, 1876- L908
Year Import Value ($) Year Import Value ($)
1876 180,620 1891 1,487,119
1877 202,697 1892 1,807,099
1878 361,249 1893 2,127,163
1879 416,396 1894 2,242,329
1880 488,515 1895 2,609,303
1881 509,664 1896 2,900,080
1882 618,191 1897 2,900,552
1883 801,189 1898 2,695,714
1884 1,037,213 1899 2,781,676
1885 1,062,981 1900 3,499,193
1886 1,143,438 1901 3,940,618
1887 1,210,147 1902 4,306,525
1888 1,373,379 1907 5,621,002
1889 1,579,683 1908 5,936,003
1890 1,541,853
1891, p.489; PGG 1894,
PGG 1899, Aw. B,p.36;
App. B, p.25; PGG 1909,
Sources: Perak Government Gazette(PGG) 1890, p.477; PGG
p.329; PGG 1895, p.381; PGG 1896, p.503; PGG 1898, p.429;
PGG 1900, App. B, p.33; PGG 1902, App. B, p.25; PGG 1903,
p.219; Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.140.
Note: Figures for 1903-6 are not available.
In the FMS, Perak was second to Pahang in land area, comprising almost five million
acres. However, the production of rice was low in relation to the land available.
Although the Malay population throughout the colonial period had never fallen below
10Comparing Table 4.2.1 andAppendix 5;Dun J. Li(1955), p.40.
"Calculated from Rex, M. (1936). Annual Reports on the Social and Economic Progress ofthe People
of Perak 1935, FMS Government Press; Cator, G. E. (1937). Annual Reports on the Social and
Economic Progress ofthe People ofPerak 1936, FMS Government Press; Cator, G. E. (1938). Annual
Reports on the Social and Economic Progress of the People ofPerak 1937, FMS Government Press;
Rex, M. (1939). Annual Reports on the Social and Economic Progress of the People ofPerak 1938,
FMS Government Press.
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35% of the total population12, and rice cultivation was a Malay monopoly, production
was not able to cater for demand. The production of wet padi, for example, in 1952 of
18.93 million13 gantangs was even less than that of 1922 which stood at 21.70
million14 gantangs. The increase inpopulation during the same period was about 40%.
Apart from the Krian district, which had the largest output in Perak, other districts did
not seem to be as productive. Since 1925, with other districts either maintaining or
declining in padi acreages, Krian district alone produced more than 50% of Perak's
total rice output.
The shortage of rice supply in Perak was also compounded by other factors. The
increase in acreages did not necessarily mean a higher level of rice output, although
that was the objective because rice cultivation depends heavily on climatic conditions
and specialised technical know-how for good harvests. Furthermore, other more
lucrative agricultural opportunities were available such as rubber and vegetable
gardening. The increase in technology was much needed to boost productivity to
overcome the over-reliance on imported rice. As such, the Rice Production
Committee, established in 1952, recommended in their report in 1956 that additional
public investment was needed to increase rice production in the state. The result of
these initiatives however, could only be seen years later when British colonialism had
ended. Sadka suggested that the importance of rice began to receive the
administration's attention in the 1890s not because of its economic value but for food
supply stocks for local defences.15 However, it has to be argued that it was the
economic reasons that compelled the administration to focus on rice agriculture. The
Based on Table 3.5.1 in Section 3.5.
13Federation of Malaya. Report ofthe Rice Production Committee 1953, pp.6-9.
1 gantang = 1 gallon = 4.54 litres
14Lim TeckGhee (1977), Appendix 6.2.
l5Sadka(1968),p.356.
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heavy foreign exchange burden in the import trade and the need for an adequate food
supply resulted in the administration's development of food policies. The
administration too anticipated that only with a large and settled agricultural peasantry
would the state be able to meet the food requirements of the population. The
development of these policies by the colonial state will be discussed in the following
section.
4.3 The British food production policy
The British colonial period had successfully transformed Perak into a leading state in
an export-oriented capitalist economy based on the two primary commodities of tin
and rubber. At the same time the state was dependent on the outside world for her
other economic needs. While enjoying tremendous economic progress in terms of
non-food export commodities, the state was simultaneously left heavily dependent on
imported food supplies to feed the increasing population. This increased reliance on
imported food provisions grew proportionately with the growth of population,
particularly that related to the export industries. Rice then became an important
imported food product for the state. The situation too presented a scenario where the
state was dependent on the price vicissitudes of these commodities in the global
market and which therefore put the state in a vulnerable position. While the export
commodities were heavily reliant on world demand and beyond the control of the
state, certain controls and initiatives could be taken to improve or reduce the import
trade. The British food policy was the outcome of these circumstances and focus will
only be directed towards major rice policies as these affected almost all of the
population.
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The colonial administration's serious attention towards food production in the state
was delayed because up until the last decade of the nineteenth century there had been
little difficulty in meeting the needs of the population with the cheap rice imported
from neighbouring countries. For example, in the late 1880s out of the 36,455 acres
that had been alienated for rice cultivation only 7,500 acres were cultivated.16 The
inadequate attention given by the colonial administration towards agriculture led to
the suggestion that agricultural policy in these first two decades was a failure.
However, the administration's interest in domestic food production began to increase
when imported rice became costly and therefore caused great loss in foreign exchange.
It was also a period when cash crop cultivation especially rubber gained popularity so
that peasants drifted away from rice cultivation.18 Although the Department of
Agriculture was established in 1905 to spearhead the development of agriculture, the
support rendered by the colonial administration for rice production was not effective.
The availability of alternative use of resources had also contributed to the
administrative failure to increase rice production.19 The 1913 Malay Reservation Act
was also seen as the first step towards impeding the drift as peasant rice cultivators
owned most of the land under reservation. It also set limits to the type of crop to be
cultivated and encouraged rice cultivation among peasants. Although the Act's
primary objective was to prevent peasants becoming landless, it was also hoped that
rice production would improve. The year of the introduction of the Act too marked
the beginning of the period of the 'Great Malayan Rice Shortage' that ended in 1931.
16Lim Teck Ghee(1976),p.55.
,7Ibid. (1977), p.30. For the development of rice cultivation in Perakprior to 1900see also Hill (1977),
pp.93-118; for Malaya in general, particularly the FMS, see Cheng Siok Hwa (1969), pp.130-144.
18The rapid shift to rubber cultivation not only hampered rice cultivation activities but also other
government initiatives to commercialise agricultural products such as fibres, preserved fruits,
groundnuts, etc. [Kratoska (1984),p.33]
19Jomo(1988),p.61.
20Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.103-31; Cheng Siok Hwa(1969), p.134.
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By 1917, when rice production did not improve as many cultivators violated the
restrictions and the import trade in rice kept increasing, the colonial administration
introduced the Rice Lands Enactment to augment the policy on rice cultivation. This
policy prohibited other crop cultivation apart from rice. It also suppressed
involvement of the peasants in rubber cultivation. The colonial administration saw
this as an effective instrument to preserve rice cultivation activities and protect their
investments as well as preventing the wastage of irrigation facilities. This policy too
did not result in a great increase in rice production.
The first major crisis that forced the state to seriously consider an effective rice policy
was in 1918 when Burma, the major supplier of rice, reduced their exports to Malaya
due to crop failure. In the same year the colonial administration introduced the Food
Production Enactment in the FMS that granted the government wide-ranging powers
to increase food production should the need arise. The crisis worsened when drought
plagued both Burma and Siam. In response to the crisis, rice controls had to be
introduced for the first time. During this control period that ended in 1921, the
colonial administration took over all commercial stock and managed imports of rice
and at the same time had to subsidize the sale of imported rice to consumers. It was
reported that the FMS had incurred a loss of $24 million during the rice control period
in subsidies.22 The severity of the crisis too compelled the administration, under the
powers given by the Enactment, to require the plantation sector to share some
responsibility in food production to meet the state's needs. The overall result of this
initiative was disappointing, as the plantations belonged to the capitalist organisations
31lbid., p.119-20.
^Ibid., p.136 fn.71. Perak being the mostheavily populated state in the FMS during that time had to
incur the majority of these losses.
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and they were not interested. This policy requirement towards the plantation sector
was repealed in 1921.
The Food Production Enactment, however, had positive results for the peasantry.
Coupled with high prices and demand for rice during the period, Perak recorded a
peak in production in 1920 with 13 million gantangs 23 or about 44% of state
consumption. The administrative pressures too resulted in the opening of new rice
fields such as in Kuala Kangsar and Lower Perak (now Hilir Perak). This tremendous
increase in production was short-lived because when the crisis was over and cheap
rice imports began to resume in 1922 rice production began to decline again.
While rice production did not expand significantly, the demand grew enormously as
the population in the ten-year period since the rice crisis began had increased by
almost 29%.24 The persisting rice crisis led to the establishment of the Rice
Cultivation Committee in 1930, which a year later recommended the construction of
drainage and irrigation facilities in promoting rice cultivation.25 The Drainage and
Irrigation Department (DID) was then set up in 1932. Despite their primary function
of consolidating existing rice production and helping intensify it with the provision of
facilities and other advisory assistance, after seven years the increase was marginal.26
Although rice yields increased with the provision of irrigation facilities, this was
offset by the declining acreages during the same period.27 During the early partof the
23lbid., pp.123, 136 fh. 83. Price of padi during the 1911-1914 period wasestimated to be 7 to 8 cents
per gantang, which increased to 11 cents in 1918. In 1919 it further increased to 13 cents per gantang.
These prices are those of the Krian area; in outlying areas the price could be as high as 17 to 18 cents
per gantang.
24Calculated from Table 3.5.1 in Section 3.5.
25This essentially was to promote efficient water control, see Federated Malay States. Report of the
Rice Cultivation Committee 1931, Vol. 1, p.24.
26Jomo(1988),p.62.
"Goldman (1974), p.32 cited in Ibid.
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colonial period, increased tin mining activity and demand for more land had also
contributed to the decline of padi acreages. The increase in aggregate rice production
therefore remained insignificant. The productive yield capacity per acre, however,
was lower than that in areas where there were no irrigation facilities; this led to the
inference that government irrigation facilities, 'by and large, serve only as a
replacement function'. The new nee cultivation schemes introduced by the DID
were seen as more of an inducement to attract peasants to the low paying occupation
of rice cultivation.
From the 1930s onwards no major enactment was introduced except for the
introduction of import duty on rice to raise revenue for further promotion of rice
cultivation.30 After the Second World War the colonial government offered to
purchase rice at a guaranteed minimum price in order to encourage rice production.
This approach had its drawback since the price adjustments were slow and offers were
often below the prevailing market price. In 1952 when the world price of rice began
to rise again the government was forced to re-examine its rice policy. This led to the
establishment of a Rice Production Committee set up to identify methods that could
increase domestic production. Their 1953 report recommended that additional public
investment be employed in fertilizer subsidies, varietal research and data collection,
and also singled out double-cropping31 as the most promising means to increase
ZttLim Chong Yah (1967), p. 165.
29Ibid.
30Jomo(1988),p.63.
31The practice of double cropping was first introduced in Perak by the Japanese during the Second
World War, see Van Thean Kee, 'Cultivation of Taiwan Padi in Perak during the Japanese Occupation'
in The Malayan Agricultural Journal (MAJ), Vol. 31, No.2, April 1948, Department of Agriculture,
pp.119-122.
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output. In their final report in 1956, emphasis was placed on the expansion of
drainage andirrigation facilities to facilitate double cropping.32
Throughout the colonial period, efforts and policies to encourage non-Malays to
become involved in rice production did not materialise. In 1890 a large tract of 1,100
acres of land granted to 466 Chinese settlers in Sitiawan for rice cultivation33 was
instead planted with rubber with the government's approval.34 In addition, the
majority of the 202 Indians granted with 530 acres of land in Teluk Anson by the
government,35 discontinued their rice cultivation.36 The little appeal that rice
cultivation had for the Chinese and Indians was best portrayed by Krian, the largest
rice production area in Perak, which had only 500 Indians and 160 Chinese as rice
cultivators towards the end of the 1890s.37 Other opportunities and wage-labour were
more attractive to them. The colonial administration's policy in opposing the granting
of land for enterprises formed to promote rice cultivation had further discouraged the
Chinese from being active in the industry.38
In sum, the development of a capitalist economy in Perak during the colonial period
instigated the rapid growth of population, which in turn, necessitated imports of huge
quantities of rice. Despite the attempts of the colonial government to improve
domestic rice production, these were not sufficient to produce a strong and properly
The Krian Irrigation Scheme, for example, was not designed for double cropping. Upgrading and
modifications were needed to allow for adequate water supply, which were subsequently undertaken,
see Jackson (1972), p.91.
33PGG 1892, p.722.
34Tan Ding Eing (1963). The Rice Industry in Malaya 1920-1940, Number 2, Singapore Studies on
Borneo and Malaya, Singapore: Malaya Publishing House Limited, p. 16.
"PGG 1892, p.722.35
36Hill(1977),p.l02.
37Ibid., p.103; In 1891 a total of40,000 acres were reported to be under rice cultivation in Krian (PGG
1892,yMX)
38Tan Ding Eing (1963), p.34.
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structured development of the rice industry. The use ofbetter seeds, for example, was
only initiated in the middle of the 1930s and, although policies were introduced to
improve rice production, the failure to provide adequate specialists and technical
advice to the rice growers contributed to these very modest achievements. While the
emphasis had always been to increase the acreages of padi land, this development did
not correspond well with the development of technology. Except for Krian and Sungai
Manik, where a substantial amount of money was invested, other areas did not receive
such attention. The use of compulsion and inducements through the various policies
were not, however, an outstanding success.
4.4 The establishment of the Krian and other irrigation schemes
To the population of Perak, the availability of rice was important as it represented
their staple consumption. The strategic role of rice then became critical, as without the
capacity to meet these basic needs, the capitalist economy brought into being by the
colonial government would be difficult to sustain. It was therefore essential for the
administration to ensure that basic food needs were met and at the same time seek to
provide the commodityas cheaply as possible. In the rice cultivationindustryefficient
water control in the padi field is one of the critical factors in obtaining a good harvest.
To intensify rice production and simultaneously encourage peasants into the industry
the provision of irrigation facilities became vital.
39For a review of the developmentof irrigationpolicy in Malaya prior to the establishmentof the DID,
see Short, D. E. and Jackson, J. C, 'The Origin of an Irrigation Policy in Malaya' in JMBRAS, 44(1),
1971,pp.78-103.
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During the early colonial period in Perak rice was grown wherever Malay settlements
were found, particularly in the swamps in Krian and Lower Perak.40 Some irrigation
was in place but was not widely used, although traditional methods were employed in
the trapping of water and later released as the crop ripened. Knowledge of drainage
and irrigation was believed to have existed in the 1880s and 1890s as the Malay
leaders, who were district chiefs in former times, began to seek loans from the
colonial government for building irrigation works.41 It was reported that 1894 was the
peak period for irrigation construction when five small schemes were initiated. This
was followed by one or two other schemes a year until the close of the century when
Perak had 20 irrigation schemes in total.42 These, however, were private and not
government initiatives.
The colonial government's first direct initiative towards provision of irrigation
facilities came almost twenty-five years after the intervention in the establishment of
the Krian Irrigation Scheme, the largest ever attempted at the time. Initiated in 1899
and completed eight years later the scheme was developed at a cost of $1.6 million to
serve some 50,000 acres of padi land. Another major scheme but smaller than the
one in Krian was at Sungai Manik in Lower Perak. The scheme was initiated in 1932
to cover an area of 25,000 acres,44 and two years later 6,000 acres of land was opened
for rice production.45 Earlier in 1926 work was reported to have started in the




43For a comprehensive history of its establishment, seeShort andJackson (1971), pp.78-103.
Selvadurai, S. (1972). Padi Farming in West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Agriculture and Fisheries
Ministry, p. 102.
45Tan DingEing(1963), p.27; andfor a comprehensive survey of the Sungai Manik Scheme, seeShort,
D. E. (1971). 'Some Aspects of the Role of Irrigation in Rural Development of Malaya', PhD. Thesis,
University of Hull; also Ferguson, D. S., 'The Sungei Manik Irrigation Scheme' in Malayan Journal of
Tropical Geography, Vol. 2, 1954, pp.9-16.
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were other smaller schemes established in Jenderata, Pulau Tiga and Bagan Datoh, all
in the district of Lower Perak.46
Throughout the colonial period there were only two major irrigation schemes initiated
by the colonial government. While the government had the desire to preserve and
expand rice production towards self- or near self-sufficiency as a means to increase
the living standards of the peasantry and to support the development of the capitalist
economy, the outcome did not reflect this. For one thing, the awareness of the
importance of water control was recognised at a very early stage by colonial officials
but initiatives came much too late.47 The colonial government recognised too that in
order to increase production, assistance must be given to the Malays, as they did not
have the capacity to raise capital to build such facilities on their own. Although
provision of loans was made for the Malays to construct small irrigation facilities,
these were rarely adequate to meet thewhole cost.48
The government's approach towards providing irrigation facilities did not come
without a price to the peasantry. The construction of these schemes, Krian for
example, was not fully financed by the colonial government.49 Upon completion, the
peasantry were required to pay an enhanced rent, apart from the land rent, in the form
of water rates.5 Since the capital outlay was considerable, the additional exactions
would ensure sufficient return to the state. Although the colonial government had the
responsibility to provide infrastructure to increase rice production, and in turn would
recover the costs from revenues generated by the settlements, this only took place in
46Lee Kam Hing (1978), p.30.
47Jomo(1988),p.58.
48Hill(1977),p.l05.
49Jomo (1988), p.59; Hill (1977), p.113.
50Lim TeckGhee (1976), pp.59-60.
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this sector and not in the production of other commodities. The viability and
possibility of profitable return on investment thus became the state's stance on any
rice cultivation schemes undertaken.51 The promotion of increasing rice production
too took place at various times during the colonial period, when other more
remunerative opportunities existed. The enhanced exactions only discouraged settlers.
The imposition of water rates later became compulsory in all padi land served by
government irrigation facilities in Malaya.
Although the eight decades of colonial administration saw many policies being passed,
which reflected the importance of the development of rice production to the
government including the Irrigation Areas Enactment of 1934 and the establishment
of the DID, implementation was rather sluggish compared to the development of
rubber and tin. While these two commodities had generous infrastructure provision
from the colonial government, the rice industry did not. Considerable provisions were
made only after the Second World War. The DID, in particular, was allocated a large
budget to expand irrigation anddrainage facilities.52 Theunsatisfactory results in the
rice industry led to the suggestion that low achievement was attributed to the
reluctance of the colonial government to allocate adequate funds for the peasant sector
as the return on investment to the state was not sufficient to justify the capital outlay.
Despite all the efforts that were undertaken to promote rice production in Perak, what
the state really needed were more reasonably sized modern irrigation schemes in
various parts of Perak. Such schemes would include the provision of adequate funds
and expertise for irrigation projects. Only with proper and suitable irrigation facilities




5 e st time the DID was allocated $38 million under the First Malaya Plan (1955-60) for
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the continuous opening of new land for cultivation. The colonial government's
attention and financial efforts were unfortunately directed more towards other
priorities, particularly the infrastructural support for the promotion of tin and rubber.
In addition, the emphasis on technological improvements in rice cultivation was not
promoted consistently from early on. Nevertheless, policies established by the
colonial government on drainage and irrigation provided Perak and Malaya with a
foundation for the development of rice self-sufficiency policies in the post-colonial
period.
4.5 The Malay peasantry in rice production
The involvement of the Malay peasantry in rice agriculture had existed since time
immemorial, long before British colonialism in Perak. Increasing involvement of the
Malays was the result of colonial policies, which encouraged rice cultivation among
the peasantry.53 While this statement was true during the early colonial period, the
transformation that took place within the agricultural sector in the later period forced
the Malays to change too, particularly in their involvement in other crops besides rice.
In the attempt to develop a thriving capitalist economy, the development of a rice
producing peasantry was central for a number of reasons. Perak needed to focus on
the availability of permanently settled peasant farmers rather than those involved in
shifting cultivation so as not to interfere with the colonial government's strategy to
expand the plantation sector. The presence of shifting cultivation restricted or
53The Colonial government's pro-Malay attitude in the rice industry resulted in the assertion that the
industry was designated as a special preserve for the Malays only. [Cheng Siok Hwa, 'The Rice
Industry of Malaya: A Historical Survey' in JMBRAS, 42(2), 1969, p.132]; prior to 1930 the
encouragement to cultivate rice and increase both production and quality was aimed at increasing the
living standards of the Malays rather than encouraging participation in the export economy [Kratoska
(1984), p.34].
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prevented any move to expand the plantation sector on a large scale. Economically, a
permanent peasantry would contribute more efficiently to the growing local
consumption needs. Finally, the foreign exchange outflows proved to be an escalating
burden to the colonial government. This was clearly evident when within a 25-year
period from 1876 rice imports had increased almost 20-fold.54 While population
growth continued apace, the need to promote aggressively peasant rice production
became vital.
During the early years of colonialism, the exactions to the territorial chiefs worked
against the increase in rice production. The benefit of the increased yields would not
accrue to the peasants but to the territorial chiefs.55 The introduction of colonial land
policy succeeded in overcoming this predicament whereby peasants had total
possession of rice production generated from their own land. This was the first step
towards increasing rice production in colonial Perak. However, the implementation
of the colonial land policy in certain circumstances did not encourage an increase in
rice production due to the limited size of land being alienated. In Blanja, an area near
Parit, a hundred-acre block of land suitable for rice agriculture was alienated to a
hundred people.56 When subdivided each parcel proved too small for any rice
enterprise.
The worst year for rice production in Perak was in 1927 when production of 12.4
million gantangs was at its lowest (see Table 4.5.1). Crop failure was attributed to bad
weather and poor seeds. The poor harvests continued for several years and only
recovered fully in 1934. While climatic conditions were important in rice cultivation




there were also other factors that influenced the slow progress in increasing rice
production. Although the provision of irrigation and drainage facilities was vital, it
was clearly inadequate to assist the peasantry in terms of financial assistance and the
development of technology.
Table 4.5.1 Perak: Wet padi production 1922-1957 (million gantangs)
Year Production Year Production Year Production Year Production
1922 22 1931 n.a 1940 n.a 1949 32
1923 22 1932 24 1941 17 1950 27
1924 n.a 1933 24 1942 n.a 1951 29
1925 n.a 1934 28 1943 n.a 1952 19
1926 21 1935 29 1944 n.a 1953 27
1927 12 1936 29 1945 n.a 1954 29
1928 20 1937 30 1946 18 1955 26
1929 n.a 1938 24 1947 18 1956 32
1930 n.a 1939 n.a 1948 29 1957 35
Sources: Lim Teck Ghee (1977), Appendix 6.2, p.256;
Note: n.a - not available
Lim Chong Yah (1969), Appendix 6.2, p.341.
The development of other more lucrative agricultural and non-agricultural activities
was another reason for the mediocre performance of the colonial government in
encouraging Malay peasants to concentrate on increasing rice production during the
colonial period.57 The prevailing lowprices for padi resulting in lowincome saw the
peasants withdrawing from this activity for higher priced agricultural products,
particularly rubber.58 During the boom years for rubber prices it could be expected
that peasants' earnings were exceptionallyhigh for half a day's work. Similar effects
could be seen in the coastal area of Perak where copra was in demand and in central
Perak, particularly in the Kinta district, where market-garden products commanded
attractive prices. The prospect of better immediate returns explains why there was a
lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Malay peasants to embark on commercial rice
cultivation or to maintain non-essential rice lands.59 Rice cultivation was generally
"Short and Jackson (1971), pp.86-7.




notas profitable as other activities.60 Forthe state it onlyrepresented a small revenue
in land rent as compared to other commercial crops that attracted export duty as well.
Table 4.5.2 below can best demonstrate the Malay peasants' response to the colonial
government's rice production efforts throughout Perak. Earlier distribution figures
were not available while those presented are for selected years to illustrate peasant
involvement in terms of acreages. Due to the nature of padi growing, actual
production did not need necessarily to correspond to the acreage planted especially
with the introduction of double cropping towards the end of the colonial period. The
year 1920 was the peak in Perak's achievement both in terms of acreage as well as
production.61 From then until the end of colonialism the total acreage engaged by
peasants in rice production fluctuated despite the provision of irrigation and drainage
facilities in certain areas coupled with improvements in planting procedures. Table
4.5.2 also indicates a trend whereby rice cultivation began to cluster in districts where
improved rice-planting facilities were provided. For this reason the districts that were
rather more consistent in their padi acreages were Larut, Krian, Kuala Kangsar and
Lower Perak. While this could indicate that the provision for rice production facilities
was lacking in other districts, the availability of other more promising and profitable
activities, particularly rubber cultivation, were more evident there; this was the result
of increased familiarity with commercial agriculture, which had weakened the
Malays' strong traditional inclination towards cultivating rice, at least on part of their
land for theirownconsumption.62 Additional distractions were the abundance of high
quality timber and forest products in Upper Perak, the high demand for market-garden
60For some comparison against other crops, see Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.258 Appendix 7.1; Sadka
(1968), p.356; Tan Ding Eing (1963), Appendix V, p.45.
61Lee Kam Hing (1978), p.10.
62Rex(1936),p.l7.
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products in Kinta and the importance of copra and the fishing industry in Dindings
(now Manjung).
Table 4.5.2 Perak: Distribution of rice cultivation areas, selected
years (in thousand acres)









1920 13.0 54.4 17.9 7.0 0.8 13.1 18.3 n.a 124.5
1925 13.0 54.8 24.8 4.8 3.2 4.8 2.3 n.a 107.7
1926 13.5 54.8 16.0 5.2 0.9 3.3 3.3 n.a 94.7
1931 12.0 51.0 18.2 7.2 0.7 7.4 3.2 n.a 99.6
1932 12.2 50.0 21.2 5.8 3.0 8.8 4.2 n.a 105.2
1939 12.6 54.8 21.5 5.4 0.6 11.8 3.0 0.7 110.4
1948 12.0 54.5 18.5 3.5 3.0 17.0 1.5 10.5 120.0
1952 12.5 56.0 15.0 3.5 0.5 13.0 0.1 1.0 101.5
Sources: Lee Kam Hing (1978). 'A Socio-Economic History ofPerak 1920-1939'in Lee Poh Ping&
Lee Kam Hing, Some Socio-economic Aspects ofPerak Society, Malaysia, No. 6, Joint Research
Project, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, Appendix I, p.65; Federation ofMalaya. Report
ofthe Rice Production Committee 1953, p.96.
Despite the encouragement by the colonial government, it does not seem that there
was a significant increase in acreage within the four main districts of rice production
in Perak. The two districts, Krian and Lower Perak, where the colonial government
had spent most of the money to establish their major irrigation facilities, failed to
attract new peasants in sufficient numbers. The irrigation extension programme in
Krian, which was implemented prior to the war in 1941, providing an additional
10,000 acres to the existing 50,000 acres of padi land, had seen peasants slow in
responding. In 1952 about 4,000 acres of land was still available for the taking. The
Sungai Manik scheme in Lower Perak presented a similar scenario. Originally
planned for a 25,000-acre scheme, at its peak, the scheme still had an excess of
unused padi land. This is evident in 1948 when the whole of Lower Perak had only
17,000 acres of padi land cultivated where Sungai Manik was one of the schemes in
this district. There was a more depressing state of affairs in Kinta and Batang
Padang when at the end of the colonial period padi production in these two districts
It was reported that in 1957 padi acreage for this scheme had declined to about 14,000 acres only.
[Cheng Siok Hwa (1969), p. 138]
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was almost totally abandoned because the focus was shifted to market gardening and
rubber cultivation.
The introduction of the Malay Reservation Act with the objective of protecting the
Malays also came with an imposition on crop cultivation conditions,64 which in most
cases, restricted cultivation mainly to padi. To the peasantry such a restriction was a
heavy price to pay since it meant that the opportunity to achieve higher incomes was
also foreclosed. The peasants had to adhereto the colonial government's requirement
to cultivate rice against their wishes. Although the restriction was legislated for, the
peasants' disinclination was clearly exemplified by the declining acreages in rice
cultivation in Perak during the colonial period.
In the early 1920s rubber prices on the world market began to slide.65 Excess supplies
forced the introduction of the Stevenson Restriction Scheme that imposed compulsory
limitations onrubber production.66 For the rice cultivation industry this was a blessing
as the restriction scheme, seen as an attack on the peasants, forced them back to rice
cultivation. This blessing, however, was short-lived. As the price of rubber began to
increase, padi fields were abandoned once again and rice production declined
correspondingly.
In 1948 when communist insurgency began to create instability throughout the
country, a state of emergency was declared and peasant rice production was affected
again. The threat, which was brought to an end in 1960, required the colonial
64Jomo (1988), p.60.
65See Table 5.3.3 in Section 5.3.
66For further details on the Stevenson Restriction Scheme, see Section 5.2
67Jomo(1988),p.62.
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government to implement tough security measures, including the resettlement of
padi-growing peasants to areas where rice cultivation was not possible or where the
fields were too far away. The introduction of curfews in the state too prevented the
peasants from working long hours in the padi fields. Although not all peasants were
affected by the resettlement requirement, it did hamper peasant participation and the
colonial government's efforts in increasing rice production.
In sum, the Malay peasants' involvement in increasing rice production in Perak did
not develop as significantly as the colonial government had envisaged. On the one
hand there were more rewarding economic activities for the peasantry, on the other,
the attempts to change the mindset of peasants towards rice commercialisation proved
quite difficult owing to the traditional nature of subsistence production. The greatest
contributory factor towards this sluggishdevelopment, however, was attributed to the
inadequate and uneven provision of facilities provided by the colonial government
throughout the state. In addition, Lim's assertion that the increase in rice production
in the FMS was the result of increases in padi acreages68 rather than in the
productivity of peasants, does not seem relevant to Perak as there was an overall
decline of acreages. This can only suggest that irrigation facilities and technology that
enabled double cropping towards the end of colonialism were the driving force in
increasing rice production and it was these elements that the peasants in other areas
throughout the state were lacking.
8Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.124. The studycarriedout was up to 1941.
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4.6 The role of the colonial state in rice production
In line with the envisioned capitalist economy, colonial rule had seen the government
play an increasingly important role in developing and shaping the state. A successful
capitalist economy, in theory, could not be achieved if the main food supply line was
not made available. Since the Malays were already engaged in this industry as their
traditional occupation, further encouragement to them was deemed appropriate to
increase rice production. The availability of sufficient internal food production was
critical for defence too. This section, therefore, provides an examination of the depth
of the involvement and the role undertaken by the colonial government in promoting
rice production in Perak to ensure proper support to the capitalist economy.
In order to promote and intensify rice production, changes to the existing approach of
concentrating on shifting cultivation had to be promoted and efforts had to be made
by the colonial government to induce the Malays towards permanent settlement. To
this end the colonial authorities made occasional attempts to assist the peasants to
settle permanently. Reluctance on the part of the Malay peasants was partly due to the
influence of the prevailing socio-political environment that discouraged permanent
settlement. While this sentiment was fast fading away, the existing land rent structure
did not help either. The 1879 and 1885 land regulations stipulated that the quit rent for
ladang (swidden land) producing dry padi had been fixed at 25 cents per acre while
those of bendang (wet padi land) were at 50 cents per acre.69 These rates would
therefore obviously influence the peasants' inclination towards shifting cultivation.
However, as a matter of policy, a decision was made by the colonial government to
disallow this form of cultivation, which eventually saw almost all the peasants revert
9Lim TeckGhee(1976),p.66.
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to wet padi production. By 1951 less than 5% of total padi production in Malaya
consisted of dry padi,70 and in Perak, dry padi production was less than 1% of total
padi production in 1952.
In order to stimulate agricultural production in Perak the colonial government passed
various legislations. In rice production, incentive schemes and project aid were
implemented, which unfortunately did not produce an encouraging outcome. One of
the factors attributed to this failure was the giving of cash advances and free rent to
peasants. The provision of free land rent was deemed a mistake; a better approach
would be the postponement of payments after harvest instead.71 Cash advances to
peasants did not produce the desired results either, as peasants vacated their land once
money had been spent. Three projects of various sizes in Lower Perak in the early
1890s, for example, where the above incentives were given, experienced this setback:
the first was in Telok Anson (now Teluk Intan) and Sitiawan, the second in Sungai
Nibong and Batak Rabit, and the third was also in Telok Anson.72 All these projects
failed miserably and resulted in monetary loss to the state.
It was acknowledged within the colonial government that Perak, with her vast land
area, was lacking in human resources in all sectors, including in rice production, to
meet her needs. On the part of the peasantry more human resources were required to
open up and work on padi land. The Department of Agriculture was established in
1905 with the primary role of improving and promoting agricultural activities
particularly rice, coconut and rubber. While there was no improvement in terms of
70Mackenzie, K. E. (1952). Malaya: Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Federation of
Malaya and Singapore, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, p.29.
7lLim TeckGhee (1976), p.76.
72Ibid., pp.71-2; Sadka (1968), pp.358-9.
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rice acreage expansion73, in fact it was declining, it can only be deduced that the
opening of new padi land in the state, with the assistance of the Department of
Agriculture, merely mitigated the decline in land area, which otherwise would have
been more severe.
The incentives offered by the colonial government in intensifying rice production
without doubt were well meant but when compared to other economic sectors it
lagged far behind in attention, fimding and expertise. In the 1950s it was established
by the Rice Production Committee that the declining interest in padi cultivation was
the indirect result of the shortage of staff in the Department of Agriculture. Rice-
growers needed their supportespecially for seed, adviceand amenities. Therefore, the
shortages that existed both on the part of the peasants as well as the government
should have been a prime concern if intensive rice production was to be achieved. The
government's action concerning staff shortages was only addressed towards the end
of the colonial period. On the peasant growers' side, the problem was addressed very
much earlier before the twentieth century with the encouragement of immigration
from the Malay Archipelago to grow padi74 along with special incentives and aid
offeredto attract them.75 It couldbe reasoned that this was where part of the problem
in failing to increase rice production occurred. While the anticipated mass
immigration did not take place, the local communities were denied the same
inducements. Therefore, the government failed on both fronts: immigration was not
as high as expected and the local peasants were disinclined to concentrate on rice
production alone. The implementation of the Malay Reservation Act that prescribed
73See Table 4.5.2 in Section 4.5
74Jomo (1988), p.58; Jackson (1972), pp.79, 90; Othman MohdYatim(1977),p.10.
75See fh.105 in Chapter3.
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the type of cultivation fiirther affected the response from the peasantry since other
crops offered better returns.
The failure to establish Malay colonies of rice growers in Perakprompted the colonial
government to attract immigrant Chinese and Indians instead.76 While they too were
offered incentives the response was also disappointing. This failure was partly
attributed to the colonial government itselfbecause inadequate effortwas put in to see
the plan through.77 At the same time the large numbers of Chinese and Indian
immigrants had already been absorbed by the tin mining and rubber plantation
industries. Above all, the contrast that existed in the rice production industry where
remuneration was low and uncertain, while other industries in the capitalist sector
were enjoying increased wages, had almost certainly discouraged most of the Chinese
and Indian immigrants from being involved in rice production.78
Since the beginning of the rice crisis in 1913, thecolonial government tooka positive
step in introducing a guaranteed minimum price policy that entailed preventive
measures towards the declining price of rice. It was hoped that this could persuade
peasants to intensify rice production and at the same time attract producers to sell rice
to the government. To support this move, the government set up two rice mills in
Kuala Kurau and Bagan Serai, both in the district of Krian.79 While this policy
provided protection for the peasantry, the minimum price set by the government was
often underestimated by a substantial margin when compared to the world market
price. This was particularly due to the fluctuation in theprices andthe slowresponse
76Hill(1977),p.l80.
77Ibid.; Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.17.
78Lim Teck Ghee (1976), p.134; Jomo (1988), p.57.
79Tan Ding Eing (1963), p.17; Lim Teck Ghee (1977), p.156
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by the government. While the rice production schemes aided by the government were
subject to a compulsory sales programme, the minimum price therefore was not
helpful to the peasants when the differential margins were considerable. This policy,
therefore, would obviously be most welcomed when the guaranteed minimum price
was higher than the world market price, which was a rare occurrence.
While the colonial government acknowledged the importance of rice development and
its own role in providing irrigation, drainage and water communication networks to
promote rice production, despite all its efforts in Perak, the outcome was
disappointing. If the expansion of acreage is used as a yardstick, then the role played
by the colonial government in promoting rice agriculture was a failure. While the
existence of other more lucrative crops could have been the strongest influence on the
poor response, prohibiting such changes too was not beneficial to the state. Allowing
peasant entry into other agricultural activities should have been encouraged rather
than deplored as that could have provided a more ethnically balanced economy. This,
however, would have had to be done at the expense of increasing rice production.
4.7 Summary and conclusion
The increasing population in Perak was one of the reasons why the focus on
increasing rice production became important. In parallel with it were the objectives of
saving on foreign exchange accounts as well as providing for local food needs. The
increasing dependence on rubber and tin also meant that the bulk of the population's
food needs had to be imported. Although part of the colonial government's dual
agricultural policy was to encourage native production, the comparative advantage of
The compulsory sales programme in Malaya ended in 1950.
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export-oriented cultivation, especially rubber, over native agriculture resulted in
limited expansion of the latter, particularlyrice production, despite increased demand
from the ever-growing population.
As part of the colonial campaign to encourage native agricultural production, the
government developed various policies, legislations and to some extent infrastructures
with the intention of assisting and expanding the peasant rice economy. The
assistance, however, was viewed as far less when compared to the attention given to
other commodity sectors. Looking back, the colonial rice policy in Perak had been a
mixed success, but it lagged far behind the other sectors. The total acreage utilised
for rice cultivation declined from its peak of 124,500 acres in 1920 to slightly more
than a 100,000 acres in the early 1950s. Most of the padi land that was left towards
the end of the colonial period was in areas where irrigation and drainage facilities
were established by the colonial government. In others they were either abandoned or
planted with other crops, a clear sign of better opportunities elsewhere.
If the increase in rice production is used to measure the achievements of the rice
policy, then the success was a very limited one, although there was a 59% increase in
total rice production between 1922 and 1957. This increase took place after a span of
three and half decades with shrinking padi acreages. Furthermore, the majority of the
increases occuned after the Second World War when double cropping was introduced.
The rise in production could, therefore, only be attributed to better facilities, improved
farming methods, superior seeds, and advanced technology provided by the colonial
government as the result of public pressure to improve the peasants' income. While
the large-scale development schemes such as Krian and Sungai Manik have made a
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majorcontribution towards promoting ricecultivation in the state, the need for small-
scale schemes, if implemented, could have avoided the loss of padi areas in most of
the districts in Perak.
The colonial government's rice development policy, therefore, was more strategic
than economic and this was demonstrated by the approaches undertaken both in
policies and implementation, andby the response of the peasantry themselves. It was
strategic since it had been a colonial policy to preserve the status quo of the traditional
rice cultivating practices of the Malays and also the desire for the state to grow at least
some, if not all, of her staple food requirements. On the other hand, it was difficult to
justify the policy in economic terms since the return from cultivating an acre of padi
had never been higher than cultivating an equivalent acreage of rubber. Despite the
growing rice trade account, most of the time it was cheaper for the state to import rice
rather than produce it. The interplay of these strategic and economic forces eventually
hindered the economic modernisation of the Malays in the capitalist economy and
contributed to an ethnic-based division of labour among the population ofPerak.
While the rice production policy was not totally successful, the economic base of
Perak, which was dependent on a very limited range of export commodities, could
have been made more secure had the cultivation of food and other export crops been
broadened hand-in-hand with the tin and rubber sectors. These crops could have been
dispersed throughout the state to enable a more well-rounded economic development
of the rural areas. Better still, if the Malays had been given more opportunities to
develop a morebalanced economy. By limiting the focus on rice production, the state
was not enlarging its economic options, and coupled with a weak implementation
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THE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF TIN AND RUBBER IN THE
COLONIAL PERIOD
5.1 Introduction
The history of the mines.. .is practically the history of the state for it is very
difficult to disentangle the one from the other. Without its tin, Perak would
undoubtedly now been an unknown jungle. It was its mineral wealth which
first brought it into notice and which has in these later years produced the
funds for its rapid development.
The transformation of Perak into an advanced state compared to any other states in
Malaya began with British intervention in 1874. Although other reasons were also
forwarded to justify the intervention, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of the state's
abundant reserves of tin was the most central. The exploitation of tin that was in great
demand by the Western world instigated the economic growth of the state. The economic
growth was later strengthened by the cultivation and export of natural rubber.
Throughout the colonial period, the role played by the state was vital in ensuring
economic success. It was within this economic framework that the state was also engaged
in the necessary functionof removing the traditional 'feudal' structure that was perceived
as a hindrance to economic progress. This 'feudal' structure was replaced with the basic
legal and institutional mechanisms, which were required for the functioning of a colonial
government in order to encourage state economic development through private
enterprise. This was the thrust used by the colonial state in the exploitation of tin and
rubber in Perak. A brief account of the development of the exploitation and export of the
^6111101(1939)^.23.
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state's economic resources is therefore vital in understanding the transformations that
took place during and after colonial rule.
5.2 The state and the development of tin and rubber
The success in the development of tin and rubber provided the state with the funds
needed to support the construction of infrastructure and the establishment of institutions
and agencies to bring about the economic 'modernisation' of Perak. The opportunities
afforded by these primary resources also influenced the approach to state governance and
policies for the benefit of capitalist development.
The development of tin mining in Perak was closely related to the industrialisation of the
West in the course of the 19th century. It was a time when industrialisation had created
the growth and demand for raw materials, particularly for the development of the tin-
plate industry. Since these countries, where tin was in demand, did not have the quantity
or quality sought after or they had none at all, they had to turn to underdeveloped
countries for the precious metal. Therefore, the same period also saw Perak's
involvement in the international markets via the export of tin to the West, its main
destinations being the United Kingdom and United States. It was against this background
of Western industrialisation that Perak was brought to the forefront of the world economy
because of its abundant reserves of tin. The continuous increase in tin export duty
collected had provided the much-needed initial capital and a turning point for the
economic development of Perak (see Table 5.2.1).
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Table 5.2.1 Perak: Export dmty on tin collected 1875-1919
Year $ Year $ Year $
1875 n.a 1888 851,420 1901 3,473,165
1876 n.a 1889 937,293 1902 4,470,319
1877 140,292 1890 866,730 1903 5,067,412
1878 245,512 1891 812,956 1904 4,607,559
1879 281,823 1892 1,124,931 1905 4,874,820
1880 298,805 1893 1,333,890 1906 5,432,675
1881 387,642 1894 1,648,981 1914 4,181,077
1882 457,410 1895 1,669,707 1915 4,373,289
1883 619,809 1896 1,541,442 1916 5,012,067
1884 641,351 1897 1,346,707 1917 5,796,437
1885 547,648 1898 1,601,310 1918 8,430,276
1886 611,869 1899 3,073,441 1919 6,200,775
1887 720,247 1900 3,570,631
Sources: PGG 1903, App. M, p.51; PGG 1907 (supplement), App. H; Perak, EstimatesofRevenuesand
Expenditures, years 1916-1921.
Note: Figures for 1907-13 are not available.
Tin had been produced in Malaya for centuries. In the early days, tin mining had been
entirely in the hands of the Malays. In Perak, when tin was discovered in Larut in the
1840s the structure of production began to change. Due to shortage of labour, Chinese
immigrants were brought in to work in the tin mines; not long after the migration, they
had succeeded in establishing control over the Perak tin industry. The Chinese
involvement was so profound that in 1880 there were 978 mines covering an area of
16,000 acres in the state run by them, although 233 of these were leased from Malay
chiefs.2 These mines in Larut were so rich that in 1876 this district alone provided more
than three-quarters of the state's annual revenue. It was the opening of the large numbers
of new tin fields in Larut that led to British political intervention in Perak. Subsequently,
the Kinta Valley, which was also known for its tin deposits, began extensive mining in
1880. The large deposits there had overtaken Larut in tinproduction by 1889.4
2Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.164.
3Ibid.,p.l9.
4 Yip Yat Hoong (1969), p.60; Ryan, N. J. (1963). TheMaking ofModern Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, p. 145.
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The British direct involvement and the French investment in tin mining in Perak came
only in the middle of the 1880s. During their early involvement, the majority of foreign
companies failed to compete with the Chinese miners whose methods of prospecting and
the simplicity and efficiency of their organisation favoured them. The high technical
skills of European mining companies, superior mining techniques and well-tried business
organisations in other colonies were not suitable for the easily accessible deposits in the
Perak and Malayan mining environment. However, the depletion of these deposits and
the introduction of the dredge in 1912 changed the production efficiency of the European
companies.5 The dredge allowed extraction of tin deposits that were not easily accessible
and enabled the Western miners to make a successful 're-entry' into the industry by
exploiting the technical deficiency and capital shortages of the Chinese. The land policy
that gave preference to Western miners also helped the process.6 From a mere
contribution of 10% towards total production output in 1900, the European figure rose
steadily and in 1929 reached 61%, thereby ending the Chinese domination in tin
"7 ftproduction, hi the mid-1920s, there were 32 dredges in operation in Perak, and in 1935
the figure rose to 70.9
Tin continued to be the most sought after commodity and all the output was absorbed by
the world market. However, by the late 1920s the situation began to change. Global
5See Rex(1936), p.27.
6In Kinta, for example, from 1,916 (31,343 acres) mining leases reclaimed in 1921, 1,442 (29,400 acres)
were re-alienated to European miners [Ravinder Singh, 'Keadaan Ekonomi Lembah Kinta Pada Masa
Kemelesetan Ekonomi Dunia 1920-19221, B.A Graduation Exercise, History Department, University of
Malaya, 1994/95, p.29].
7Yip YatHoong (1969), p.164. These figures refer to those of the Federated Malay States. However, the
scenario was also the same for Perak as the state was the largest tin producer in Malaya.
8Francis Loh in Ravinder Singh(1994/95), p.10.
9Rex(1936),p.30.
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economic depression, violent tin price fluctuations and surplus production forced
producing countries to sign an international tin agreement in 1931 to balance the
production and consumption as well as protecting tin prices. Although the tin agreement
did increase the price of tin to an acceptable level, the drawback was the limitation on
production. Tin production in Perak was greatly affected as a result of this agreement.
The global success of this arrangement led to subsequent international agreements in
1934-36 and 1937-1941.
The Japanese occupation in Malaya during the Second World War delivered another
blow to the tin industry in Perak.11 In the great haste to retreat to Singapore, the British
carried out a 'scorched earth' policy. Tin production for the state then was severely
disrupted, as time was needed for rehabilitation. Even so, tin production in Perak run by
Japanese companies continued on the average of about a third of the pre-war capacity of
1941.12 The Japanese occupation too resulted in the displacement of thousands of
Chinese labourers in the industry. After the war, when the British colonial government
1 'j
was reinstated, further rehabilitation was carried out. In order to accelerate the process,
financial aid was provided for both the Chinese as well as the European tin mining
companies. Increased mechanisation was encouraged to confront the problem of labour
shortages. By 1948, production had reached pre-war production levels and continued
I0See Tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 respectively.
1'Along withrubber, it was the Japanese occupation policythat the production of both commodities wereto
fulfil Japanese demand and at the same time they wished to control the global market for tin and rubber; in
both commodities Malaya's production had exceeded their domestic industrial needs, see Yoshimura
Mako, 'Japanese Occupation and Economic Policy in Malaya' in Jernal Sejarah, No. 10, 2002, History
Department, University ofMalaya, pp.24-5.
I2Francis Loh Kok Wah (1988).Beyond the Tin Mines, Singapore: OxfordUniversityPress, p.58.
'Rehabilitation of both tin mines and rubber estates in Malaya was largely financed by the Japanese
Reparation Fund [Yoshimura (2002), p.39]
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almost consistently at that level until the end ofthecolonial period.14 In 1953, a post-war
international tin agreement took effect with several similar features to the pre-war
agreements and this evidently helped protect the tin price and the economy ofPerak.
The phenomenal development of the tin mining industry in colonial Perak was the result
of three fundamental components: first, the existence of abundant tin deposits; second,
the availability of imported labour and entrepreneurial skills; and third, the availability of
both local and foreign capital. The future of tin was very much dependent on the rate of
exhaustion of deposits, discovery of new mining areas, and the discovery of
complementary materials. Conscious of the fact that tin was a wasting asset and that there
was a need to diversify the state economy the colonial government turned their attention
towards rubber as well.
Rubber was introduced into Perak in 1877 with the arrival of the first consignment of
trees in Kuala Kangsar, which were planted in the garden of the Resident, Hugh Low.15
Experiments were then carried out to ascertain the suitability of this new crop to the
Malayan environment. Research centres were established and the findings were that the
plants thrived under all conditions. Along with the growing world demand for rubber this
marked the beginning of large-scale rubber planting in Perak and marginalised the
interest in almost all other crops.16
14See Table 5.3.2 in Section 5.3.
15Drabble (1973), p.4.
16The rapid increase in rubber planting canalso be seen through the alienation of land in the Malay States.
For a brief overview during the 1903-1910 period, see Drabble, J. H., 'Land Alienation and the First
Rubber Boom in Malaya' in Jernal Sejarah, Vol. II, 1972/73, History Society, University of Malaya,
pp.23-8.
147
Many of the initiatives in the development of the rubber industry came from the
encouragement by the colonial government and its deliberate policy. It was this industry
that symbolized the cornerstone of the British agricultural policy,17 though Perak was a
latecomer in plantation agriculture. The first commercial planting in Malaya took place
during the 1880s in Malacca and Selangor. The expected rush by the Europeans to plant
rubber did not materialise due to the unattractive land tenure system which only offered
short-term possession and no assurance of a continuous supply of labour; both at the
lowest possible cost. To induce planters the colonial government decided to introduce
new land policies, the most vital of which was the introduction of a system of negotiated
titles in land. To deal with the slow response, the colonial government promoted further
incentives that eventually instigated the land rush. The planted rubber area within the
state grew tremendously and from 1905 to 1906 alone the acreages more than doubled
from 12,000 to 29,600 acres.19 From thenon, thegrowth of the rubber industry caused by
the increasing world demand and liberal land policies was so rapid that by 1909 the state
had 68,278 acres planted with rubber,20 and453,400 acres in 1922. It further increased to
540,700 acres in 1930, 589,100 acres in 1940 and towards the end of the colonial period,
in 1953, stood at 608,000 acres. During this period, Perak was second only to Johor in
rubber acreages in Malaya, which in 1953 had 1,078,500 acres.
The interest in rubber planting attracted both capitalists and peasants. Although it was the
plantation sector that first initiated rubber cultivation, the attractive income strongly
l7Lim TeckGhee(1976), p.81.
l8Drabble (1973), p.15; see fh.66 in Chapter 3.
19Ibid., p.48.
20Chai Hon-Chan (1967), p.I55.
21Lim Chong Yah (1969), Appendix 4.4,p.330.
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influenced peasant smallholders to divert their attention to rubber. Despite the barriers,
both in terms of state policies as well as financial and organisational constraints towards
their entry, the peasants managed to offer a strong challenge to the plantation sector,
particularly in terms of acreage expansion. Following closely behind the plantation
sector, the aggregate acreages for smallholders in 1953 exceeded those of the plantation
sector (see Table 5.2.2). As a consequence of the continuous growth of this sector, the
rush for land became very competitive among both the peasants and the plantations.
Table 5.2.2 Perak: Rubber distribution and growth,
selected years (acres)
Year 1922 1930 1940 1953
Plantation sector 239,800 284,200 314,700 296,500
Smallholding sector 213,600 256,500 274,400 311,500
Total 453,400 540,700 589,100 608,000
Source: Collated from Lim Chong Yah (1969), Appendix 4.4, p.330
The great demand for land too had created widespread land sales and speculation,
particularly among the Malays. While this activity could adversely affect the Malay
landholding structure in the long run, it was also recognised as the contributory factor in
the decline of padi land. The Malay Reservations Act amongst others was designed to
confront this unhealthy situation.
The rapid expansion of the rubber industry had been extraordinary. However, the failure
of the world's rubber producers to match output to demand, which was fundamental in a
capitalist enterprise, was obvious. The result was the introduction of the Stevenson
Restriction Scheme in 1922. This policy imposed a quota on rubber output with the sole
intention of raising prices. The imposition of the scheme brought different impacts to the
22Drabble (1972/73), p.26-7.
23For a detailed discussion of this scheme andits impacts on rubber growers in Malaya, see LimTeck Ghee
(1977),pp.l39-154.
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plantations and smallholders. The scheme set a very low quota for the smallholders,
which caused them to resort to other economic activities to alleviate financial hardship
inflicted upon them.24 The plantations, on the other hand, were not as badly affected.
While the scheme failed to restore the plantation industry to its former position, it did
restore the plantations' profits by downsizing the operations that saw the laying-off of
plantation workers. Another important consequence of the scheme embarked upon
unilaterally by the British in Malaya and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) had seen other non-
restricting rubber-producing countries, particularly the Netherlands East Indies (now
Indonesia) step up production and new planting which resulted in the weakening of
Malaya's position in world rubber production.26 The Stevenson Scheme was finally
abolished in 1928. Six years later as a result of the world depression, an International
Rubber Regulation Scheme was formulated and agreed upon by all rubber producing
countries and was put into operation to raise rubber prices. This scheme, with its
extensions, ended in 1942.
Unlike tin mining, the development of the rubber industry was not monopolised by any
particular ethnic group. Although initiated by the Europeans, the emergence of Asians in
this sector was encouraging. Despite the limitation of freedom of the Malays in dealing
in land, the discrimination against the early Chinese and Indians in rubber holdings, and
the preference given to the Europeans, the total acreage held both by the Malays and
other Asians continued to grow rapidly. Although accurate ethnic segregation cannot be
24Ibid., p.143. Smallholders were restricted to a maximum output of 320 lbs/acre/year only. In 1923, this
figure was revised to 425lbs/acre/year.
25Ibid.,p.l53.
26Lim Chong Yah(1969), p.77.
27Ibid.,p.81.
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made at this point as to the ownership of these holdings, the aggregate figures indicate a
rapid increase. In 1907 the involvement of Asians in the Malayan rubber industry stood
at 2,000 acres and in 1910 out of the 541,000 acres of rubber planted, 70% were owned
byEuropeans and 30% other ethnic groups.28 By 1921 Asian holdings comprised 46% of
the total acreage of 2,240,000 acres, mainly Malays and Chinese. Since distribution
figures by state are not available it can be deduced that Perak had a large portion of
Asian-owned rubber holdings since the state was the second largest in rubber planting in
Malaya. This trend continued until independence in 1957. Although the Second World
War from 1941 to 1945 interrupted the development of rubber, the damage to the rubber
industry was minimal. It lost only 4% of its planted acreage mainly due to the lack of
upkeep of young rubber and also the destruction of mature rubber to provide land for
food crops.30 The development of the rubber industry was interrupted in the 1950s when
there was a growing trend to use synthetic rubber among industrialised countries.
The key drivers that brought the transformation in the colonial economy of Perak relied
on tin and rubber. During the economic expansion brought about by tin, extensive
infrastructural projects, particularly related to the transport system, were carried out to
facilitate the movement of tin. The initial development of rubber, therefore, was rapid due
to the ready availability of transport, and further development only served to smooth the




Under Japanese occupation, an association comprising the government and private companies was set-up to
manage rubber estates in Malaya under unified control. In Perak, for example, Showa Gomu K. K. was
allotted 253,000 acres under this arrangement. [Yoshimura (2000), pp.28, 32]
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gradually brought changes to the values and perspectives of the population. Subsistence
production was no longer preferred and they were forced to adapt to changes to survive in
the new economy. However, although economic opportunities were available, most of
these were 'restricted' as the majority of the population either did not have the capacity to
seize such opportunities or were restrained by state policies.
As in tin mining, the fundamental economic components of rubber cultivation - land,
labour and capital - were the driving force of the industry in Perak. Of utmost importance
too was the global market capacity of these commodities. It is in this light that we now
turn to the demand and export of these commodities during the colonial period.
5.3 Demand and export of tin and rubber during British rule
An interesting aspect of both these commodities was that the main consuming countries -
United States, Great Britain, France and Germany - produced either little or none at all of
these commodities while the major producing countries were almost totally dependent on
them. From a geographical perspective, the producers were located in the tropics where
the majority were underdeveloped Western colonies and dependencies, while the
consumers were located in the developed industrial countries of the temperate regions.
Perak as the producer ofboth commodities fitted well into this pattern.
In the case of tin, the driving force that encouraged its production was the increase in
both the prices and demand from consuming countries. In the European markets, the
average price of tin in 1881-85 was £91 per ton, which increased to £127.30 per ton in
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1901-5, and in 1951-5 stood at £846.60 (see Table 5.3.1). The price trend particularly
after 1900 was very encouraging except for a brief period in the 1930s when the price
dropped below the £200 mark. This was due to the impact of the world economic
depression, although the consumption during this period did not show much variation.
The wide variety of industrial use of tin as well as the global volume of industrial
activities increased and, therefore, so did the demand and price for the commodity. The
technological changes that came about also influenced the manner in which tin was
consumed. By 1928, Western industrialisation had seen world consumption of 169,000
tons, more than double that of 1900.32 After 1928, except for 1929 and 1937, world
consumption had seen a decreasing trend and by 1957 the consumption had decreased by
about 15% and stood at 143,000 tons. Technological progress had allowed the increased
use of substitute materials as well as economising on the use of tin.
Table 5.3.1 Five-year average tin prices 1881-1955
Year Price Year Price
1881-1885 £91.00 1921-1925 £207.40
1886-1890 £102.80 1926-1930 £230.70
1891-1895 £80.40 1931-1935 £181.00
1896-1900 £87.60 1936-1940 £223.90
1901-1905 £127.30 1941-1945 £283.50
1906-1910 £155.30 1946-1950 £530.40
1911-1915 £183.80 1951-1955 £846.60
1916-1920 £260.60
Source: Collated from Yip Yat Hoong (1969), p.147 Table 11-5;p.l 1 Table 0-1
Note: Price per ton basis.
With the increasing prices and the continuous high consumption of tin, Perak's
contribution towards meeting global demand was enormous. During the colonial period,
the production of tin in the state was entirely for export as internal industrial tin
31See Yip Yat Hoong (1969), Appendix 2, p.394.
32Ibid.
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consumption was virtually non-existent. From a small production of 657 tons in 1874 the
export of tin for Perak had increased more than 32-fold at the turn of the century; the
figure doubled to 44,600 tons in 1929 and stood at 36,100 tons in 1957 (see Table 5.3.2).
Since the 1880s, Perak tin production had contributed about half of Malaya's production
and further increased to two-thirds of national production in the late 1920s. In terms of
world production, the state produced only 1.8% in 1874 and the production expanded so
fast that by 1894, Perak produced 26.5% of world production. The state maintained this
domination, producing more than a quarter of the world's tin for the next 15 years before
declining slightly, but it still remained as a major world tin producer. The consequence of
the international tin agreements implemented since 1931, aimed at prohibiting excessive
production and restraining severe tin price fluctuations, began to affect tin production in
Perak. Production and export for the following year fell to 17,200 tons, almost a drastic
60% drop from 1930. Perak's tin production and export did not recover well for the next
15 years due to the restrictions, and the Second World War made the conditions worst.
After the war rehabilitation programmes carried out by the colonial government showed a
positive recovery; from 1948 until the end of British colonialism Perak was once again
producing a fifth of the world's tin.
The rapid expansion of the tin mining industry in Perak, which initially was made
possible by the settled political conditions in the state, was further supported by the
continuous demand from the industrialised countries. The list of the consuming countries
expanded as more countries from both the East and West became industrialised. The
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Table 5.3.2 Perak, Malaya and World tin production, 1874-1957 (thousand tons)
Year Perak Malaya World Perak/World
(%)
Year Perak Malaya World Perak/World
(%)
1874 0.6 4.2 36.4 1.8 1916 27.2 47.2 119.0 22.9
1875 1.8 8.6 41.6 4.2 1917 24.6 42.9 119.0 20.7
1876 2.3 9.5 40.2 5.6 1918 23.0 40.1 116.0 19.8
1877 2.9 3.0 36.0 8.0 1919 21.9 39.2 113.0 19.4
1878 3.5 7.9 45.9 7.5 1920 21.9 36.9 112.0 19.6
1879 4.1 9.9 47.8 8.6 1921 21.0 36.2 110.0 19.1
1880 5.2 11.7 47.7 11.0 1922 21.8 37.2 114.0 19.1
1881 6.0 11.4 48.7 12.4 1923 24.7 39.4 118.0 20.9
1882 7.2 11.7 49.8 14.5 1924 29.8 46.9 135.0 22.1
1883 9.5 17.0 54.1 17.5 1925 30.7 48.1 137.0 22.4
1884 10.2 17.5 53.0 19.2 1926 30.7 47.8 137.0 22.4
1885 9.7 17.3 54.4 17.8 1927 36.3 54.4 153.0 23.7
1886 11.0 19.7 57.9 19.0 1928 41.1 64.5 171.0 24.0
1887 12.9 24.0 62.8 20.5 1929 44.6 70.0 189.0 23.6
1888 13.0 23.9 61.6 21.2 1930 41.7 65.0 172.0 24.2
1889 13.5 26.5 65.6 20.5 1931 34.1 53.1 138.0 24.7
1890 14.1 27.2 65.9 21.4 1932 17.2 27.8 92.0 18.7
1891 14.4 32.4 68.5 21.0 1933 15.0 23.9 80.0 18.8
1892 16.5 34.3 72.2 22.9 1934 22.3 36.2 112.0 19.9
1893 18.9 39.9 76.8 24.6 1935 25.0 40.8 129.0 19.4
1894 23.0 47.7 86.7 26.5 1936 39.0 64.7 170.0 22.9
1895 24.0 50.0 90.2 26.6 1937 44.9 75.1 195.0 23.0
1896 22.8 48.5 84.4 27.0 1938 25.0 41.2 152.0 16.4
1897 20.9 44.1 81.0 25.9 1939 26.5 44.6 155.0 17.1
1898 19.7 41.2 78.6 25.1 1940 49.0 80.7 223.0 22.0
1899 19.0 39.0 75.3 25.2 1941 36.6 60.3 238.0 15.4
1900 21.2 43.1 85.0 24.9 1942 10.7 15.7 115.0 9.3
1901 22.9 47.5 92.5 24.8 1943 17.2 26.0 134.0 12.8
1902 24.2 47.3 88.7 27.2 1944 6.1 9.4 97.0 6.3
1903 26.0 50.8 93.9 27.7 1945 2.2 3.1 86.0 2.6
1904 26.4 51.7 95.6 27.6 1946 5.2 8.4 87.0 6.0
1905 26.6 51.0 98.9 26.9 1947 17.9 27.0 108.0 16.6
1906 25.9 48.7 102.6 25.3 1948 29.4 44.8 146.0 20.1
1907 25.7 48.5 101.7 25.2 1949 34.2 54.9 157.0 21.8
1908 27.8 50.9 108.5 25.7 1950 36.4 57.5 162.0 22.5
1909 27.5 50.8 115.0 23.9 1951 34.3 57.4 162.0 21.2
1910 25.1 45.9 115.7 21.7 1952 35.0 57.1 165.0 21.2
1911 26.0 47.5 116.3 22.4 1953 34.5 56.4 170.0 20.3
1912 28.4 50.0 124.7 22.8 1954 37.6 60.9 169.0 22.2
1913 29.4 51.4 133.8 22.0 1955 37.7 61.2 168.0 22.4
1914 28.6 50.6 124.1 23.0 1956 38.3 62.3 166.0 23.1
1915 27.8 50.0 128.0 21.7 1957 36.1 59.3 163.0 22.1
Sources: Wong Lin Ken (1965), Appendix A(c) &(d), pp.246-9; Jomo (1990), Appendix Table 1 & 6, pp.78-9, 89; Yip Yat
Hoong (1969), Appendix 1, pp.392-3; Lim Chong Yah (1969), Appendix 2.1, p.319.
Note: Figures from above sources have been rounded to nearest 1000 tons.
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increased demand for tin was also the result of global population growth that demanded
more consumer products, the recovery and expansion of the world economic order, and
the important strategic demand for stockpiling, particularly among the main consuming
countries.
As with tin, the planting of rubber was primarily motivated by the attractive prices and
the demand from world markets. It was reported that between 1905 and 1906, the average
price of rubber had more than doubled from 61 cents to $1.50 per pound. However, in
later years the price of rubber had been on the decline and never matched the 1906 price
again except in 1951 (see Table 5.3.3). Ironically, the planted acreage in the state kept
growing and the plausible explanation is that, although prices were declining,
in most years these were deemed as still attractive.34 Other apparent reasons were the fact
that rubber cultivation does not require as much attention as compared to some other
crops, and the short hours of daily work in the smallholdings had made rubber cultivation
an appealing income-generating activity.
Between 1908 and 1912, Perak produced a total of 8,904 tons of rubber beginning with
196 tons m 1908 and the output was more than doubled every year. As with tin, the
majority of the rubber produced in the state was for export, as local use was very limited.
Although a continuous state-by-state breakdown for rubber production during the period
33Jomo(1988)p.l81.
34Dun J. Li (1955), pp.61-2 mentions that the first two decades of the twentieth century had seen returns
from rubber cultivation as extremely good so that British rubber compames were able to pay dividends as
much as 300% while average dividends stood at 68.8%.
35Lim TeckGhee (1977), p.96 fh.12. Figures are to beregarded as approximations onlysince dataprovided
by three separate relevant authorities do not tally.
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Table 5.3.3 Rubber prices 1918-1957 (cents/lb
-)
Year Price Year Price Year Price
1918 64.3 1929 34.6 1947 37.3
1919 80.7 1930 19.1 1948 42.1
1920 75.7 1931 9.8 1949 38.2
1921 31.1 1932 7.0 1950 108.2
1922 28.8 1933 10.2 1951 169.5
1923 51.2 1934 20.6 1952 96.1
1924 49.0 1935 20.2 1953 67.4
1925 114.0 1936 27.0 1954 67.3
1926 80.5 1937 32.1 1955 114.2
1927 64.3 1938 24.1 1956 96.8
1928 36.8 1939 31.0 1957 88.7
Source: Jomo (1988), Table 7.1 pp.1
Note: Prices based on ribbed smoked
81-2
sheets (RSS).
is not available, the aggregate production for the FMS indicates the importance of the
commodity to the state since Perak already had the largest acreage of rubber land in the
1920s in the FMS.36 Comparing the FMS against the world natural rubber production
uncovers an interesting relationship (see Table 5.3.4). In the decade of the 1920s, the
FMS was aheady contributing more than a quarter (26.1%) of the world's natural rubber
production. A decade later, the figure slightly declined to 25.1% due to the aggressive
rubber cultivation schemes initiated by the Dutch East Indies government.
Table 5.3.4 FMS production, World production and consumption of natural
rubber, 1920s-1930's (tons)
Decade FMS production World production World Consumption FMS/World production
1920's 1,350,000 5,173,000 5,480,000 26.1%
1930's 2,244,600 8,943,000 9,520,000 25.1%
Sources: FMS data collated from Lim Teck Ghee (1977) Appendix 4.2, p.254; World production data from A. McFadyean
(1944) in Ibid., Appendix 4.1, p.253; World consumption data from Lim Chong Yah (1969) Table 3.3, p.92.
The early development ofrubber during the first decade of the twentieth century had seen
heavy planting taking place in many parts of the world, including Malaya. It was reported
36In 1922, Perak had 453,400 acres of rubber overtaking Selangor, which had 417,500 acres. Since then
Perak had been the leader in the FMS [Calculated from Lim Chong Yah (1969), Appendix 4.4, p.330].
Nationwide, Johor had the largest area for rubber cultivation.
"During this period, the FMS contributed 57% ofthe total Malayan natural rubber production..
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that during the 1910s alone global rubber production had increased 27 times and
that rubber prices had eventually decreased by more than 80%;38 this was the beginning
of severe price fluctuations in natural rubber. Although the demand for natural rubber had
increased tremendously, particularly in the United States where automobile production
had increased by sixteen-fold during the period, the world markets were not able to
absorb the entire surplus. The data presented in Table 5.3.4 therefore include the
voluntary curtailment of production by rubber producers with the Stevenson Restriction
Scheme of 1922-28 and a second restriction scheme introduced in 1934. These schemes
also explain why global production was able to follow the demand rather closely.
Although matching the global supply to the demand of rubber seemed to be effective, the
attempt to secure price stability, which was crucial to producers, was not as successful.
During the 1929-33 period, for example, theFMS produced an average of 248,060 tons40
of rubber annually but the drastic drop in prices (see Table 5.3.3) during those years
caused the rubber export revenue for the FMS to plummet from a high of $202 million to
the lowest of $37 million.41 However, during the late colonial period there were increases
in the rubber price that greatly benefited Perak's export revenue. But, while the 1940s
saw industrial countries begin stockpiling, which obviously increased the demand for
rubber, the 1950s was dominated by the increased use of synthetic rubber. Despite the
presence of a formidable substitute, the superiority of natural rubber in the manufacture
of specific products not only increased the demand for the commodity but also
encouraged rubber producers to replant old low-yielding rubber trees. The exploitation of
38Lim Chong Yah (1969), p.75.
39Ibid.
40Calculated fromLimTeck Ghee (1977), Appendix 4.2,p.254.
41Ibid.,fn.2,p.216.
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tin and rubber brought economic progress to the state in general but the impact on the
peasantry presents a different picture.
5.4 Impact of tin and rubber on the peasantry
The impact of the exploitation of tin and rubber on the peasantry occurred at two
different phases and had slightly different consequences. The exploitation of tin was
already taking place when the British intervened in Perak. Although three years later the
colonial government introduced rubber, it was about two-and-a-half decades later that
this commodity began to have a considerable impact on the peasantry.
The considerable involvement of the Malay peasants in the tin mining industry was
limited to the early decades of the 19th century.42 Even then, it wascarried outon more of
a part-time basis and whenever their farming activity, particularly rice cultivation,
allowed them. From the 1840s, the Chinese immigrants had begun to replace the Malay
peasants as suppliers of tin in Perak.43 The rapid growth of tin mining also inevitably put
pressure on the peasants' agricultural activities and gave rise to conflicts between tin-
miners and rice cultivators.44 Of primary concern, was the disruption of padi irrigation
that saw waste and residues from tin mines getting into the system and damaging padi
growth. Padi production was therefore much affected, which in turn had an effect on the
42This does not mean that Malay involvement, including as owners, in tin mining had disappeared
altogether in the later years. In 1892, for example, a mine in Batu Gajah owned by Siti Raja, a Malay,
employed more than 1,000 labourers, mainly Chinese. [Sanusi Samid, 'The Development ofTin Industry in
Perak 1880-1910', B.A. Graduation Exercise, History Department, University of Malaya, 1966, p.4]; and in
1935, out of a total labour force of 32,596 in the state tin mining industry, 1,655 (5.1%) were Malays. [Rex
(1936), p.29]
43The encouragement to recruit foreign labour came from statedignitaries who were also the mine-owners.
[Winstedt, R. O. and Wilkinson, R. J., 'History ofPerak', in JMBRAS, 12(1), 1934, p.78]
^See LimTeckGhee(1977), pp.46-9.
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already low income of the peasantry. It was only when the Perak Mining Code was
enacted in 1895 that prevention of pollution to water supplies was introduced, along with
the segregation of tin mining operations and agricultural areas.45
During the late 19th century, the peasants' perception towards wage employment started
to change. This was particularly so in the districts where tin mining and rice cultivation
co-existed. Economically, rice cultivation on its own without any government assistance
was generally unprofitable, which encouraged a shift in the peasantry towards wage
employment in the tin mining industry. Working as wage earners and buying rice was
deemed to be easier than cultivating it. The introduction of rubber further encouraged the
trend. Districts such as Kinta and Batang Padang saw rice fields severely neglected and
abandoned.46 While this trend indicated the peasants' willingness to adapt to changes, the
negative side was that the transformation of the peasantry took place at the expense of the
rice cultivation industry.
The existence of potentially stanniferous land in tin mining districts was yet another
factor affecting peasants. The rapid growth of the tin industry necessitated the search for
new lands to mine. Competition for land for both agricultural purposes and tin mining
became more aggressive. In their eagerness to either commence or expand operations
capitalists were also always on the lookout for potential land to purchase for rubber
45Teoh Kah Heng, 'Transformasi Gunatanah Perlombongan Bijih Timah di Daerah Kinta 1966-1995',
B.A. Graduation Exercise, Department ofGeography, University ofMalaya, 1996, p.5.
46By 1952, Kinta had only about 500 acres ofpadi land still inproduction while Batang Padang had almost
wiped out her rice industry from 18,300 acres in 1920 to about 100 acres in 1952. See Table 4.5.2 in
Section 4.5 for Perak's rice distribution acreages.
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cultivation.47 The lure of attractive prices offered often induced the peasants to part with
AC/
their land and unless agriculture was exceptionally productive, the Perak Mining Code
allowed such land to be withdrawn by the state and re-alienated for tin mining.49
The conflict between the miners and the peasants and suppression by the former of the
latter appeared to reduce over time. An important contributory factor was the advent of
rubber planting in the state. Although initially the peasants saw rubber as an industry
beyond their reach as it was promoted as an alien, large-scale, intrusive activity, the
peasants eventually realised its advantages. Unlike tin mining, which is highly
capitalised, rubber does not require much initial investment and the amount of capital
required is very much dependent on the size of the cultivation plot.
The impacts of rubber on the peasantry therefore contrasted with those of tin mining,
though in both industries the peasants were never encouraged by the state to play a major
part.50 Participation in the rubber industry was limited and indirect such as the award of
short-term contracts in felling and clearing of virgin areas for planting. While it is true
that some attempts were made to encourage rubber cultivation among peasants whereby
the state, through the FMS administration, allocated $25,000 for loans in the agricultural
47For example, the huge number of sales of potential land for tin mining and rubber cultivation by the
peasantry had caused them to be marginalised and to be moved further away from urban areas.
[Shamsuddin Mohd Nor, 'Tinjauan Ringkas Sejarah Kampaf in Jernal Sejarah, Vol. 13, 1974/74/76,
Kuala Lumpur: Historical Society, University ofMalaya, pp. 10-11]
48In Batu Gajah stanniferous agricultural land was offered between $500 and $1,000 an acre towards the
end ofthe 19th century. [Lim Teck Ghee (1977), m.93, p.65]
49Ibid.,p.48.
50For colonial policies which hindered theexpansion ofthe peasants in therubber industry between 1876 to
1941, see Radhakrishnan, P. (1974). 'The Role of Rubber in the West Malaysian Economy', PhD. Thesis,
Stanford University, pp.43-53.
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sector, the response was low due to red tape in the processing of the loans by the state.51
Most peasants did not have collateral to offer, and those who did had it under-valued.
In the early stages of rubber development, some colonial officers expressed their
reservations and even a critical attitude towards rubber planting not only by peasants but
also by all non-Europeans. Although the bias was not in any way linked to any deliberate
policy to deter peasant participation in rubber cultivation, other policies were devised to
prevent peasant rubber enterprises from expanding.52 The rationale was that peasants had
insufficient capital to undertake projects that required four or five years after initial
planting before tapping, and they lacked the expertise. To add further to the
discrimination towards the peasantry, the colonial government agreed to the demand of
the United Planters Association (UPA) of the FMS not to alienate any road-frontage land
to peasants. This decision forced peasants to incur additional costs to transport their
produce.
Attempts to deter peasant participation in rubber cultivation can also be seen in the fee
charged for land ownership as compared to foreign capitalists in the preference for rubber
rather than rice cultivation. In Krian, the peasant rice cultivator had to pay 40 cents in
quit rent and a premium of $3.00 per acre or alternatively 60 cents per acre without
premium.53 In contrast, for rubber cultivation, the planters were offered free rent for the
first two years and subsequently 20 cents quit rent thereafter or alternatively a lump sum
5lAlthough it was reported that the reason was the preference of peasants to borrow from Indian chettiar
moneylenders, it was also due to the delays in processing loans, under-valuation of collateral and the




payment of $3.00 per acre on premium with no subsequent rent.54 The peasants thus
should have pursued rubber cultivation instead since rubber land rents were much lower
than the padi land. There was, however, an obstacle whereby the rubber rent stipulated a
minimum of 500 acres to enjoy such benefits. This was thus obviously affordable only by
the foreign planters.
Despite all the restrictions and barriers, the acreage of smallholding rubber continued to
grow. The response was so great that land applications in the state had to be closed in
1919.55 The rush for land too had created a new activity; sale of land by Malay peasants
to non-Malays, including to estates. Although the sale was perfectly in line with the
principles of economic liberalisation, its scale, however, would have disastrous
implications for the peasantry.56 To curb such practices andprevent the Malay peasantry
from becoming landless the Malay Reservation Act of 1913 was implemented. This Act
came with a heavy price for the peasantry. What started as a means of protection against
the disposal of land by the Malays turned into a restriction on cultivation rights where it
was forbidden to cultivate rubber as well. This resulted in dissatisfaction among the
smallholders who were mainly peasants. With the Act in place peasant land carried a
lower market value than it otherwise would.
The Stevenson Restriction Scheme imposed in 1922 to control the fluctuating price of
world rubber also had a considerable impact on the peasantry. The restriction scheme that
54Drabble (1973), p.15;PGG1891, p.419.
55Lim TeckGhee(1977), p.l 17.
56For landsale statistics, see Ibid.,p.115; Drabble (1973), p.102.
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imposed too lowa quota57 for rubber smallholdings severely affected theirincome, which
inevitably forced them to resort to other economic activities. Although the rubber
industry was never intended for the peasantry on any scale, the attractive prices and the
possibility of profit proved too much to resist. In 1921, the total area alienated for
smallholdings in Perak already stood at 241,654 acres.58 Theinterest among smallholders
further increased, and between 1926 and 1930 the state received 22,629 applications
totalling 90,435 acres for rubber land of which 4,927 applications totalling 16,777 acres
were approved.59 The extent of smallholder rubber planting in the last four decades of
British colonialism in Perak can be seen in Table 5.2.1 earlier where between 1922 and
1953 the smallholders' share of the planted acreage had increased by almost 46% from
213,600 acres to 311,500 acres, providing a strong challenge to the estates. Towards the
end of the colonial period, the resilience of the ever-growing peasants' participation in
the rubber industry had forced the government to change their view to provide protection
for peasant rubber-planting activities.
These changes had made the peasantry more responsive and adaptable, and forced them
to compete in the new capitalist economy despite their lack of capital and expertise.
From being a minor player during the early development of rubber, they emerged as a
powerful competitor with a substantial advantage over the estate sector, which they
managed to surpass. However, the 'modernisation' of the peasantry could have been
"Smallholders'production quotawasset at 320 lbs. per acreper yearbut laterraisedto 425 lb. per acre per
year. This was against their normal production of between 733-1,200 lbs. per acre per year. [Lim Teck
Ghee (1977), pp.145-6]
58Ibid.,m.53,p.l75.
59Ibid., fh.52. Within the FMS the number of rubber landapplication fromPerakwas the highest.
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more significant by the end of the colonial period had state legislation and policies been
more peasant-friendly.
5.5 Mining land and estate ownership in Perak
In exploiting both tin and rubber in Perak, there were two important consequences for
land use: one was the problem of economically unproductive ex-mining land and
secondly, the liberal land policies adopted by the colonial government whereby large
tracts of land were alienated to foreign capitalists at the expense of the peasantry.
Although in pursuing economic progress the deforestation of state land was recognised
and accepted as inevitable, large areas were rendered unusable with a very long period
needed for rehabilitation. The emphasis on tin mining industry had always been focused
on productivity in terms of output rather than acreage of land attributed to it, and
therefore the early records are rather sketchy. The earliest available figure shows that in
1889 a total of 11,995 acres had been alienated for tin mining purposes in the state (see
Table 3.6.1).60 In the next 13 years, the increase in the acreage averaged about 8,500
acres a year so that by 1902 land alienated for tin mining totalled 122,514 acres.61 In
1931, the acreage fell to 112,151 acres.62 No statistics were found for the years
approaching the end of British colonialism but the first land use report of independent
mPGG 1890, p.480.
6lPGG 1903, Appendix C, p.28.
62Lim TeckGhee (1977), Appendix 8.1,p.259.
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Malaya in 1966 gave a figure of 73,401 acres in tin mining in Perak.63 Despite thepatchy
data, some inferences can still be made.
It was a normal practice in the mining industry that once tin had been extracted the land
would be left abandoned, as it would no longer be suitable for cultivation. The impact
towards abandoned tin mining land was realised and made known as far back as 1895
when Swettenham remarked that
we [the government] give to the miners what is often fine land covered with
magnificent forest, and when he has destroyed the timber he turns the soil
upside down and after a few years abandons it, leaving huge stretches of
countryof sightlesswaste of water-holes.64
Proper rehabilitation initiatives were never carried out, as it was not in the financial
interest of the colonial state nor the capitalists. Although it could be argued that the total
acreage utilised in the exploitation of the state's tin resources was small in comparison to
the state's 5.2 million acres, most mining areas were located along the central plain where
population was concentrated. Where productive land had fast become a commodity of
high demand, the existence of unusable land raised dissatisfaction among the peasantry.
Furthermore, some of these land areas were formerly theirs but were taken back by the
colonial government, since they were either left idle or under-exploited, and redistributed
in large parcels to European capitalists65 for mimng activities. The problem could have
been more severe had not the colonial government occasionally decided to cease mining
63Siew Kam Yew (1970). The Present Land Use ofPerak, Present Land Use Report No. II, Ministry of
Agriculture and Co-operative, Malaysia; Wong, I. F. T. (1974). The Present Land Use of Peninsular
Malaysia, Volume I, Ministry ofAgriculture, Malaysia, p. 394.
MPGG 1895, p.371.
65Yip YatHoong (1969), p.52.
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land applications and at the same time enforce a more stringent policy on resuming
mining operations on land, wholly orpartially worked.66
The data presented above too do not reveal the actual acreages affected by tin mining as
they only cover areas supposedly actively mined. Furthermore, licenses for tin mining
were granted for between one to twenty-one years, andin special cases a longer period.67
Upon expiration of these licenses, the land reverted back to the state. The actual
unproductive land, as a result of tin mining activities, was therefore much greater than
that reported. During periods of downturn in the tin industry when laying-off of labour
was common, it was difficult to utilise the land for agricultural activities such as market-
gardening.
While the tin mining industry did not involve active participation of the indigenous
peasantry on any scale, the advent of rubber, which did not require much additional skill
and knowledge, suited agriculturalists. However, the colonial government's policy of
encouraging and preserving the plantation sector dominated by Europeans provided them
with a head start in the industry. Prior to the introduction of rubber in Perak in 1897, the
state aheady had 76 estates totalling 71,636 acres68 for the cultivation of sugar, coffee,
and gambier (see Appendix 1). Ownership in terms of total acreages comprised 56%
European, 39% Chinese, 1.4% Malay, 0.4% Indian, and the balance others. At this stage
alone, the domination of foreigners in the overall agricultural sector stood at about 31%




of total agricultural acreage alienated by the state69 and justified the concerns of the
peasantry.
There are difficulties in tracing the early development of rubber estate ownership in
Perak because of inadequate statistical data. However, it is still possible to make some
observations on the changes in rubber estate ownership in Perak. As of 1920 there were
35 estates operating in Kinta alone (see Table 5.5.1). In the Rubber Census of 1921, it
was reported that the state had 231,893 acres of planted rubber in the estate sector70,
which had increased to 298,154 acres in 1934.71 Details of ownership of these estates are
not available but since it was a phase where extensive development by capitalists took
place, it is likely that the ownership of these estates would not differ much from those in
earlier times when the Europeans, followed by the Chinese, owned the majority. The
increasing trend of ownership did not affect the peasantry to any great extent. Important
changes, however, only took place during the 1950s when Europeans began to relinquish
their holdings mainly to the Chinese.
In 1937 there were 441 rubber estates operating in Perak with 52% owned by the
Europeans, 26% Chinese, 19% Indian, and the balance owned by others including the
non-European Western owners (see Table 5.5.2). While the participation of the Chinese
and the Europeans was anticipated, the emergence of a high percentage of estate
ownership among the Indians was quite surprising. It is not known whether any of the
69Ibid.; The total agricultural land alienated bythe state in 1897 was 231,691 acres (PGG 1898, p.432); see
also Table 3.6.1.
701921 Census ofRubber Area, FMS inLim Teck Ghee (1977), fh.53, p.175.
71Grist(1936),p.74.
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estates were owned by Malays as they were categorised under the 'others' column. Ten
years later, the changes began to be more far-reaching.
Table 5.5.1 Perak: Estates in Kinta District, 1920
No. Name of estate/proprietor Location
1 Ashlett (H.A. Hope) Ipoh
2 Au Kong Tg. Rambutan
3 Balarajah (A.E. Clough) Batu Gajah
4 Batu Dua & Ridhuan Batu Gajah
5 Cannng Estate Ipoh
6 Chan Hin Estate Ipoh
7 Chien Sein Lion Ipoh
8 Changkat Meru Rubber Estate Ltd. Ipoh
9 Changkat Kinding Ipoh
10 Changkat Tualang Estate Kota Bharu
11 Chemor United Rubber Estate Ltd Chemor
12 Chung Ah ming & Lim Sin Chew Ipoh
13 Chendreng Estate Batu Gajah
14 Chumor Estate Chemor
15 Chew Boon Juan Kg. Kepayang
16 Chan Shan Estate Kampar
17 Choong Lam Estate Kampar
18 Changkat Melintang Gopeng
19 Dusun Bertam Estate Ipoh
20 Dusun Besar Estate Ipoh
21 Erikson R Telok Anson
22 Gunung Kroh Rubber Syndicate Kg. Kepayang
23 Gunung Panjang Estate Ipoh
24 Gunung Pari Estate Ipoh
25 Gunung Rapat Estate Ipoh
26 Gunung Panjang Estate Chenderiang
27 Harewood Rubber Estate Ltd Batu Gajah
28 Haji Mohd Yusul b. Ramal Estate Gopeng
29 Hill Rise Estate Batu Gajah
30 Hopeland Estate Ipoh
31 Hew Ho Poew Ipoh
32 Kepayang Estate Ipoh
33 Kantan Estate Ipoh
34 Kinta Kellas Estate Batu Gajah
35 Klian Kellas Ltd Batu Gajah
Source: Ravinder Singh, 'Keadaan Ekonomi Lembah Kinta Pada Masa Kemelesetan
Ekonomi Dunia 1920-1922', Academic Exercise, History Department, University of
Malaya, 1994/95, p.32.
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Table 5.5.2 Perak: Rubber estates planted acreage and ownership,
1937 & 1947-51
Year Europeans Chinese Indians Others Total
No. Acres No. Acres No. Acres No. Acres No. Acres
1937 230 254,901 113 28,660 82 20,588 16 3,196 441 307,345
1947 210 235,869 115 29,695 84 19,873 8 1,701 417 287,138
1948 207 240,332 114 29,047 83 19,485 7 1,399 411 290,263
1949 200 242,404 117 29,861 88 21,265 7 1,400 412 294,930
1950 190 241,203 124 31,183 84 20,085 7 1,369 405 293,840
1951 170 231,613 143 39,872 80 19,708 7 1,369 400 292,562
Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaya: Rubber Statistics Handbooks, 1938 & 1948-52.
Beginning in 1948 European estate ownership began to dwindle. While the decline in
European ownership was more gradual in the decade 1937-1947 with an average of two
estates a year, the next five years saw a substantial average decrease of eight estates a
year. This saw European estate ownership in Perak at 170 in 1951. Further decline
followed, and statistics for 1960 and 1961 show European ownership at 100 estates.72
The large reduction of estates of European ownership within the final two decades of
colonial rule deserves some explanation. Was it because Pax Britannia was anticipated to
end soon? It is evident that the decline in European ownership was faster in the years
approaching independence. The decisions by capitalists to replace rubber with oil palm,
another export crop that had begun to be in demand on the world market during the
period, also contributed to the decline. Although oil palm had been introduced at about
the same time as rubber, it was not seen as a viable economic crop then as it demanded an
expensive technology to process the fruit. In 1951, Perak had 32,300 acres of estates
planted with this crop.
72Department of Statistics, Malaya: Rubber Statistics Handbook 1962, p.11.
73Lim Chong Yah (1969), Table5.6,p.139.
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When the European owners were keen to part with their estates, the Chinese who had the
capacity to raise capital took the opportunity. Chinese estate ownership did not change
much from 1937 to 1947 but then saw a rapid increase from 115 estates to 143 estates in
the next five years. This was an evidence of the change in ownership from the Europeans
to the Chinese. A further indication of the trend is shown in the data for 1960 and 1961,
although categorisation is limited to Europeans and Asians only.74 Indian rubber estate
ownership did not, however, show any major changes despite controlling about a fifth of
estate ownership in the state in 1937. Overall, the number of estates operating in Perak
had declined from 441 in 1937 to 400 in 1951.75 Apart from the changes of ownership
from the Europeans to the Chinese, the decline in the number of European estates was
also due to amalgamation ofestates to achieve higher efficiency in production.
At the end of colonial period what was left in the state, particularly the large tracts of ex-
mining land and the changing green landscape filled with rubber trees, demonstrate the
scale of exploitation of the state's primary resources, largely to the benefit of foreign
capitalists. Along with it was the establishment of institutions and infrastructural facilities
necessary to expedite the exploitation programmes and to advance the standard of living
of the population. While tin and rubber provided the revenue for state development, it
also allowed a massive outflow of profits. Whether the provision of the established
institutions and the infrastructural facilities was the 'price' paid by the indigenous
population for allowing the exploitation of the state's primary resources depends on one's
74In I960 European rubber estate ownership stood at 100 estates while Asian ownership at 290 estates.
[Department of Statistics (1962), p.ll]. Comparing these figures with those of 1951 above, while the
European ownership declined by 70 estates there was a corresponding increase of 67 estates for the Asians.
75For a list ofEuropean registered rubber companies still inoperation inPerak in 1957, see Appendix 6.
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perspective. The exploitation of tin and estate rubber, however, did not directly benefit
the indigenous population to any great extent. The colonial state did introduce and
implement policies that were meant to assist the development of the indigenous
population. The interestsof capitalist enterprise however remained a priority.
5.6 Labour and immigration policy
The economic achievements in Perak, like any other production processes, required the
input of the three factors of production: land, labour, and capital. While land was readily
available and foreign capital could be attracted, the growth of the state via the
exploitation of tin and rubber could not have been achieved without an adequate labour
force. The small population of the state and the lack of interest of the indigenous
peasantry were part of the reasons why the state necessitated an immigration policy that
encouraged the importation of labour.
In tin mining, the major part of the labour force came from Kwantung and Fukien in
South China. The Chinese came in large numbers because of the prospect to earn
considerable amounts of money, much of which could be repatriated. The scale of
Chinese immigration generally followed quite closely the demand of tin in the world
markets that, in turn, influenced production.77 This situation, at least, holds true until the
end of the 19th century after which the changes in land policy and the mechanisation of
76For Perak's population growth andthe influx of foreign labour, see Section 3.5.
77For detailed statistics on immigration and emigration of Chinese men in Perak between 1885-1914, see
Wong Lin Ken (1965), Appendix A, Table M, p.258.
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tin production resulted in a great reduction in labour requirements. These two occasions
eventually led to the displacement of a large number of Chinese labourers, some of them
were repatriated79 andthe restwere forced to switch occupation.80
As in the case of tin mining, the rubber industry faced similar problems. The exclusion of
significant access of Chinese labour to European capitalists resulted in the immigration of
Indian labour from Southern India. Unlike tin mining, the inflow of immigrant labour in
the rubber industry was not only unrestricted but also assisted by the colonial
government. The extent of colonial government support for the large-scale importation of
Indian immigrants was so strong that in 1907 a 'Tamil Immigrant Fund' was established
to finance Indian immigrant passage to Malaya, hi 1911, there were already 33,122
Indian immigrants working in various estates throughout Perak and at its peak the
numberrose to 75,840 in 1921.82
In the development of the Chinese tin mining industry their success was closely linked to
their labour control capability. Various means were used including indenture, kinship
and clan ties, and provincial connections in the recruitment drive. A free market for
labour was non-existent and they were within the rigid control of Chinese capitalists and
secret societies. The abolition of secret societies undermined the Chinese control over
78Chinese immigration fell sharply after 1914 due to the drop in tin prices. Immigration restrictions
imposed by the government and the devaluation of the Straits dollar in subsequent years made Malaya an
unattractive country to work in, see Lee Kam Hing (1978), pp.41-2.
79Ibid., p.35. For example, in 1931 21,176 Chinese immigrants were repatriated and in 1932 the figure
stood at 10,007 immigrants.
80In 1918, for example, a total of 21,180 Chinese labourers, mostly made redundant in the tin mining
industry, were involved in the rubber smallholding sector in Kinta. [Ravinder Singh (1994/95), p.30]
81This scheme wasestablished by the FMSto assist all the statesin the Federation.
82See Table 3.5.3 in Section 3.5.
83For Chinese capitalists' controloverlabour, seeJomo (1988), pp.162-7.
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labour and saw the emergence of 'free' labour that could choose employers, obviously
preferring those willing to pay higher wages. This led to the shift in labour patterns where
the Chinese labourers either moved to work for other foreign employers or engaged in
other economic activities. In the rubber industry, the control of Indian labour was initially
through the indenture recruitment system. The high cost and the monopoly of labour by a
few recruiting firms necessitated and encouraged the kangany system. This involved
sending a kangany (Tamil foreman) to his village to recruit cheaper labour and without
loss of control over labour for the employer. The eventual demise of the kangany
recruitment system came in 1938 when all assisted passage from India to Malaya was
prohibited.
Different policies existed in the recruitment of labour for both the tin mining and rubber
industries, hi tin mining, labour recruitment was carried out directly by the Chinese
capitalists with minimal government intervention. Despite the deplorable working
conditions that the labourers endured, the absence of resistance from the Chinese
government was understood, as a treaty between Britain and China allowed unlimited
emigration of Chinese labour to any part of the British colonies as and when required.84
On the other hand, the recruitment of Indian labourers was carried out through inter-
government agreements that, at least, theoretically ensured that the immigrant labourers
would be well catered for during their working stay in Malaya. With such an
arrangement, in contrast to the Chinese immigrants, the colonial government treated




In the late 1930s, the decline in traditional tin production methods, which were replaced
by new technology, greatly reduced the need for imported labour. The prevailing
immigrant workforce available for employment signified that the state was not in short
supply of labour and the surplus availability forced the colonial government to impose a
quota system for Chinese immigration. By this time, the need for immigrant labour in
Perak was virtually over. The 'surplus' labour available therefore had to pursue other
economic activities. Being settled immigrants, their access to land was restricted and
wage employment was also limited so that many Chinese became involved in self-
employment activities in diverse sectors, filling in the gaps that were created by the
dynamic colonial economy. Together with the networks that relied heavily on kinship
ties, dialect groups and other economic linkages Chinese immigrant labour prospered and
managed to move away from their reliance on the tin mining industry. While the quota
system was imposed on Chinese immigration, at about the same period the Indian
government too had imposed a total ban on the emigration of unskilled labour to Malaya.
However, the progress of Indian immigrant labour had not been as successful as the
Chinese. During the low demand and low prices for rubber, the high unemployment
among Indian immigrants had also forced repatriation.88 In addition, the isolated self-
contained, low-wage estate environment made it difficult for Indian immigrant labourers
to pursue alternative economic activities.
86Chinese labour in the tin mining industry in Perakin 1935, for example, stood at 26,739 and more than
two-thirds were in the Kinta district. [Rex (1936), p.29]
87Jomo(1988),p.l74.
^Repatriation of Indian immigrant labour from Perak stood at 10,420 in 1931, 9,797 in 1932, 1,315 in
1933, and 343 in 1934, see Lee Kam Hing (1978), Table 11, p.36.
175
Labour and the immigration policy, therefore, played an important role in the economic
exploitation of tin and rubber during the colonial period. The absence of an indigenous
proletariat necessitated the importation of foreign labour to ensure an adequate
workforce. In achieving competitive advantage for the primary commodities, the colonial
state's labour policies ensured that sufficient labour was available at the lowest possible
costs. It is in the attempt to seek 'surplus' by capitalists that labour control was essential
and also wages were suppressed. Technological progress and the vicissitudes of world
markets eventually led to the decreasing need for and the displacement of labour. These
changes, in part, led to the permanent settlement of both Chinese and Indian immigrants
after spending many years in Perak. While the 'free' Chinese displaced labour moved
into other employment created by the rapid development of the colonial state, the 'free'
Indian immigrants and the Malays lagged behind in this area. However, the prevailing
conditions also meant that opportunities were available for the Malays to redistribute
economic activities between subsistence, export commodity production, and also wage
employment. By the end of the colonial period, Perak, once dominated by Malays, had
been transformed into a multi-ethnic state. Although the availability of imported labour
had assisted the rapid economic development of the state, the decision of a substantial
number of immigrant labourers to become permanent settlers contributed to the alteration
of the pattern and character of the communities in Perak.
5.7 Summary and conclusion
The presence of British administration in Perak for some eighty years had both positive
and negative consequences for the state. On the independence of Malaya, Perak had been
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successfully transformed into a modern state. It is therefore appropriate to conclude by
examining some of the transformations that had taken place during the colonial period
and the exploitation oftin and rubber.
In order to exploit these primary commodities, the availability of capital and labour was a
priority for the colonial government. Once these issues had been successfully resolved,
the focus then turned to the ways in which the production of tin and rubber could be
sustained with regard to the expansion of infrastructure and social development.
However, these were only developed to a level which facilitated the exploitation of the
commodities. Most of the benefits accrued to both the foreign capitalists and the colonial
government with the repatriation of income and profits to the home country. This had far
exceeded the relatively modest investment in government institutions and infrastructure,
which were in any case concentrated in areas where it was necessary to have efficient
communication for the transport of export commodities. By the end of the colonial
period, the focus on tin and rubber too resulted in a dependent state economy that was
exposed to the fluctuations of the world market. This dependent economic status could
prove detrimental to the long-term prosperity of the newly independent state. As a
dependent territory, Malaya at that time was merely one element in a global economic
and political order dominated by Britain.
To the Malay population, the exploitation of tin and later rubber had resulted in the
commercialisation of the Malay economy. The increase in the immigrant population
working in tin mines enabled surplus rice production to be sold. In the rubber sector the
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Malays were directly involved in production, mainly as smallholders. Traditional
economic relations that were weakened with the introduction of the colonial landholding
system were further undermined during the era of rubber cultivation. To preserve Malay
landholding and rice production, the Malay Reservation Act was introduced. Therefore,
the main resource available on which the Malays could capitalise was land and this was
placed under restriction. Rather than providing protection, it stunted the growth ofMalay
entrepreneurship in the colonial economy. The Malay traditional disinclination towards
investment was therefore reinforced by colonial policies, which in the first place
attempted to insulate the indigenous community. As a consequence of these restrictive
circumstances, there was no substantial participation of the Malays in the commercial
sector during the colonial period.
The shortage of labour to work the tin mines and rubber estates was resolved by the large
immigration of Chinese and Indians. Over time, the substantial increase in the immigrant
population also enabled the formation of self-sustaining and relatively self-contained
ethnic communities. It was also the result of the colonial government's practical policy
of combining ethnic identity and economic function. This saw the immigrant Chinese for
example, using family relations, neighbourhood and language ties as a basis of their
internal organisation. This system of networking, however, was not particularly evident
among the Indian immigrant commumty except in limited areas such as the formation of
unions in estates to struggle for better working conditions and wages.
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The relationship between ethnic commumty and economic function too brought changes
to the state's demography and population distribution. The development of tin and
rubber, which were both labour intensive, resulted in population concentration in defined
geographical areas. The Chinese immigrants, therefore, were heavily concentrated in the
Larut and Kinta districts, prominently associated with tin mining. The distribution of the
Indian immigrants was within the rubber belt while the Malays were located in the rice-
growing districts. Towns in the tin mining districts also took on a mainly Chinese
character. These patterns of ethnic distribution and settlement were also associated with
patterns of uneven economic development.
The higher volume ofcommercial activity and the increase in population also gave rise to
a range of trading, financial and other services. Private enterprise was the agent in the
development of the export of tin and rubber but the state played its role in providing the
administrative and legal framework for a successful capitalist economy. While it is true
that the colonial government had to diversify the economy from tin by promoting rubber
production as well, both commodities were export-oriented in nature, which resulted in
the state's high propensity to import other goods. The notion that the comparative
advantage of tin and rubber was a reason why the state had not focussed on
industrialization should not be accepted. In fact, these commodities could have been the
basis for industrialisation. In the longer term, the state could not survive on the basis of
the export of these two commodities; tin was a declining resource and rubber was too
sensitive to price fluctuations and faced stiff competition from substitutes.
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Overall, Perak had achieved considerable progress in economic development during
colonial rule. Basic infrastructures were developed and standards of living had risen.
However, this expansion was uneven in its scope and consequences. Colonial policy was
oriented primarily to an extractive rather than a developmental strategy. There was little
attention to the development of either heavy industry or domestic manufacturing other
than small-scale foundries to service the mining sector and, in the rubber sector, the
simple process of producing smoked sheet operated by smallholders. Therefore, the
multiplier effect in economic development was very much less evident. It was left to the
state in independent Malaya to try resolve these economic imbalances and the uneven
character of capitalist economic development.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF PERAK (1957-1980)
6.1 Introduction
When Perak achieved her independence along with other states in Malaya in 1957, a new
chapter in its history emerged. Having undergone 83 years of British colonialism, the
opportunity for the local populations to administer their own country became available.
Immediate changes were not apparent but initiatives were taken and gradually the state
government of Perak began to make alterations to those approaches adopted by the
former colonial government. These changes were more evident when the National
Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1970. Shifts in economic and social policies,
and related activities were made or amended to suit the local requirements as well as to
adapt to changes demanded by the global economic environment. Above all,
diversification in an economy, which relied on two main commodities, became essential.
As a result of economic diversification, changes in the land use pattern, labour utilisation,
and investment became more prominent. The roles undertaken by the state were mainly
as initiators for the changes in Perak's economic and social structures. As in previous
periods, emphases and analyses in this study are given to the changing economic
structure of Perak, again in particular to those associated with land, labour, and capital.
This chapter, therefore, discusses the role of the state in the independent Malay(si)a, and
the economic development in Perak from independence to 1980.
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6.2 The state and underdevelopment
With regard to Perak it has to be acknowledged that, as a state, the post-independence
period up to 1980 saw rapid economic growth brought about by the legacy of the colonial
capitalist economy, which was mainly based on the exploitation of its tin and rubber.
However, economic progress was limited to those parts of the state most closely linked to
the international capitalist system, and was therefore uneven in nature. Other parts of the
state that had nominal or no connections with either the tin or rubber sectors, particularly
the rural areas, did not develop in tandem. At the state level the developed areas became
the 'metropoles' while the rural areas the 'satellites'. Generally, a dual condition existed
in Perak: on the international front, as a result of economic dependence, the economic
surplus was extracted and was used mainly for the development of the Western centres;
and on the domestic front, the economic centres turned into urban metropoles and the
rural areas became the satellites that depended on the former.
The notion of dualism within underdevelopment, which implies that there is no
connection between the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors of the economy, however is
false since there are important linkages. The introduction of capitalism into Perak
generated the development of the modern sector; other areas inevitably had to come into
contact with these 'modern' areas, particularly in trade and primary commodity-related
activities. But the state experienced considerable economic and social division: disparities
in spatial development, differing technological levels between sectors and regions, and in
the social customs and attitudes between the indigenous and imported systems.
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During the post-colonial period there was a need to address and restructure this imbalance
to avoid continuing underdevelopment and overdependence on foreign economic
interests. In the early period after independence, restructuring was not substantial except
that Perak began gradually to diversify its economic activities that ranged from tin mining
and rubber to other commercial crops such as oil palm and cocoa. It however only began
to develop manufacturing industry, on any scale, in the early 1960s. When diversification
towards industrialisation began to take root in Perak, the concentrations of these
industries were located either within or at the fringes of urban areas where adequate
infrastructural facilities and labour for industrial production were available. However, in
1970 the introduction of the NEP began to see some changes in this process.
Improvements in the state infrastructure comprised the construction of industrial parks in
more dispersed parts of the state and these offered significant opportunities for the rural
population to seek employment. In the 1970s textile manufacturing saw significant
development in Perak, particularly in the north in the Larut Matang district. For the
period 1970-1978 the manufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 31.9% (at
1970 prices).1 The development of this industry, however, did not alleviate the problem
of underdevelopment in Perak as a whole, as it merely absorbed the excess labour force
released from the declining tin mining industry.
In the 1960s government policies also emphasised industrial investment, provision of tax
subsidies and incentives to industries, tariff and quota protection and also greater
spending in urban areas on schools, training, housing, and medical facilities. This is not
to say that the rural sector had been neglected altogether. In fact, post-independent
^erak (1981).Rancangan Malaysia KeEmpat Negeri Perak 1981-1985, Ipoh,p.6.
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government policies had emphasised the importance of rural development, more so under
the NEP, with the establishment of various federal and state agencies to accelerate
development in the rural sector. The progress however was comparatively slow compared
to the urban sector. Between 1970 to 1978, the agricultural sector managed an average
growth of 4.4% per year, which comprised 24% of the state's Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), which made it the largest contributor in 1978.3 Thelowaverage annual growth in
agriculture compared to manufacturing (31.9%) was partly due to the need to establish
appropriate infrastructure for rural development and partly to the need to change the
thinking and culture on development among the rural population. Although there was
progress in rural development, the gap between the urban and rural sectors remained
wide.4 There was a continuing need to increase productivity to achieve higher living
standards and at the same time eradicate poverty. The rural sector was particularly
affected when there were limited employment opportunities and at the same time rapid
population growth. While the need for industrial-based development had become more
essential in the early 1960s, the reluctance of the industries to set up operations in rural
areas prompted the government to introduce agriculture-based rural development
schemes to counter underdevelopment in this sector. At the federal level, agencies such
as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) started the first scheme in Perak at
Hulu Perak district in 1962 with 2,679 acres, the Federal Land Consolidation and
2An example of the government's serious assistance towards the rural poor can be seen through the
Guaranteed Minimum Price scheme for padi. In 1970 the minimum price was set at RM16 per pikul,
increased to between RM36 to RM40 by 1980. [Shaari & Jomo, (1984) in Riggs, J. (1990). Southeast Asia:
A Region in Transition, London: Unwin Hyman, p. 118]
3Perak(1981),p.6.
4Gunnar Myrdal argued that in the development process spatial difference will always persist. Economic
and social forces will produce tendencies towards disequilibrium, and movement to equilibrium is a false
assumption. See Myrdal, G. (1963). Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: University
Paperbacks.
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Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) in Slim River in 1967 with 300 acres, and the
Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority (RISDA) in Hilir Perak in 1968
with 6,500 acres. At the state level, the State Agricultural Development Authority
(SADC) began their first scheme at Jalong in 1974 with 1,160 acres.5 As more schemes
were undertaken by these government agencies in the rural areas it also helped mitigate
rural-urban migration.
There was also a rapid growth of population in the state. In the short-term, rapid
population increase could retard the development process but in the longer run it could
stimulate development in investment and technical progress. This could be beneficial to
the state if complementary resources and factors of production are available, but the
short-run costs may outweigh the benefits for a considerable time. The population grew
from 1.221 million in 1957 to 1.589 million in 1970 and in 1980 stood at 1.744 million
people.7 In the 1960s when Perak initiated its industrialisation activities, at a time when
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) was encouraged by the federal government, the
urban industrial sector was capable of absorbing labour from the rural sector. However,
as industrial growth is dependent on the availability of capital, the capacity to absorb
labour from the agricultural sector relied on continuing capital investment; the lack of
capital investment could later restrict employment opportunities. The rural sector on the
other hand, faced further underdevelopment until rural development schemes were
gradually introduced by state and federal agencies.
5Economic Planning Unit (EPU), Perak (1976). A BriefOverview ofAgricultural Sector in Perak, Ipoh,
pp.21-4.
Thirlwall, A. P. (1999). Growth and Development, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p.47.
'Federation of Malaya, Annual Report 1957; EPU, Perak (1993), p.9.
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In confronting the conditions of underdevelopment between regions in Perak in the post-
independence period, another key issue was the need to improve the low level of capital
accumulation that was seen as the cause of low productivity and poverty. Capital
accumulation requires investment and savings and it was not easy for the poor, who were
primarily located in the rural areas, to save. The post-1970 NEP was launched to address
this underdevelopment issue. The progress that took place within the next decade saw a
substantial reduction in the level of poverty in Perak from 34% in 1970 to 19.3% in
1980.9
At the same time the overall rapid development in the state saw a chain of further
cumulative expansion in favoured regions, by both state and private capital, particularly
those in the north bordering Penang and in the central region surrounding Ipoh. The
'backwash effect'10 created by development in the favoured regions resulted in the
persistence of economic difference. While the 'trickle down' or 'spread' effects usually
included only neighbouring regions, the speed of development beyond favoured regions
was invariably sluggish.11 It was envisaged that only through active government
intervention could regional differences be narrowed. The consecutive state 5-year
planning programmes, in conjunction with those of the federal government, beginning
particularly with the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-76), emphasised the importance of
1 T
achieving relatively even economic development throughout all the regions in the state.
8Perak(1981).p.73.
9EPU, Perak (2002a), iPembangunan Ekonomi dan Industri Negeri Perak', Seminar Sasaran Kerja Tahun
2002/2003, 21st January (Seminar paper).
10Forced concentration of resources in a particulararea whichdoes not spread out.
nMyrdal (1963) argues that the 'backwash effect' would always be stronger than the 'spread effect', which,
in turn, causes regional differences to persist, that is, if the state does not intervene.
12See Perak(1971). Rancangan Malaysia KeDua Negeri Perak1971-1975, Ipoh.
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From 1957 to 1980 economic development in Perak saw various social and economic
changes taking place. Although initial development was based more or less on the
approach of the colonial government, from 1970 a radical change in the development
agenda emerged, with greater emphasis on the rural sector. The government, both at state
and federal levels, through the NEP, began to intervene increasingly in the economic
system by direct participation in the ownership and control of productive assets. Like any
market, a government can fail too, but Perak's achievements have shown considerable
progress, particularly in the reduction of poverty. Government agencies set up to assist
the rural population in agricultural activities had also produced an improvement in the
general standard of living. Regional underdevelopment had decreased by 1980 but as it
was only halfway in the NEP's 1970 to 1990 timeline, more needed to be done if the
policy objective was to be met.
6.3 The economic thrust of the state
The development policies of Malaysia between 1957-1980 can be divided into two
distinct stages: the pre- and the post-1970 periods. The pre-1970 policies were the
continuation of approaches adopted by the colonial government, which relied heavily on
commodity export, the provision of infrastructure and rural development. The post-1970
period, on the other hand, as part of the 20-year national New Economic Policy,
concentrated on affirmative action, growth with equity, and the greater emphasis on the
industrialisation of the state.
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After independence, there were several political and administrative changes which were
mainlyrelated to the replacement of personnel in the administrative system. In principle
however very little change took place in economic policy based on the export of the
primary commodities of tin and rubber. The colonial approach, based mainly on the free
market system, was seen as the cause of increasing poverty and ethnic-based economic
disparity.13 The major modern economic activities, with the state providing support and
facilities for capitalist enterprise and organising the division of labour in ethnic terms
focusing on plantations, mining, and commercial activities, were not located in the
villages, and were not seen as benefiting the rural population. Agriculture was the main
economic activity for more than halfof the population of the state,14 especially the native
communities. While the economic focus in the pre-1970 period continued to concentrate
on primary commodities, changes in the rural sector began to take place in the 1960s with
government initiatives. Among the various crops that were actively promoted were
rubber and oil palm - commodities that strengthened Perak's dependence on international
markets. The government's increased direct involvement in agriculture via rural
development marked the end of the free market economic system in Perak and the
beginning of a mixed economic system that saw the combination of free enterprise with
active government support and direction. The establishment of government agencies,
particularly in assisting in agricultural development (see above) is evidence of this.
Prior to independence, the attempts made by the colonial government to encourage the
development of industries were largely focused on tin, rubber and its ancillary activities,
13SyedHusin All (1981), p.80.
14Perak(1981).p.8.
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though on a smaller scale raw material processing and basic consumer goods production
were also present. This is understandable because as a colonial power, industrial
development was geared towards the natural advantage available in commodities that can
easily be exploited and at the same time protects the domestic market for British
exports. Other than those activities associated with tin and rubber, industrialisation only
began to take place in Perak with the first major programme in Tasek Industrial Park in
Ipoh in the early 1960s. In fact, the main policy difference between colonial and
independent Perak was that in the latter, industrialisation was part of the state economic
development programme, although it was not forcefully promoted until 1970, as the
capacity to do so was limited. The form of industrialisation that took place during this
time, however, did not see a decline in foreign dependence.16 Rather Perak was further
integrated into the international capitalist system.
However, from 1970 the NEP dictated the direction of the whole nation and signalled
major changes in government involvement in the economy. The policy placed emphasis
on two principal objectives: the need to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by
raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians
irrespective of ethnicity; and to accelerate the restructuring process of Malaysian society
so that identification of ethnicity with economic function would be reduced and
Lim Chee Ping, 'The Role of Government in Malaysia Industrial Development' in The SoutheastAsian
Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985, April, p.30; Hamilton, R., 'Industrialisation and Small-Scale
Enterprise - The Case of Malaysia', Working Paper Series 90/9, University of Edinburgh, February 10,
1990, p.l 1. Lim Teck Ghee (1977) argued that colonial policies were designed to shelter British capitalist
interests at the expense of local enterprise.
16Lim Mah Hui & William Canak, 'The Political Economy of State Policies in Malaysia', Journal of
ContemporaryAsia, 11(2), 1981, p.211.
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eventually eliminated.17 On the surface, since the majority of the poor were from rural
areas, it would only be sensible to confront the issue of poverty by expanding rural
development programmes to raise income levels. Major efforts at improving the
agricultural and rural sectors were concentrated on land development, double cropping of
rice, drainage and irrigation, rubber replanting and the expansion of oil palm cultivation.
While this approach was a practical one, it did not help expedite development as
envisaged. It relied too much on agricultural development, which would only expose the
economy to dependence on one sector. In the 1970-75 period the average growth of
annual agricultural production was only 3.7% in Perak compared to the national figure of
7.5%.18 Furthermore, too much dependence on the agricultural sector would not achieve
the second objective of the plan. More concentrated measures were therefore increasingly
taken to promote manufacturing. Such action was seen as the prime mover of the
economy and at the same time capable of reducing the income gap within Perak and
moving away from dependence on primary resources. While the state economy
progressed it was hoped that a fairer distribution of wealth could be achieved. In the
decade of 1970-80 the share ofGDP by sectors in Perak had changed (see Table 6.3.1).
Table 6.3.1 Perak: Gross Domestic Product by
sector (:L978 prices)





Source: EPU, Perak (1999b). 'Taklimat Pembangunan" (Development briefing
notes to Menteri Besar), December 16, p.3 (unpub.)-
17This policy was first unveiled in the Second Malaysia Plan and further explained in detail under the
review of the plan two years later, see Malaysia (1971a). Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala
Lumpur: Government Printers; Malaysia (1973b). Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-
1975, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer. Alternatively, for state specific, see Perak (1971).
18Perak (1976). Rancangan Malaysia Ketiga Negeri Perak 1976-1980, Ipoh,p.2.
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The most remarkable change was the shift in the growth of manufacturing. This sector
almost doubled its contribution towards GDP from 11% in 1970 to 20% in 1980.
Between 1968-1974 the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA)19 approved a
total of 242 manufacturing projects in Perak and a further 160 projects between 1975-
1978.20 In the agricultural sector, although there was continuous emphasis given by the
government to rural development projects, the contribution towards state GDP began to
see a decline from 30% in 1970 to 26% in 1980. The decline, in part, was the result of the
more dynamic growth in the manufacturing sector. Although the percentage contribution
had decreased, the agricultural production value increased. For example, in 1970 state
agricultural production was valued at RM486.2 million, and it increased to RM612.0
million in 1975 and RM658.3 million in 1978.21 In the mining sector the contribution
towards state GDP had decreased substantially from 19% in 1970 to 11% in 1980. The
reduction was mainly attributed to the depletion of the easily accessible tin ores, and the
fluctuating price of the commodity. Furthermore, in areas where deep extraction was
needed, it required a more sophisticated technology that was obviously more costly. The
service sector however benefited from the positive developments in manufacturing.
Originally, based on the needs of tin and later rubber production during the colonial
period, the service sector expanded further despite the reduction in the importance of the
agricultural and mining sectors. Their contributions to the state GDP, complementing the
expansion of the manufacturing sector, rose from 40% in 1970 to 43% in 1980.
19Formed in 1964, FIDA is a federal agency responsible for promoting industrial development in Malaysia,
later renamed the Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (MIDA).
20Perak (1976), p.16; Perak (1981), p.19. 33 (13.64%) out of the 242 manufacturing project proposals
approved in 1968-74 were eventually withdrawn.
2iPerak(1981),p.9.
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6.4 Diversification of the economy
The transfer of power from the British in 1957 signified a new era in the history of the
country. But the legacy was a capitalist sector, consisting primarily of foreign-dominated
enterprises involved in tin mining and rubber plantations, producing for export and was
based on imported wage-labour. At the same time there existed a non-capitalist
indigenous sector or a 'traditional' sector that was primarily involved in rice cultivation,
shoreline fishing, and small-scale rubber planting activities that generally utilised family
labour, where production was mainly for local consumption.
The economic approach of the colonial period was extended into the immediate post-
independence period. However, adjustments to the approach were needed to counter two
main problems facing the state. First, allowing the dualistic economy to persist would
lead to a continuing severe uneven development in the state, spatially and ethnically.
This would result in a division between a flourishing sector and an undeveloped sector
that would grow wider with time. Secondly, the state as a whole would not grow
economically on the basis of the export of its primary commodities which were subject to
price volatility on the world market. The first 13 years of independence in Perak focused
on economic diversification and income growth, while maintaining core economic
activities in tin and rubber.
The attempt by the state to improve economic conditions in the pre-1970 period closely
followed the ISI policy, in which most of the colonial policies were maintained. At the
same time however there was increasing intervention in the rural sector as well as in the
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development of the social and physical infrastructure. Despite the need for industrial
development, the policy remained broadly non-interventionist, partly due to the pressures
from foreign plantation companies that wanted to keep wages down, and at the same
time, mitigate potential rural-urban migration. It was also partly due to the view that
aggressive promotion of industrialisation would, among the local capitalists, largely
benefit the Chinese, who comprised 49% of the total population of Perak in 1957. This
would in turn further widen economic disparities among the population.23 During this
period, while the initiatives for rural development were spearheaded by the government
with the establishment of public agencies in particular, the development of the industrial
sector was left mainly to private capital. This was with the exception of the initiatives of
the federal government in the provision of infrastructure and the introduction of industrial
incentive schemes.24 It also conformed to Perak's economic policy whose basic intent
was limited to the provision of a favourable economic climate with very little government
interference or participation in industry. At the same time government regulation in the
industrial sector was kept to the minimum.
Although some industrialisation took place, particularly in the early 1960s in Ipoh and the
surrounding areas, the emphasis in Perak's economy was still confined to agriculture,
mining, and to a certain extent, logging. For example, 27% of the state revenue in 1964 of
22Federation of Malaya, Annual Report 1957.
23Govindan, K., 'The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on a Developing Country: A Case Study of
Malaysia', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Lancaster, September 1997, p.25.
24The introduction of the Pioneer Industries Ordinance (1958) that provided tax-free holidays for selected
industries depending on the length and size of investment, and also moderate tariffs granted to new
industries was an initiative by the Federal Government to promote industrialisation in Malaya. The
Investment Incentive Act (1968) superseded the earlier scheme, which provided revised incentives but still
maintained its non-intervention policy in industrial development.
25LimChee Peng (1985), p.30.
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almost M$29 million, apart from federal fund allocations, consisted of revenues from
forests, land and mines. In the mining sector, concerns about oversupply in the global
market, partly as the result of disposing from stockpiles, and the depletion in local
sources in the longer term, were partly responsible for the state seriously addressing the
issue of economic diversification. The migration of tin-miners from the vicinity of Larut
to new areas in Kinta and Batang Padang districts, due to the decline of production and
depletion of tin, was a lesson learnt for the state not to be overly dependent on the mining
sector. In addition to this predicament was the situation that in the agricultural sector
prospects for rubber were not positive with the increase in industrial consumption of
synthetic rubber in the developed countries. Global industrial consumption of synthetic
rubber had risen from 30% in 1955 to 52% in I960.27 Locally the 40% fall in rubber
prices between 1957 and 1970 was largely blamed for the deterioration in the economic
standing of the majority of the lower income groups.28 It was in the late 1960s that the
federal government finally acknowledged that industrialisation was the way forward for
the nation to achieve sustained growth, a lasting positive balance of payments and
optimistic employment possibilities for the increasing labour force and for those
displaced from primary industries.29 From 1970 economic policy emphasised export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI) rather than import-substitution. For Perak, despite the
favourable economic climate promoted, industrialisation (in the manufacturing sector)
26Calculated from State of Perak (1965). Estimates ofRevenue andExpenditure for the Year 1965, Ipoh,
p.3.
27Govindan(1997),p.l5.
28Othman (1984), p.131 in Rigg(1990), p.I15.
29Govindan(1997),p.l4.
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accounted for only 11% of GDP in 1970 , indicating the general state of
underdevelopment in modern sector activities.
The then economic strategy, despite the active promotion of rural development, had
failed to spread economic benefits between both the urban and the rural population, and
also between the different ethnic groups. This was particularly acute in Perak where the
Malays comprised 39.7% of the population and the Chinese 44.2%. The dissatisfaction
with the lack of progress in addressing Malay economic backwardness nationwide
culminated in the 'race riots' of May 1969, and led to the introduction of the NEP.
Guided by the new federal policy, Perak abandoned its competitive capitalism policy and
in its place, state agencies played an increasingly direct role in the economy, from being
primarily involved in resource allocation and regulation of the economy to direct owners
of private enterprises.33 Thegovernment's aims were clearly expressed in that
[it] will participate more directly in the establishment and operation of a wide
range ofproductive enterprises. This will be done through wholly owned enterprises
and joint ventures with the private sector. Direct participation by the government in
commercial and industrial undertakings represents a significant departure from past
practices. The necessity of such effort by the government arises particularly from
the aims of establishing new industrial activities in selected growth areas and of
creating a Malay commercial and industrial community.34
The need for diversification in the economy was also explicitly expressed in the NEP
where measures were aimed directly at developing and restructuring the manufacturing
sector. It was also the sector where the disparity gap was the greatest. The dual
30EPU, Perak (1999b), p.3.
31Calculated from Table 3.5.1 in Section 3.5.
32Vigorous state intervention was necessary to make a speedy development transition, both to promote
growth and create better distribution ofeconomic benefits. [Todaro (1992), pp. 80-94]
33Lim&Canak(1981),P.217.
34Malaysia (1971a), p.7.
35Lhn CheePing (1985), p.32.
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possibility of achieving economic growth and more balanced economic distribution
among ethnic groups encouraged the state to diversify into manufacturing. On a
national scale the reliance on economic diversification within agriculture did not result
in any significant improvement. Attempts made to diversify from rubber to oil palm
and cocoa cultivation were unable to absorb the excess labour released by the decline of
rubber and tin. In rural development, initiatives through drainage and irrigation were
unsuccessful in generating any significant employment. However, the industrial
development incentives provided by the government began to see an increase in
manufacturing activities in Perak. Additional legislation, such as the Industrial
Coordination Act of 1975, further assisted the government in the implementation of its
industrial policies. Whilst most manufacturing activities were concentrated in the Kinta
district in the 1960s, the 1970s saw these spread to other districts with the establishment
of industrial parks by both the public as well as private sectors, with the public sector
emerging as the prime mover through the Perak State Development Corporation
(PSDC). This decade also saw an increase in the presence of multinational corporations
in the state. By 1980 the state managed to almost double its manufacturing share in
GDP to 20%.37
6.5 The proliferation of state enterprises
In the economic development of post-independence Perak up to 1980 the changes in the
involvement of state enterprises38 can be divided into two distinct periods: the first is
36Govindan(1997),p.l5.
37EPU, Perak (1999b), p.3.
38A distinction has to be made between state agency and state enterprise. State agency refers to any public
body established by the state that is supported by public funds and serves the community at large. The state
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from 1957 to 1970, and the second from 1971 to 1980. The division between these two
periods is important because economic policy at both the federal and the state levels
underwent a radical change. The former was in many ways the continuation of the
colonialsystemand the latter was under the NEP. The pre-1970 period was based broadly
on an economic policy which more or less followed the colonial approach. The
commitment of the state was to an unregulated private enterprise system with some
modification to meet local needs. State expenditure in direct public investment in the
modern sector was negligible. What was present was a modest amount of investment in
commerce and industry to assist Malay participation and some government support to
rural development.39 During this period, the growth of government enterprises to
encourage economic development was all federal-controlled. At the state level, however
no authority was available to establish these government enterprises. In 1957 there were
only 10 public enterprises40 responsible in assisting the economic development of the
whole nation.
However, the period 1971 to 1980 saw a shift in the economic development strategy
towards export-oriented industrialisation (EOT). Most important, however, was the
implementation ofthe NEP, embedded in the Second Malaysia Plan in 1971,41 which saw
the beginning of widespread direct state involvement in economic development.
Formulated to extend over a 20-year period, both the federal and state governments were
enterprise also carries a similar connotation but as a commercial organisation it has a different funding
structure; most commonlyan initial capital grant is provided; thereafter it may receive annual operating and
development expenditure grants or it may be required to generate its own income.
39Tan Loong-Hoe, 'The State and Distribution of Wealthwithin the Malay Society in Peninsular Malaysia'
in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1981, p.226.
40Mohd Affandi (1976), p.365-6 in Lim & Canak(1981), p.217.
41See Malaysia (1971a). Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, KualaLumpur: Government Printers.
197
entrusted with the main tasks of redistributing economic resources among the main ethnic
groups and also restructuring the society to eliminate economic imbalances. In achieving
the targets of the NEP, which were principally to achieve Malay politico-economic
empowerment,42 the distribution of economic wealth at the end of 1990 was set at 30%
for bumiputeras, 40% for non-bumiputeras, and the remaining 30% for foreigners. The
NEP also clearly stated the government's intention to participate in the establishment and
operation of diverse productive enterprises.43 These enterprises would later be transferred
to the bumiputeras as private enterprises.44 It was this policy approach that saw the
proliferation ofgovernmententerprises in Perak as well as in the country as a whole.
On a national scale the number of state enterprises increased rapidly with the
implementation of the NEP. Within four years there were 82 public enterprises owned by
both the federal and state governments, excluding 65 wholly-owned subsidiaries and 185
jointventures.45 This figure further increased in 1980 to 434 public enterprises at federal
level alone, engaged in a wide range of economic activities including services (41.6%),
manufacturing (41.1%), agriculture (8.5%), construction (5.8%), and mining and
quarrying (3.0%) (see Table 6.5.1). Although identifying the actual number of federal
public enterprises that were directly involved in the economic development of Perak
would be difficult, as no comprehensive data are available, those that were active
complemented the economic developmentinitiatives undertaken by the state government.
42Morgan, J. (1971), 'Economic and Social Trends' in Trends in Southeast Asia No.2: Proceedings and
Background PaperofSeminar on Trends inMalaysia, Singapore: Institute of Asian Studies, p.15.
43Malaysia (1971a), p.7.
44Malaysia (1976), p.88;Perak(1976), p.17.
45Mohd Affandi (1976), p.365-6 in Lim& Canak(1981), p.217.
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In Perak the establishment of public enterprises only began in the early 1970s. The
establishment of two state enterprises, namely the Perak State Development Corporation
(PSDC) in 1971, and two years later the Perak State Agricultural Development
Corporation (PSADC) signified the initial stage in direct state involvement in economic
development. While the PSADC had the objective of encouraging and improving the
development of agriculture in the state, the PSDC on the other hand was the prime mover
in other wide-ranging economic enterprises, which had also complemented development
initiatives carried out by federal agencies and the private sector. Its activities included
assisting in the provision ofdownstream economic activities for the Forestry Department,
and also in land development schemes, particularly in town and housing development
projects such as those already undertaken by the Department of Land and Mines, and
Housing and Local Government. Although the functions and objectives of the federal and
state agencies and enterprises are similar, complementary, and in many cases
overlapping, Perak's state enterprises have been in a better position to promote the local
economy. They possess greater efficiency and operational flexibility, and are managed
akin to a commercial venture, as compared to the traditional forms of federal and state
agencies. The federal and state agencies were much more bureaucratic in character.
While it is not possible to determine the exact number of subsidiaries and joint-venture
companies associated with the proliferation of state enterprises in Perak during the 1971-
198046 period, either because the available state reports do not specify them or the
required access was not granted during data collection, it is possible to illustrate the scale
46.This period covers two Malaysia Plans: the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975 and Third Malaysia Plan
1976-1980.
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of involvement. The PSADC, for example, during 1971-1979 had developed a total of
19,642 acres of agricultural land with 2,878 acres during the Second Malaysia Plan and
the balance of 16,764 acres in the subsequent period (see Table 6.5.2 and Map 6.5.1).
Table 6.5.1: Number of Public Sector Enterprises by activity in Malaysia, 1980
Activity No. of Enterprise/s Percent (%)*
Agriculture and Livestock Production 9 2.1
Forestry 27 6.2
Fishing t 0.2
Rubber, Oil Palm, and Tea Processing 15 3.5
Mining and Quarrying 13 3.0
Food Manufacturing 38 8.8
Mfr. of Footwear, other wearing apparel and 19 4.4
made-up Textile goods
Mfr. of Wood, Rattan Products 17 3.9
Mfr. of Furniture and Fixtures 5 1.2
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 4 0.9
Mfr. of Leather, Fur, and Leather Products 2 0.5
Mfr. of Rubber Products 10 2.3
Mfr. of Chemicals and Chemical Products 6 1.4
Mfr. Of other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4 0.9
Basic Metal Industries 5 1.1
Mfr. of Metal Products 11 2.5
Mfr. of Machinery 4 0.9
Mfr. of Electrical Machinery 10 2.3
Mfr. of Transport Equipment 12 2.8
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 16 3.7
Construction 25 5.8
Wholesale Trade 17 3.9
Retail Trade 6 1.4
Banks and other Financial Institutions 57 13.1
Insurance 6 1.4
Real Estate 24 5.5
Transport 33 7.6




Source: Adapted from Ministry of Public Enterprise in Lim Chee Ping (1985). 'The Role of Government in Malaysian
Industrial Development' in The Southeast Asian Economic Review, Vol. 6, No.l, April, p.37.
* Note: Percentages were re-calculated as some figures from the original source were incorrect.
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While the monitoring of the schemes was centralised under the PSADC, the management
and operation of these plantations were effectively run by wholly-owned subsidiaries
such as Ladang Lekir Sdn Bhd, Dindings Oil Palm Industries Sdn Bhd, and Ladang
Jalong Sdn Bhd. While these are some of the better-known enterprises established under
the PSADC, there were others, particularly run on a joint-venture basis with the private
sector to support such activities as nurseries, real estate, land clearing and rehabilitation,
mills, and transport. In the post-1980 period, the PSADC had also established various
enterprises in agro-business related industries.
Table 6.5.2 Perak: PSAD<2 Land Development Schemes 1971-1979
District Development Scheme Crop Acreage
Kuala Kangsar Jalong Tinggi,
Sungei Siput
Oil Palm 1218.0
Kuala Kangsar Jalong Tinggi,
Sungei Siput
Rubber 645.0
Dindings Lekir Coconut 529.7
Kampong Gajah Air Kuning Tapioca 485.0
Dindings/Perak Tengah Lekir Oil Palm 3661.0
Dindings Lekir Cocoa 529.7
Dindings Lekir Tapioca 485.0
Dindings Changkat Cermin Oil Palm 3441.5
Dindings Changkat Cermin Tapioca 2562.0
Dindings Raja Hitam III Oil Palm 1300.0
Dindings Raja Hitam III Tapioca 3165.0
Perak Tengah Air Kuning Tapioca 1000.6
Kuala Kangsar Jalong Tapioca 50.0
Perak Tengah Changkat Lada Tapioca 570.0
Total 19642.5
Source: Collated from Perak (1981). Rancangan Malaysia KeEmpat: Negeri Perak 1981-1985, pp.56-7.
In the case of the PSDC, the increase in the number of state, enterprises was even more
substantial due to its diverse involvement in the economy. In the logging industry 20
joint-venture companies were established during 1976-1977 alone, all with 60-40 equity
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Jalong Tinggi, Sg. Siput
Map 6.5.1 Perak: PSADC Land development schemes 1971-1979
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with the PSDC holding the larger share; there was also the establishment of a sawmill in
Grik.47 In the manufacturing sector, in the early 1970s, four enterprises were established:
two wholly-owned enterprises involving coconut-based products in Hutan Melintang and
a brick factory in Bruas, and two joint-venture enterprises involving electronics and
timber-based products located in Ipoh.48 Apart from these projects, there was also
evidence of the PSDC acting as capital providers in numerous manufacturing companies
throughout the state during 1971-1975 totalling RM340,000.49 In the mining sector a
total of 10 joint-venture enterprises were established during the 1971-1980 period.50
Through various joint-venture arrangements, 267 commercial stalls either for rent or sale
were set up to encourage small businesses in the state which the PSDC had built.
There was much more PSDC investment in the construction and industrial sector. In
construction a total of 688 houses were built via joint-venture companies during 1971-
1975;52 during 1976-1980 10 joint-venture companies were established to undertake the
development of 2,904 residential and commercial buildings. To further promote
industrial development in the state, the PSDC developed 6 industrial estates with a total
acreage of almost 2,300 acres during the 1971-1980 period.54 Although there is no
indication whether these industrial estate projects were undertaken directly by the PSDC
or by newly formed subsidiaries and joint-venture companies, the general trend of the








54Perak (1976),p.18; Perak (1981),p.54.
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The available evidence clearly indicates the beginnings of a substantial increase of state
enterprises in Perak in the early 1970s. There may be others for which data are
unavailable. Between 1971 and 1980 at least 54 state enterprises were established (see
Table 6.5.3).55 This transformation is totally in contrast to the economic development
approach undertaken prior to 1970.
Table 6.5.3 Perak State Enterprises by industry, 1971-1980*








Note: * Not comprehensive and limited to the data available.
6.6 The changing land use pattern
In the economic development of Perak changes can also be identified in the land use
pattern in the post-independence period. This section traces land development in the
1957-1980 period. As with the increase of the number of state enterprises in Perak, the
intensification in land use was more prominent after 1970 as a result of the NEP. The
discussion of land use patterns is divided into two parts - the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors.
Medium- and large-scale land development schemes were introduced with rubber, a high
demand commodity at the time, in addition to oil palm, padi and coconut. Prior to 1970
55It is reported that prior to 1955 there were 11 public enterprises in Malaysia. In 2004 the numbers had
increased to more than 1,345, both at federal and state levels. [Hill et. al. (2004). Accountability and
Control ofPublic Enterprises,Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), pp. 1,6,9]
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two state schemes were established in Perak - the Fringe Land Alienation Scheme and
the Group Settlement Scheme covering a total of 32,936 acres benefiting 7,041 settlers.56
These were agricultural schemes that had similar structures to the federal-controlled
FELDA and RISDA programmes but were controlled by Perak state. Since the 1960s
federal agencies too contributed to the changing agricultural landscape of Perak. FELDA
had established five rubber land development schemes totalling 14,144 acres, FELCRA
and RISDA, with two schemes each, developed 1,567 acres and 11,500 acres
respectively.57
While rubber was the leading crop of the time, oil palm began to gain momentum in the
early 1960s. Oil palm cultivation had been a minor part of the agricultural scene up to
CO
1961 when there were only 32,300 acres of oil palm plantations in Perak. The first oil
palm scheme initiated by a public agency was initiated by FELDA in 1962 and by the end
of the decade a total of five schemes had been established covering an area of 14,049
acres; the state scheme only began in 1968 under the Youth Land Scheme in Perlop with
800 acres.59 Padi and coconut cultivation did not figure in land development schemes in
the pre-1970 period compared to those of rubber and oil palm cultivation. Restricted by
soil conditions, the few schemes established consisted of very large areas. Concentrated
in the districts of Krian, Hilir Perak, and Dindings, padi and coconut cultivation,
however, received extensive state support, particularly in terms of drainage and irrigation
facilities, technical assistance, and subsidies. The support enabled the expansion of these
56EPU, Perak(1976), pp. 19-20.
"Calculated from EPU, Perak (1976), pp.22-24. Distribution of land development schemes among the
districts in Perak up to 1975 can be found in this report.
58Lim Chong Yah(1969), Table 5.6, p.139.
59EPU, Perak(1976), pp.20-2.
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crops to a remarkable level so that in 1966 there were 128,746 acres of padi and 104,632
acres of coconut in the state (see Table 6.6.1).
Table 6.6.1 Perak : Agricultural land use 1966-1980, selected 'vears60
Land Use Category 1966 1970 1974 1980
(acres) (acres) (acres) (acres)
Rubber 624,101 634,321 683,045 627,251
Oil Palm 39,337 81,145 130,612 223,130
Padi 128,746 201,399 129,299 171,696
Coconut 104,632 110,905 116,104 135,711
Pineapple 1,456 n.a 200 n.a
Coffee 108 n.a 61 2,032
Cocoa 8 8,042 20,230 62,868
Sugarcane 0 10,175 7,666 52
Orchards 2,706 n.a 7,576 21,592
Sources: 1966 & 1974: Wong (1974). The Present Land Use ofPeninsular Malaysia, Vol.1, Ministry of Agriculture,
p.395; 1970: EPU, Perak (1976). A BriefOverview ofthe Agricultural Sector in Perak, p.14; 1980: Perak Agricultural
Department (1980). Maklumat Tanaman Perak, pp.1-20.
New development initiatives were limited in the non-agricultural sector in the pre-1970
period. Attention was mostly directed to the provision and improvement of infrastructure
to support the rural development policy. Apart from the tin mining industry, the non-
agricultural changes in land use were essentially the result of urbanisation with the
growth of new townships and the beginning of industrial enterprises in the late 1960s.61
Tin mining, however, continued to dominate this sector. Producing at an annual average
of 35,000 tonnes during the 1957-1970 period this sector continued to open up more
60These statistics were gathered from the sources indicated with different datacollection approaches. While
those of 1966 and 1974 were collected via more scientific mapping surveys, those of 1970 and 1980 were
collected on the ground by the State Agricultural Department. Some caution should therefore be applied
using these statistics, although the general pattern of the development of the agricultural sector can still be
discerned.
61The PIO (1958) did not attract many industrial establishments to Perak exceptfor those located in Tasek
Industrial Park, Ipoh in the early part of 1960. The IIA (1968) changed the momentum that saw more
industrial development taking place at the end of the decade.
62Calculated from Jomo, K. S. (1990). Undermining Tin: The Decline of Malaysian Pre-eminence,
Transnational Corporations Research Project, University of Sydney, Appendix Table 6, p.89. During the
period tin production was at its lowest in 1958 with 21,700 tonnes and gradually increased to the highest
production in 1968 with 43,500 tonnes; for Perak's tin production during 1957-2000, see Table 7.2.2 in
Section 7.2.
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land for the extraction of the commodity. In 1966 a total of 73,401 acres were attributed
to tin production (see Table 6.6.4).
After 1970 the agricultural sector was further expanded. However, industrialisation in the
non-agricultural sector expanded at a much faster rate. Although there was a realisation
of the need to diversify the economy in the early years of independence, no vigorous and
constructive efforts were undertaken until after 1970. Table 6.6.1 above can best illustrate
the changes in the agricultural sector. Rubber, which was dominant as the most important
agricultural commodity from the beginning of the century, began to decline from the mid-
1970s. Between 1974 and 1980 there was a reduction of about 8% or almost 56,000
acres. The increasing competition from other world producers and the growing use of
synthetic rubber forced cultivators to seek and plant new crops; rubber prices too were
not encouraging - the last year that the rubber price exceeded 100 cents per pound was in
1960 and it gradually declined to its lowest in 1972 at 42.4 cents per pound before again
progressively reversing the trend.63 However, despite thedecline in the acreage of rubber,
level of production was not severely affected. Advances in the technology of rubber
production from planting material to yield stimulation to soil maintenance and so on saw
a reduction of 8.2% in the acreage between 1974 and 1980 but this only resulted in about
a 4% decrease in production (see Table 6.6.2).
The decline in the interest in rubber was also the result of both estates and smallholders
turning to oil palm as an alternative crop. Apart from its high price, oil palm also requires
63For comparative purposes, in 1960the priceof rubber was 108cents/lb, in 1970 was 56.4 cents/lb, and in
1980 was 141.7 cents/lb. The price is based on ribbed smoked sheets (RSS) only. For a complete list of
rubber annual prices 1905-1983, see Jomo (1988), Table 7.1, pp.181-2.
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a shorter maturation period and better returns as compared to rubber. In 1970 a metric
tonne of fresh fruit bunches (ffb) of oil palm fetched a price of RM80; the price more
than doubled to RM180 per tonne in 1978;64 and the annual return for investment in oil
palm was reported to be averaging between 20% to 30% against fewer than 10% for
rubber.65 With such an incentive, oil palm cultivation was fast changing the land use
pattern in Perak. Within a decade oil palm had increased its total acreage by almost three
fold from 81,145 acres in 1970 to 223,130 acres in 1980. The production of estates and
land schemes alone had increased by about the same amount (see Table 6.6.2). While the
reduction in rubber acreage was partly the result of estates switching to oil palm, this crop
also attracted both large and small new cultivators. Between 1970 and 1979 the state
government had alienated a total of 333,353 acres for agricultural purposes (see Table
6.6.3). While a complete crop distribution is not available for detailed analysis for
alienated agricultural land, a simple exploratory assessment can be made: RISDA focused
on the development of rubber for smallholders;66 FELDA and FELCRA, despite their
involvement in rubber and, to a very limited extent, in padi cultivation in their early
years, concentrated more on oil palm cultivation from the early 1970s; SADC had a more
wide-ranging involvement in crop cultivation - between 1971 and 1979 about 49% of its
planted area comprised oil palm;67 the private 'individual' category, largely consisted of
smallholders, and this is more difficult to generalise but the trend of new planting
between 1970 and 1980, excluding padi, goes in the order of coconut, oil palm, and
64Perak(1981),p.l3.
65Nagayam (1990), p.16 in Drabble (2000), p.218.
66RISDA did venture into oil palm cultivation in the late 1960s. In 1980 they had 3,926 acres brought
forward from the early development schemes. [Perak Agricultural Department (1980), p.3] Subsequent
years saw their oil palm holdings decrease to about 680 acres only. [EPU, Perak (1986a), p.44]
67Calculated from Table 6.5.2 in Section 6.5 with the following result: rubber (3.2%), oil palm (49.0%),
coconut (2.7%), cocoa (2.7%), and tapioca (42.3%).
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rubber respectively.68 But between a half to two-thirds of the agricultural land alienated
during the 1970 and 1979 period was directed towards oil palm cultivation.
Table 6.6.2 Ferak: Agricultural >roduction 1971 -198U, selected ci
Year Rubber Oil Patm* Padi
(metric tonnes) (metric tonnes) (metric tonnes)
1971 181,387 437,339 208,148
1972 176,429 458,181 208,397
1973 211,844 474,314 234,293
1974 215,272 578,939 264,021
1975 199,426 683,344 201,199
1976 226,736 726,050 196,291
1977 225,014 869,397 226,888
1978 219,523 961,054 174,511
1979 216,656 1,123,966 202,194
1980 206,253 1,184,223 190,131
Source: Collated from Economic Planning Unit (comp.)(1994). Statistical Datafor Gross Domestic Product,
Kuala Lumpur: Regional Economic Section, Prime Minister's Department, Tables 1, 4, and 5
Note: *Production of fresh fruit bunches (ffb) by estates and land schemes only.
Table 6.6.3 Perak: Land alienated for agricultural purposes 1970-1979 (in acres)
Year FELDA FELCRA RISDA SADC Individuals Total
1970 6,940 1,470 0 0 1,125 9,535
1971 0 1,500 0 0 74,440 75,940
1972 0 9,000 0 0 20,572 29,572
1973 0 6,000 0 0 30,980 36,980
1974 0 5,066 14,910 0 16,606 36,582
1975 2,940 0 0 3,241 559 6,740
1976 0 0 0 16,130 319 16,449
1977 28,700 922 7,355 1,050 7,902 45,929
1978 31,800 37,761 0 2,092 683 72,336
1979 2,000 1,290 0 0 0 3,290
Total 72,380 63,009 22,265 22,513 153,186 333,353
Source: Department of Land and Mines in Perak (1981). RancanganMalaysia Keempat Negeri Perak 1981-1985,p.10.
While oil palm saw a tremendous increase between 1971 and 1980 overtaking rubber,
padi cultivation decreased to be the third important agricultural crop in the state. The
68The increase/decrease of new planting among smallholders for the period is as follows: coconut+30,199
acres, oil palm +20,803 acres, and rubber -53,201 acres. [Calculated from Perak Agricultural Department,
(1975). Statistik Pertanian Negeri Perak 1975, Ipoh, pp.26,28,31; Perak Agricultural Department (1980),
pp.1,4, 9]
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extensive government support, which padi had received from both the colonial and the
post-independence governments under rural development schemes, is well known. The
development from 1970 onwards is a further extension of the former arrangements.69
Although padi made a relatively small contribution to the state economic output,
continuing state support was deemed important, both economically and culturally, to the
Malay rural population and, therefore, politically highly sensitive. With the high capital
1 1 __investment needed for infrastructure it would have been cheaper to import rice. Table
6.6.1 clearly indicates that efforts had been made to bring more areas under rice
cultivation between 1966 and 1980.72 The large schemes were mainly located in Krian,
Hilir Perak and Manjung districts while the smaller schemes, totalling some 6,000 acres,
were dispersed in other districts in Perak. During the 1971 to 1980 period a total of
RM119 million had been spent either to improve or provide new drainage and irrigation
facilities throughout the state74 to enable double cropping,75 a practical way of optimising
land utilisation. Intensification was also carried out through utilisation of improved
seeds, training, subsidies and other measures. In contrast, however, padi output did not
69For example, during the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), Perak was allocated MS34.8 million for
drainage and irrigation development, of which a large portion was used to implement 31 new and
continuous irrigation and drainage schemes to improve infrastructure facilities to some 53,000 acres of
existing and new padi land. [Malaysia (1973a). Triennial Report of the Drainage and Irrigation Division
for the Years 1970, 1971 &1972, Kuala Lumpur: Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development, p.142]
70The total agricultural GDP contribution to the state in 1970 was 30% and later declinedto 26% in 1980.
[EPU, Perak (1999b), p.3] In 1970 padi production contributed only 16.5% of the total agricultural output
ofRM427.3 million. [Perak (1976), p.3]
71Apart frominfrastructure and fertiliser subsidy provisions, the government guaranteed price scheme kept
rice cultivation a viable venture for the peasantry. The padi price was guaranteed at RM16 in 1970, $24-28
in 1975, $28-32 in 1979, and $36-40 in 1980. [Jomo (1988), p.121]
72The figure of 201,399 acres for 1970 looks odd. The possible explanation for this sudden increase in
cultivation acreages is due to double counting for double-cropping of rice cultivation, which was common
in rice statistics and continued to be so.
73See Malaysia (1971b). Triennial Report ofthe Drainage andIrrigation Divisionfor the Years 1968, 1969
&1970, Kuala Lumpur: Ministry ofAgriculture and Rural Development, pp.111-5.
74Perak(1981),p.l3.
75For example, Trans-Perak Irrigation Scheme and Krian Extension Scheme were to increase its double
cropping area from 30,000 to 60,000 acres [Malaysia (1973a), p.142]
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show the same result (see Table 6.6.2). The increase in output from 208,147 metric
tonnes in 1971 reached its peak in 1974 with 264,021 metric tonnes before declining
again. The period 1978-1980 even saw Perak's annual padi output fall below that of 1971
despite the larger cultivation area.
Coconut and cocoa were the two remaining crops that had a significant impact on the
agricultural land use pattern of the state (see Table 6.6.1). Primarily concentrated in Hilir
Perak, Manjung, and Krian, the 1970-1980 period saw coconut and cocoa cultivation
increase their acreages by 24,806 and 54,825 respectively.76 It is interesting to note that
smallholders were dominant in the cultivation of both these crops. In 1970 estates
comprised 37,007 (33.4%) acres of coconut while the smallholders covered an area of
73,898 (66.6%) acres; in 1980 the estate coconut had decreased both in acreage and
percentage to 31,614 acres (23.3%), and the smallholder area increased to 104,097
(76.7%) acres. The decrease in estate cultivation was attributed to the switch to oil
palm. In cocoa cultivation smallholders only represented 5% of the total cultivation area
in 1970 but in 1980 hadincreased significantly to 53%.78
In the non-agricultural sector, Table 6.6.4 provides a broad comparative assessment of the
changing land use pattern during the period.79 The increase in the urban and associated
areas clearly indicates the evolving development process in Perak, mainly comprising the
enlargement of existing and the establishment of new towns and industrial estates; the
It is common practice that coconut cultivation is intercropped with cocoa on the same plot of land.
"Calculated from Perak Agricultural Department (1975), p.31; Perak Agricultural Department (1980), p.9.
78Ibid.,p.34;Ibid.,p.l5.
79An equivalent complete data for 1980 were notavailable during data collection.
211
increase was concentrated mainly in the better developed regions which function as
administrative, commercial, and industrial centres. Among the districts, Kinta and Larut
Matang, each showed a 42% and 23% increase respectively, particularly in industrial
areas.80 Up to 1979 five outof the sixindustrial estates in Perak were located in these two
districts, and a further 238 projects (82.4%) outside these industrial estates were also
Q 1
located in these districts.
Table 6.6.4 Perak: Selected non-agricultural land use, 1966 and 1974
Land Use Category 1974 1966 Increase/
(acres) (acres) Decrease
Urban and associated areas 41,547 31,311 10,236
Tin mining areas 134,209 73,401 60,808
Other mining and quarrying areas 803 784 19
Grassland 87,640 226,551 -138,911
Forest 2,764,207 2,845,026 -80,819
Scrub forest 167,514 195,200 -27,686
Newly cleared land 118,221 53,644 64,577
Swamps 508,037 613,468 -105,431
Unused land 6,251 29,410 -23,159
Source: Collated from I.F.T. Wong (1974). The Present Land Use ofPeninsular Malaysia, Vol. I, Ministry
of Agriculture, p.394.
In the pre-1980 period mining remained an important element in the land use of the state.
Concentrated mainly in the districts of Kinta, Batang Padang, and Larut Matang there
was an increase in the tin mining area of 60,808 acres between 1966 and 1974, partly in
response to its high price. The price of RM373 per pikul in 1957 increased continuously
and reached its peak in 1980 at RM 2,159 per pikul. The acreage of mining land had
also increased to 144,766 acres by 1980. Although the mining economy was primarily
based on tin, iron ore and gold were also mined on a small scale in the state.
80Calculated from Wong(1974), pp.394-443.
81Perak (1981), Table2-10,p.23.
82Jomo (1988), Table 6.1,pp.l59-160.
83EPU, Perak(1986a), p.113.
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The remaining categories of land use in Table 6.6.4 represent a very large portion of the
state. Specific identification of the changes is difficult without actually scrutinising the
detailed cartographic map of Perak during both years, which is beyond this study. A
general comment will, however, be made. The bulk of both forest and scrub forest are
located in the districts of Hulu Perak, Kuala Kangsar, and Batang Padang. For obvious
reasons logging has been a principal economic activity in Perak and the huge reduction in
forest was mainly attributed to this activity as well as for agricultural purposes.84
Between 1971-1979 a total of 363 logging licenses for 389,399 acres had been issued by
the state,85 which produced 27.7 million cubic feet of timber.86 The reduction in scrub
forest by almost 30,000 acres between 1966 and 1974, which generally occurred at the
edge of the forest, might suggest improvement in forest regenerating programmes, the
rehabilitation of previously abandoned cultivation areas or new re-development schemes.
These changes were also probably the reason for the reduction of grassland by almost
140,000 acres.
Swamps that are commonly associated with low-lying areas are a general feature in the
west and southwestern parts of Perak. The reduction of 105,431 acres in swampland
during the period suggests that extensive efforts had been carried out to reclaim these
areas for agricultural activities and also the successful rehabilitation programme for
abandoned padi land. Incidentally, this is also the region of the state that had seen
Post-1980 however painted a different picture where both the tin price and acreage started to decline. In
1981 there was a sharp drop by about 56% in acreage to 64,375 acres; see Section 7.2.
84During the 1970-1979 period a total of 231,137acresof forestreserve had been delineated for agricultural
purposes. [Perak (1981), p.15]
85lbid., Table 2-4,p.16.
86Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia (comp.)(1994), Table 10(unpub.).
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extensive development of padi, oil palm, and coconut cultivation. As for the increase in
newly cleared land it obviously suggests that these areas had been prepared for
development, either agricultural or non-agricultural, where identification was not possible
at the time of the survey.
Throughout the whole period of 1957 to 1980 the agricultural sector emerged as the
single largest contributor to the changing land use pattern. Oil palm became the most
important crop. The three-fold increase in acreage and even more in production is
evidence of this. With the exception of rubber, the cultivation of padi, coconut, and cocoa
continued to expand and what is more important is the massive involvement of
smallholders in the agricultural sector.
The government's role in achieving this progress was vital. Apart from providing the
necessary development infrastructure, it was the participation of the government agencies
in developing land schemes that helped expand the agricultural economy. However,
agricultural expansion for a state like Perak has its limits. According to the 'Land
Capability Classification Report: State of Perak 1969',87 potential land for agricultural
development totalled 607,000 acres. Deducting the land alienated for agricultural
development between 1971 and 1979 the state was left with about 274,000 acres for
future expansion. With the declining trend in suitable land availability, the optimisation
of land use, particularly with the use of new technology, therefore, became an important
issue for the state.
87Perak(1981),p.ll.
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The rapid depletion of potential agricultural land was also an important factor that
compelled the state towards industrialisation. The emergence of state-sponsored
industrial estates and the encouragement of industrial projects in the 1970s clearly
showed the government's commitment towards industrialisation. However, in contrast to
the agricultural sector, the development in the industrial sector was restricted to a few
districts thereby widening the development gap between different regions within the
state.
6.7 Changing labour utilisation
This chapter so far has reviewed and reflected on the various changes that have taken
place in post-independence Perak up to 1980 focussing on economic growth and
diversification issues, and specifically the initiatives of the state in accelerating growth
via the establishment of state agencies. These initiatives and policies resulted in changing
land use patterns. This section will examine changes in the labour utilisation patterns,
another aspect of the impact of state initiatives in economic development.
Examining the change in population in Perak during the period provides a starting point
before scrutinizing the transformation, which underlies these figures. In 1957, the
population of the state was 1.221 million; it increased to 1.569 million in 1970, and in
1980 to 1.805 million (see Table 6.7.1). Therefore, the population grew by about 48% but
the percentage change in 1957-1970 was much higher than 1970-1980 at 28.5% and
15.1% respectively. This increase that comprised mainly natural growth rather than
immigration is indicative of the increase in the availability of labour in the state.
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Table 6.7.1 Perak: Urban and rural population, selected years
Sector 1957 1970 1980 Change (%)































Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaya (1959a). Population Census 1957, Report No.14, pp. 1-2; EPU, Perak
(1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985, p.15; Department of Statistics, Malaysia (1980). General Report of the
Population Census 1980, VoI.2,pp.l-2.
Another trend was the gradual increase in the distribution of the urban population from a
quarter in 1957 to almost a third in 1980 of the total population either as a result of the
expansion of existing towns and cities or the establishment of new urban areas. The
growth in the urban population during 1957-1980 suggests that it increased to almost
three times (90.3%) of the rural population (33.6%). The growth in the urban population
was balanced by a corresponding decline in the rural population; and the period 1970-
1980 shows a significant change when the urban population grew almost four-and-a-half
times more than the rural sector. A basic assessment can therefore be made of labour
availability and utilisation linked to population growth. There was a clear shift of labour
from the rural to the urban sector. Whether this shift was the result of more employment
opportunities created by intensified economic activities in the urban sector or the
establishment of many economic projects in rural areas, which resulted in new urban
growth, needs more detailed consideration. These changes will be examined through data
in Tables 6.7.2 and 6.7.3 that follow.
The agricultural industry has been the mainstay of economic activity in Perak since the
pre-colonial period. Although this category, according to census reports, comprises
8Urban is defined as gazetted areaswitha population of 10,000 or morepersons at the time of the census.
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Table 6.7.2 Perak: Labour force distribution 1957-19 JO, selected years
Sector 1957 1970 1980
{'000) % ('000) % ('000) %
Primary
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 219,008 52.8 215,800 47.5 215,297 37.7
Mining and quarrying 30,052 7.2 31,018 6.8 26,054 4.6
Secondary
Manufacturing 25,090 6.1 39,642 8.8 67,835 11.9
Construction 12,664 3.1 9,175 2.0 26,965 4.7
Tertiary
Electricity, gas and water 3,032 0.7 4,267 0.9 1,719 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade, and
restaurants and hotels 37,108 8.9 46,698 10.3 72,256 12.6
Transport, storage and communication 10,372 2.5 12,193 2.7 18,720 3.3
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services 1,314 0.3 * * 7,636 1.3
Community, social and personal services 63,980 15.4 77,541 17.1 112,259 19.6
Others (Not adequately known) 12,346 3.0 17,902 3.9 23,134 4.0
Total 414,966 100.0 454,236 100.0 571,875 100.0
Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaysia (l959b).Population Census 1957: State of Perak, Report No.8, pp.59-63; Perak (1981).
Rancangan Malaysia KeempatNegeri Perak 1981-1985, Table 4-10, p.79; EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri Perak 1980-1985, p.25.
Note: * These figures have been included under 'Wholesale and retail trade, and restaurants and hotels'.
Table 6.7.3 Perak: Changes in abour force distribution 1957-1980 (percent)
Sector 1957-1970 1970-1980 1957-1980
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing -1.5 -0.2 -1.7
Mining and quarrying 3.2 -16.0 -13.3
Manufacturing 58.0 71.1 170.4
Construction -27.6 193.9 112.9
Services 21.5 51.1 83.6
Source: Calculated from Table 6.7.2 above.
Note: Apart from 'Others' in Table 6.7.2 all other industries have been re-categorised under 'Services'.
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, the participation of labour in the latter two industries
was insignificant compared to agriculture. For example, in 1957 the labour participation
from both forestry and fishing constituted only about 8% of the primary sector; almost
two-thirds of that 8% were in the fishing industry.89 This trend did not change much
during the next two decades. The labour force in the agricultural industry therefore
^Calculated from Departmentof Statistics, Malaysia (1959b), p.59.
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comprised the largest proportion in the primary sector. There were 219,008 workers in
1957 which thereafter experienced a decline and stabilisation to 215,800 in 1970 and
215,297 in 1980. These statistics obviously raise certain issues since government fiscal
policies had been very generous towards agriculture in attempting to raise incomes as
well as to increase labour participation. Aside from the funds allocated by the federal
government and other complementary state expenditure on rural development, the state
alone spent in excess of RM86 million for the development of agriculture during the
1971-1980 period.90 However, the increase in labour participation in this sector did not
materialise because of technological and capital intensification and migration drift to
other occupations.91
We have seen in the previous section the government's vigorous initiatives that led to the
establishment of various agencies, especially to promote agriculture. A total of 333,353
acres were alienated for agricultural purposes between 1970-1979 ofwhich 180,167 acres
(54%) were alienated to government agencies to establish land development schemes.
For economic reasons, these schemes were later distributed to agricultural settlers in the
form of individual parcels, each measuring about six acres for padi cultivation, or ten
acres for rubber or oil palm cultivation.93 As also indicated in the previous section the
interest in padi development had been nominal compared to that in rubber and palm oil.
On the basis of these figures, the land schemes should have attracted at least 18,000 new
^Agricultural development expenditure during 1971-1975 and 1976-1980 was RM62.17 million and
RM26.18 million respectively. [Perak(1976), Table 1-4, p.10; Perak (1981), Table 5-1, p.l 14]
91The government projected labour participation in the agricultural sector to increase to 245,000 in 1980.
[Perak (1981), Table 4-10, p.79] Rapid population growth and the stagnation of agriculture seem to be the
most severe problems of newly independent countries in South and Southeast Asia during the period.
[Gunnarson, C. (1979). Malaysian Rubber Production: Patterns of Growth 1900-1975, Ekonomisk-
Historika Institutionen, Lund Universitet, No. 6, p.52]
See Table 6.6.3 in Section 6.6.92
93Perak (1981), p.44.
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settlers/labour participating in the agricultural sector during the period. Furthermore,
coupled with the 153,186 acres of new land alienated to individuals for agricultural
purposes, the target of increasing labour from 215,800 in 1970 to 245,000 in 1980
seemed easily achievable. However, the fundamental reason for failure to achieve this
goal was that those awarded land for agricultural purposes, either through schemes or
individual grants, were already in this sector in the first place and, therefore, no added
labour was generated.
What emerged in the agricultural industry during the pre-1980 period was mainly the
result of the redistribution of the existing labour force within the same sector. The
attraction of more commercially viable crops that commanded healthier demand and
better prices encouraged farmers to cultivate them, even without government-funded
initiatives. Despite continuous population growth the agriculture was unable to absorb
any increase in labour; instead labour surplus was on the increase. However, on the
positive side, due to technological change and innovation, in general, there were
improved efficiencies in crop production. The decline of 1.7% in the agricultural labour
force during the 1957-1980 period did not affect output and the sector's share of the state
GDP increased by 53% from RM486.2 million in 1970 to RM744.2 million in 1980.94
Productivity per capita from this sector too had increased from RM2,253 to RM3,456
respectively.95 While the labour force in this sector was declining, productivity had
improved markedly suggesting better income for the agricultural labour force in general.
94EPU, Perak(1986a), p.36.
95Forestry andfishing industries included.
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In the primary sector, apart from agriculture, the mining industry suffered more in terms
of labour utilisation. The once largest producer of tin in the world had seen the mineral
fast depleting. Although during the 1957-1980 tin remained an important export
commodity in Perak, the remaining deposits left were only extractable using modern
mechanisation techniques, particularly dredges that require high capital investment.
Driven by the world demand and high price of the commodity, modem tin mining
operations meant reduction of labour was inevitable. This period, particularly in the
1970s, also saw a large reduction in the number of tin mines96 due to high production
costs which resulted in a considerable number of layoffs of workers. By 1980 the mining
industry had lost a total of about 4,000 jobs or 13.3% compared to 1957.
With both agriculture and tin mining in the primary sector beginning to lose momentum
in providing adequate employment opportunities, and together with the increasing
number of working-age population in the state, the only choice was to give more
emphasis to the development of the labour intensive secondary and tertiary sectors and to
channel the surplus labour in that direction. Championed by the federal government and
followed by the state, the commencement of the ISI programme in 1958 and the EOI
programme in 1970 created the mechanism to alleviate the labour surplus crisis. Under
the ISI programme the state encouraged new manufacturing industries as evidenced by
the increase of 58% or almost 15,000 jobs during 1957-1970. The ISI, at its tail end, and
EOI programmes functioning side by side in the 1970-1980 period provided more than
28,000 additional jobs for the state. In total, during the 1957-1980 period, manufacturing
industry had succeeded in providing an increase of 170.4% or an addition of more than
96See Section 7.4.
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42,000 jobs. These industrial activities comprised mainly food production, simple
machinery, electrical and electronic products, textiles, chemicals and non-metallic
Q*7products. Although they were located primarily in the Kinta and Larut Matang districts,
there were also manufacturing industries situated away from these urban locations. Up to
1979 a total of 51 manufacturing plants were operating outside these popular urban areas
with the Dindings and the Teluk Anson/Bidor areas emerging asthemost important.98
In construction, another industry in the secondary sector, the shift in the labour force
during the pre-1980 period had mixed outcomes. The 1957-1970 period saw labour
utilisation slump by almost 3,500 jobs or 27.6% but it recovered in the 1970-1980 period
when the industry was able to absorb a total of almost 18,000 jobs. The slump in the
1957-1970 was due to the decline in projects for the industry. Although this period saw
development activities relating to improvements in state infrastructures and rural
development, it was also a time when most of the projects were carried out in-house by
the public sector leaving the construction industry dependent on the sluggish private
sector projects. This scenario changed in the 1970-1980 period when manufacturing was
intensified, offering more opportunities for the construction industry; at the same time
outsourcing of government projects to the private sector had also increased. The state
government's announcement of the need to build more than 67,000 units of houses during





The demand for labour in the tertiary sector consistently grew between 1957 and 1980.
During the period labour utilisation in this sector almost doubled from 115,806 in 1957 to
212,590 in 1980, growing twice as fast in the 1970-1980 compared to the 1957-1970
period. The enormous rise was in tandem with the sector's contribution to the state GDP
where it grew from RM628.3 million in 1970 to RM1,225 million in 1980.100 The growth
in labour utilisation in this sector was mainly to support accelerated economic
development, particularly in the secondary sector, and to increasing government
involvement in the economy through the establishment of public sector agencies and
other support services.
While the changes in labour utilisation have been presented, the changes among the
ethnic groups invite further scrutiny. A direct comparison of the ethnic groups in labour
distribution during the colonial cannot be carried out as categorisation of industrial
sectors was different and limited to only three sectors.101 However, clearchanges can be
seen in the labour force distribution by sector and ethnicity from 1957-1980 (see Table
6.7.4). In the primary sector, there was a reduction in the ethnic participation rate in
agricultural activities among all the main groups.102 The bumiputera, who had 70.2% of
its population involved in this sector in 1957, had gradually declined to 67.2% in 1970,
and later to only 51.3% in 1980; the Chinese had decreased its participation from 36.0%
of its population in 1957 to 21.5% in 1980, and the Indian from 52.4% in 1957 to 42.1%
in 1980.
100Calculated from EPU, Perak (1986a), p.36.
101See Appendix 7.
102The reduction in the percentage involvement ratio in industrial sectors does not necessarily mean a
reduction in the total labour involved because of the increase in population.
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There were no significant changes in the mining and quarrying sub-sector among the
bumiputera and the Indians. The Chinese population, however, decreased drastically from
12.6% in 1957 to 6.8% in 1980. These decreases in the primary sector, at the very least,
reveal that the interest of workers in these two sectors was changing as were the
opportunities and they were moving towards other areas of employment.
Table 6.7.4 Perak: Labour force distribution by sector and ethnicity, 1957-1980
(percent)
Sector Bumiputera Chinese Indians
1957 1970 1980 1957 1970 1980 1957 1970 1980
Primary




















Mining and quarrying 2.6 2.6 2.8 12.6 11.6 6.8 4.3 4.0 3.4
Secondary 4.3 3.9 9.4 16.7 19.1 24.7 12.5 4.6 15.1
Manufacturing 2.7 3.4 7.6 12.7 15.3 16.4 8.7 3.6 11.7
Construction 1.6 0.5 1.8 4.0 3.8 8.3 3.8 1.0 3.4
Tertiary 19.7 21.6 33.0 31.8 37.6 42.2 28.1 36.8 35.5
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Wholesale and retail trade,



















Transport, storage and communication
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services
Community, social and personal
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix 7.
In the secondary sector, participation by ethnicity in manufacturing showed a continuous
increase for all groups. For the period 1957 to 1980, the bumiputera had increased from
2.7% to 7.6% of its total population, the Chinese from 12.7% to 16.4%, and the Indians
from 8.7% to 11.7%. In the construction sub-sector all three ethnic groups show a
common trend i.e. their participation decreased in the 1970s before recovering to about
the same or even a higher level. Around 1970 the construction sub-sector faced a
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downturn. During the 1957-1980 period the bumiputera and the Indians did not show any
significant changes in their involvement in the construction sub-sector. The Chinese,
however, had more than doubled in their participation rate from 4.0% in 1957 to 8.3% in
1980. The increase in the secondary sector, as a whole, was largely attributed to the
increase in the manufacturing rather than the construction sub-sector.
From 1957 to 1980, the tertiary sector was the second most important after the primary
sector in terms of labour utilisation. During the period, the bumiputera increased from
19.7% in 1957 to 33.0% in 1980, the Chinese from 31.8% to 42.2%, and the Indians from
28.1% to 35.5%. The large increase in bumiputera participation came from the sub-sector
of community, social and personal services. For the Chinese, wholesale and retail trade,
restaurants and hotels saw the largest increase in their participation. There were no
significant changes in the participation rate amongst the Indians in any specific sub-
sector, though there was general increase across all the sub-sectors.
Therefore, the labour utilisation pattern of Perak during the period under examination was
fast changing. Data suggest significant intersectoral transfers of labour from agriculture
to other sub-sectors. The decline of the mining industry suggests a shift either towards
manufacturing, construction or the service industries, as these were the growing
economic activities in the districts where tin mining was prominent. A small,
insignificant number possibly moved into market gardening, as this was quite a popular
economic activity in mined-over areas in Kinta. During the period, as elsewhere in
Malaysia, the additional entry of previously under-utilised women workers helped
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explain part of the increase in the labour market. In 1970 the female population m
Perak stood at 49.9% and experienced a further increase to 50.6% in 1980.104 The
changes in rural lifestyle, improved education, and also the stagnant agricultural demand
for labour provided the push factor that facilitated the state's ISI and subsequently EOI
programmes to channel surplus labour into the secondary and tertiary sectors. The shift of
labour towards these sectors required the intra-migration of labour towards established
economic centres such as those surrounding Ipoh and Taiping. Despite the achievement
in shifting labour surpluses into new economic sectors and improving the state's
economy, success was still modest. The creation of new jobs did not match the labour
increase. Although the unemployment rate of 9.0% in 1970 had decreased to 7.7% in
1980, the reduction was minimal.105 At the same time the inability to provide sufficient
job opportunities resulted in Perak being consistently a 'net-loss state', with a continuous
out-migration of valuable labour to other states.106 During this period, however, Perak
managed to broaden its economic base into new economic sectors capable of responding
to the market and provide the state with an 'insurance' and foundation for further
economic growth.
103Labour participation rates for women in Peninsular Malaysia rose from about 30% in 1957 to 46% in
1987 [Drabble (2000), p.248]; Jomo arrived at a different set of figures: 24.6% in 1957, 30.2% in 1970, and
32.4% in 1980. [Jomo (1988), Table 11.1, p.291]
104EPU, Perak(1993), p.11.
105Department of Statistics (1980), Summary Table 1,p.3.
106Between 1975-1980 the state had a net population out-migration of 158,080. [EPU, Perak (1986a), p.31;
see also Jones, G. W. and Manjit Singh Sidhu (1979). 'Population Mobility in Peninsular Malaysia' in
Development Forum, Vol. IX, No.2, December]
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6.8 Local and foreign investment
There was a clear shift in the structure of investment in the state economy since
independence. The heavily concentrated colonial economy based on the export of
primary products had gradually been diversified to include other commodities such as
palm oil and cocoa, and also the branching out from the primary sector to the secondary
and tertiary sectors. These transformations have been shown in the preceding sections
involving land use and labour utilisation. The key driver in these changes was the
government economic policies to promote economic growth initiated through the Second
and Third Malaysia Plans. Although rural development, particularly agriculture, remained
an important feature in the state economic history since 1957, diversification into new
areas was inevitable with the growing labour force. In the pre-1980 period the ISI and
EOI programmes had largely influenced the state in its attempts to achieve economic
growth.107 It was these programmes that had a large influence in the promotion of
investment in Perak that will be examined in this section.
hi promoting economic growth the largest investor in Perak during the pre-1980 period
was the government, both at the state and federal levels. Besides rural development,
which played a central part in economic development initiatives prior to 1970, the
state, however, only began large-scale economic diversification into industrialisation in
l07From 1958 to 1970 the state economic policies were effectively driven by ISI and 1970-1980 by EOI
programmes.
108Most data pertaining to pre-1970 economic achievement held at the State Economic Planning Unit have
been disposed of to make space for new materials (personal communication with EPU chief librarian).
However, for state and federal development in agriculture in the pre-1970, see Section 6.6.
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1962 with the establishment of the 370-acre Tasek Industrial Estate in Ipoh.109 With a
combination of federal and state investment of RM20 million the industrial estate housed
industries involved in the production of steel and concrete products, cement, steel and
wooden furniture, chemicals, printing and newspapers. Some of these original companies
such as Tasek Cement, Hume Industries, Chemical Industries, and Far East Oxygen and
Acetylene are still in existence today. At the same time two other smaller industrial
estates were developed by the state; one in Menglembu (70 acres) catering for light
industries and another in Falim (7 acres) for cottage industries. Apart from these three
industrial estates, state investment in the industrial sector had undergone a slow period of
growth before picking up again towards the end of the 1960s.
During the 1971-1975 period (Second Malaysia Plan) the Government of Perak had
invested a total of RM137.4 million in economic development expenditures (see Table
6.8.1).110 Almost all (92.7%) of the development expenditure was directed towards
agriculture and, infrastructure and services, with 45.3% and 47.5% respectively. Perak
had spent only 1.5% of its development expenditure on the manufacturing sector. The
low expenditure could be due to the availability of funds from the federal government for
industrial estate development.111 There was also a shift in operational policy where
industrial development in Perak was entrusted to the PSDC. Industrial estate development
financing since then was mainly carried out through loans either from the government or
109See Ipoh Municipal Council (1962). Ipoh: The town that tin built, Phoenix Communications Limited,
pp.56-8.
1I0Federal development expenditure in Perakduring the sameperiod totalled RM130.8 million. Out of this
RM16.8 million (12.9%) were spent on housing, a new township, and industrial estates; the balance was
spent on infrastructure and services. [Perak (1976), Tables III-3 & V-l, pp.23, 38] The total of both state
and federal expenditures was RM268.2 million.
ulIbid. The federal governmentspent RM8.04 millionduringthe period.
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private capital. This was also a period when industrial development in Perak was already
accelerating and when 259 manufacturing projects in various industries had been
approved between 1968-1975.112 The state's focus was also directed to other
complementary development activities such as infrastructure and services.
Table 6.8.1 Perak: Economic development expenditure









Source: Collated from Perak (1976), Tables 1-4, III-3, IV-1, pp. 10, 23, 29.
State direct involvement in the construction industry during the 1971-75 period totalled
RM6.65 million (4.8%). This was largely the provision of housing for the lower income
groups of the population. Commerce, however, was the lowest with RM1.25 million
(0.9%) spent over the 5-year period indicating the state's prefened approach of providing
the infrastructure and a viable investment environment but not being directly involved in
this sector. This approach however changed in later years.
In the 1976-1980 period the state government spent a total of RM240.29 million in
development expenditure.113 Against a state allocation of RM476.37 million Perak's
achievement for the period was only about 51%. In total, however, including those
allocations from the federal government, the development expenditure for Perak during
this period (Third Malaysia Plan) was RM1.79 billion; economic development expended
ll2Calculated from Tables 6.8.3 and 6.8.4.
113Perak(1981), Table3-1,p.60.
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RMl,129.9 million (63.1%), social development RM226.2 million (12.6%), defence
RM395.3 million (22.1%), and administration RM40.4 million (2.2%).114 Comparative
assessment is not possible, as the economic expenditure category does not provide the
breakdown between industries as in theprevious period.115 What was available, however,
was the reduction in state expenditure for agriculture by almost two-thirds to RM21.79
million during this period.116 It is suggested, however, that since this period saw the
substantial expansion of state enterprises involved in various industries,117 part of the
state economic development expenditure was also directed towards these enterprises for
start-up capital and operations.
The industrial investment in manufacturing from the private sector began to accelerate
again in the late 1960s after losing momentum during the middle of the decade. The PIO
of 1958, introduced to encourage local and foreign investment in industries to produce
items previously imported, failed to attract continuous investment. Although it provided
tax relief for varying lengths of years depending on the size of investments, import-
substitution industrialisation had its limit. High capital investment with a small national
market demonstrated that the incentives were not attractive enough to encourage
industrial investors. The decline in the industrialisation momentum in the Kinta Valley
mentioned at the beginning of this section is evidence of its limitations. On a national
1I4EPU, Perak(1991a). Taklimat Pembangunan Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, Ipoh, September, p.10.
Federal budget allocations to all states since the mid-1970s have been generous due to the large increase in
revenue from petroleum exports. [Drabble (2000), p.199] Between 1973-1974 the petroleum price rose
from RM70 to RM214 per ton and 1978-1980 from RM245 to RM596. [Dhanji et. al. (1983), Malaysia:
Structural Change and Stabilization, Washington: World Bank, p. 109]




scale the same situation emerged.118 It was due to this decline that the Investment
Incentives Act (IIA) was introduced in 1968 to provide a greater variety of incentives to
induce funding flows into existing and new industries, particularly from foreign investors.
These added incentives provided by the IIA saw private sector investment begin to rise
again. During the period 1968-1980 the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
(MIDA) approved a total of 436 industrial projects in Perak (see Table 6.8.2).U9 These
were considered large-scale manufacturing projects engaging more than 25 employees
and had paid-up capital in excess of RM250,000 for each establishment.
Table 6.8.2 Perak: Distribution of approved industrial projects by incentives
1968-1980
Incentive No. of projects %
Pioneer status 148 33.9
Investment tax credit 60 13.8
Labour utilisation concessions 9 2.1
Other incentives 10 2.3
Without incentives 209 47.9
Total 436 100.0
Sources: Collated from MIDA in Perak (1981). RME,Table 2-7, p.19; MIDA, Perak in
EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri Perak 1980-1985, p.90.
Although statistics pertaining to smaller scale manufacturing projects that did not require
approval from the federal body are non-existent, it is believed to be more than those
approved by MIDA during the period, influenced by the buoyant industrial expansion.
About half of these MIDA-approved industrial projects were granted some form of
incentives. The other half were approved but were not granted any incentive either
because no application was made or they did not qualify as requirements were not met.
nBCourtenay, P. P. (1972). A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya, London: G. Bell & Sons
Ltd, p.4.
119There are no statistics indicating the actual implementation of these projects in Perak in the pre-1980
period. In a study of foreign direct investment in the Malaysian industrial sector it was estimated that 20-
25% of the approved projects were never actually realised. [Anuwar et. al., 'Direct Foreign Investment in
the Malaysian Industrial Sector', in Jomo, K. S. (ed.) (1993). Industrialising Malaysia: Policy,
Performance, Prospects, London: Routledge, p.81]
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Although the IIA, in principle, was to provide better incentives to attract investment and a
platform for the nation to embark on the EOI programme, the establishment of industrial
projects approved in Perak showed that although EOI had made considerable inroads by
1980, ISI-related projects also continued to receive considerable interest (see Table
6.8.3). It is plausible to suggest that most of the ISI-related industrial projects in the
1970s mainly consisted of local investors. Food manufacturing, comprising about a fifth
of the projects approved, was mainly for domestic consumption. Products from wood-
related industries, basic metal industries, and printing and its allied industries too were
not known for export but rather were being used within the country. However, those
industries related to the production of metal and non-metal products, machinery,
electrical and electronics, textiles and leather, and chemicals had entered the export list of
Perak. Although these industries represented almost two-thirds of the total approved
projects, not all of the production was exported, as some share of it was used
domestically.
Table 6.8.3 Perak: Distribution of approved industrial projects by industry
1968-1980
Industry No. of projects %
Food Manufacturing 91 20.9
Metal products, machinery, electrical and
electronics 74 17.0
Textiles and leather products 67 15.4
Chemicals and chemical products 66 15.1
Non-metal products 47 10.8
Wood related products 27 6.2
Basic metal products 14 3.2
Tourism related industries 6 1.3
Printing, publishing and allied industries 7 1.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 37 8.5
Total 436 100.0
Sources: Collated from Perak (1981), Table 2-6, p. 19; MIDA, Perak in EPU, Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-
1985,pM.
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While investment in the manufacturing sector, as shown above, is in terms of
development and expansion of industries, it is difficult to ascertain its actual value or the
total investment in the industrial sector in the pre-1970 period. There was no
comprehensive collection of data, either by the public or the non-public sector, on the
flow of private sector investment in the state. The period 1971-1980 shows that the
total investments for the approved manufacturing projects in Perak was RM1,509.8
million (see Table 6.8.4). Distinguishing between the two Malaysia Plans at this time,
207 projects were approved during the second (1971-1975) and 177 projects during the
third (1976-1980), each bringing in an investment of RM620.1 million and RM889.7
million respectively. Despite having fewer projects during the latter period the higher
amount of investment suggests that the kind of manufacturing industries approved were
more capital intensive in nature and involved a high level ofproduction for export.
Table 6.8.4 Perak: Approved industrial projects and total investment 1971-1980













Source: MIDA in EPU, Perak (1996). TaklimatPembangunan Perindustrian
Negeri Perak, Table 3.
120Efforts towards the gathering of investment data were first carried outby MIDAin 1971 and laterjoined
by PSDC in 1980. Even then it is still not comprehensive until 1980 onwards.
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While the proposed total capitalisation of industrial projects in the 1971-1980 period
totalled RM1,509.6 million, the data on the divisions between local and foreign
capitalisation on these approved projects were only available from 1976 as shown in
Table 6.8.5 below. From 1976-1980, the total investment in the industrial sector was
RM889.7 million of which 304.8 million (34.3%) comprised equity and RM584.9
(65.7%) million loans. With 177 industrial projects approvedduring the period, RMl77.1
million (58.1%) of the equity came from local investors while RM127.7 million (41.9%)
was from foreign investors. Loans provided for these projects came from both local and
foreign capital.
Table 6.8.5 Perak: Approved industrial projects and equity investments 1976-1980
Year Total number
of projects
Equity Investment (RIV million)
Local Foreign Total
1976 36 38.5 3.5 42.0
1977 36 35.7 8.9 44.6
1978 34 15.2 5.8 21.0
1979 37 45.6 94.7 140.3
1980 34 42.1 14.8 56.9
Total 177 177.1 127.7 304.8
Sources: Perak (1981), Table 2-9, p.21; MIDAin EPU, Perak (1986a).Statistik NegeriPerak
1980-1985, p.92, 103.
In 1980 the local-foreign investment distribution became clearer.121 During the year from
the RM143.7 million (see Table 6.8.4) of industrial investment capitalisation, RM86.6
million was from loans; RM56.7 million (65.3%) was raised within the Malaysian capital
market while RM30.1 million was from foreign loans.122 Together with equity
participation thetotal capitalisation from local investors stood atRM98.8 million (68.8%)
and foreign direct investment at RM44.9 million (31.2%).
121For detailedlocal-foreign investmentdistribution from 1980onwards, see Section 8.7.
122PSDC documents (unpublished).
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Table 6.8.6 Perak: Locations of industrial projects approved between 1976-1980
District/Industrial estate No. of projects Percentage (%)
Kinta District 93 52.5
- Tasek Industrial Park 34 19.2
- Jelapang Industrial Park 18 10.2
- Pengkalan/Lahat Industrial Park 8 4.5
- Outside industrial estate 33 18.6
Larut Matang District 30 17.0
- Kemunting Industrial Park 18 10.2
- Tupai Industrial Park 4 2.3
- Outside industrial estate 8 4.5
Kuala Kangsar District 13 7.3
- Kuala Kangsar Industrial Park 5 2.8
- Outside industrial-estate 8 4.5
Krian District 9 5.1
- Parit Buntar Industrial Park 7 4.0
- Outside industrial estate 2 1.1
Manjung District 5 2.8
Batang Padang District 7 4.0
Hilir Perak District 18 10.2
Hulu Perak District 2 1.1
Perak Tengah District 0 0.0
Projects located in industrial estates 94 53.1
Projects located outside industrial estates 83 46.9
Total 177 100.0
Source: MIDA in EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri Perak 1980-1985, pp.86-7.
Kinta district in the attempt to provide a more geographically balanced development.
The increased competition for labour in Kinta and the proximity to raw materials, such as
the availability of kaolin in Batang Padang or timber in Hulu Perak, further helped
disperse these industrial activities. During this period 52.5% of the 177 approved
industrial projects were located in Kinta with about two-thirds sited within the three
industrial estates. Larut Matang, Kuala Kangsar, and Krian districts that had started
developing their industrial estates in the early 1970s began to enjoy industrial investment.
Almost a third of the approved industrial project investments during this period were
directed to these districts. The districts of Manjung, Batang Padang, Hilir Perak and Hulu
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Map 6.8.1 Perak: Locations of industrial projects approved 1976-1980
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Perak succeeded in attracting 32 (18.1%) of these industrial projects despite lacking the
appropriate industrial development infrastructure. The only district that failed to attract
any industrial development project was Perak Tengah. The overall state industrial
development during the period saw a balanced distribution of industrial investment
projects between those located within (53.1%) and those outside industrial estates
(46.9%), suggesting a shift in investors' preferences in terms of location.
So far, the investment data presented that cover those from the state and the private sector
are limited to mainly manufacturing, hi other economic sectors, no useful data have been
found. However, an estimate will be attempted based on labour increase and the
estimated investment per unit of labour in the selected sectors. Between 1970-1980 an
estimated RM2,226 million was invested in the construction, transport, storage,
communication, commerce, banking, and other services sectors in Perak (see Table
6.8.7). Local capital is believed to be the main source of investments in these sectors.


























Sources: Labour force increase figures from Table 6.7.2; Estimated investment per unit labour from 'Kajian Wilayah
Seberang Perak' in Perak (1981). RME,p.79A.
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While domestic capital could come from all over Malaysia, the available capital within
Perak was capable of funding a large portion of these investments. Apart from the
construction sector, the other sectors are generally categorised as services, which in
aggregate totalled RM2,119.3 million. If this estimate is reliable then the growth in the
industrial sector had encouraged strong expansion in the service sector. Comparatively,
the increase of investment in the service sector was much higher than the industrial sector
at RMl,509.8 million (see Table 6.8.4) during the decade. Some caveat, however, has to
be placed on the estimates, particularly on the reliance on labour force increase. This is
important as no estimate can be made of those industries in which labour had declined
during the period, particularly in the agriculture and the mining sectors. In contrast these
sectors were also known to have utilised a large amount of private investment during the
period, for example, the opening of new land and the switch from rubber to oil palm
among private estates, and the use of new technology, particularly the dredge in the
mining sector which was highly capital intensive. This kind of investment has been
omitted in the estimation exercise.
What has been presented in this section during the period 1957-1980 demonstrates the
changes that have taken place in the investment climate in Perak. The aggregate total of
all investments in the public and private sectors, however, could not be presented as
methods applied in arriving at investment figures vary greatly from continuous data
collection by the relevant authorities to pure estimation. Despite these shortcomings the
l25The deposits in commercial banks and finance companies in Perak had increased by almost five times
from RM450.6 million in 1971 to RM2,189.3 million in 1980. [Bank Negara Malaysia in EPU, Malaysia
(1994), Table 29 (unpublished)]
126A study by the International Tin Council quoted that the cost of a dredge in 1977 was RM25 million.
[Thoburn(1981),p.ll7]
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trend of investments is still evident. Heavy foreign investments as seen in the colonial
period in rubber and tin mining industries had gradually declined. The need to actively
diversify into other economic areas, envisioned by the state since 1957, was quite slow in
implementation in the first decade. Except for the continuous investment by the state to
promote economic development, investment from both the local and foreign sectors only
began in the early 1960s and gained momentum later in the decade. Apart from local
investment, the most apparent deciding factor for foreign investment was the incentives
offered by the federal government. While the availability of labour and raw materials was
also paramount in investment decisions, the added incentives could only improve
viability and profitability for potential investors. In hindsight, Perak could have achieved
more in promoting investment since it enjoyed the already available basic infrastructure
left by the colonial government as compared to other states. The trend in investment,
even though slow-moving in the beginning, gained momentum by 1980. However, when
measured against the national performance, achievements were modest in terms of
attracting foreign investment; between 1976 to mid-1979 Perak managed to attract only
4.5% of the total foreign equity in industrial projects in Malaysia. Considering the
economic development during the period when the majority of the states were still
developing their basic infrastructure to promote growth through industrialisation, the bulk
of the foreign investments were focused on Selangor and Penang.
Within the state, despite the failure in attracting a large amount of foreign investment, the
pre-1980 period saw the growth of local investment in new economic enterprises. Local
127Calculated from Perak (1981), Table 2-9, p.21. Within thesame period, outof the 715 industrial projects
approved with foreign involvement, only 43 (6.01%) were located in Perak.
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investment of about two-thirds of the total capitalisation in the five years preceding 1980
is indicative of the willingness of local investors to take both the opportunity and risks
created by the state's economic diversification strategy. While this development was
encouraging there is a limit to the capacity of local investment. The expansion of
investment in Perak therefore had to rely on foreign investors, which during this period
was lacking. The need actively to pursue foreign investment then remained an important
issue for Perak to address.
Failure to attract large investment into the state could also be partly attributed to the lack
of new supporting infrastructure geared towards industrialisation. While it is true that
Perak had taken some initiative to promote economic diversification, as evidenced by the
establishment of six industrial estates before 1980, it is also clear that about half of those
approved industrial projects opted to be located outside these estates. Reasons for doing
so could be various but possibly investment by the private sector, particularly from
foreign investors, could have been higher if, during the period, a customer-oriented
industrial development approach had been adopted by the state. Even though the federal
government had implemented a variety of incentive programmes to encourage
investments, the challenge was for Perak to accelerate industrial development and to
provide the appropriate environment for it.
6.9 Summary and conclusion
During the period 1957-1980 the government played a major role in promoting changes
in the economic and social structures of the state. One of its main priorities was the
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gradual diversification from the primary sector to the secondary and tertiary sectors. The
changes that took place, however, evolved in two distinct phases. The first covers the
period 1957-1969 while the second 1970-1980. The need to distinguish these two phases
separately is simply due to the introduction of the NEP in 1970 which changed the
direction and the role of the state in managing the economy as a whole.
During the first phase, government policy was very much an extension of the British
colonial legacy. The major exception, however, was the increased participation of federal
and state governments and its agencies in developing the rural economy. This initiative
can be seen as an attempt by the state to modernise what was considered to be the
'traditional', indigenous sector. It is acknowledged that during the colonial period, the
attention given to the rural economy was there, however, it was limited and focused
mainly on padi cultivation.
However, in the pre-1970 period, the state government of Perak adopted a broadly non-
interventionist strategy in the economy. But the considerable state involvement in
promoting the rural economy, particularly through land development schemes, began to
mark the end of the free-market economic system and the beginning of a mixed-economy
- a system combining free enterprise with active government support and direction.
Promoting and establishing land schemes during that time seemed to be the answer to
further state economic development. The economic system was then essentially divided
into two separate spheres: extensive rural development was in the domain of the
government whilst the very limited industrial sector was left mainly in private hands. The
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state was also gradually moving away from its focus on tin mining, and focussing its
attention on local agriculture.
The common sight of rubber gardens and estates in the agricultural landscape was fast
supplanted by the rapid expansion of oil palm cultivation, which became the new 'most
important' crop for the state. However, even with this greater emphasis on the rural sector
the overall growth of agriculture in Perak was modest, achieving only about half of the
national growth of 7.5% in the early 1970s.
In the period 1970-1980 the role of the state and the direction of the economy changed
dramatically with the introduction of the NEP. With a clear objective of redistributing
economic wealth to all ethnic groups, the NEP basically abandoned the competitive
capitalism policy, and in its place the state played a much more direct role. State
intervention in the economy became much more evident. Direct state participation took
the form of capital provision, joint-venture partnerships and the establishment of state
enterprises. These initiatives were intended, at some point, to be transferred to capable
bumiputeras.
The radical change in economic approach during the two phases can also be seen in
industrialisation policies. The state emphasis on ISI, initiated during the late colonial
period, only lasted until the end of the first phase. From 1970 onwards economic policy
emphasised EOI initiatives. The move towards EOI also meant the expansion of the
secondary and tertiary sectors. Manufacturing, in particular, became the prime mover of
242
the economy. The growth of industrial estates and urban-based manufacturing also saw a
huge shift in population from the rural to urban areas. Apart from agriculture, which saw
only minor infra-industry shift within sub-sectors, the balance of the labour force had
begun to move into secondary and tertiary sectors. However, the failure to create
sufficient jobs had also forced quite a substantial number of workers to leave Perak in
search ofemployment.
The two different economic approaches during 1957-1980 can also be seen in changes in
the investment climate in Perak. Although the government was the largest investor in
Perak during both phases, a much more visible change began to emerge during the second
phase. Encouraged by the various incentives offered by the government, Perak saw an
increase in private capital investment, though initially this was mainly from local
investors. Only later did foreign capital gain momentum. At the same time, an improved
distribution in terms of the spatial location of industrial investments can also be seen.
With the reasonable level of success achieved through the NEP up to 1980 and the
increasing involvement of the state in economic development, the next step was to
increase foreign participation in Perak's industrial activities. I will return to this issue,
among others, in Chapter 8 in examining the period 1981-2000.
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CHAPTER 7
THE DECLINE OF TIN MINING AND RUBBER CULTIVATION IN PERAK'S
ECONOMY
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the role of the post-colonial state in the development of Perak has
been examined. Tin and rubber continued to be a vital revenue-generating vehicle for
Perak for about two-and-a-half decades. Particularly with regard to rubber cultivation,
which had once been the domain of private estates and smallholders, it saw expansion in
the involvement of federal and state agencies, largely as part of the government's rural
development programme, to raise the income and standards of living of the rural
population. However, the dependence on two primary commodities to sustain
development was not a viable option. This was particularly so when these commodities
were traded in the global markets and were exposed to supply and demand and price
volatility. An additional difficulty was present in the tin industry; apart from the gradual
decline in production since the 1970s, tin is a non-renewable extractive industry. Yet, the
tin industry finally collapsed due to other reasons and not to the exhaustion of supplies.
In the rubber industry, generally unattractive market prices had forced diversification into
other crops; this had already been undertaken gradually by the private estate sector during
the colonial period. Crop diversification became more significant after independence,
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. The fluctuations in commodity prices and the
establishment of international commodity agreements had a significant impact on Perak's
economy and eventually witnessed changes in labour and land utilisation. These are the
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issues that will be examined in this chapter in relation to the decline of tin mining and
rubber cultivation.
7.2 The fluctuation in global tin and rubber prices
In the world markets, the fluctuation in the prices of tin and rubber, although directly
linked to supply and demand, was also closely associated with the International Tin
Agreement (ITA) and the International Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA).1 The ITA's
main objective was clearly to keep the tin price stable, the INRA, on the other hand,
concentrated more on the comprehensive buffer stock operations, which indirectly also
meant trying to stabilize rubber prices. In the period 1957 to 2000, Perak suffered from
commodity price fluctuations which affected state revenues and helped initiate the move
to other crops and industries. The shift, however, was not entirely the result of price
movements.
hi the tin industry, the price fluctuation in the Kuala Lumpur Tin Market (KLTM) during
1957-2000 is shown in Table 7.2.1 below. With an annual average price of RM6.17 per
kilogram in 1957, it hovered between RM6 to RM10 per kilogram during 1957-1973,
before surging to a height of RM18.74 in 1974. It then experienced a slight decline in the
following year before undergoing a continuous increase in price to reach an all-time high
of RM35.70 per kilogram in 1980. From the price levels of 1957-1980 it can be deduced
that Perak should not have faced any difficulty in revenue generation. In fact, state
revenues from tin for further economic development purposes should have increased at
'See Section 7.3 for more details.
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least five-fold from 1957 if production had been kept constant, which was not the case.
Perak tin production in 1957 stood at 36.1 thousand tonnes, dropped to 27.1 thousand
tonnes for the next two consecutive years, before it began increasing almost continuously
reaching a record level of 45 thousand tonnes in 1971 (see Table 7.2.2). However, since
then tin production had declined and in 1980, only 35 thousand tones were produced.







1957 6.17 1972 10.36 1987 16.80
1958 6.11 1973 11.34 1988 18.49
1959 6.56 1974 18.74 1989 23.05
1960 6.51 1975 15.94 1990 16.45
1961 7.39 1976 18.96 1991 15.06
1962 7.40 1977 26.17 1992 15.25
1963 7.53 1978 28.69 1993 13.09
1964 10.24 1979 32.39 1994 14.12
1965 11.62 1980 35.70 1995 15.54
1966 10.67 1981 32.34 1996 15.35
1967 9.92 1982 30.06 1997 15.31
1968 9.35 1983 30.20 1998 21.46
1969 10.35 1984 29.16 1999 20.20
1970 10.99 1985 29.67 2000 20.47
1971 10.44 1986 15.39
Sources: Jomo (1990), Appendix Table 2, p.81; Tin Industry (Research and Development) Board,
Malaysian Tin Bulletin, various issues 1987-2003.
Notes: 1. Prices are based on Kuala Lumpur Tin Market (KLTM)
2. From 1995 average price was based on turnover. Prior to 1995 average price was based on
number of trading days.
3. Prices of 1957-1979 have been converted from RM/pikul (1 pikul = 60.48kg)
Apart from the two declining production years (1958 and 1959) prior to 1971, Perak had
enjoyed at least a good 12 years where both price and production were on an upward
trend, and thereby theoretically increasing revenue available to the state (see Figure
7.2.1). The period 1972-1980 on the other hand presented a different picture when prices
had increased by almost three-and-a-half times while production decreased by almost a
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Table 7.2.2 Perak, Malaysia and World tin production, 1957-2000 (thousand tonnes)
Year Perak Malaysia World Perak/World
(%)
Year Perak Malaysia World Perak/World
(%)
1957 36.1 59.3 163.0 22.1 1979 35.7 63.0 201.0 17.8
1958 21.7 38.5 116.0 18.7 1980 35.0 61.4 199.0 17.6
1959 21.7 37.5 119.0 18.2 1981 34.5 59.9 202.0 17.1
1960 29.9 52.0 134.0 22.3 1982 28.7 52.3 191.0 15.0
1961 32.2 56.0 137.0 23.5 1983 22.8 41.4 172.0 13.3
1962 33.8 58.6 145.0 23.3 1984 22.0 41.3 165.0 13.3
1963 34.1 59.9 143.0 23.8 1985 20.0 36.9 158.0 12.7
1964 n.a 60.0 143.0 n.a 1986 16.6 29.1 184.0 9.0
1965 37.1 63.7 153.0 24.2 1987 17.1 30.4 185.0 9.2
1966 39.0 68.9 163.0 23.9 1988 16.9 28.9 172.0 9.8
1967 40.9 72.1 171.0 23.9 1989 19.1 32.0 171.7 11.1
1968 43.5 75.1 183.0 23.8 1990 17.6 28.5 158.3 11.1
1969 41.8 72.2 177.0 23.6 1991 12.9 20.7 180.8 7.1
1970 42.8 72.6 183.0 23.4 1992 8.8 14.3 174.0 5.1
1971 45.0 74.3 184.0 24.5 1993 6.3 10.4 195.5 3.2
1972 44.8 76.8 197.0 22.7 1994 3.9 6.5 188.5 2.1
1973 41.5 72.3 185.0 22.4 1995 4.2 6.4 201.8 2.1
1974 39.6 68.1 181.0 21.9 1996 3.4 5.2 222.9 1.5
1975 37.4 64.4 175.0 21.4 1997 3.5 5.1 222.3 1.6
1976 35.0 63.4 178.0 19.7 1998 3.3 5.8 229.4 1.4
1977 32.9 58.7 187.0 17.6 1999 4.3 7.3 217.9 2.0
1978 34.8 62.7 197.0 17.7 2000 4.0 6.3 248.8 1.6
Sources: Jomo (1990), Appendix Table 1 & 6, pp.79, 89-90; Malaysia, Malaysian Mining Industry: Reports and Statistics, Minerals
and Geoscience Department, 2001 & 2003; Malaysia, Malaysian Minerals Yearbook, Geological Survey Department, issues 1988-
1997; Tin Industry (Research and Development) Board, Malaysian TinBulletin, various issues 1991-2003; EPU, Malaysia (1995),
Statistical Data for Gross Domestic Product, Table 13 (unpub.).
quarter; this combination too proved beneficial and should not have created any serious
problems for Perak's economy as far as revenue was concerned. The period 1981-2000
however, saw both price and production in steep decline. From the peak of 1980 (at
RM35.70 a kilogram) tin prices subsequently faced more turbulent fluctuations and in
2000 the price stood at RM20.47 a kilogram. The most drastic annual price drop was
in 1985/86 when the international tin market collapsed, resulting in the loss of almost
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50% of its value. If price and production are the only factors taken into consideration,
Perak would appear to have faced a decline in revenue in the post-1980 period, when
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Similar to all commodities traded in the global market where price and production are the
main factors affecting a country's revenues, other variables, both from the supply and
demand sides also come into play to influence these two components. Mansor (1986) has
outlined a list of these other factors, which include competition among producing
countries, threats from recycling and tin substitutes, decrease in investment, higher
operating costs, competition for mining land, land administrative problems, taxation and
fiscal problems, hi Malaysia all these factors had, in one way or another, considerable
impact on both the tin producers as well as the state. For the tin producers, the increasing
2For an account regarding the collapse of the tin market, see Crabtree, Duffy, and Pearce, 'The GreatTin
Crash' in Jomo, K. S. (1990). Undermining Tin: The Decline ofMalaysian Pre-eminence, Transnational
Corporations Research Project, University of Sydney, pp. 1-42; and Anderson, R. W. and Gilbert, C. L.,
'Commodity agreements and commodity markets: lessons from tin' in Economic Journal, 98, 1988, pp.l-
15.
3Mansor Ibrahim(1986). 'Tin-miningindustryin Malaysia: the need for a national reclamationpolicy',
Ph.D Thesis, University ofWisconsin, Madison., pp.34-45; see also
http: //www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/tin.htm on reasons for the collapse of the tin mining
industry in Malaysia (16/02/2005).
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operating costs and government tax structure were the main disincentives for further
investment in the industry. In 1973 it was reported that the average total cost for every
kilogram of tin output was RM3.96; but the production cost had escalated to RM23.83
perkilogram in 1984, a six-fold increase.4 After the tin market crashed in 1985 the move
by mining operators to reduce costs resulted in a decrease of about 30% in average
production cost to RM15.82 a kilogram in 19885 and in 1999 stood at RM19.00 a
kilogram.6 Comparing these four-years' figures (1973, 1984, 1988, 1999) against the
prevailing tin price, the gross profit from every kilogram of tin produced were
diminishing at a fast pace; in 1973 gross profit stood at RM7.38 a kilogram, decreased to
RM5.33 in 1984, stood at RM2.67 in 1988, and in 1999 at RMl.20 a kilogram. In 1993 it
was reported that tin mine producers would only be making decent profits if tin prices
increased beyond the RM17 a kilogram mark,7 while the price was only RM13.09 at the
time. Adding to the aheady low gross profit margin was the tax structure of the tin
industry, which during the 1980s was between 76% to 78%,8 making it the most heavily
taxed industry.9 At the same time tin producers too had to endure their own operational
financial predicament such as servicing high interest rates and a credit squeeze.
4Hamza (1984) in Ibid., p.43.
5For developments in tin production in Malaysia, including production costs during 1980-1988, see Abdul
Ghani, 'Pengeluaran TimahMalaysia' in Timah Malaysia, Vol.16, No.4, 1989, pp.2-15.
6Metal Bulletin Monthly, 'Tin resilient to Southeast Asian troubles' in Metal Bulletin Monthly, No.344,
August, 1999, p.31.
7Tin industry Board(1993), Vol.4, No. 12,December, p.3.
8Mansor (1986), p.44; AbdulGhani (1989), p.10.
9The tin industry was reported to havebeen levied eight different types of direct and indirect taxes by the
Federal Government: export duty, export surcharge, income tax, tin profit tax, development tax, sales tax,
import surcharge, and royalty payments [Mansor (1986), p.44]; see also Thoburn, J. T. (1981).
Multinationals, Mining and Development, Farnborough: Grower Publishing Company Ltd., Chapter 6 on
the effects of tax structure discouraging new investments in the Southeast Asian tin mining sector]
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As for Perak and other tin-producing states, the scenario was different as far as revenue
from tin is concerned. Although revenues for the states came in the form of taxes
collected from the tin industry - and obviously the higher the price of tin the higher the
level of taxes that could be collected - the taxes were not wholly returned to the state;
only 10% from the proceeds in the form of tax-sharing grants were given to the state
while 90% were withheld by the Federal Government as national revenue.10 At the same
time the depleting tin reserve in the state further dampened Perak's hope of relying on
this sector.11 The decision by the Geological Survey Department to discontinue tin
exploration activities in Malaysia from 197912 gave further indication of tin depletion and
the non-viability ofnew ventures, hi this connection, during the 1990s when the tin price
was almost stable, ranging between RM13-RM15 a kilogram for seven years before
surging to around RM20 towards the end ofthe decade, Perak tin production experienced
a sharp decline from 17,600 tonnes in 1990 to 3,900 tonnes in 1994, and thereafter
stabilized within the region of3,300-4,300 tonnes per annum to 2000.
The overall picture of the tin industry in Perak reveals that price was not the only factor
that resulted in the loss of the tin industry and its revenue. Except for 1971 and 1972, tin
prices in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s never went below the 1970 price of RM10.99 a
kilogram, in fact, in excess of 40% of the time tin was traded at more than double the
price. The main contributors seemed to be the rapid rise of operational costs and the
depletion of resources that discouraged investors' interest in Perak's tin mining sector.
I0Tax-sharing grants in excess of 10% can onlybe approved by the FederalGovernment. [Article 110(3A),
Federal Constitution ofMalaysia]
"Estimates by the U.S Mining Bureau in 1985 suggested that the Malaysian tin reserve would face total
depletion by 2004 if production was kept at 30,000 tonnes a year. [Abdul Ghani (1989), p.14]
12Ibid.,p.l5.
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This is clearly demonstrated by the drastic closure in the number ofoperating tin mines in
the state from 707 in 1970to only23 in 2000.13
Table 7.2.3 Annual average rubber prices ]L957-200C1(sen/kg)
Year Price Year Price Year Price
1957 195.66 1972 165.61 1987 248.67
1958 176.83 1973 179.43 1988 309.99
1959 223.90 1974 136.69 1989 261.72
1960 238.28 1975 199.06 1990 233.37
1961 184.17 1976 202.76 1991 226.73
1962 172.40 1977 229.99 1992 218.92
1963 159.22 1978 279.41 1993 213.02
1964 154.37 1979 312.35 1994 294.92
1965 144.14 1980 257.82 1995 395.56
1966 119.23 1981 210.13 1996 350.39
1967 117.11 1982 247.21 1997 278.10
1968 153.93 1983 224.55 1998 280.54
1969 124.38 1984 188.70 1999 239.26
1970 101.61 1985 n.a 2000 261.93
1971 93.50 1986 208.42
Sources: Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1986, Table 12.1, p. 175; 1987, Table
12.1,p.l55; 2001, Table 7.1,p.l63; Selvakumaran (1994). Indian Plantation Labour in Malaysia,
Institute of Social Analysis (INSAN), Table 3.2, p.73.
Note: Prices based on RSS1 issued by the Malaysian Rubber Board in Kuala Lumpur.
In the rubber sector, the trend of price movements during 1957-2000 was generally in
reverse order when compared to tin, except for 1971-1984 when the prices of both
commodities were moving in a rather similar trajectory. At independence, the average
annual price of rubber did not attain a very high level (see Table 7.2.3); at 195.66 sen a
kilogram in 1957 it represented one of the lowest prices since 1950 and compared to the
peak of 373.68 sen in 1951 the price of rubber had declined by almost half.14 In 1958 it
dropped further to 176.83 sen a kilogram before increasing to 238.28 sen in 1960. For
the next 11 years rubber prices saw a continuous decline to 93.50 sen a kilogram in 1971.
See Table 7.4.2 in Section 7.4. Nationwide there were only 40 tin mines actively operating dining the
year: 23 in Perak, 11 in Selangor, 2 each in Johor and Pahang, and one each in Kedah and Terengganu.
[Malaysia (2000). Minerals Yearbook2000, Geological Survey Department, p.36]
14For rubber prices during thepre-1957 period, see Table 5.3.3 in Section 5.3.
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Comparatively, this price was the lowest for rubber since the two previous decades15 and
also an all-time low for the whole of the post-independence period until 2000. For the
next three decades from 1971 rubber prices continued their chaotic fluctuations, reaching
new peaks of above 300 sen a kilogram on three occasions in 1979, 1988 and 1995.
During this period the lowest price recorded was in 1984 at 188.70 sen a kilogram. The
price of 395.56 sen attained in 1995 was not only the highest price recorded in the 1957-
2000 period but also the highest ever recorded since complete rubber price data were
made available in 1918.
Table 7.2.*1Perak: Rubber production 1957-2000 (tonnes)
Year Production Year Production Year Production
1957 54,000 1972 173,642 1987 220,096
1958 57,000 1973 208,498 1988 225,403
1959 60,000 1974 215,272 1989 185,704
1960 59,000 1975 199,426 1990 163,070
1961 62,000 1976 226,736 1991 169,031
1962 62,000 1977 225,014 1992 132,468
1963 125,666 1978 219,523 1993 113,446
1964 129,884 1979 216,656 1994 139,446
1965 128,403 1980 206,253 1995 131,926
1966 137,946 1981 199,165 1996 122,513
1967 138,648 1982 221,359 1997 105,927
1968 157,637 1983 228,009 1998 97,847
1969 172,526 1984 216,255 1999 73,980
1970 175,018 1985 192,391 2000 59,812
1971 178,522 1986 210,388
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, various years 1969-2001;
Department of Statistics Malaysia (1989). State/District Data Bank 1987/88, p.211; Department of
Statistics Malaysia (1990). State/District Data Bank 1989, p.201; Thomas & Fong Chu Chai (1968).
Rubber Industry Statistics, Rubber Research Institute ofMalaya.
Notes: Hectarage figures from 1958-1973 have been converted from acres in the original source.
(1 hectare = 2.471 acres)
Figures for 1957-1962 have been rounded to the nearest 1,000 tonnes by the original source
and only cover estate production.
While the rubber sector has seen extreme fluctuations of prices with a peak of 395.56 sen
and the lowest of 93.50 sen during the 1957-2000, production did not follow these
15The lowest price prior to 1971 was in 1949 when the annual average price of rubber was 84.22 sen a
kilogram.
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movements closely. Rubber production in Perak during 1963-1971 clearly shows
contrasting trends (see Table 7.2.4 and Figure 7.2.2). While there was a continuous
decline in prices that eventually hit an all-time low in 1971, production, on the other hand










showed a 42% increase.16 During 1971-1979, when the rubber price showed a staggering
234% appreciation, production only increased by about 21%, and 1980-1993 showed a
more parallel movement of rubber prices in relation to production. The years 1993-1995
again showed a substantial difference - an 86% price increase accompanied by only 16%
increase in production; and finally during the years 1995-2000 when the price dropped by
34% production declined by about 55%.
The situation presented above in relation to rubber prices and production in Perak reveals
an important issue for the state agricultural sector, particularly with regard to the
declining contribution from the rubber sector to the state economy. While price is an
,6Comparison for the years 1957-1962 cannot be made as the production data available were only for
estates. Smallholders' production figures were only made available from 1963.
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important factor in any production processes in which profit is sought, it does not,
however, translate well without taking into account output capacity. In general, although
the price of rubber was reasonably high, in the region of 200 sen or above in the post-
1975 period, and twice reaching beyond the 350 sen mark, production hovered between
190,000 and 225,000 tonnes a year until 1988. There was a continuous steep decline to
about 60,000 tonnes in 2000, a figure that matched up to the annual estate production in
the late 1960s. While increased production costs, which led to diminishing returns, was
one of the factors that saw the decline in interest in rubber production in Perak, the
attraction to switch to oil palm cultivation seems to be the major reason since it offered a
better income. This can be clearly demonstrated by the substantial increase in the oil
palm cultivated area in the state, including the switch from rubber, with new plantings
from 32,838 hectares in 197017 to 319,086 hectares in 1999,18 almost a ten-fold increase.
Although oil palm cultivation requires more crop attention and the market prices were
lower as compared to rubber,19 themuch higher yield per hectare of oil palm provided the
incentive to venture into this crop on a massive scale. As an example, using 1997 as a
base year, 193,994 hectares of land was attributed to rubber cultivation in Perak
producing 290,860 tonnes, which is equivalent to an average of 1.5 tonnes of production
per hectare. In the case of oil palm 6,563,116 tonnes were produced from 262,525
hectares of cultivation, which is equivalent to 25 tonnes of production per hectare
cultivated.20 While palm oilprices were about 73% lower thanrubber during theyear, the
17Perak(1976),p.4.
18SeeTable 7.5.1 in Section 7.5.
19In the year2000 the annual average rubber price was261.93 sen per kilogram and 70.65 sen for palm oil.
[Based on palm kernel (ex-mill) prices. For annual average prices ofoil palm products, see Malaysian Palm
Oil Board (MPOB) at URL http://161.142.157.2/home2/home/table5 1 2000.htm (11/03/2005)]
20Calculated from EPU, Perak(1999a). Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998,Table
6.1,p.45.
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yield of almost 17 times more per hectare encouraged the crop switch and new
21plantings.
Although tin and rubber each has its own set of problems, most of these problems were
shared, particularly with regard to the rising operational costs and the diminishing profits.
Added to these were the depletion of resources, in the case of tin, and the competing
attraction of oil palm, in the case of rubber. However, for both commodities it was the
prolonged depressed prices against operational costs that had halted further investment in
these industries. Producers therefore were diverted to other more productive and viable
economic activities. For the state, the commodities that had helped bring Perak to the
forefront of economic expansion had lost their importance. In the tin industry the early
1970s marked the beginning of the decline, while for rubber it was towards the end of the
1980s. One of the anticipated consequences expressed by the public sector in the late
1950s and early 1960s was that the state would lose its revenues from these two
commodities. This finally became a reality. The consolation for the state was probably
that the decline in revenue-generation from these two commodities since independence
was relatively gentle, in that diversification to other activities was able to take place. In
place of rubber, oil palm proved to be a success and the demise of tin was replaced by
diversification into manufacturing industries from the 1970s.
21In 1997 the annual average price of oil palm kernel (ex-mill) was 75.65 sen a kilogram. This example is
for illustration only. Oil palm is also subject to serious price fluctuations and, therefore, comparative
figures against rubber will change continuously.
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7.3 The impact of international commodity agreements on the economy of Perak
The impact of prices of both tin and rubber has been examined in the previous section.
The discussion of the impact, however, focused more on the influence of price on the
productive capacity of the state and the reasons why both industries had ceased to be the
primary revenue-generating vehicles for Perak. However, for commodities traded in
world markets, rubber and tin are also constrained by global supply and demand and
other initiatives undertaken by each commodity fraternity; among them the most
on
popularly known are the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) . This section
will examine the impact of the ICAs on the economy of Perak.
Although there are several ICAs covering various commodities , only those pertaining to
tin under the International Tin Agreement (ITA) and to rubber under the International
Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA) will be examined here. While both ICAs had slightly
different approaches, the main intention was to achieve price stabilization at remunerative
levels for both commodities to benefit consumers and producers. The ITA was already in
place when Malaysia achieved its political independence in 195724 while the INRA
commenced its operations in 1980.
22Numerous publications are available on ICAs. For those relevant to the tin and rubber industries, see
Anderson, R. W. and Gilbert, C. L. (1988). 'Commodity agreements and commodity markets: lessons from
tin' in Economic Journal, 98, pp.1-15; Corea, C. (1992). Taming Commodity Markets, Manchester:
Manchester University Press; Gilbert, C. L., 'Post-war tin agreements: an assessment' in Resource Policy,
3, 1977, pp.108-117; Gilbert, C. L., 'International commodity agreements: design and performance' in
World Development, 15, 1987, pp.591-616; Miranda, M. J. and Helmberger, P. G., 'The effects of
commodity price stabilization programs' in American Economic Review, 8, 1988, pp.46-58.
230nly five ICAs are knownto exist. Apart from the twomentioned above, the others are the International
Sugar Agreement, the International Cocoa Agreement, and the International Coffee Agreement. [Gilbert, C.
L. (1995). International Commodity Control: Retrospect and Prospect, Policy Research Working Paper
1545, The World Bank, pp.1 & 46]
24The first ITA in the post-war period tookeffect in 1956. Prior to independence there were already three
ITAs, which started in 1931 but ended at the outbreak of the Second World War.
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The ITA operates on the basis of buffer stocks and export quotas to stabilize price: the
former principally attempts to reduce price fluctuations and the latter raises prices. While
it has to be acknowledged that the ITA was able to assist in controlling global tin prices
for about three decades prior to the international tin market collapse in 1985, the impact
on the state was very serious; Perak being the principal tin producer in Malaysia,
producing between 53%-69% of national production during 1957-2000, and heavily
reliant on this commodity, had seen its revenue from tin gradually reduced. Whether the
ITA was the sole cause of this predicament is debatable at least in two ways. Firstly, tin
is a non-renewable asset and continuous extraction of the commodity results in the
depletion of supply. The non-parallel trends in the tin price and production as shown in
Figure 7.2.1 in the previous section clearly indicate that despite uninterrupted price
increases during the early 1970s to early 1980s production was on a decreasing trend.
Secondly, which is related to the first, is the tin price itself. Although price stabilization
initiatives on tin were taking place on a global scale, the price level was not remunerative
enough for Malaysian producers to increase production. The logic of rapidly expanding
production to maximize profit did not occur during the last three decades. After 1972
Perak tin production was on a continuous decline.
One of the possible arguments is that export restrictions, which were implemented
intermittently26 to raise prices and dispose of the International Tin Council's 7 (ITC)
25Calculated from Table 7.2.2.
26Export restrictions were in operation whenever 70% of the maximum value in thebuffer stock washeldin
tin metal.
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surplus stock, had limited the economic expansion of Perak. Such an argument cannot be
fully accepted. This line of argument can be countered by examining the state's tin
production against the world production figures as presented in Table 7.2.2 in the
previous section. It is acknowledged that the decline in Perak's tin production during
1958-1960 was the result of the export control order but the subsequent years did not
experience any decline; in fact tin production had been on the increase until 1971. For the
next three decades the continuous decline in tin production too could not be related to the
export control order. If the intermittent export restrictions were to have affected the
state's tin production then the production graph as in Figure 7.2.1 would have shown
increases and decreases in production in line with the impact of withdrawals and
enforcements of the export restrictions. Whenever export restrictions were withdrawn, the
production should have shown significant increases, allowing producers to accumulate
extra surpluses, particularly when there was a continuous price increase in the 1970s to
mid-1980s. The continuous decline in the production trend does not seem to support the
argument that export restrictions had led to a decrease in Perak's tin production.
Furthermore, excess production due to export restrictions could have been diverted for
the Malaysian downstream tin-based manufacturing industry since tin consumption had
increased by more than seven-fold in 1990 from its 1980 level, and in 1999 an increase of
almost thirteen-fold. For comparative purposes, Malaysia's domestic consumption had
27The Council was established in 1956 with the principal aim of achieving long-term balancebetween tin
production and consumption and to prevent excessive fluctuation ofprices.
28Abdul Ghani(1989), p.2.
29The 6 ITAwas the final agreement that expired in 1989. In the subsequent years the Association ofTin
Producing Countries (ATPC) took charge ofenforcing export restrictions among member countries.
30In 1980 Malaysia's domestic tin consumption was 434 tonnes, in 1990 3,143 tonnes, and in 1999 5,639
tonnes. [Tin Industry Board (1990), issues February 1990, January 1994, and November 2001 respectively]
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represented about 1% of Perak's tin production in 1980, and increased to about 18% in
1990. However, in 1999 the state's tin production could not even fulfil domestic needs.
From examining the trend it can be deduced that, at least in the case of Perak, the buffer
stock operations and export controls had little bearing on the decline in tin production.
Heavily debated issues, such as non-compliance and allocation of export quotas, had
gradually become hrelevant.31 The severe reduction in tin production was solely a result
of depleting resources. As for the ITA, the failure of the ITC to stabilize the prices at a
higher level further aggravated the tin revenue for Perak. Known to be a relatively high
cost producer, the tin price levels did not benefit the state. The attempt by Malaysia in
the early 1980s to corner the world tin market through the London Metal Exchange
epitomized the initiative to raise tin prices.33 Whether the tin price could have been
higher without the existence of the ITA, i.e. by allowing the free market to determine tin
prices, remains highly speculative. If prices reached a very remunerative level for
producers, the obvious result for the state would have been maximum expansion of tin
production that would, in turn, have contributed to its accelerated depletion. In the short-
run, the state could have experienced a substantial increase in revenue but in the longer
term the accelerated depletion of tin could also have caused a more severe economic
breakdown. At least what took place in Perak was the gradual decline in tin revenue,
31On the national level this issue remains important for a longer period, as cumulative production of the
country remained a forceful influence in the international tin arena.
32Except for Bolivia, Malaysia has been a high cost producer when compared to Indonesia, Thailand,
Brazil, and China. [Crabtree etal. (1990). 'The Great Tin Crash' in Jomo (1990), pp.15-6; also Abdul
Ghani (1989), p. 10-11]
33For an account of Malaysia's failed attempt and its loss ofRM660million, see Jomo (1990). 'Malaysia's
Tin Market Corner' in Ibid., pp.71-7.
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which encouraged the state to diversify into other economic activities to cushion the
depleting revenues from the tin mining sector.
In October 1985, when the international tin market collapsed due to lack of finance for
buffer-stock operations and the tin price dropped by half, Perak tin-producers suffered a
huge loss. The impact faced by the state was, however, not so acute as tin production had
already declined by more than 60% compared to its height in 1971. During the collapse,
the prevailing 6th ITA was still in operation until 1989 for which period no significant
improvement was seen in term of prices except during the final year when it breached the
RM20 a kilogram mark before declining again in subsequent years. For Perak, the
dependence on tin as the main revenue had long gone, even before the tin market
collapsed; the final decade of the twentieth century only saw Perak producing an average
of less than 3% of world production. After more than a century, Perak, along with
Malaysia, had ceased to be the world's largest tin producer and in 2000 ranked as the
seventh largest producer ofmined tin.34
In the rubber sector, the impact ofinternational agreements on the economy ofPerak took
a slightly different turn. The global rubber producers and consumers introduced the last
ICA in 1980; the INRA35 operated entirely on the basis of buffer stock intervention to
stabilize prices. Theoretically, whenever rubber prices fall or go beyond a certain pre-
34Wu, J. C. (2001). 'The Mineral Industry of Malaysia' in U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook 2000,
p.16.1.
35Sanctioned under the International Natural Rubber Organization (INRO).
36For a comparative view of the various designs and operations of ICAs, see South CentreAnalytical Note
(2004). Commodity Market Stabilisation and Commodity Risk Management: Could the Demise of the
Former Justify the Latter?, November, pp.2-22.
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specified price range, the INRA stock intervention will be activated. The intervention is
done either by purchasing the commodity when price is below the range or selling when
it goes above the range. While the objective was to maintam rubber prices to allow
reasonable economic surplus to be gained by mbber producers in the producing countries,
the impact of the international initiatives seems to have produced a mixed result for
Perak.
Learning from the ITA's experience, the INRA had made its technical operations more
clearly defined.37 The exclusion of export quotas was important to Perak as in the post-
independence period, unlike tin, the main rubber producers were smallholders. As long as
price was attractive the production of rubber continued to expand. With only the buffer
stock intervention in operation, there was theoretically no limit to production as excess
supply could be absorbed by the buffer stock. This is evident from Figure 7.3.1 and
Table 7.3.1 below. From 1963, when state data for smallholders began to be made
available, one of the most salient features in the state rubber industry was that the total
rubber production for both estates and smallholders was almost the same. The production
from each sector was in the region of 60,000 tonnes a year. This trend of roughly equal
contribution towards the state's total production continued until about 1968. Thereafter
the smallholders took the lead as the main rubber producers in Perak. Rubber prices
under the influence of INRA, which started in 1980, do seem to have benefited the
Tbid.37I
38During the first three INRAs 700,000 tonnes had been purchased under the buffer stock arrangements.
[Budiman, A. F. S., 'Recent Developments in Natural Rubber Prices', Paper presented in FAO's
Consultation on Agricultural Commodity Price Problems, Rome, March 25-26, 2002, p.8]
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producers, especially the smallholders. The low cost of production created a natural
advantage for the smallholders. This is particularly so when smallholders' production
during the decade before INRA is compared to that of post-INRA. From 1970 to the
introduction of INRA, rubber smallholders' production in Perak was aheady growing in
tandem with rubber prices i.e. increases in production when there were increases in price
and vice-versa. This same production trend, in general, continued in the post-INRA
period, indicating that the response from smallholders was that production would increase
when the rubber price increases. An additional benefit, however, was present in the post-
INRA period in terms of price. A ten-year rubber price average in the 1970s was 190.04
sen a kilogram. The average ten-year price in the 1980s and 1990s, two decades under
INRA, had increased to 239.68 sen and 273.08 sen a kilogram respectively. This
indicates that smallholders had taken advantage of price increases to improve income.
39,Calculated from Table 7.2.3 in previous section.
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Table 7.3.1 Perak: Rubber production of estates and smallholdings, 1957-2000
(tonnes)
Year Estates Smallholdings Total Year Estates Smallholdings Total
1957 54,000 n.a 54,000 1979 76,000 140,656 216,656
1958 57,000 n.a 57,000 1980 71,630 134,623 206,253
1959 60,000 n.a 60,000 1981 70,802 128,363 199,165
1960 59,000 n.a 59,000 1982 67,746 153,613 221,359
1961 62,000 n.a 62,000 1983 67,941 160,068 228,009
1962 62,000 n.a 62,000 1984 66,584 149,671 216,255
1963 64,179 61,487 125,666 1985 63,306 129,085 192,391
1964 66,082 63,802 129,884 1986 67,301 143,087 210,388
1965 65,854 62,549 128,403 1987 65,577 154,519 220,096
1966 68,851 69,095 137,946 1988 63,579 161,824 225,403
1967 70,585 68,063 138,648 1989 56,219 129,485 185,704
1968 77,312 80,325 157,637 1990 51,088 111,982 163,070
1969 78,011 94,515 172,526 1991 48,613 120,418 169,031
1970 80,681 94,337 175,018 1992 42,848 89,620 132,468
1971 84,744 93,778 178,522 1993 38,300 75,146 113,446
1972 83,621 90,021 173,642 1994 36,840 102,606 139,446
1973 87,751 120,747 208,498 1995 33,846 98,080 131,926
1974 88,375 126,897 215,272 1996 33,575 88,938 122,513
1975 76,270 123,156 199,426 1997 30,725 75,202 105,927
1976 85,711 141,025 226,736 1998 27,959 69,888 97,847
1977 80,600 144,414 225,014 1999 24,153 49,827 73,980
1978 79,141 140,382 219,523 2000 14,700 45,112 59,812
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, various years 1969-2001; Department of Statistics
Malaysia (1989), State/District Data Bank 1987/88, p.2Il; Department of Statistics Malaysia (1990), State/District Data Bank
1989, p.201; Thomas & Fong Chu Chai (1968). RubberIndustryStatistics, Rubber Research Institute ofMalaya.
Notes: Hectarage figures from 1958-1973 have been converted from acres in the original source (1 hectare = 2.471 acres).
Production figures for 1957-1962 have been rounded to the nearest 1,000 tonnes by the original source and only cover
estate production.
Another trend also appears in the process. Although in the post-INRA period, prices had
been higher than before and the smallholders seemed, in general, to be moving in parallel
with price fluctuations, the decrease in production was accelerating faster when there was
a price decrease than when price was on a rising trend. The expansion of output during
periods of low prices to maintain income levels did not seem to take place. This was
particularly so, beginning in 1988, and indicates that, although rubber production
remained an important income-earner for the smallholders, there was a continuous move
by a growing section of the smallholders to divert to other economic activities. It was
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mostly diversification to oil palm cultivation for the reasons aheady mentioned in the
previous section i.e. much higher yields and better income despite lower prices. This is
evident in the increase of 228,719 hectares in oil palm cultivation in the state from 1980,
the year INTRA was introduced, to 1999, witnessing more than a three-fold increase in two
decades.40 Although the figures represent the total state hectarage covering both the
smallholders as well as estates, it is estimated that the former cultivated about a third of
thehectarage41.
In the estate sector, the development of rubber in Perak in the post-INRA period
demonstrates an important difference. When smallholders were responding quite well to
the rubber price fluctuations, the estate sector appeared to have lost interest in the
commodity. It is difficult to determine whether the introduction of the INRA was the
sole reason for this or that INRA had further augmented the already declining production
trend in the preceding six years of 1974-1980. Rubber production had declined from its
height of 88,375 tonnes in 1974 to 71,630 tonnes in 1980. The drop was an annual
average decline of about 3% in production and also a sharp drop in cultivated area from
73,064 to 57,327 hectares, a loss of about 2,600 hectares a year (see Table 7.3.2). During
the post-INRA period (1980) Perak's rubber production had declined to 14,700 tonnes in
2000, resulting in an annual average drop of almost 4% when compared to the 1980
40See Table 7.5.1 in Section 7.5.
41For example, in 1987 there were 198,191 hectares of land cultivated with oil palm in Perak with the
following breakdown: smallholders 24,006 ha., FELDA 19,040 ha., FELCRA 25,901 ha., RISDA 3,088
ha., SADC 4,850 ha., and private estates 121,306 ha. [Perak (1990). Pelan Tindakan Sektor Pertanian
1989-2000, p.2 (unpub.)] Except for SADC, which are run identical to estates, for the other land schemes
they were subdivided into small parcels and cultivated by settlers a.ka. smallholders but under the umbrella
of the respective agencies. Therefore, the total for the smallholders' category was 72,035 hectares
representing 36.3% of total oil palm hectarage in Perak; under the same assumption smallholders
represented 34% in 1991 and 39% in 2001 in cultivated areas, [calculated from Table 7.5.4 in Section 7.5]
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figure; and a smaller decline of about 2,200 hectares a year bringing it to 12,802 hectares
in the same year. The use of modern technology and better cultivation techniques did not
appear to be of much assistance in mitigating the decline in production and hectarage
reduction. When both the production and hectarage were declining continuously at a
rapid pace, the most obvious conclusion is that the price established by the INRA was not
remunerative enough, especially with rising operational costs, to further prolong the
estates' involvement in rubber production. It seems that the INRA had no significant
positive impact on the estate sector in Perak. This is further demonstrated in Table 7.3.2
that the continuous decline in rubber hectarage had already been taking place since
independence.42 Similar to the smallholder sector, the move to the more profitable oil
palm cultivation was the reason for the decline. In fact, it was the estates that had
initiated crop diversification from rubber to oil palm before being followed by the rubber
smallholders. As more organized entities, the estates were more sensitive to and aware of
the global economic environment that required them to change.
The smallholders and the estate sectors in Perak's rubber industry had responded
differently to the activities of INRA. But on aggregate, the state rubber industry was not
able to sustain its high production capacity, at levels prior to the agreement, for very long
in the post-INRA period (see Figure 7.2.2). This was because the unattractive rubber
prices failed to encourage production expansion in the state. The prolonged low prices,
and also INRO's rejection of increased rubber prices, saw thedemise of INRA in 1999.43
42In Malaysia hectarage under rubber had been on the decline since the early 1980s. [Tunku Mahmud
(2000). 'Crop Diversification in Malaysia', Regional Expert Consultation on Crop Diversification
Workshop, FAO/Rap Publication No. 2000/14, p. 1]
43The 4th INRA collapsed after the withdrawal of three major rubberproducers - Malaysia, Thailand, and
Sri Lanka [South Centre Analytical Note (2004), p.20]
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Table 7.3.2 Perak: Rubber estate hectarage, 1957-2000
Year Hectares Year Hectares Year Hectares
1957 n.a 1972 80,057 1987 46,487
1958 112,465 1973 76,822 1988 45,244
1959 109,308 1974 73,064 1989 43,427
1960 105,677 1975 69,918 1990 41,847
1961 105,265 1976 67,018 1991 40,220
1962 104,718 1977 65,174 1992 37,517
1963 104,006 1978 63,256 1993 35,478
1964 102,191 1979 60,165 1994 34,342
1965 99,478 1980 57,327 1995 31,693
1966 94,744 1981 54,974 1996 28,885
1967 89,992 1982 53,604 1997 25,990
1968 87,993 1983 56,690 1998 24,510
1969 85,320 1984 54,443 1999 18,704
1970 84,354 1985 50,853 2000 12,802
1971 82,831 1986 47,946
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, various years 1969-2001; Department of
Statistics Malaysia (1989). State/District Data Bank 1987/88, p.211; Department of Statistics Malaysia (1990).
State/District Data Bank 1989, p.201; Thomas & Fong Chu Chai (1968). Rubber Industry Statistics, Rubber Research
Institute of Malaya.
Notes: Hectarage figures from 1958-1973 have been converted from acres in the original source (1 hectare = 2.471 acres).
These figures do not include those under RISDA, FELDA, FELCRA, and other state land development schemes.
In Perak, the existence of tin and rubber cultivation had provided the state with the
impetus and foundation for greater economic growth. In the international arena, the
establishment of the ICAs to balance both global production and consumption, and
thereby theoretically benefit the producing and consuming countries, did not help sustain
the economic expansion of the state as a producer. It was not possible to continue to
depend on these commodities as prices were low and resources were depleting. On a
more positive note, the huge reduction in rubber production and revenue allowed oil palm
cultivation to be carried out on a more rapid scale. Although the ICAs did not help to any
great extent in economic revenue generation in Perak, they did force the pace and the
need for economic diversification in the state.
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7.4 The changing pattern of labour and land utilisation after the decline of tin
The two previous sections have focused on the impact of price fluctuations of the two
primary commodities on the producers and the state, both as the result of market supply
and demand and the influence of the ICAs. The consequences are far-reaching whenever
commodities production moves in parallel, particularly over a long period. When
commodity production was on the increase, along with remunerative prices, its
contribution to the local economy will be positive - creating employment, improving
income levels and standards of living, and triggering a number of related downstream
economic activities. Improvements to revenue theoretically will allow better provision
for state development programmes, hi the case of tin in Perak the circumstances,
beginning from the early 1970s, had been in the reverse. This section will examine the
impact on labour patterns and also land utilisation as the result of the continuous decline
in tin production in Perak.
In 1971, Perak recorded the highest post-independence tin production of 45,000 tonnes.44
It was also the year that the post-independence tin mining industry in the state had
employed a record high of 28,844 workers (see Table 7.4.1 below)45. Prior to 1971, the
general trend in tin production, except for 1957, has been on the increase and therefore
saw a corresponding rise in the labour force. Although the situation was unlike the tin
44SeeTable 7.2.2 in Section 7.2.
45This, however, is not the highest record for the whole tin industry history in Perak as it was reported that
Larut alone had about 40,000 Chinese immigrants working in tin mines during the early colonial period,
see Section 3.5.
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boom years of the colonial period, particularly in the first 15 years of the 1900s when
production was higher46 than that of 1971, theincrease in tinmining labour was evident.
Table 7.4.1 Perak: Labour in tin mining sector, 1957-2000
Year Labour Employed Year Labour Employed Year Labour Employed
1957 21,430 1972 28,771 1987 6,681
1958 13,510 1973 n.a 1988 7,010
1959 14,033 1974 27,836 1989 7,948
1960 18,048 1975 24,805 1990 7,051
1961 18,725 1976 23,082 1991 4,949
1962 18,591 1977 23,478 1992 3,106
1963 19,107 1978 25,007 1993 n.a
1964 22,018 1979 24,538 1994 n.a
1965 26,235 1980 23,821 1995 2,400
1966 27,943 1981 20,937 1996 1,133
1967 28,673 1982 16,018 1997 1,018
1968 28,418 1983 15,114 1998 1,256
1969 27,841 1984 13,917 1999 1,171
1970 28,719 1985 9,632 2000 999
1971 28,844 1986 6,508
Sources: Malaysia (2001). Malaysian Mining Industry, Minerals and Geoscience Department, Table 15, p.35;
Francis Loh (1988). Beyond the Tin Mines, Table 5.4, p.189; Perak (1976), RMK3, Table HI-L, p.20; Perak
(1981), RMK4, Table 2-11, p.26; EPU Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985, p.lll; EPU Perak
(1991c). PerangkaanAsas Negeri Perak,p.28; EPU Perak (1993). BankData Negeri Perak,p.l 02; EPU Perak
(1999a). Buku Perangkaan UtamaNegeri Perak Darul Ridzuan1998, p.56.
Note: The 1989 and 1995 figures comprised those categorized under 'mining and quarry'. No distinctions were
made between each category and the various types ofminerals.
With a labour strength of 13,510 working in the mines in 1958 it grew continuously to
1971; the workforce more than doubled. Accompanied by a gradual increase in tin prices
that hovered between RM6 and RMll a kilogram, the tin industry seemed to have been
able to absorb the displaced labour as the result of the sudden decrease in labour
requirements in 1957-58. On top of that, the industry also provided employment
opportunities for new labour. The increase in employment opportunities in this sector
during the period was also made available by the significant increase in the use of the
46See Table 5.3.2 in Section 5.3. Mechanized tin extraction was in the early stage of introduction and
manual labour was still heavily depended upon.
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more labour-intensive gravel-pump tin mining operations, encouraged by the rising tin
47prices.
This positive labour pattern started to halt and reversed its direction after 1971. In line
with the decline in tin production beginning inthe early 1970s48 the labour force in this
sector followed suit. The continuous decline in labour was rapid and within a twenty-
year period the tin industryhad lost almost97% of its workforce leaving only 999 people
in the industry in 2000; and compared to 707 tin mines operating in 1970 only 23 left in
2000 (see Table 7.4.2).49 Major tin mine locations surrounding the districts of Kinta,
Larut Matang, and Batang Padang that had been the centres of economic activities in
Perak inevitably had to search for new alternatives to absorb the excess labour. While
Perak had seen a net out-migration of labour since the 1970s with the majority of the
migrants heading for the adjacent states of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur50, the
circumstances surrounding the three mining districts was slightly different. Rather than
expecting a net out-migration due to the decline in tin mining activities, the three districts
received a net in-migration ofpopulation.51 Intra-state migration alone during 1970-1980
shows that the district of Kinta received a total net in-migration of 181,000, Batang
47Francis Loh(1988), p.188.
48See Figure 7.2.1 in Section 7.2.
49Perak's major tin mining companies still operating in 2000 were New Lahat Mines at Lahat, Rahman
Hydraulic Tin at Klian Intan, S.E.K. (M) at Kampar, Omsam Telecommunication at Bakap, and Tasek
Abadi at Senudong.
50Perak's net migration in 1970 was -7.0%, 1980 -15.7%, 1986-1991 -3.8%, and 2000 -0.3%. [ Perak
(1991). Kajian Pembangunan Wilayah dan Pengenalan Projek Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, Final Report,
p.4-5; Department of Statistics Malaysia (1996). Internal Migration in Malaysia, No.2, Table 3.2, p.9;
Department of Statistic Malaysia (2001). Migration Survey ReportMalaysia 2000, p.24]
51Although the migration figures represent population movements, the inflows inevitably resulted in
additional available workforce into these districts.
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Padang 21,000 and Larut Matang 9,000.52 Even after the international tin market had
collapsed in late 1985 and labour in the tin mining sector had reduced to about a quarter
of the 1980 figure, these districts maintained their capability to attract intra-state
migrants. The period of 1986-1991 saw Batang Padang district experience a 1.1% net in-
migration, Kinta 1.8%, and Larut Matang 0.5% in relation to the district's population.53
Inter-state migration from these districts is more difficult to ascertain as statistical data
available (except for 1980) only show migration between states without indicating the
district of origin. In 1980, the district of Kinta was recorded to have 83,900 in inter-state
out-migration, Larut Matang 40,978 and Batang Padang 25,766.54 While there is no
certainty from which sector all these out-migrants originated, it is certain that some were
from the tin mining sector.
Table 7.4.2 Perak: Nu tuber of tin mines, 197)}-2000
Year No. Year No. Year No.
1970 707 1981 446 1992 36
1971 700 1982 376 1993 21
1972 699 1983 341 1994 22
1973 655 1984 280 1995 24
1974 686 1985 169 1996 18
1975 603 1986 124 1997 19
1976 543 1987 148 1998 23
1977 553 1988 149 1999 26
1978 596 1989 183 2000 23
1979 571 1990 96
1980 549 1991 55
Sources: Perak (1981), RMK4, Table 2-11, p.26; EPU, Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985,
p.113; EPU, Perak (1993). Bank Data Negeri Perak, p.102; Malaysia, Malaysian Minerals Yearbook,
Geological Survey Department, issues 1988-2000; EPU, Perak (1991c). Perangkaan Asas Negeri Perak Darul
Ridzuan,p.2S.
The pattern of labour in these districts clearly indicates that despite losing its principle
economic activity, these districts had coped quite well in redirecting the surplus human
52Perak (1991), Figure 4.1.2. During 1970-1980 Perak experienced a net out-migration of 104,400 of its
population.
^Department ofStatistics Malaysia (1996), p.20.
54EPU, Perak (1986a), p.33.
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resources from the tin mining sector and new labour migrants into new economic
activities. At the lower end, a small number of the former tin mining, labourers had
moved into the agricultural sector. This is particularly prominent in the districts of Batang
Padang and Kinta, which saw a huge increase in market-gardening activities (see Table
7.4.3). While this economic activity existed during the colonial period in the Kinta
district to support the needs of the growing population,55 the increase in hectarage in the
post-independence period, particularly after the first official survey in 1966 (which shows
an increase of 732 hectares to 1,105 hectares in 1985) could only suggest that there is a
link between the increase in market-gardening hectarage and the decline in tin mining
employment. In 1992, seven years after the collapse of the International Tin Agreement
the hectarage had further increased to 1,306 hectares.56 A huge increase is also seen in
Batang Padang where market-gardening activities had increased from 58 hectares in 1966
to 898 hectares in 1985.
Table 7.4.3 Perak: Market gardening and orchard cultivation hectarage,
selected years
Market Gardening Orchard
District/Year 1966 1974 1985 1966 1974 1985 1996
Batang Padang 58 71 898 12 128 838 2,951
Larut Matang 180 255 234 380 808 1,646 5,517
Kinta 732 952 1,105 297 794 993 1,773
Sources: Wong (1974). The Present Land Use ofPeninsular Malaysia, Volume I, Ministry of Agriculture, Malaysia, pp.399,
411, 433; EPU Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985, Ipoh, p.47; Perak Agricultural Department (1997). Laporan
Tahunan 1996, Appendix 8,p.31.
Note: All figures have been rounded to the nearest hectares.
Apart from market-gardening, orchard cultivation had also emerged as an important
economic activity. The development in this sector, as shown in Table 7.4.3, indicates
55See Francis Loh (1988), pp. 20-3.
56Majlis Daerah Kinta Barat & Selatan (1996). Rancangan Struktur Sebahagian Daerah Kinta: Laporan
Pemeriksaan, November, Table 3.4.1, p. 3.4-1.
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that the growth was faster during the post-1985 period in all the three tin mining districts.
Although all these districts registered impressive growth in orchard cultivation, the most
remarkable was that of Larut Matang where an additional 3,871 hectares was developed
between 1985-1996.
While the development of the agricultural sector has helped provide new employment
opportunities in these districts, it was not able to absorb all the surplus labour with the
decline in tin mining. However, these districts had advantages that could be capitalized
on as a result of the prior development of the tin industry; and this is the availability of
modern physical infrastructures that could assist diversification into industrialization.
Partly as a state initiative, industrialization, which first took place in Ipoh in the 1960s,
began to expand. From 1976 to 1980, a total of 93 (52.5%) industrial projects approved
in Perak were situated in the district of Kinta, 30 (17.0%) in Larut Matang, and only 7
(4%) in Batang Padang (see table 7.4.4). During the period 1981-1985, the momentum
created in the preceding five years was not well sustained, because only Kinta district had
shown significant improvement; Kinta had 132 projects approved during the period, a
slight improvement on Larut Matang with 35 approved projects, and a deteriorating
situation in Batang Padang with only 4 projects during the period. The employment
opportunities created by these projects had provided a part-solution for the districts'
surplus labour problem. During the period 1980-1985 the industrialization initiatives in
these districts managed to provide 9,270 new jobs in Kinta, 3,024 in Larut Matang, and
1,194 in Batang Padang.58 At the same time, these districts also faced the ups anddowns
For total aggregate number of projects approved in each district during 1976-1986, see Map 7.4.1.
EPU, Perak (1986a), p.100-1.
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of demand and supply that affect certain sectors within the industry, which at times
involved the laying off of workers such as those that took place in the textile industry in
Larut Matang district in the 1980s.59 Although the industrial development in these
districts was not fast enough to provide sufficient employment opportunities for all,
Table 7.4.4 Perak: Geographic location of industrial projects
approved between 1976-1986
1976-1980 1981 -1985
District/Industrial estate Number % Number %
Kinta District 93 52.5 132 61.4
- Tasek Industrial Park 34 19.2 26 12.1
- Jelapang Industrial Park 18 10.2 20 9.3
- Taman Meru Industrial Park 0 0.0 6 2.8
- Silibin Industrial Park 0 0.0 7 3.3
- Pengkalan/Lahat Industrial Park 8 4.5 17 7.9
- Outside industrial estate 33 18.6 56 26.0
Larut Matang District 30 17.0 35 16.3
- Kemunting Industrial Park 18 10.2 19 8.8
- Tupai Industrial Park 4 2.3 5 2.3
- Outside industrial estate 8 4.5 11 5.1
Kuala Kangsar District 13 7.3 10 4.6
- Kuala Kangsar Industrial Park 5 2.8 8 3.7
- Outside industrial estate 8 4.5 2 0.9
Krian District 9 5.1 12 5.6
- Parit Buntar Industrial Park 7 4.0 9 4.2
- Outside industrial estate 2 1.1 3 1.4
Manjong District 5 2.8 13 6.0
- Kampong Acheh Industrial Park 0 0.0 4 1.9
- Outside industrial estate 0 0.0 9 4.2
Batang Padang District 7 4.0 4 1.9
Hilir Perak District 18 10.2 8 3.7
Hulu Perak District 2 1.1 1 0.5
Perak Tengah District 0 0.0 0 0.0
Projects located in industrial estates 94 53.1 121 56.3
Projects located outside industrial estates 83 46.9 94 43.7
Total 177 100.0 215 100.0
Source: MIDA in EPU, Perak (1986a). Statistik Negeri Perak 1980-1985, pp.87-8
59In 1985 a total of662 workers were laid off as 6 factories were closed down. [EPU, Perak (1986a), p.107]
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significant progress did take place, and by 1991 manufacturing industry in Kinta was
employing 49,029 people, Larut Matang 15,910 people, and Batang Padang, at a slower
pace, 3,456 people.60 From 1990, the tin industry in these districts was no longer seenas
economically important.
While the initiatives undertaken by the state in diversifying its economic activities were
able to provide job opportunities and mitigated an even higher level of out-migration
from these districts in the state, the initiatives undertaken in administering the ex-mining
areas seem to have taken a back seat. This is evident when no particular emphasis was
given as to any specific rehabilitation programmes for the ex-mining areas. In a
development policy document of 1986-1990, as part of the State's 5th Malaysia Plan, the
utilisation of ex-mining land for market-gardening activities was only mentioned in
passing.61 Another minor initiative appeared in the then proposed State's 7th Malaysia
Plan (1996-2000) where reference was made to the promotion of aquaculture in these
areas, particularly in Kinta.
Table 7.4.5 below depicts the total hectarage that has been alienated for tin extraction
activities.63 The continuous increase in hectarage since 1966 only reiterates superficially
60Department of Statistics Malaysia (1995). Population Report for Administrative Districts: Occupation
and Industry, pp.360, 372, 390.
61EPU, Perak(1985). Dasar, Matlamat &Strategi Pembangunan Negeri Perak 1986-1990, Ipoh, Appendix
A,p.5.
62EPU, Perak(1995a). Cadangan Rancangan Malaysia KeTujuh (1996-2000), Ipoh,p.66.
63Statistics for the 1980s are available. However, figures presented were restricted to actual worked
hectarage for the year and do not portray total tin mining hectarage in the state.
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the notion that no action has been taken to rehabilitate ex-mining land.64 However,
although it is not explicitly spelt out in the state planning documents, some initiatives had
been taken. It could not, however, be ascertained that they were taken principally as part
of rehabilitating ex-mining land or as a result of land shortages for development
purposes. While specific statistics relating to state-wide development of ex-mining lands
are not available, an estimate in the district of Kinta in 1996 revealed that 3,294 acres had
been re-developed for various purposes; 1,010 hectares for planned villages, 449 hectares
for agriculture, 966 hectares for industrial areas, 577 hectares for housing schemes, and
291 hectares for recreational areas.65 Similar re-development programmes have since
taken place in other ex-mining districts. Although one of the problems facing
rehabilitation of ex-mining areas was the lease-holders' desire to hold on to the land until
the expiry of the lease period, despite having worked on the entire area, this obstacle
disappeared over time as more and more mining leases came to an end. At the end of
1992, only 12,582 hectares were still under mining lease and this figure was further
66
reduced to 1,694 hectares for expiry at the end of 2000 and beyond.
Table 7.4.5 Perak: Mining land distribui ion, selected years
Year Hectares ('000) Year Hectares ('000)
1966 29.7 1992 68.0
1974 54.3 1997 84.0
1978 65.3 2000 84.0
Sources: I.F.T. Wong (1974). ThePresent Land Use of Peninsular Malaysia, Vol. 1, Ministry
of Agriculture, pp.394-5; Perak (1981). RMK4,p.26; EPU, Perak (1993). Bank Data Negeri
Perak Darul Ridzuan,p.102; EPU, Perak (1999). BukuPerangkaan UtamaNegeri Perak
Darul Ridzuan 1998, Table 2.4, p.14;
http://www.perak.eov.my/english/geography/land usage.html (22/04/2005)
64It is apparent that the statistics onlytake into account the total hectarage alienated for mining without any
reduction carried out when land has been re-developed for other purposes.
65Majlis Daerah Kinta Barat& Selatan (1996), p. 3.4-9.
66EPU, Perak(1993), p.50-2.
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The passing of tin in Perak inevitably forced the state to diversify its economic activities.
The most notable change was the diffusion of labour from the tin mining sector to other
sectors, particularly to agriculture and manufacturing. Although manufacturing
development had been reasonably rapid with the passing of tin in the respective districts,
its development was not adequate to prevent the out-migration of a significant number of
people. At the same time more emphasis and actions could have been taken earlier to
utilize the ex-mining areas for re-development programmes which could have generated
the much needed jobs and better land utilisation.
7.5 Land utilisation during the decline of rubber
In the previous section, it had been argued that the changes in labour patterns and land
utilisation after the passing of tin had resulted in labour being channelled into other
activities. The changes had also led to migration and also some attempts to rehabilitate
and divert ex-mining land into other economic uses. The changes in land utilisation due
to the decline of tin mining have not been rapid i.e. redevelopment of ex-mining land was
not a priority as the state still has ample tracts of land for development. On the other
hand, the changes in land utilisation with regard to the rubber sector present a different
state of affairs. This section traces and examines the changes in land utilisation during the
decline of rubber in Perak.
The changing land use pattern, including rubber cultivation up to 1980, has been
presented in Section 6.6 and the relationship between rubber production and price in
Perak has also been shown in Section 7.2. While the state rubber production had
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remained in the high range of between 190,000-225,000 tonnes in the 1973-1988 period,
with most of the years at a price of above 200 sen a kilogram, the direction of change in
rubber land utilisation was contradictory. In 1974, when the Ministry of Agriculture
carried out a survey on land use throughout Malaysia, Perak had 276,413 hectares planted
with rubber. This corresponded well with its high production of 215,272 tonnes during
the same year. In 1980, when the production had declined by about 9,000 tonnes, the
hectarage had greatly reduced by more than 22,000 hectares. While on the one hand new
high-yielding rubber clones and modern techniques have shown improvement in rubber
yield and production, on the other it is the beginning of the decline in rubber hectarage in
Perak. This declining trend is shown in Table 7.5.1 below when by 1990 the rubber
sector had lost a further 42,341 hectares compared to 1980. No significant improvement
was seen in the decade of the 1990s, except that in 1995 when some expansion in rubber
cultivation was seen to be taking place, it was superseded by the faster rate at which
cultivators switched land utilisation into other agricultural or non-agricultural activities.
This finally saw the total rubber hectarage in 199969 standing at about the same level as in
1990. Comparing the high rubber hectarage of 1974 to the total hectarage of 1999 the
rubber industry in the state had declined by 65,264 hectares or by about 24% within a 25-
year period.
67SeeTable 6.6.1 in Section 6.6.
68SeeTable 7.2.4 in Section 7.2.
69Statistics for 2000 are available but not used since figures relating to rubber hectarage do not seem
logical. A drastic drop in hectarage to 4,542 hectares was reported in 2000; and in 2001 rubber hectarage is
reported to be 195,421 hectares. Statistics for padi and orchard cultivation for 2000 are also not available.
[http://agrolink.moa.my/BI/statistics (05/04/2005); Perak Agricultural Department (2002). Laporan
Tahunan 2001, Appendix 4, p.26]
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Table 7.5.1 Perak: Selected agricultural land use, 1980-1999, selected
years
Land Use Category 1980 1990 1995 1999
(hectares) (hectares) (hectares) (hectares)
Rubber 254,038 211,697 218,258 211,149
Oil Palm 90,367 248,465 337,525 319,086
Padi 69,537 83,243 73,536 81,022
Coconut 54,963 39,593 36,013 24,193
Cocoa 25,459 30,608 29,161 6,607
Orchards 8,745 21,939 19,276 17,989
Sources: EPU, Perak (1999). BukuPerangkaan UtamaNegeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998,p.l5; Ministry of
Agriculture, Peninsular Malaysia official website at http://agro1ink.moa.my/Bl/statistics (05/04/2005).
In examining Table 7.5.1 the changes in land utilisation during the decline of rubber is
obvious. The trend of switching crop cultivation from rubber to oil palm that began in the
1960s had continued into the 1980s and 1990s. There were also other reasons for the
reduction in rubber hectarage in Perak such as for the development of housing and
industrial estates, but the decline was insignificant compared to the mass switching to oil
palm with its hectarage increasing by more than three-fold within two decades since
1980. As in the 1960s, the estate sector represents the largest sector among rubber
cultivators, which had switched to oil palm, hi terms of the number of estates the 1990s
represent the largest decline in rubber estates in Perak; the rubber industry lost 122
estates within the 1990-2000 period (see Table 7.5.2).70 Estates that represented 57,327
hectares of the total rubber hectarage in 1980 had declined to only 12,802 hectares in
2000; a decline of 44,525 hectares (see Table 7.5.3). The table too reveals another trend
that despite the fact that the overall state rubber hectarage had been on the increase since
independence and only began to decline in the mid-1970s, for the estate sector the
continuous decline in rubber hectarage was aheady taking place from the colonial
70Decline in the number of rubber estates in Malaysia since the 1960s wasalsopartlydue to subdivisions of
estate land into smallholdings. [Gunnarson (1979), p.67]
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*7lperiod. It is evident that the estates had long reduced their participation in rubber
cultivation and the increase in state rubber hectarage prior to the decline in the mid-1970s
was the result of smallholder participation. It seems that the estate sector was quicker in
recognizing the need to diversify crop production rather than be solely dependent on
rubber, and they were more able to respond.
One of the reasons why the smallholders' rubber hectarage continued to increase was the
direct involvement in subsidy assistance and encouragement provided principally by
RISDA, a federal agency, as part of the national rural development programme.72 The
government's post-independence national rubber policy had intensified initiatives in the
form of replanting and technical assistance, land settlement and new planting, central
marketing, and intensified research programmes. In the 1991-2001 period, for
example, when the estates and other government agencies such as FELDA and SADC
had shown a decline in rubber cultivation hectarage, and FELCRA too had shown only
some minor increase in hectarage, smallholders under RISDA, however, had shown a
very large increase; during this period these smallholders had added a total of 21,532
hectares in rubber cultivation areas in the state. The ability to sustain rubber hectarage
in the state was the result of the active role played by RISDA in encouraging rubber
cultivation among smallholders.
71The rubber estate sector in Perak was at its height in 1940 when 127,352 hectares were cultivated; see
Table 5.2.1 in Section 5.2.
72In 1973 almost 50% of the total planted hectarage on smallholdings in Malaysia consisted of replanted
land under RISDA schemes. [Gunnarson (1979), p.54]
73Ibid.
74Statistics for 2001 areuseddueto unavailability of detailed statistics for 1999 and2000.
^Smallholders' rubber hectarage under RISDA in 1981 and 2001 was 141,303 and 162,835 respectively.
[Perak Agriculture Department (1992). Laporan Tahunan 1991, Appendix 2, p.38; Perak Agriculture
Department (2002), Appendix 4, p.26]
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Table 7.5.2 Perak: Number of rubber estates 1960-2000, selected
years
Year Estates Year Estates Year Estates
1960 390 1975 288 1990 206
1965 374 1980 258 1995 n.a
1970 349 1985 231 2000 84
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, RubberStatistics Handbook, various years 1969-2001.
Table 7.5.3 Perak: Rubber estate hectarages, 1958-2 )00
Year Hectares Year Hectares Year Hectares Year Hectares
1958 112,465 1969 85,320 1980 57,327 1991 40,220
1959 109,308 1970 84,354 1981 54,974 1992 37,517
1960 105,677 1971 82,831 1982 53,604 1993 35,478
1961 105,265 1972 80,057 1983 56,690 1994 34,342
1962 104,718 1973 76,822 1984 54,443 1995 31,693
1963 104,006 1974 73,064 1985 50,853 1996 28,885
1964 102,191 1975 69,918 1986 47,946 1997 25,990
1965 99,478 1976 67,018 1987 46,487 1998 24,510
1966 94,744 1977 65,174 1988 45,244 1999 18,704
1967 89,992 1978 63,256 1989 43,427 2000 12,802
1968 87,993 1979 60,165 1990 41,847
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, various years 1969- 2001;
Department of Statistics Malaysia (1989). State/District DataBank 1987/88, p.211; Department of Statistics
Malaysia (1990). State/District Data Bank1989, p.201; Thomas & Fong Chu Chai (1968). RubberIndustry
Statistics, Research Institute ofMalaya.
Note: Hectarage figures from 1958-1973have been converted from acres in the original source.
(1 hectare = 2.471 acres)
The reasons for switching from rubber to oil palm have been mentioned in the previous
chapter. Although this began gradually from the colonial period, it was from the 1980s
that the momentum gathered to transform the agricultural landscape of the state. It was in
the 1980s that oil palm surpassed rubber as the largest agricultural crop in the state (see
Table 7.5.1). The history of the development of rubber in Perak where the rapid
expansion of rubber in the smallholder sector eventually exceeded the estates, both in
hectarage and production, has not yet happened in oil palm cultivation. During the period
1981-2001, the smallholder sector had increased by almost five-fold while the estates by
about three-and-a-half fold. The rapid expansion in the oil palm smallholding sector in
281
the 1980s and 1990s, however, did not manage to surpass the estate sector which
remained the dominant player in the oil palm industry, controlling about 61% of Perak's
oil palm hectarage (see Table 7.5.4). The same period also witnessed a more serious
involvement of the federal and state governments through their agencies in crop
diversification initiatives in Perak as shown in the increase of 72,066 hectares in oil palm
cultivation. It is also interesting to observe that RISDA too, a federal agency, formed to
assist rubber cultivation among smallholders, had also been actively involved in mini-
estate oil palm cultivation. From a hectarage of only 275 hectares in 1981,7 it had
increased to 32,891 hectares in 200177. This makes it second to FELCRA which owned
33,401 hectares, a small difference ofonly about 500 hectares.
Table 7.5.4 Perak: Oil palm hectarage by sector, selected
years
Sector/Year 1981 1991 2001
Estates 54,331 199,641 242,366
Smallholdings 9,281 30,137 55,322
Federal/state agencies 27,724 71,357 99,790
Total 91,336 301,135 397,478
Sources: Perak Agriculture Department (1982). Laporan Tahunan 1981, Table 21, pp.24-27;
Perak Agricultural Department (1992). Laporan Tahunan 1991, Appendix 3, p.39; Perak
Agricultural Department (2002). Laporan Tahunan2001, Appendix 5,p.27.
Land utilisation during the decline of rubber was principally replaced and further
expanded by oil palm cultivation. Other agricultural crops such as padi, coconut, and
cocoa that were once important economic activities had either maintained or declined in
hectarage.78 Orchard farming gained some popularity so that thehectarage hadmore than
doubled in the post-1980 period, indicating the increase in demand for orchard products.
Not limited to the private sector, the state too had a hand in crop diversification and in
7ePerak Agriculture Department (1982), Table 21,p.27.
77Perak Agriculture Department (2002), Appendix 5, p. 27.
78See Table 7.5.1.
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promoting oil palm cultivation after the decline of rubber as about a quarter of the total
hectarage in 2001 was under government-initiated schemes.
7.6 Summary and conclusion
The unbalanced and dependent economy of Perak, which had primarily depended on tin
and rubber during the early decades after independence, posed serious problems for the
state. This is particularly so when reliance on commodity trading exposes the economy
to the fluctuations in world demand and prices. While it was tin and rubber that had
underpinned the state economy and enabled it to become one of the most successful states
in Malaya in the colonial period, it was these same commodities that caused the state to
struggle in maintaining its economic development during the post-independence period.
The initiatives undertaken by world producers and consumers of these commodities to
match supply and demand as well as to stabilize prices through the establishment of ICAs
also did little to benefit the state. By 2000, both the ITA and INRA were dead.
The rapid deterioration of tin production in the 1970s and more so in the 1980s only
confirms that tin was no longer the pre-eminent industry in the state. At the state-level,
the attention given to the tin industry was also declining at an equal rate. In Perak's
Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) the strategic focus on tin mining development was
only mentioned briefly, and in subsequent plans it was omitted altogether; focus began to
be diverted to value-adding initiatives in other minerals such as kaolin, limestone,
granite, and clay to help subsidise the loss ofrevenue from tin. These minerals, however,
were not in abundance as tin once was. At the same time as declining attention given to
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the tin industry, priority was directed to the development of the manufacturing sector to
help absorb the labour made redundant by the tin industry. This too was in line with the
import-substitution, and later export-promotion programmes initiated by the Federal
Government.
The change in direction eventually saw the growth of the industrial sector in the state.
What was lacking in the early industrial development programme was the over-emphasis
placed on locating industrial development in the tin districts where it was expected to
have large unemployment without the appropriate balance given to the other districts.
Between 1976 and 1985 a total of 290 (74%) industrial projects were located in the Kinta
and Larut Matang districts, hi other districts, the limited industrial development
initiatives carried out were concentrated at selected urban sites. While the development of
the industrial projects in the tin districts helped to provide new opportunities for the ex-
mining labour, it also attracted new labour. What transpired was the movement of labour
both as a result of intra-state and inter-state in-migration to these districts. In the policy
move towards economic diversification, it seems that the urban population was better
placed to benefit during the initial shift towards manufacturing industrialization.
When tin was fast depleting, the growth in the rubber industry was the result of
smallholder involvement. Expansion in this sector was the result of an administrative
policy undertaken by the government in the form of replanting and the encouragement to
raise rural incomes as part of the NEP initiatives. This too helped mitigate a more severe
exodus of rural population to the urban areas in search of work. The growth of rubber
^Calculated from Table 7.4.4.
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productivity until the late 1980s, however, has given a false impression of a healthy
industry, where in fact there was a significant loss of hectarage compensated for by
higher yields. While promoting higher income for the rural population is a justifiable and
noble initiative of the state, leading them primarily into rubber does not seem to have
fully benefited them. It does not seem beneficial as the estate, vis-a-vis the private sector,
had long diversified into other agricultural crops, in particular oil palm. Although crop
diversification to oil palm took place, particularly from the 1980s, the change was still
slow among smallholders; the most drastic changes were those undertaken by federal and
state agencies. By the end of the decade, the state agricultural landscape witnessed a
better balance between rubber and oil palm cultivation, with the smallholders as the
major producers for the former and the estates for the latter. Overall, the state seemed to
have succeeded in its agricultural policy of crop diversification from solely relying on
rubber but it was at the expense of the smallholders; but encouraging rubber cultivation
among smallholders did improve income. However, the results could have been better if
oil palm cultivation had been encouraged as this crop had proven to be a more robust
income-earner, at least during the period under consideration. There was no significant
improvement witnessed in other crops.
The over-dependence on two primary commodities had provided a valuable lesson for
Perak in that the economy had to be based on a much broader footing. Focus could not
be directed only to limited sectors where a decline there would severely affect the state
economy. Positive diversification was necessarily encouraged and supported by the state
in its efforts to reorganise of the economy. This change in the role of the state in
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THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN REORGANIZING PERAK'S
ECONOMY (1981-2000)
8.1 Introduction
The post-1980 decade demonstrate another era of change in the economic development of
Perak. The policies undertaken by Perak in moving towards further economic
development after the 1969 'race riot' did not show much progress in the 1970s. By 1980
the NEP had already reached its half-way mark but was far from meeting its principal
objectives. The role of the state in economic development needed reviewing. It was
hoped that such a review would help organise the state economy. In 1990 when the NEP
had reached its target date, the government replaced it with the NDP. Although the
fundamental direction of the state economy in the 1970s had been appropriate, the post-
1980 period required more to be done in fine-tuning existing economic policies,
diversification into new areas, and the introduction and implementation of new policies.
The impact of the fast-changing global economic environment too had a strong influence
on local economic circumstances in the post-1980 period. As a result the state had to
adapt to these changing demands which eventually also led to changes in the socio
economic characteristics of the population. This is particularly apparent in the changes in
labour patterns among the various sectors of the economy. This chapter therefore
examines the role of the state in economic policies and activities in relation to Perak.
287
8.2 Diversification from a natural resource-based economy
The foundation of Perak's economic progress was the colonial heritage of a relatively
prosperous economy that relied principally on tin and rubber, and on a smaller scale,
those traditional economic activities such as smallholder production of rice, rubber, and
small-scale fishing. The active development of the tin and rubber industries also meant
that the physical infrastructure of Perak was reasonably well developed which provided
the basis for further economic development. The emphasis on development in the
immediate post-independence period, particularly up to 1970, saw only limited state
involvement in the manufacturing industry, though this began to take shape in the early
1960s.
Diversification in Perak's economy can be first seen in the agricultural sector where
rubber cultivation was gradually superseded by the rapid expansion in oil palm
cultivation. This diversification was mainly undertaken by estates rather than
smallholders, and involved only a limited labour expansion. In the previous chapters, we
have seen how the over-reliance on a limited range of primary commodities and price
volatility had affected Perak's economy. At the same time, the potential of value-added
spin-off from tin, which was expected to expand, also deteriorated as tin production
declined. This is evident from Table 8.2.1 below, which shows that in the post-1980
period the value-added contribution from mining to the state economy began to decline,
in that the 1990 contribution represented about a quarter of the contribution of about a
decade before. Along with the gradual demise of tin as a principal commodity export for
the state, the importance of value-added activities followed suit. The decline in tin
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production therefore not only resulted in the displacement of those directly involved in
tin mining operations but also to those in the downstream value-added activities. The
state therefore faced a problem because labour was being displaced from both its tin and
rubber industries. Another key factor that compounded the need to diversify Perak's
economy was the increase in population which eventually saw an increase in the labour
force.
Table 8.2.1 Perak: Mining value added ]1971-1990
Year RM '000 Year RM *000 Year RM '000
1971 260,120 1978 428,610 1985 262,908
1972 242,177 1979 501,690 1986 154,500
1973 252,850 1980 n.a 1987 148,665
1974 382,598 1981 419,390 1988 162,367
1975 290,041 1982 n.a 1989 224,040
1976 343,827 1983 359,108 1990 126,439
1977 363,687 1984 313,973
Source: EPU, Malaysia (1995). Statistical Data for Gross DomesticProduct, Table 11 (unpub.).
The intention to diversify the economic base into industrialisation had been a state
strategy since independence, although in the agricultural sector it had been taking place
since the colonial period.2 The diversification was implicitly referred to from the late
1950s and was later made explicit in the first two Malaysia Plans for Perak (1966-1975).
The diversification programme into non-resource industrialisation, however, did not see
much progress during this early period. The Federal government policy in the 1960s,
which aimed to move away from the narrow range of commodities, promoted import-
substitution industrialisation (ISI) in Perak, concentrating mainly on the district of Kinta.
This industrialisation programme managed to provide much-needed jobs in the state as it
was based on labour-intensive and assembly-type industries. However, the saturation of
*For population and labourforce distribution 1957-1980, seeTables6.7.1 and 6.7.2in Section 6.7.
Specifically, Perakdid not have anyeconomic niche industry afterthedecline of tin (Interview withDato'
Hamdan Hazizi, former Chief Executive Officer of PSDC 1975-1992, and currently the Chairman of
Gopeng Berhad in October, 2002).
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the small domestic market and the lack of linkages that this kind of industrialisation had
to offer led to the shift in national economic policy towards export-oriented
industrialisation in the 1970s, which continued in tandem with the ISI until the mid-
1980s.3 It thenbecamethe dominant approach from about 1985.
The economic diversification programme in Perak was similar to that undertaken in other
states in Malaysia as the Federal Government prescribed the main policies governing
economic development in the country. However, their implementation was left mainly to
individual states.4 Diversification from the natural-based economy to resource-based
industrialisation had generated a shift in Perak's demographic structure. The population
of the state had grown faster in the pre-19805 compared to that in the post-1980 period
(see Table 8.2.2). As a result of the economic diversification initiatives undertaken by the
state, the most significant change was the shift of population from the rural to the urban
sector. Rural development programmes were an important government initiative from
1970 as they were part ofpoverty reduction measures under the NEP. However, outflows
ofpopulation and labour from the rural areas to the cities seemed unstoppable. With only
about 32% of the state population residing in the urban areas in 1980, diversification of
the state economy into industrialisation saw a subsequent rapid population movement
into urban areas which eventually almost doubled to about 60% in 2000. The negative
population growth in the rural sector over the two decades is also shown in Table 8.2.2.
3Perak's involvement in industrial development was much later than other states in Malaysia, which
depended on spill-over effects from other adjacent states (Interview with Dato' Harun Saruji, CEO of
PSDC 1993-1997 on 23/10/2002).
4Confirmed by Daruk Ahmad Koncong, former Deputy State Secretary (Economic Development), 2000-
2004 during interview in October 2002)
5See Tables 6.7.1 and 6.7.2 in Section 6.7.
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Although these changes in demographic structure might signify that the population had
responded well to the state's economic diversification programmes, it also suggests that
the rural development programmes, mainly based on agriculture had limitations and were
not completely successful in retaining the rural population.
Table 8.2.2 Perak: Urban and rural population 1980-2000 , selected years
Sector 1980 199' 2000 Average Growth (%)































Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia (1980). General Report of the Population Census 1980, Vol.2, pp.1-2; EPU,
Malaysia (1996). Profail Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, Prime Minister's Department Table 1, p.4 (unpub.); EPU, Perak
(1998). Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri PerakDarul Ridzuan, Table 3.2, p.20; EPU, Perak (2002a). Pembangunan Ekonomi
dan Industri Negeri Perak Seminar Sasaran Kerja Tahun 2002/2003, p.3 (unpub.); Department of Statistics, Malaysia
(2000). State/District Data Bank, pp.1, 18, 247.
The population shift in the context of diversification into industrialisation in Perak
obviously resulted in the growth of urban centres (see Table 8.2.3). While growth took
place in most of the major towns in the state, there were some exceptions in the ex-tin-
mining towns. Apart from the state capital, Ipoh, which saw continuous growth in the
post-1980 period, Kampar and Taiping did not increase in tandem. For Taiping, the
positive growth of 2.9% in the 1980s dwindled to a negative growth of 0.1% in the
1990s. The sudden decline in population after a decade of positive growth was mainly
due to the decline in the textile and clothing industry which was a prominent economic
activity in the area in the 1980s. In the case of Kampar, the town had never experienced
any upsurge in population because, although situated in the same district as Ipoh in the
district of Kinta, economic diversification into industrialisation was mainly concentrated
in the vicinity of Ipoh, at the expense ofKampar.
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The economic diversification programme did achieve some success. Revenues from the
state alone, excluding federal grants, had improved significantly from the RM22.37
million in 1957 to RM109.96 million in 1980, and further increased to almost triple to
RM326.53 million in 2000.6 The revenue from tin had been declining so rapidly, that in
1 _
2000, it had become so insignificant and stood at only RM200,000. Economic
diversification too had created a shift in sectoral contributions in the overall state
economy. The primary sector that represented the largest component at 43.6% in 1980
had reduced by more than half to 20.1% in 2000, and there was almost a reciprocal
increase in the secondary sector.8 With the increase in the secondary sector, significant
improvement was also witnessed in the tertiary sector which together resulted in a better
sectoral balance in the economy.
!.3 Perak: Urban population growth rates 1980-20




Kuala Kangsar 5.0 0.6
Teluk Intan 2.2 -0.3





Tanjung Malim 4.3 3.0
Source: EPU, Perak (2002a). TaklimatPembangunan Ekonomi dan Industri
Negeri Perak, Seminar Sasaran Kerja 2002/2003, p.4 (unpub.).
For Perak's total revenues and expenses 1957-2000, see Appendix 8.
7State ofPerak (2002). Estimates ofRevenue and Expenditure, p.18.
8See Table 8.9.3 in Section 8.9.
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8.3 The 'new' investment policy for state economic development
From 1981 under the Fourth Malaysia Plan Perak began to redirect its development
investment strategy. Although rural development remained an important item on the
agenda,9 priority was given to trade, industrial development, and services. The emphasis
was that these priority activities should be spread across the state to allow for balanced
regional development.10 Economic policy also envisaged that the private sector would
take the lead role in providing as much as two-thirds of the investment in these initiatives
with the balance coming from the state;11 private investment was assumed to come from
local investors. Ironically, even though state plans in the 1980s made no mention of
actively attracting foreign investment, such forms of investment totalled RM268.5
million or about 29% of industrial investment equity in 1980-89.12 The investment from
the state for the economic development of Perak in the 1980s under both the Fourth
(4MP) and Fifth Malaysia Plans (5MP) was RM4,639.8 million (see Table 8.3.1).
Although the allocations provided for the economic sector for both the 4MP and 5MP
represented about the same percentage of between56% to 59% of the overall allocations,
a larger portion was allocated for industrial development, particularly in the
establishment of industrial zones and estates,13 and infrastructure.
The state faced challenging circumstances during the 5MP when there was a global
downturn in the demand for electronics and primary commodities in 1985-86. This had a
9See Table 8.2.2 in Section 8.2.
mAhmad acknowledged that economicdevelopment had been uneven among the regions in the state during
prior periods (interview in October 2002).
"Perak (1981), p.78A.
^Calculated from Table 8.7.1 in Section 8.7.
I3For establishment of industrial zones and estates in Perak in the post-1980 period, see Section 8.4.
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severe impact on the country's financial position and saw the allocations to states
curtailed. Perak's allocation was reduced by about a fifth from its previous amount in the
4MP. This period saw local and foreign investments reduced drastically before bouncing
back towards the end of the 5MP.14 When development allocations were reduced, the
state was also under great pressure to expand development in the social sector,
particularly in reducing poverty and redistributing wealth within the multi-ethnic
population, since it was in the final five years of the NEP. While the increase of
investment and allocations in the economic sector could have cushioned the impact of the
global downturn, the state had to increase its allocations in the social sector which
increased by almost 50% from the previous period (4MP).










Economy 1,478.0 1,182.8 1,546.0 2,077.7
Social 369.5 545.6 656.0 1,606.3
Security 751.6 223.8 206.0 338.9
Administration 42.6 45.9 154.0 177.1
Total 2,641.7 1,998.1 2,562.0 4,200.0
Sources: EPU, Perak (1993), Bank Data Negeri Perak (PerangkaanAsas), p.27; EPU, Perak (2000) Briefing Note
on Economic Development of Perak State, pp.23-5 (unpub.); EPU, Perak (2002c) Address to International
Participants ofDiplomatic Training Course, October 21 2002, p.7 (unpub.).
In the 1990s, development initiatives were steered by the Sixth (6MP) and Seventh
Malaysia Plans (7MP) along with the NDP. Shortly before the launching ofPerak's 6MP
the Federal Government also launched 'Vision 2020' which aimed to achieve a fully
developed industrialised status for Malaysia by the year 2020. Blending the national
vision into state development programmes, investments in the manufacturing and service
sectors were again promoted. Perak set a target that by 2020 the GDP structure in the
14As a consequence of the globaleconomic downturn industrial project investment in Perak in 1987hit an
all-time low for the post-1980 period at only RM33.5 million (see Table 8.7.1 in Section 8.7).
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primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors would be 15%, 30%, and 55% respectively.15 In
1990 the prevailing GDP structure was 33.6% for the primary sector, 22.6% for the
secondary sector, and 43.8% for the tertiary sector.16
With the development targets prescribed above, manufacturing industry, which was given
priority in the 1980s, continued to be the focus of development policy in Perak in the
1990s to further reduce poverty, increase standards of living, and restructure society in
line with national aspirations.17 Resource-based manufacturing, utilizing local resources
and labour-intensive production which provided the much-needed growth and sectoral
linkages initiated in the 1980s, was also extended into the 1990s, hi fact, local sourcing
1 ftbecame a crucial criterion for the provision of incentives in the late 1980s to encourage
the small-medium industries (SMIs) to expand, upgrade, and modernize their activities.19
These incentives became part of the initiatives to promote state investment policy. To
further expand the manufacturing sub-sector, foreign investment became one of the
explicit strategies to support Perak's economic development policy. This policy
achieved substantial investment expansion in the 1990s, so that, although industrial
projects carried out in the 1980s and 1990s were about equal in number, the latter
managed to attract a total of RM16,980.1 million in investment. It was an increase of
15EPU, Perak(1995b). Taklimat Rancangan Malaysia KeTujuh (1996-2000) bagiNegeri Perak, February,
Ipoh, p.3.
16SeeTable 8.9.3 in Section 8.9.
17Ahmad, however, argued that the focus of state development policy was not only limited to
manufacturing but also to reduce regional development gap as well as to upgrade human resource
capabilities (interview in October 2002).
18Rajah Rasiah (1992). 'The Role of Foreign Manufacturing Firms in Industrial Development: A Case of
Malaysia', Ph.D Thesis, University of Cambridge, p. 88.
In addition to the incentives mentioned in Table 6.8.2, the Federal Government introduced export-
refinancing facilities that enable credit facilities at preferential rates to Malaysian exporters in 1977.
I9In 1993 about 80% of the manufacturing sector in Perak consisted of SMIs. [Johnson, M. (1993). "The
Northern states link together' mEuromoney, London, July, p.10]
20EPU, Perak(1995b), p.6.
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more than five-fold21 compared to the previous decade. This rapid expansion also
signified the move towards high technology and capital-intensive industries.
In the move to promote rapid growth in manufacturing, the direct involvement of the
state government in ensuring the success of its investment policy and providing an
attractive environment for investors was clearly visible. The most obvious was the
establishment of industrial zones and estates by the state or its agencies, particularly by
the PSDC. By 1998 the state had 86 such establishments covering about 6,000 hectares
of land.22 While these initiatives allowed investors and entrepreneurs to locate
manufacturing operations in these designated areas, simultaneous direct involvement and
investment by the state on the basis of a public enterprise strategy in the manufacturing
sector can also be seen. By 1989, the state had invested in 12 manufacturing compames
including two that were wholly owned by the state government. At the same time the
establishment of a one-stop Centre of Investment (COI) was an initiative to provide an
efficient approach in all investment protocols.
In the 1990s, apart from the attention given to the manufacturing sector, investment was
also directed to the service sector, principally to develop Perak as a popular destination
for tourists and promote it as a hub for educational centres of excellence. While the
tourism sub-sector was seen as the key driver to accelerate growth, the educational
centres were directed at providing educated and skilled workers for the labour market,
21Calculated from Table 8.7.1 in Section 8.7.
22See Table 8.4.1 in Section 8.4.
23c
'See Table 8.5.4 in Section 8.5.
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and at the sametime contributing to the local economy.24 In the second-halfof the decade
approaching the new millennium, with the economic focus still on promoting
manufacturing, state investment to upgrade infrastructure, particularly in transport and
communication, was seen as a strategy not only benefiting manufacturing but
encompassing all sectors.
Economic development planning in Perak in the 1990s adopted a more systematic
approach in that development corridors were established to achieve more a regional
balance. Establishment of the four corridors27 also allowed a greater investment focus
with each corridor specializing in niche areas, particularly in access to resource materials
and markets: the Southern Corridor covering Tanjung Malim-Slim River and Teluk
Intan-Hutan Melintang was to be focused on automotive, ceramic and education
industries; the Central Corridor covering Ipoh-Lumut focused on engineering,
pharmaceuticals, marine-related activities, tourism, and other auxiliary industries;29 the
North-eastern Corridor covering Hulu Perak-Selama focused on eco- and agro-tourism,
agriculture, and wood-based industries; and the Northern Corridor covering Parit Buntar-
24During 7MP education and training received RMl,151.3 million (72%) of the funds allocated under the
social sector. [EPU, Perak (2000). Briefing Note on Economic Development ofPerak State, p.24]
"Transport and communication was allocated RMl,430.1 million (69%) of the economic sector allocation
during 7MP. [Ibid.]; Unavailability of good transportation system seemed to be the key problem that
mitigated economic development in Perak (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
26The state government had rightly spent huge amount of money in infrastructure development in view of
anticipated economic development progress (Ahmad, interview in October, 2002).
27EPU, Perak (1999a), Table 9.1 & 9.2, pp.71-2; EPU, Perak (1999b). pp.11-2.
28Separation of specialised industrial focus between corridors was largely due to different economic
conditions between them (Ahmad, interview in October, 2002); Economic development in Perak
concentrated more in the north-south rather than east-west directions (Hamdan, interview in October,
2002).
29The extremely slow development progress of this corridor was caused by the delay in constructing the
Ipoh-Lumut highway (Ahmad, interview in October, 2002). To date, the construction of this highway has
still not been completed.
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Taiping focused on auxiliary industries to support manufacturing activities in Perak as
well as the northern states.
The investment policy of the state during the last two decades had been transformed from
one based on natural resources to one based on industrial production. But, although
investment policy achieved some favourable results, the speed with which it was moving
was still sluggish compared to other states such as Penang, Negeri Sembilan and Johor -
states which lacked any significant industrial tradition to begin with. The challenge for
Perak then was to maximize activities in the aheady identified sub-sectors, though, as we
shall see, achievements were rather mixed and the overall programme fell short of
expectations.
8.4 Establishment of industrial estates
In theory, the development of industrial areas in Perak can be divided into three
categories: industrial estates developed by government agencies, those developed by the
private sector, and industrial zones. In practice, however, there seems to be a
misconception in that available reports tend to mix these categories, and infrastructure
provisions for the development of these areas, in most cases, tend to be the same, because
local councils compete to develop industrial estates in their respective districts, and the
state develops industrial areas jointly with the private sector, hi this section, no explicit
30EPU, Perak (1996), p.5.
31Industrial zones, by definition, comprise state landthathas been designated for industrial purposes by the
state authorities. They are later subdivided and alienated to individual owners who bear responsibility for
developing them.
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distinction will be made between industrial estates and industrial zones; all these
categories will be referred to as 'industrial estates'.
As I have already indicated industrial estate development in Perak started with the
establishment of Tasek Industrial Park near Ipoh in the early 1960s as part of the state
plan to become involved in an import-substitution programme championed by the federal
government.32 It was later expanded in the 1970s, when an export-oriented strategy was
initiated and implemented concurrently with the earlier programme. Despite investors
taking up only 24% of the industrial lots developed at Tasek in the early 1970s, the state
continued its industrial estates development programmes. By 1980, a total of seven
estates were established in Perak with three in the district of Kinta, two in Larut Matang,
and one each in Kuala Kangsar andKerian.34 While the state government, mainly through
the PSDC, developed these industrial estates, the post-1980 period saw a considerable
increase both in the number of estates established and the participation of the private
sector.
Direct involvement of the state government in industrial estate development continued in
the post-1980 period so that by the end of 1994 it had established a total of 25 estates
throughout Perak,35 excluding privately developed ones. Nationwide, this achievement
was second only to Selangor, which had a total of 27 state-developed industrial estates,
32See fn. 107 in Chapter 6.
33Perak(1976),p.l8.
34See Table 6.8.6 in Section 6.8.
35EPU, Perak (1996), Table 7.
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and equal to Johor, also with 25 estates.36 It seems that there was competition between
the states as to which could develop the greatest number within the country, irrespective
of whether the state had the capacity to attract investors.
The remarkable increase in industrial estates in Perak continued and in 1998, a total of 86
was established comprising state-developed, jointly developed, and those established by
the private sector (see Table 8.4.1 and Map 8.4.1). The district of Kinta, which had three
industrial estates in 1980, saw a fourteen-fold increase to 42 in 1998. The Mukim of
Kampar in Kinta district, which was once the key economic centre during the tin era, and
had not seen any significant industrialisation activities in the 1960s and 1970s, began to
show some signs of change in the post-1980 period with five industrial estates
established. Designed to handle light industrial activities, these estates constituted only
3% of the total hectarage developed for industrial purposes in Kinta. However, the poor
showing of industrial development in Kampar suggests that the pre-eminent tin district
had failed to reinvigorate its industrial past.
In Kinta, the establishment of industrial estates during this period seems to have been an
expansion of the previous decades, concentrated in the vicinity of Ipoh in Mukim Ulu
Kinta. Only about 15% of the total industrial estate hectarage was established outside
this mukim. Within the district, industrial estate development was still lopsided but
Kinta's contribution to Perak as a whole was prominent as about 48% of the industrial
estates hectarage was situated in this district (see Table 8.4.2). Out of the three remaining




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Map 8.4.1 Perak: Distribution of industrial zones and estates 1998 by districts
302
.4.2 Perak: Distribute n of indusitrial area;
District Hectares Percent
Kinta 2,938.3 48.2
Larut Matang 640.0 10.5
Kuala Kangsar 403.8 6.6
Kerian 106.7 1.8
Perak Tengah 124.7 2.0
Hulu Perak 98.5 1.6
Batang Padang 486.9 8.0
Manjung 709.4 11.6
Hilir Perak 586.4 9.6
Total 6,094.7 100.0
Source: Table 8.4.1
estates during the pre-1980 period, only the former two had shown a significant increase
in new estates. By 1998, Larut Matang and Kuala Kangsar had increased from two to
nine estates and from one to eight estates respectively. In almost two decades the
development of industrial estates in Kerian had been sluggish as it managed to add only
one other estate to the district.
During 1980-1998, industrial estate development had also spread to other districts with
varying degree of success. The district of Perak Tengah, sandwiched between the two
fast-growing districts of Kinta and Manjung, did not attain much success in establishing
industrial estates due to the lack of appropriate infrastructure, amenities, and labour force.
The long-delayed development of Seri Iskandar, the new self-contained township and
district administrative centre supposedly to begin in the early 1980s, also contributed to
the pace of industrial estate development in the district. A similar situation took place in
Hulu Perak, the largest district in Perak. Along with Perak Tengah, these two were the




During the post-1980 period, the districts that had shown remarkable success in
establishing estates were Batang Padang, Hilir Perak, and Manjung providing 8%, 9.6%,
and 11.6% of the total state industrial hectarage respectively. Although Hilir Perak and
Manjung had only four industrial estates each, compared to nine estates in Batang
Padang, these districts each have a large-hectarage anchor industrial estate like Kampung
Acheh Industrial Estate in Manjung and Kawasan Perindustrian Teluk Intan-Cangkat
Jong in Hilir Perak, capable of supporting the industrialisation needs of the districts.
Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a move on the part of the state to direct
specialised industrial activities towards particular estates with the intention ofbringing all
related operators onto one site; where there would be common facilities and the provision
of marketing and product support with the idea of forming a distinct focus and gradually
moving to higher value-added activities. Pioneered with the centralisation of foundries,
the Ceramic Park was also established in Kinta. Sometime in the mid-1990s similar
efforts were also taken with the establishment of the Pharmaceutical Park in Perak
Tengah covering an area of 114 hectares.
The significant improvement in the development of industrial estates in Perak in the post-
1980 period was not only made possible by the direct involvement of the state, but also
the initiatives taken by private developers and joint ventures. Although continuous and
consistent data are not available to map trends in the division between the industrial
estate sectors, as of the end of 1994 slightly more than half of the estates were developed
38PSDC (2002a). Senarai Kawasan Perindustrian Sehingga 31/12/98, Ipoh(unpub.)
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by the state, 32% by the private sector, and 14% were jointly developed. This
development demonstrates that, despite the sharp increase in private sector involvement,
the state played the key role in establishing industrial estates in Perak in the 1990s.
While there was a tremendous increase in the number of estates in Perak during the post-
1980 period, their performance in terms of sales and actual industrial operations was not
encouraging, particularly those which were state- and jointly-developed. Up to the end
of 1998, a total of 2,437.7 hectares of land in 66 industrial estates had been placed on the
market for sale.41 Despite the state government's active promotion andencouragement of
industrial estates only 1,072.2 (44%) hectares of these estates were sold (see Table 8.4.3).
Kinta, which had almost two-fifths of the industrial hectarage for sale, had shown a better
performance with about 65% of the industrial land taken up by investors; the remaining
eight districts managed to sell only about 30% of their existing industrial estate stock.
While many factors can be attributed to the poor sales of these industrial areas, at least in
Table 8.4.3 Perak: Industrial estal es stock status 1998
District Sold Unsold Total area
Hectares Percent Hectares Percent Hectares Percent
Kinta 614.0 65.4 325.6 34.6 939.7 100.0
Other districts 458.2 30.6 1,039.8 69.4 1,498.0 100.0
Total 1,072.2 44.0 1,365.4 56.0 2,437.7 100.0
Source: Collated from PSDC (2002a). Senarai Kawasan Perindustrian Sehingga 31/12/98, Ipoh (unpub.)
Kinta, the most profound reason was the glut of such industrial areas; and about half of
these estates were relatively newly developed and required time to attract buyers. Out of
those estates developed earlier during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Ceramic Park
''Calculated from EPU, Perak (1996),Table 8.
40Statistics pertaining to sale of industrial lotsby private developers are not available.
4,This figure represents net available industrial areas for sale after deducting all necessary provisions for
basic infrastructure development. The use of industrial lots to present sale performance is discarded since
there were industrial estates that offered industrial lot size tailor-made for the buyer's requirements.
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fared the worst. Although conceptually the idea of specialised industrial estates was a
good one and had worked well with the foundry industries in the Pengkalan industrial
area with a success rate of more than 85% of the industrial land being sold, 58% of the
industrial hectarage at Ceramic Park was still unsold after almost a decade of its
completion.42
There was also another problem, in that not all the industrial land sold was developed. In
Kinta, for example, the Bemban industrial area comprising about 73 hectares had more
than 90% of its area sold but less than ten industrial concerns were and still are operating
in that area; in the Pharmaceutical Park in Perak Tengah, although only 18.13 hectares
(42%) were sold out of the available land for sale, only two manufacturing concerns have
been operating in this area up to now; and in Manjung, the Kampung Acheh Industrial
Park sold all its available industrial land, comprising about 440 hectares subdivided into
101 industrial lots of various sizes, but to date only 47 of these lots have been
developed.43 Whether it was due to economic swings that discouraged fiirther
development on the individual industrial lots, or to speculative buying by investors with
the hope of disposing of the lots at a later date is not certain. What is clear, however, is
that the sale of industrial land was not a realistic representation of industrial development
in the state.
In the post-1980 period, the development of industrial estates in Perak saw a dramatic
increase; initially a state crusade to promote industrialisation in Perak, it later received
42Calculated from PSDC (2002a). Senarai Kawasan Perindustrian Sehingga 31/12/98, Ipoh(unpub.).
43Ibid. Data for operating concerns are from current local knowledge and site inspection since actual
statistics during the period are unavailable.
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overwhelming support from the private sector. This development too had seen a more
even distribution of these estates among the various districts rather than being solely
concentrated in Kinta. It was also one of the state's main policies in balancing economic
and social development, mitigating rural-urban migration, and also increasing the income
of the rural population. However, despite this growth and a degree of achievement in
diversification, failure to fully accommodate these industrial estates with investors and
manufacturing concerns suggests that effort and resources should now be concentrated
not on developing new estates but on further promoting the existing vacant sites.
8.5 The state as capitalist
As we have seen, the changes in Perak from the 1980s had concentrated on the need of
the state to diversify its economy from dependence on primary commodities, its
promotion of a new direction for economic growth and development via industrialisation,
and its provision of an environment for industrialisation to prosper. While this has been
achieved with mixed outcomes, from success in the ability to diversify the economy to a
modest accomplishment for the sale and implementation of operations on industrial lots,
the achievement in the economy as a whole was not solely the result of the participation
of private capital in the state economic system. This section will examine the
participation of the state as capitalist in the development ofPerak during the same period.
The involvement of the state in Perak's economy does not amount to state capitalism,
which relies heavily on combining capitalism with state ownership. The system that has
been in place in the post-independence period is based on a mixed economic system that
lies between the socialist command economy and the capitalism of the market economy.
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Despite the fact that some means of production are owned by the state, the bulk of the
ownership is still in private hands. The state's adoption of this economic system became
clearer in the 1970s, at least for two reasons: first, the introduction of the NEP gave a
major role to the state in redressing the ethnic imbalance of equity capital and control of
enterprises; and second, the state involvement as capitalist was needed to help expedite
industrialisation as the main focus of the economy. Without the state taking the lead, the
progress in economic diversification would have been much delayed.
The state-capitalist character of Malaysia continued in the post-1980 period after the
explosion of state enterprises in the 1970s.45 Partly in an effort to continue stimulating
the economy, the prolongation of this trend was also due to state intervention from the
1980s because the NEP targets, particularly for the bumiputera sector, were still far from
being met. The incorporation of these enterprises was part of the state strategy to
establish and increase bumiputera participation in the commercial and industrial
sectors.
There was a tremendous increase in the role of the state as capitalist, via the PSADC, in
the agricultural sub-sector, hi the decade of the 1970s the PSADC's involvement in
developing agricultural land totalled 7,949 hectares comprising oil palm, rubber, coconut,
tapioca, and cocoa.47 In thenext two decades, the PSADC hadexpanded its development
programme almost three-fold, covering an area of 21,669 hectares (see Table 8.5.1).
Except for oil palm and rubber, the PSADC's post-1980 agricultural development also
^In general, Harundisagreed on the state's involvement as capitalist, as the government has no business to
be in business (Harun, interview in October, 2002).
45See Section 6.5.
"'Malaysia (1971a), p.7.
47See Table 6.5.2 in Section 6.5.
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witnessed diversification into other commercial and agricultural activities. From only
three subsidiary companies in the 1970s it had expanded to include six subsidiary
companies and five associated companies (see Table 8.5.2). Although operating as
capitalist, its contribution to the state economic policy through the Ladang Rakyat
schemes in various parts of Perak was also evident. A new company would be
incorporated once any agricultural projects under the PSADC had reached 'maturity',
with 51% of the equity held by the PSADC and the remaining 49% distributed among
selected shareholders, comprising below-poverty income earners, social welfare subsidy
recipients, and low-ranking employees of the specific agricultural projects. While this
has been the practice of the PSADC for agricultural projects within the state, the same
approach was not applicable to out-of-state projects that were solely undertaken for
profit.49 The capitalist character of the state, at least in the agricultural sub-sector, was
rather muted in the sense that while seeking profits the benefits were also directly shared
with the selected deserving recipients.
Table 8.5.1 Perak: PSADC development hectarage, 1999
Crop Hectare Crop Hectare
Oil Palm 20,581 Pamelo 20
Rubber 460 Forestry 260
Herbs 64 Fruits 27
Tea 121 Aquaculture 136
Total 21,669
Source: http ://www.perak.gov.mv/enelish/eovemment/sadchtml (27/05/2005)
In the non-agricultural sector, the state-capitalist role was mainly undertaken by the
PSDC.50 Forthepost-1980 period, an internal study by the PSDC in 1989 indicated that it
48http://www.perak.gov.my/english/government/sadc.html (27/05/2005)
49By 2000all theprojects undertaken by PSADC were within the stateborders except for about 8,000
hectares ofoil palm cultivation in Sumatra, Indonesia.
[http://www.jphpk.gov.my/English/Jan%202001%2030.htm (09/06/2005)]
50For the 1970s, see Section 6.5; The establishment of State Development Corporations in each state was
the result of the resolution of the Bumiputera Economic Convention that also saw the establishment of
Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Berhad and Majlis Amanah Rakyat.
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Table 8.5.2 Perak: PSADC companies 1999
Subsidiary companies
Ladang Lekir Sendirian Berhad
Ladand Jalong Sendirian Berhad
Lenggong Tea Plantations Sedirian Berhad
Global Herba (Perak) Sdn Bhd
Perbadanan Perak Fimaly Plantation Sdn Bhd
Perak SADC Management Services Sdn Bhd
Associated companies
Koko Malaysia Sendirian Berhad
Perak Fruits and Development Corporation Sendirian Berhad
United International Enterprise Sdn Bhd
Dindings Soya & MultiFeeds Sdn Bhd
Dindings Poultry and Processing Sdn Bhd
Source: httpV/www.perak.gov.my/englislVgovemment/sadc.htrnl (27/05/2005)
was involved in 80 enterprises in various sectors with a total capital investment of
RM146.3 million (see Table 8.5.3).51 While this figure shows an apparent increase in the
number of enterprises under the PSDC compared to the 1971-1980 period, there was a
significant change in its sectoral involvement in the economy. Comparatively, the
involvement of the PSDC enterprises in the construction and property development
sectors had decreased from 10 to 1 and from 6 to 3 enterprises, respectively. The
reduction does not necessarily mean that state involvement had significantly been
reduced in these sectors as greater involvement can also be achieved by expanding
operations or joint-ventures through these reduced numbers of enterprises. On the
contrary, a substantial increase was observed in the manufacturing and logging sectors
from 4 to 12 enterprises and from 21 to 48 enterprises, respectively.
The 1989 study too revealed that a large number of the enterprises under the capitalist
arm of the state were performing poorly, which was mainly due to high financial costs,
51PSDC (1989). Studies ofCompanies Under PKNP, p.8 (unpub.).
52See Table 6.5.3 in Section 6.5.
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operational problems, and poor marketing approaches.53 Massive structural
reorganizations took place during the year that saw a total of 48 enterprises being sold,
including one being de-registered.54 Bythe end of 1989 the PSDC had trimmed down its
direct involvement to 32 enterprises - 5 wholly-owned, 6 subsidiaries, 14 associates, and
7 related enterprises and reduced its total capital investment to RM141.5 million (see
Table 8.5.4). Table 8.5.4 also reveals that almost RM100 million (71%) of the total state
capital investment was directed to manufacturing, RM16.6 million (12%) to the
investment sector, RM16.0 (11%) million to mining, and RM7.3 million (5%) towards
property development. Sectors comprising services, construction, tourism, logging and
others each had less than 1% of the state capital investment. Although the sectoral
distribution of capital investment conformed to the state strategy in developing
manufacturing industrialisation as its economic mainstay, a shift in the approach can also
be observed.
Table 8.5.3 Perak: PSDC enterprises by sector, 1989








Logging & others 48
Total 80
Source: Collated from PSDC (1989). Studies ofCompanies Under PKNP,
p.8 (unpub.).
In the manufacturing sector, out of the eleven enterprises under the PSDC, seven were
established in the pre-1980 period. This suggests that in the post-1980 period the PSDC
53PSDC (1989), p.2; The underperformances of state enterprises have been in existence for many years
(Harun, interview on 23/10/2002).
54Ibid., p.13.Outof the 48 enterprises, 44 of these were from the logging sector, with40 disposed under the
'SkimPerintis Pembalakan' (Logging Pioneering Scheme), 1 from manufacturing, and 3 from the mining
sector.
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Table 8.5.4 Perak: PSDC companies 1989
Wholly-owned companies
Year of Paid-up capital Cost of % held by
No. Name of company incorporation Industrial sector (RM) investment (RM) PSDC
1 Batu Perak Sdn Bhd 1975 Manufacturing 377,002 377,002 100.0
2 Maju Kayu Sdn Bhd 1975 Manufacturing 1,700,000 850,000 100.0
3 Maju Timah Sdn Bhd 1975 Mining 250,002 250,002 100.0
4 Maju Kawal Sdn Bhd 1977 Services 200,004 100,002 100.0
5 Gelombanq Perak Sdn Bhd 1975 Project Devt. 250,001 250,001 100.0
Subsidiary companies (50-99%)
Year of Paid-up capital Cost of % held by
No. Name of company incorporation Industrial sector (RM) investment (RM) PSDC
6 Volex (M) Sdn Bhd 1980 Manufacturing 2,000,000 1,300,000 65.0
7 Perak Hanjoong Simen Sdn Bhd 1980 Manufacturing 149,570,000 89,741,997 60.0
8 Maju Bangun Sdn Bhd 1974 Construction 500,000 299,997 60.0
9 Gopeng Berhad 1983 Mining 7,975,768 3,530,652 50.0
10 Maju Penawat Sdn Bhd 1977 Mining 150,000 90,000 60.0
11 Sv. Kayu-Kayan Bersekutu Sdn Bhd 1976 Logging 10,000 60 60.0
Associated Companies (20%-49%)
Year of Paid-up capital Cost of % held by
No. Name of company incorporation industrial sector (RM) investment (RM) PSDC
12 Hilir Maju Sdn Bhd 1977 Mining 119,997 47,999 40.0
13 Perak Dredging Sdn Bhd 1976 Mining 3,200,000 960,000 30.0
14 Timah Dermawan Sdn Bhd 1975 Mining 14,208,000 4,262,400 30.0
15 Senggang Realty Sdn Bhd 1975 Mining 215,000 129,000 60.0
16 Rahman Hydraulic Sdn Bhd 1983 Mining 28,125,000 6,750,000 24.0
17 Elitewood Product (M) Sdn Bhd n.a Manufacturing 1,661,000 813,890 49.0
18 A.P.M Sdn Bhd 1978 Manufacturing 5,600,000 219,999 28.6
19 Zen Concrete Sdn Bhd 1975 Manufacturing 5,000,000 1,499,999 42.4
20 Mapa (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd 1981 Manufacturing 5,004,000 1,789,574 30.0
21 Pulai Jaya Sdn Bhd 1984 Property Devt. 500,000 150,000 30.0
22 Sy. Maju Perak Sdn Bhd 1976 Investment 1,000,000 343,275 34.3
23 Cash Complex Sdn Bhd 1985 Property Devt. 23,000,000 6,900,000 30.0
24 Sy. Permodalan dan Perusahaan Perak 1988 Investment 50,453,801 15,686,087 31.1
25 Rubber Metall-Technik (M) Sdn Bhd 1979 Manufacturing 5,300,000 2,454,000 46.0
Related Companies (<20%)
Year of Paid-up capital Cost of % held by
No. Name of company incorporation Industrial sector (RM) investment (RM) PSDC
26 Permodalan Nasional Berhad 1969 Others 751,012,180 250,000 0.0
27 Sy. Gabungan Pembalak Perak Sdn Bhd 1984 Logging n.a 1 0.0
28 Koko (M) Sdn Bhd 1987 Manufacturing 17,750,000 950,000 5.4
29 Oswar Plantations Sdn Bhd 1981 Investment 5,100,000 612,000 12.0
30 Sy. Pelancungan Pangkor Laut Sdn Bhd 1985 Tourism 6,512,300 651,000 10.0
31 Pernida Sdn Bhd 1975 Trading 2,000,000 250,000 12.5
32 Hume Industries Sdn Bhd 1961 Manufacturing 214,463,211 1,080 0.0
Source: Collated from Perak State Development Corporation (1989). Studies ofCompames UnderPKNP,pp.12-13 (unpub.)
had gradually moved away from direct involvement in manufacturing and instead
extended its efforts into creating a better and more conducive environment for
manufacturing industrialisation to flourish. This is evident from the commitment and
attention given by the PSDC to the development of industrial estates presented in the
preceding section. Another observation is the change in sectoral attention given by the
PSDC in its capitalist role in the economy. Out of the twelve new enterprises established
in the post-1980 period 42% were in the tertiary sector comprising management services,
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investment, and tourism, indicating the state's effort to expand the economic contribution
from these sectors.
In the development of state enterprises in Perak, another changing trend was also present
in terms of ownership. The capitalisation of the enterprises incorporated by the PSDC in
the 1970s comprised a mixture of wholly owned enterprises, as subsidiaries, associates,
or related enterprises, suggesting that their ownership by the state can vary between total
ownership or a modest equity. This trend did not seem to continue as those state
enterprises incorporated in the post-1980 period consisted of commercial arrangements
with a growing participation of and collaboration with private capitalists.
The 1980s had seen an increase in the number of state enterprises, however, later,
towards the end of the decade, there was a reduction as well as diversification into
various other sectors. The 1990s also saw an additional dimension in which privatisation
of state enterprises had taken place, a development trend that we shall examine in the
next section.
8.6 Privatisation of state agencies
Privatisation is an economic development approach which is part of the federal
government's programme of economic liberalisation and deregulation. It began to take
place in Malaysia in the 1980s.55 This approach was largely an attempt to counter the
macroeconomic problems that the country was facing during that time, which came about
55It officially started when the Prime Minister announced the 'Malaysia Incorporated' concept as a national
policy in 1983.
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as a result of the government's increased direct involvement in the economy,56
particularly in executing NEP-related projects since 1970. Another factor that contributed
to the problem was the global recession in the early 1980s that created growing public
sector deficit and necessitated extensive domestic and external borrowings.57 Basically
government revenue could not keep pace with the expenditure, which, in turn, prompted
the necessary change in policy. The federal government's change in direction from
public-sector-led to private-sector-finance in economic development required all the
states in Malaysia to follow, and Perak was no exception. This section will examine the
changes that took place in Perak as a result of this policy change.
As outlined by the federal government, the privatisation policy entails a number of major
objectives:59 first, to relieve the government from the undertaking and maintenance of a
constantly expanding network of services and investment in infrastructure; second, to
promote competition, improve efficiency and increase productivity; third, to stimulate
private entrepreneurship and investment in order to accelerate economic growth; fourth,
to reduce the size and presence of the public sector, along with its monopolistic
tendencies and bureaucratic support of the economy; and fifth, to contribute towards
meeting the objectives of the NEP.60 Privatisation in the context of Malaysia is
56The Malaysian public sector grew from 29% of GNP in the 1970 to 58% in 1991. [Yaacob et. al.,
'Contracting for Private Provisions of Infrastructure: The Malaysian Experience' in Harinder Kohli et. al.
(eds.) (1997). Choices for Efficient Private Provision ofInfrastructure in East Asia, Washington D.C: The
World Bank, p.43]
"Malaysia's external debt quadrupled between 1980 and 1985. [Ibid.; see also Tull, M. and Reveley, J.
(2001). Privatisation ofPorts: A Malaysian Case Study, Working Paper No. 182, School of Economics,
Murdoch University, January, p.l 1]
58This policy was initially guided by the Guidelines on Privatisation (EPU, Malaysia, 1985) and later
strengthened by Privatisation Masterplan (Malaysia, 1991b).
59See EPU, Malaysia (1985). Guidelines onPrivatisation, Kuala Lumpur: Prime Minister's Department.
60Apart from these objectives, Hamdan was also of theopinion thatit wasnotthe question of the success of
privatisation programme that was the main issue but rather had the state awarded those projects to the right
people and the level ofMalay participation in it (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
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multifaceted and is not limited to the simple sale of state enterprises alone, but also
encompasses the privately financed development ofnew services and facilities. Although
privatisation was first directed towards the provision of major infrastructure projects in
the country such as highways and telecommunications, those in the construction,
manufacturing, and transportation sectors then promptly followed. During the period of
1983 to September 1997 a total of416 major projects were privatised inMalaysia.
Privatisation which involves the contractual anangement between the public and private
sectors inMalaysia comprised at least one of the following methods: outright sale of state
entities; corporatisation; management contract; build-operate-transfer (BOT); or build-
operate-own-transfer (BOOT). In each of these privatisation methods, the contracts
would either involve time-bound leasing, 20- to 30-year concessions, a combination of
leasing and concessions, contracting out the management of state entities, or some kind
ofpurchase agreements, as in the case of power-generation privatised projects.62 Equally
important is that privatised projects in Malaysia need not necessarily originate from the
public sector; project proposals are also encouraged from the private sector, and in most
cases the initiators were accorded exclusive rights in undertaking the projects once
approved by the government.
61Kasim b. Md Mansur (2000). 'The Role of Government in Economic Development: The Malaysian
Experience', Ph.D Thesis, University ofWisconsin-Milwaukee, p.327. Acontradiction appears in the total
number ofprivatised projects as the list released by the Federal government during the 1998 United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO) general assembly, as a response to accusations ofpolitical cronyism, only
revealed 257 projects, see The New Strait Times, June 21 &22, 1998.
62For some brief information on theworking of these privatisation agreements, seeYaacob, Naidu andLee,
'Malaysia: The Transition to Privatisation' inAshoka Mody (ed.)(1997). The Untold Story: Infrastructure
Strategies In East Asia, Washington D.C.: Economic Development Institute, The World Bank; Salleh,
Ismail Muhd, 'Privatization: The Malaysian Experience' in Hisashi Yokohama and Mokhtar Tamin
(eds)(1991). The Malaysian Economy in Transition, Tokyo: Institute ofDeveloping Economies.
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With the new policy in place, the changes that took place in Perak came from two
fronts;63 the first comprised national privatisation projects and the second were projects
sanctioned solely within the jurisdiction and primarily to the benefit of the state itself.
Some of the general features for federal-approved privatisation projects are that the
proposed development would also involve other states, such as highway projects or
telecommunications, or major projects beyond the experience of the state such as port
development, or specific development on land already alienated for the federal
government such as the construction of federal government office complexes. As clearly
stated in the main objectives, infrastructural development was at the forefront of the
privatisation programmes where prior development was entirely financed by the public
sector. Although the implementation of the policy effectively started in 1986, there were
only three federal privatisation projects that involved Perak before 1990; the others were
in the post-1990 period.64 By 1998, at least 14 of the economic sub-sectors had been
privatised, as shown in Table 8.6.1, along with the respective recipients of the projects;
these, however, were limited to nationwide projects that have a direct impact on the state
economy either through their activities or services, which in most cases were distributed
very widely in Perak, such as those ofthe health services and utilities.
During the 1985-1998 period there were 11 state-specific projects approved by the
federal government in Perak (see Table 8.6.2). Comparatively, the total number of
projects was small and represents only about 3% ofthe total 416 privatised projects that
63Privatisation programmes undertakenwas the government's way of transferring entrepreneurial role back
to the private sector (Ahmad, interview in October, 2002).
64The first was the North-SouthExpressway project, carriedout to link Thailand in the north and Singapore
in the south of Malaysia and passing through Perak, which was awarded in 1988, and the other two,
specifically for the state, were the privatisation of Ipoh Water Supply and Larut Matang Water Supply
schemes, both awarded in 1989.
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Table 8.6.1 Federal privatised projects in Perak, 1998
Sub-sector Recipient/s
Highway PLUS Berhad
Telecommunications Telekom Malaysia Berhad
Power Tenaga Nasional Berhad
Railway KTM Berhad
Airline Malaysian Airline System Berhad
Airport services Malaysian Airport Berhad
Postal services Pos Malaysia Berhad
Sewerage services Indah Water Consortium Sdn Bhd
Health services Remedi Pharmaceutical Sdn Bhd
Tongkah Medivest Sdn Bhd
Fomema Sdn Bhd
Vehicle inspection Puspakom Sdn Bhd
Urban development UDA Holdings Berhad
Felcra Felcra Berhad
Risda (commercial activities) Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Getah Berhad
Waste disposal Kualiti Alam Sdn Bhd
Sources: Collated from Naidu (1995) in
Yahya, and Naidu (1997), Appendix Table;
Kasim b. Md Mansur (2000), Appendix C, p.403; Yaacob,
, p.53; TheNew Straits Times, June 21 & 22,1998.
Table 8.6.2 Perak: Federal privatised projects, 1998
Projects Recipient/developer Districts)
Ipoh Water Supply Intan Utilities Berhad Kinta
Larut Matang Water Supply GSL Water Sdn Bhd Larut Matang
Lumut Maritime Terminal Lumut Maritime Terminal Sdn Bhd Manjung
Segari Power Plant Segari Energy Ventures Sdn Bhd Manjung
Janamanjung Power Plant TNB Janamanjung Sdn Bhd Manjung
UDA Greentown Development Faeiz Corporation Sdn Bhd Kinta
Pasir Bogak Rest House Exxa Sdn Bhd Manjung
Ipoh Police Headquarters TH Universal Sdn Bhd Kinta
Ipoh-Lumut Highway Silex Sdn Bhd Kinta/ Perak Tengah/ Manjung
West Coast Highway Konsortium LPB Sdn Bhd Larut Matang/ Manjung/
Perak Tengah/Hilir Perak
Naval Dockyard PSC-Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd Manjung
Sources: Collated from Naidu (1995) in Kasim b. Md Mansur (2000), Appendix C, p.403; Yahya, Yaacob, and Naidu (1997),
Appendix Table, p.53; TheNew Straits Times, June 21 & 22,1998; TheNew Straits Times, January 05, 1998
have been federal-approved nationwide.65 Apart from the privatisation project in Larut
Matang, which was the corporatisation of the state water supply division, and the two
proposed privatised highways, which run across various districts, the other privatised
projects were restricted only to the districts of Kinta and Manjung. Manjung secured a
65The percentage is about4% if totalprivatised projects are takenas 257, see fn. 51.
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port project and two power plants, major projects that potentially would benefit the
district in employment generation and were also capable of creating significant economic
multiplier effects.
Privatisation programmes were carried out at a much greater pace at the state level
compared to those sanctioned by the federal government. These projects, comprising
those initiated by the state as well as by private capitalists, were within the jurisdiction of
the state authorities. One of the salient factors which explains the large number of
privatised projects at state-level was that the key requirement in physical development
activities (i.e. land availability) was under the purview of each individual state.66 With
this advantage there were two ways in which privatised project development in the state
was carried out. First, outright privatisation i.e. where project development approval
would be granted by the state and then the whole project executed by private capitalists
for which all the necessary related costs and land premiums were paid to the state
government; and second, where the execution of approved privatised projects involved
the state government, through its agencies, as a joint-venture partner for which state land
in certain cases, became the share contribution in the partnership scheme. Although
direct state participation, apart from granting project approval, in a logical sense, should
not constitute real 'privatisation', these projects, however, were still regarded as part of
the privatisation programme by the state. By 1998 there were 55 projects carried out
under this programme encompassing the various sectors of industrial, mixed, and
However, Hamdan was of the opinion that land approvals for economic development purposes was not
fast enough and represented a major stumbling block among entrepreneurs (Hamdan, interview in October,
2002).
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Table 8.6.3 Perak: State privatised project s by sector, 1998
Sector Project Recipient/Developer District
Industrial Bandar Proton Proton City Dev. Corp. Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
development Sungai Perangin Industrial Zone Bemam Industrial Estate Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
Bidor Industrial Township Trisilco Perak Development Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
Tambun Industrial Zone PYP Sdn Bhd Kinta
Tungxen Industnal Zone Tungxen Development Sdn Bhd Kinta
Kuala Kangsar SMI Industrial Zone MIELSdnBhd Kuala Kangsar
Seri Iskandar Technology Park Palmshine Development Sdn Bhd Perak Tengah
Kampung Acheh Industrial Zone Lumut Maritime Terminal Manjung
Manjung SMI Zone Syarikat Kar Sin Dev. Sdn Bhd Manjung
Marine Construction and Services Penang Shipbuilding & Const. Sdn Bhd Manjung
Kamunting III Industrial Zone Paku Rimba Sdn Bhd Larut Matang
Bagan Serai Housing and Industrial Golden Hope Development Sdn Bhd Kerian
Development
Dennistown Industrial Zone Constant Skyline Sdn Bhd Kerian
Lembah Beriah Industrial Zone EMKAY Sdn Bhd Kerian
Mixed
development Diamond Creeks Country Resort Golden Approach Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
Behrang New Township Behrang Properties Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
Tapah New Township Permodalan Perak Berhad Batang Padang
Sungai Samak Housing Estate Samak Bestari Sdn Bhd Batang Padang
Greentown New Township IZIN Development Sdn Bhd Kinta
Tronoh Water Sports Complex Lembayung Sukma Sdn Bhd Kinta
Kinta Highland Development Rimba Raya Sdn Bhd Kinta
Tasik Perdana Town Centre Syarikat Maju Perak Berhad Kinta
Seri Iskandar Township SIDEC Sdn Bhd Perak Tengah
Bagan Datoh Coastal Development Innovest Sdn Bhd Hilir Perak
Taiping Villa Development Taiping Villa Development Sdn Bhd Larut Matang
Bukit Merah Housing Development Segi Objektif (M) Sdn Bhd Kerian
Desa Manjung Raya AN Bagas Dev. (Perak) Sdn Bhd Manjung
Lekir Coastal Development Project Desa Kilat Sdn Bhd Manjung
Housing Project Constant Skyline Sdn Bhd Kerian
Kampar New Township Syarikat Batu Sinar Sdn Bhd Kinta
Lumut Park Lumut Pant Resort Manjung
Taman Seri Raia Gopeng Berhad Kinta
Housing Project Kris Properties Sdn Bhd Kinta
Housing Project Arab Malaysian Corporation Bhd Larut Matang
Setia Putera New Township Semi Sensasi Sdn Bhd Kuala Kangsar
Housing Project II Arab Malaysian Corporation Bhd Larut Matang
Alor Bakung Integrated Development Syarikat Maju Perak Bhd Hilir Perak
Commercial Medan Gopeng Commercial Complex Megoplex Medan Gopeng Kinta
development Tapak Ekspo - Galari Ipoh Siivertage Galieria/PKNP Kinta
Ipoh Metro Township Intan Payung Sdn Bhd Kinta
Ipoh Pulai Township Golden Dragon Sdn Bhd Kinta
Teluk Intan New Township Bukit Mewah Development Sdn Bhd Hilir Perak
Lot 1160 Taiping Bakti Wangi Sdn Bhd / MPT Larut Matang
Cyber Town, Ipoh Cyberland Sdn Bhd Kinta
Commercial Centre Chin Development Sdn Bhd Kinta
Tourism Pulau Pangkor Redevelopment Project Seri Koleksi Sdn Bhd Manjung
Sunway City Kinta Valley Resort / Bandar Sunway Kinta
Gua Tempurung Development Project Heritage Acres Sdn Bhd Kinta
Tasek Chenderoh Development Project Land & General Hulu Perak
Lumut Waterfront Mustlka Resort Sdn Bhd Manjung
Damai Laut Country Resort Damai Laut Resort Sdn Bhd Manjung
Golf Resort Clear Water Sanctuary Golf Sdn Bhd Kinta
Golf Resort Data Elegance Sdn Bhd Hulu Perak
Special Asean Medical College Suci Teguh Holdings Sdn Bhd Kinta
projects Institut Teknologi Petronas Petronas Property Mgt Serv. Sdn Bhd Perak Tengah
Source: Collated from EPU, Perak (1999a). Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998, Ipoh, pp.90-7
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commercial development, tourism, and special projects (see Table 8.6.3 above).
Together with federal-approved projects mentioned earlier there were a total of 66 Perak-
specific privatised projects.
The demographic distribution of the state-level privatisation projects does not show any
significant spatial shift in the development trends (see Table 8.6.4). Kinta remained the
most important district where the concentration of 19 privatised projects was approved.
Manjung made considerable progress in attracting privatised projects; not only did the
district manage to attract 9 privatised projects in various economic sectors, it was also the
largest recipient of the federal-approved privatised projects. For Batang Padang, although
it received only 7 privatised projects up to 1998, which were limited to the industrial and
mixed development sectors, the proposed privatised development of Bandar Proton
(Proton City), a new automotive hub for the country, was expected to create huge
economic spin-offs for the district and the adjacent state of Selangor. The other districts
managed to attract between 2 to 5 proposed privatised projects during the period.
Table 8.6.4 Perak: Approved privatised projects b> district up to 1998
District Projects RM million District Projects RM million
Kinta 19 6,865 Larut Matang 5 556
Batang Padang 7 14,804 Kerian 5 2,565
Kuala Kangsar 2 892 Hulu Perak 2 641
Perak Tengah 3 10,000 Hilir Perak 3 20,131
Manjung 9 7,901 Total 55 64,355
Sources: Tables 8.6.2 & 8.6.3; EPU, Perak (1999a). Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998,
Ipoh, pp.90-7.
Table 8.6.4 also shows that the approved state-level privatised projects in Perak were
expected to generate RM64.355 billion of investment. The distribution of these projects
in terms of value was in the reverse order i.e. districts with a small number of privatised
67The list is limitedto thoseprojects in excess ofRMl million each.
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projects approved received the highest amount of investment, such as Perak Tengah and
Hilir Perak. The total investment figure seems, on the surface, to have been a tremendous
achievement for the state privatisation programme; however, the reality was not as
promising. Looking back at the approved privatised projects in Perak, as listed in both
Tables 8.6.2 and 8.6.3, a number of project failures can be observed by 2000, some of
the major ones as listed in Table 8.6.5 below. The failure of these projects was principally
a result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the inability of the project recipients to raise
sufficient funds, or in some cases, objections from landowners against acquiring their
land for these projects. Even as of 2006, the two highway projects, for example, have not
materialised;69 Tronoh Water Sports Complex was scaled down considerably, the Kinta
Highland Development, a 400-hectare highland agricultural scheme, has not seen much
progress, and the remainder of the projects only saw either a delayed or scaled down
implementation. When the failed projects are taken into consideration in assessing the
achievement of the privatisation programme in Perak as a whole in the pre-2000 period,
state-level privatisation at best only achieved less than 40% of the intended plan in terms
of investment.70
Table 8.6.5 Perak: Failed privatised projects, 2000
Project RM million Project RM million
Ipoh-Lumut Highway 1,200 Seri Iskandar Township 9,000
West Coast Highway 3,000 Bagan Datoh Coastal Development 20,000
Tapah New Township 1,400 Setia Putera New Township 780
Tronoh Water Sports Complex 1,000 Sunway City 830
Kinta Highland Development 2,500 Gua Tempurung Dev. Project 500
Total 40,210
Source: Figures from EPU, Perak (1999a). Buku Perangkaan UtamaNegeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998, Ipoh, pp.90-7.
68Project failures denote projects that either did not take-off at all, were delayed, or later scaled-down in
their implementation.
69The failure to construct the Ipoh-Lumut highway was due to the focus of the concession owner on
projects located somewhere else and not in Perak (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
70.Calculated from Tables 8.6.4 and 8.6.5.
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When the federal and other state governments were actively downsizing the public sector,
as one of the objectives under the privatisation programme, Perak did not achieve
significant success. Up to the year 2000, except for the privatisation of the state's two
water supply departments mentioned earlier, the privatisation of only four state
enterprises, which comprised Gopeng Berhad, Perak Hanjoong Simen Sdn Bhd, Zen
Concrete Sdn Bhd, and Anakku Corporation Berhad, by any account, had no impact in
reducing the size of the state public sector because all along they were run like private
organisations.71 A more reliable explanation, at least for the first three state enterprises,
is that they were privatised via the direct transfer of assets in the attempt by the state to
increase bumiputera participation in the commercial sector, as advocated under the NEP.
The privatisation of these companies resulted in the state losing its 'anchor cash cow'
compames, which were principal organisations in their respective business sectors in the
state.72 Ironically, these enterprises were transferred to a single recipient, which, in a way,
defeated the capacity-building intentions of bumiputera participation in the economy.
The privatisation of the fourth enterprise was strictly a commercial decision by the PSDC
to reorganise its portfolios.73 Forother state enterprises in Perak, their non-privatisation
was mainly due to their poor performances which failed to attract private capitalists or, in
some cases, due to political reasons such as the failed attempt to privatise the whole state
agriculture arm, the PSADC, in the early 1990s.
7IFor the state's share in these companies, see Table 8.5.4 in Section 8.5.
72Gopeng Berhad had extensive land bank reserve and later ventured into infrastructure development and
construction; Perak Hanjoong Simen Sdn Bhd and Zen Concrete Sdn Bhd were the main producers for
cement and cement-related products respectively.
73The state's involvement in Anakku Corporation Berhad, a company that specialises in baby products,
started in the early 1990s.
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Privatisation in Perak had created an important shift in the respective roles of the public
and private sectors in the economy. The partnership in the public-private sectors, as a
result of the privatisation programme, can be shown to have benefited the state
development programmes overall. This is because provision of infrastructure and
facilities had been accelerated, coverage of services extended, and, for the state
government, the ability to leverage its resources, particularly from the fiscal point of
view, was increased. But this programme had its flaws too, particularly in meeting all the
five objectives of the privatisation programme, as mentioned earlier in this section. The
most conspicuous was the failure to reduce the size and presence of the state public
sector, although its monopolistic tendencies and bureaucratic support were evidently
decreasing if one takes into account the fact that the overall number of privatised projects
being implemented had declined. The achievement of privatisation in contributing
towards meeting the NEP objectives, however, cannot be deemed a total success. On
the one hand, it had managed to create a new breed of entrepreneurs, as evidenced by the
good mix ofproject recipients, mainly bumiputera, in state privatisation programmes; but
on the other hand the privatisation of state enterprises to the bumiputera community, as
originally planned in the NEP, was insignificant. However, it was privatisation that
played an important part in invigorating the economic environment that further attracted
new investment into the state, which will be examined in the next section.
8.7 Investment in the 'new' economy
In 1980, Perak was one of the four west coast states, including Selangor, Johor and
Penang that contributed more than 80% of Malaysia's manufacturing output, despite
74Conceptually, privatisation is acknowledged being a good approach, however, the implementation had
been poor (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
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having a total population aggregate of only 43%.75 The contribution from Perak was
made possible by the active government policy of providing the necessary infrastructure.
Further emphasis was evident when from 1981 to 2000 the public sector spent a total of
RMl 1.4 billion in developing Perak, including RM6.3 billion (55.1%) in the economic
sector, while the social, security, and state admimstrative sectors each spent RM3.2
billion (27.9%), RM1.5 billion (13.3%), and RM0.4 billion (3.7%) respectively.76
Slightly more than half of the state budget had been channelled towards economic
development in this 20-year period. Although the development of industrial estates and
the privatisation of projects had assisted the acceleration of Perak's economic
development, it was also made possible and intensified by the availability of both private
internal and external funds. This section focuses on the development of private
investment, both internal and external, in the industrial sector (the 'new' economy) in
Perak during the 1980 to 2000 period.
The momentum created towards manufacturing industrialisation in Perak before 1980,
and in particular during the 1976 to 1980 period as presented in section 6.8, and the
aggressive industrial infrastructure development, especially industrial estates, had created
an appealing environment for investment in the industrial sector, apart from the financial
incentives offered by both state and federal governments and the relatively cheap labour
available then. This can be shown during the period 1976 to 1980, in which the average
number of industrial projects approved was about 35 a year, but increased to about 47
projects annually during the 1980 to 2000 period (see Table 8.7.1). Since these are
75Hamilton(1990),p.l3.
76Calculated from Table 8.3.1 in Section 8.3.
"Calculated from Table 6.8.5 in Section 6.8.
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averages, there were instances where the annual changes were large. The most obvious
change was in 1987, when the number of approved industrial projects plummeted to only
12, the second lowest number not only during the period under discussion but since
1970.78 In fact, the start of the decline can be traced back to 1985 when the world










1980 34 16.1 26.0 14.8 57.0 86.7 143.7
1981 46 87.4 98.7 56.5 242.5 512.6 755.1
1982 32 12.3 24.4 6.8 43.5 58.4 101.9
1983 33 15.1 12.2 7.3 34.6 52.0 86.5
1984 62 54.2 63.5 20.5 138.2 224.2 362.3
1985 46 30.2 29.7 24.5 84.4 142.6 227.0
1986 32 31.1 25.4 17.2 73.7 82.9 156.5
1987 12 1.0 7.9 7.4 16.3 17.2 33.5
1988 43 11.6 54.9 46.1 112.6 102.6 215.2
1989 37 7.5 33.6 67.4 108.4 186.7 295.1
1990 68 52.5 55.1 264.1 371.6 505.7 877.3
1991 74 472.4 313.8 541.6 1,327.8 2,678.1 4,006.0
1992 50 121.1 24.8 859.7 1,005.6 3,388.2 4,393.8
1993 44 55.2 72.4 77.9 205.5 783.9 989.4
1994 57 38.9 64.9 78.2 182.0 272.6 454.5
1995 65 123.3 122.2 135.9 381.4 514.1 895.5
1996 43 41.7 59.9 46.9 148.5 646.6 795.1
1997 50 28.1 86.2 85.0 199.3 384.9 584.2
1998 52 51.4 78.4 78.8 208.5 302.4 511.0
1999 56 43.9 38.9 31.4 114.2 1,178.0 1,292.3
2000 57 388.6 690.5 529.3 1,608.4 1,450.1 3,058.5
Total 993 1,683.3 1,983.4 2,997.2 6,663.9 13,570.6 20,234.5
Source: Collated from PSDC (2002b). Sistem Maklumat Kelulusan Projek MIDA, Lapuran Statistik Kelulusan Projeck Mengikut
Tahun, p.20 (unpub.).
Note: Slight variation in figures exists due to rounding up from the original source.
economy was beginning to decelerate and reached its lowest point in 1987 before
rebounding; the influence it had on industrial investment is clearly demonstrated in
Perak. However, improvement and subsequent development in the Malaysian economy
78The lowest was 17 in 1971,see Table 6.8.4 in Section6.8.
325
saw a continuous growth when industrial investment projects approved in Perak reached
their height in 1991 with 74 projects. In contrary to the situation in 1987, the 1997
regional financial crisis in Asia which resulted in Malaysia enforcing capital control on
foreign investors and currency-pegging did not seem to have lessened the interest in
industrial investment in the state;79 the number of industrial projects submitted and
approved hovered in the 50s during this trying economic period, demonstrating the
continuing interest of investors.
While the number of approved projects provides us with some kind of measurement of
the progress in industrial project investment, the other equally relevant measure is the
average volume of investment. Comparatively, during the 1971-1980 period average
on
industrial investment in Perak was about RMl 51 million a year; but the average figure
based on approved industrial investment during the 1980 to 2000 period stood at about
RM964 million a year, more than a six-fold increase per year compared to the pre-1980s.
While the average number of projects approved had only increased by about 30% per
year in the post-1980 period as compared to the previous period, the large increase in
total investment in the latter clearly indicates that there was a shift in the industrialisation
focus to capital- and technology-intensive against labour-intensive activities.
Another observation is that out of the total approved industrial investment in the final two
decades, RM3,254.1 million (16%) were approved in the 1980s and RM16,980.3 million
(84%) were approved in the 1990s. The 1980s therefore can be seen to be the transition
period when capital- and technology-intensive industrialisation, as mentioned above,
79In 2000 capital control on outgoing foreign funds and currency-pegging were still in operation in
Malaysia.
80Calculated from Table 6.8.4 in Section 6.8.
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began to take place in Perak. The decade of the 1990s was also when the NDP was in
operation which saw more emphasis giventowards industrialisation throughout the whole
nation. Privatisation, as discussed in the preceding section, was also an important factor
which helps explain the large increase in the 1990s.
The tremendous increase in the volume of industrial investment in Perak, however, did
not result in a drastic change in terms of percentage distribution in total equity
participation from both local and foreign investors. The 58% local and 42% foreign
equity in the pre-1980 period81 had only changed slightly in the 1980 to 2000 period
when local equity participation had decreased to 55% and a reciprocal increase in foreign
participation to 45%.82 The percentage ratio of the local-foreign equity participation
shows that both played an almost equally important role in contributing towards the
success of industrial investment in Perak; and within the local investment sector the
participation from the bumiputera community represented about 25% while the non-
bumiputera about 30% of investment equity.
The positivechanges in the increased numberof approved projects and investment values
in the post-1980 period in Perak were also accompanied by the shift in the character of
industrial development. By number of approved industrial projects the food-
manufacturing industry, which was the most popular industry in the pre-1980s, had lost
its lead and was only the fifth most important industry in the 1980 to 2000 period (see
Table 8.7.2); it was replaced by the electrical and electronics industry which became the
8lCalculated from Table 6.8.5 in Section 6.8.
82Calculated from Table 8.7.1.
83See Table 6.8.3 in Section 6.8. Direct comparison with the pre-1980 period in all industrial sectors is not
possiblesince the mode of categorisationof industries wasnot the same.
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largest sector in Perak, involving 161 projects, followed by industries producing non-
metallic mineral products (129 projects), rubber products (102 projects), and textiles (98
projects). Comparing the industries by the amount of total investment, the petroleum-
based industry emerged as the largest with RM4.06 billion in total investment, followed
closely by electrical and electronics (RM3.96 billion) and the non-metallic product
industry (RM3.92 billion). The textile industry, which had been an important economic
contributor in the 1970s, continued its presence in the 1980s and 1990s with about RM1.4
billion of approved investment. The large investment also sigmfies the move to high
technology production. The remaining industries, although smaller in approved numbers
and amount of investment, remained as important economic contributors, partly for the
revenue and partly for their contribution to a broad and diversified industrial base.
Table 8.7.2 also reveals that there seems to be some modest variation in the industrial
focus in terms of equity participation among the investor groups over the 1980 to 2000
period. Foreign equity participation was largest in the petroleum-related industry
followed by the electrical and electronics industry. The bumiputera equities were more
heavily invested in the non-metallic mineral industry followed by the electrical and
electronics industries, while non-bumiputera involvement was in the reverse order to that
of the bumiputera. If the level of technology involved is attached to these three most
important industries, then within them the general assertion would be that foreign equity
participation was largely focused on high-technology industries, the non-bumiputera on
medium-level and the bumiputera involvement more heavily concentrated on lower-level
technology industries.
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Food 74 44.8 66.0 57.5 323.9 492.3
Beverages and tobacco 15 43.4 27.5 55.3 114.3 240.5
Textiles 98 21.4 36.2 163.6 1,168.4 1,389.6
Leather 9 0.2 3.9 9.1 10.6 23.8
Wood 30 63.8 88.0 32.6 344.3 528.8
Furniture & Fixtures 22 4.1 27.9 19.4 66.8 118.2
Paper, printing & pub. 35 57.5 67.6 73.5 344.8 543.3
Chemical 52 40.6 56.3 66.7 235.7 399.3
Petroleum refineries/prod. 4 0.9 2.2 810.0 3,242.2 4,055.3
Rubber products 102 69.9 125.0 87.6 489.4 772.0
Plastic 65 33.9 39.7 27.9 188.7 290.1
Non-metallic mineral prod. 129 474.5 352.0 407.3 2,686.3 3,920.1
Basic metal 39 211.6 250.0 251.6 1,712.6 2,425.7
Fabricated metal products 35 16.2 33.5 34.4 105.9 190.1
Machinery 33 15.5 22.6 98.9 164.6 301.6
Electrical & electronics 161 434.9 744.6 741.7 2,039.9 3,961.1
Transport equipment 57 147.2 29.7 18.7 269.1 464.6
Scientific equipment 5 0.6 1.7 5.2 8.7 16.2
Others 28 2.0 9.2 36.3 54.3 101.8
Total 993 1,683.3 1,983.4 2,997.2 13,570.6 20,234.5
Source: PSDC (2002b). Sistem Maklumat Kelulusan Projek MIDA,
Note: Slight variation in figures exists due to rounding up from the
LapuranStatistikMengikut Jenis Industri, p.l6b (unpub.).
original source.
In foreign direct investment during the period, the total contribution stood at RM10.18
billion, which represents 50.3% of the total approved investment of RM20.23 billion in
Perak (see Tables 8.7.2 and 8.7.3). European countries contributed about 47% of the
foreign direct investment, Asia 42%, and the balance of 11% comprised countries from
other continents. Europeans and Asians represent the most important investor groups for
the state during the period. By individual country, in terms of number of projects
approved during the period, Taiwan (138 projects) was the largest investor followed by
Japan (102 projects), Singapore (72 projects), and Hong Kong (55 projects); and in terms
of total investment France was the largest single investor with RM4.08 billions worth of
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Africa (South) 1 2.0 7.2 9.2
Asean Countries 1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Australia 16 15.7 17.5 33.3
Belgium 1 1.6 0.8 2.4
Canada 8 24.6 111.4 136.0
China 8 9.7 5.9 15.7
Denmark 5 55.8 133.7 189.4
Finland 1 1.5 1.0 2.5
France 10 819.9 3,258.9 4,078.8
Germany (West) 13 20.4 52.7 73.1
Greece 1 1.2 0.9 2.1
Hong Kong 55 163.3 210.3 373.6
Indonesia 6 41.2 31.7 72.9
India 11 9.0 28.2 37.2
Italy 3 18.1 5.0 23.1
Japan 102 399.8 1,031.9 1,431.7
Korea (South) 17 128.6 679.5 808.1
Netherlands 2 6.9 3.3 10.2
Norway 4 5.3 11.4 16.7
Philippines 3 1.1 3.3 4.5
Pakistan 1 15.0 30.7 45.7
Singapore 72 456.8 298.4 755.2
Sri Lanka 2 0.3 1.5 1.8
Slovenia 1 2.3 0.0 2.3
Sweden 5 9.6 17.2 26.8
Switzerland 6 70.9 70.6 141.5
Thailand 4 16.7 0.9 17.6
Taiwan 138 328.3 332.9 661.2
United Arab Emirates 1 8.7 10.2 18.9
United Kingdom 31 59.9 101.5 161.3
USA 30 106.0 143.2 249.3
Virgin Islands 2 4.5 7.3 11.8
Yugoslavia 1 0.6 1.4 2.0
Others 37 134.9 456.0 590.9
Unknown 55 56.7 112.2 168.9
Total 2,997.2 7,178.8 10,175.9
Source: Collated from PSDC (2002c). Sistem Maklumat Kelulusan Projek MIDA, Ringkasan Maklumat
Pelaburan Asing, p. 19b (unpub.).
Note: Slight variation in figures exists due to rounding up from the original source.
investment, then followed by Japan (RM1.43 billion), South Korea (RM0.81 billion), and
Singapore (RM0.76 billion). The approved project investment for French investors alone
accounted for 40.1% ofthe total foreign direct investment in Perak during the period.
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In promoting the 'new' economy in the state, Perak requires both a large number of
projects and a large total investment. In the case of France, for example, the high total
investment, with only ten approved projects, suggest that these were generally large in
nature utilising high-technology production processes. On the other hand, a large number
of projects are also important; for example, Taiwan was not only the highest investor in
high-technology industries but it also implemented a large number of projects offering
significant employment opportunities for the Perak work force.
A further comment can also be made on the ownership status of these approved projects
(see Table 8.7.4). From the total of 993 projects, joint-ownership comprising local
investors, bumiputera and non-bumiputera accounted for 242 projects (24.4%), followed
by those involving joint-ownership between local (bumiputera and non-bumiputera) and
foreign investors totalling 220 projects (22.1%), and then projects solely funded by
foreign investors totalling 188 (18.9%). Based on the number of approved projects
wholly owned by individual investor groups, non-Malaysians comprised the largest
investor group (188 projects), followed by non-bumiputera (131 projects) and
bumiputera (26 projects).
A similar trend could also be detected with regard to equity ownership of approved
industrial projects by individual investor groups. The largest investor group also
comprised foreigners (RM1.66 billion); it was followed by bumiputera (RM175.5
million) and then non-bumiputera (RM138.5 million). Among the local investors, when
84See Section 8.10 for the shift in labourpatternsduringthe 1980 to 2000 period.
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26 175.5 0 0 88.2 263.8
131 0 138.5 0 299.1 437.6
188 0 0 1,655.2 4,679.1 6,334.3
242 328.9 486.1 0 1,679.8 2,494.8
64 264.6 0.07* 158.6 1,227.3 1,650.6
107 4.9* 110.3 199.5 353.0 667.7
220 909.4 1,248.5 983.9 5,173.6 8,315.3
15 0 0 0 70.4 70.4
993 1,683.3 1,983.4 2,997.2 13,570.6 20,234.5
Source: PSDC (2002d). SistemMaklumat Kelulusan ProjekMIDA, Lapuran StatistikMengikut Status
Pemilikan, p.l5b (unpub.).
Note: Slight variation in figures exists due to rounding up from the original source.
* Due to the minute equity shares of the respective investor group in these projects, the source had
categorisedthe ownershipstatusas bumiputera and foreign,and non-bumiputera and foreign.
comparing both the number of approved industrial projects solely for the individual
investor group and the amount of equity investment, it demonstrates that bumiputera
investors had a much higher average equity investment per project (RM6.8 million)
against the non-bumiputera (RM1.1 million). While the majority of the non-bumiputera
equity investments were most likely from individual investors, it is, however, uncertain
where the investment for the bumiputera group originated although it seems that a large
part would come from institutional investors, such as state and federal agencies, investing
on behalf of the bumiputera community.85 Table 8.7.4 also reveals that the bumiputera-
foreign partnerships represented a much larger share in total investment (RMl.7 billion)
compared to the non-bumiputera-foxQ\&\ partnerships (RM0.7 billion), although the latter
had significantly more in the number of approved projects (107 projects), compared to
the former (64 projects). These comparative figures point to at least two developments:
first, that the nature of projects in the bumiputera-ioxQign partnerships were of large
scale, capital-intensive, and involved high-technology processes; and second, it confirms
the active participation of government-linked institutional investors as a proxy for the
85No further detailed breakdown of the bumiputera and non-bumiputera investment is available.
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bumiputera as the capacity to do so by most of the individual bumiputera investors86 was
known to be limited during the period.
The interest shown by both local and foreign investors in Perak's industrialisation has
been demonstrated in the number of approved projects and the respective total investment
proposed. These projects, upon realisation, should increase the economic performance of
the state, particularly in improving revenue generation and creating new employment
opportunities. The growing population from 1.74 million people in 1980 to 2.13 million
in 2000 clearly requires new jobs to cater for new entrants into the labour market.
This is apart from jobs needed for laid-off employees as a result of the closing down or
downsizing of manufacturing operations in certain industrial companies. On the revenue
side, the availability of these projects had improved the income of the state substantially.
Excluding federal grants, the annual average revenue for Perak had increased from
RM74.0 million in the 1970-1979 period to RM221.7 million during the 1980-2000
period. However, despite all the successes presented, the actual achievement of the state
up to 2000 shows a much lower attainment, a matter that is often not publicised by state
administrators and politicians.
As shown in Table 8.7.5 below, as of the year 2000, out of the total 993 approved
industrial projects in Perak, only 581 (58.5%) were actually operating commercially. If
the projects under production trial-run, machinery assembly, and site acquisition were
8Hamdan, however, emphasised that raising capital was not an issue for the individual bumiputera
investors but rather what to do with those capital (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
87See Table 8.2.2 in Section 8.2.
88See Section 8.10 forthechanging labour pattern in thepost-1980 period.
89Calculated from Figure 8.9.1 in Section 8.9and Appendix 4.
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Table 8.7.5 Perak: Industrial project status and investment, 1980-2000 (RM millions)






Commercial production 581 925.3 1,115.4 1,222.4 4,236.7 7,499.8
Production trial run 15 8.6 5.7 3.3 53.3 70.8
Machinery assembly 21 8.8 26.1 39.1 344.7 418.6
Site acquisition 16 180.0 196.1 206.3 1,674.1 2,256.4
Planning stage 155 214.6 250.8 316.0 2,101.5 2,882.9
On temporary hold 28 41.4 71.4 60.6 283.8 457.2
Takeover by others 1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.0
License revoked 71 92.4 99.1 922.8 3,777.6 4,891.9
No progress 18 16.4 14.5 27.6 108.7 167.2
Shutdown/closed 38 78.9 91.1 97.4 532.9 800.2
Dissolved/abandoned 49 116.9 113.0 101.8 456.9 788.6
Total 993 1,683.3 1,983.4 2,997.2 13,570.6 20,234.5
Source: PSDC (2002e). Sistem Maklumat Kelulusan Projek MIDA, Lapuran Statistik Projek & Pelaburan, p.2 lb (unpub.).
Note: Slight variation in figures exists due to rounding up from the original source.
categorised as 'active' projects, then it can be construed that in 2000 only a total of 633
projects (63.8%) had been implemented in Perak. Out of the remaining 360 projects
(36.2%), a total of 273 (27.5%) comprised those projects still in the planning stage, on
temporary hold, as taken over by others, as having their license revoked, or as making no
progress at all; in addition 38 (3.8%) projects that were in commercial production had
ceased operations largely due to financial difficulties and competition; and a total of 49
(4.9%) ofthe projects had been dissolved or abandoned due to various reasons.
When based on 'active' projects as expressed above, the total investment in Perak during
the 1980 to 2000 period stands at RM10.25 billion, representing only about half (50.7%)
of the expected total investment of RM20.23 billion. In equity investment, the
bumiputera and non-bumiputera each had only invested about two-thirds of their
intended investment90 while the foreign investors only 49.1% of the approved equity
investment. Taking into account that on average 47.1% of the total loan during the 1980
90The bumiputera andnon-bumiputera equity investment stood at 66.7% and67.7% respectively.
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to 2000 period was from local origins,91 foreign loans utilised for implemented industrial
projects stood at about RM3.34 billion; and together with foreign equity of RMl.47
billion the total for foreign direct investment in Perak for the 1980 to 2000 period
actually stood at about RM4.81 billion, less than half (47.3%) of the proposed industrial
investment of RM10.18 billion.92 For local investors, the actual investment only totalled
RM5.44 billion, slightly more than half (54.1%) of the proposed industrial investment of
RM10.06 billion.
Therefore, during the 1980 to 2000 period, Perak had been reasonably successful in
transforming its economic base to the 'new' economy, as shown by the large increase in
state revenues. Initiatives undertaken by the state had seen a commendable growth in
industrial investment. But despite these successes, almost half (49.3% or RM9.98 billion)
of the approved industrial project investment had not taken off as planned. The growth of
industrial investment in Perak during the period also shows the reliance of the state on
foreign direct investment because local capital was insufficient to support extensive
growth. Based on this trend, future industrial growth for Perak inevitably has to rely on
the capability of the state to attract more foreign investment. Within the sphere of
industrial investment, the trend clearly shows that the concentration was largely focused
in the field of electrical and electronic goods, non-metallic mineral production, and
rubber products. Although other industries had also seen some progress, allowing too
much concentration on a limited number of industries could also prove disadvantageous
in the long run, as the colonial history of the state has shown in its reliance on a limited
91Calculated from Tables 8.7.3 and 8.7.5.
92SeeTable 8.7.3.
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number of primary products. Diversification of investment within the manufacturing
sphere remains an important consideration for Perak.
While the growth of investment in the manufacturing industries in the 1980 to 2000
period has helped a great deal in the overall economic development of Perak, there is also
the need to examine the development of the service sector, which partly supports the
industrial development already discussed and also expands the economy into new
activities. The development of this sector during the same period will be considered in
the next section.
8.8 Intensification of the service sector
So far the considerable progress in the secondary sector in Perak during the 1980 to 2000
period has been demonstrated. The shift in the economic focus, as planned by both the
federal and state governments, to move away from dependence on primary commodities
to industrialisation has been emphasised. On the part of Perak, the provision of new
economic policies and the roles played in establishing the appropriate basic infrastructure
and environment helped the shift to occur. However, these changes occurred only with
the existence and expansion of the third sector i.e. the service sector. It was also a part of
the state's strategic planning to encourage the expansion of this sector in the 'new'
93
economy.
93The emphasis to expand the service sector has been anessential part of theNEP. However, from 1970,
service sector expansion was heavily focused on those activities carried out by the government. It is only
in the post-1980 period that participation from the private sector has been encouraged by the government,
which, in turn, has contributed to service sector growth, see Perak (1981), p.73.
336
The need to promote and expand the service sector in the Perak economy during the post-
1980 period was based on at least two rationales. First, progress in the expansion of the
state secondary sector required the service sector also to expand in order to support its
activities without which business operation cycles would be disrupted. This is particularly
relevant in such service sub-sectors as transportation, utilities, government services,
trade, and finance. Second, the expansion of service industries into new activities could
offer an additional source of revenue for the state, apart from increasing the
competitiveness of the industry; for example, since the early 1990s the state has begun to
focus on such activities as tourism, education, and health.94 In addition, privatisation of
some of the government bodies such as those involved in telecommunications, energy
and water supplies helped expedite the service sector expansion process.
The growth of the service sector in Perak can be illustrated by examining its contribution
to state GDP and also the growth in employment during the post-1980 period. In terms
of GDP, the service sector improved its contribution from 38.4% in 1980 to 43.8% in
1990, and in 2000 the contribution stood at 47.7%.95 Within the service sector itself, the
annual growth rate of 6.2% over the two decades proved to be a significant development
for the state (see Table 8.8.1). Except for utilities and government services, which had
shown slower annual growth rate in the 1990s, all the other sub-sectors had shown
continuous growth through the 1980s and 1990s. For the utilities sub-sector, although the
annual growth was faster in the 1980s as compared to the 1990s, the overall two-decade
annual growth shows that it represented the fastest growing sub-sector with an annual
growth rate of 11.5%. This large growth was attributed, in part, to the efforts by the
94It was the state's intentionof turning Ipoh into a healthcare city (Ahmad, interviewin October, 2002).
95Calculated from Tables 8.8.1 and 8.9.1; see also Table 8.9.2.
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government, both federal and state, in providing basic access to clean water and
electricity throughout the state, in particular to the rural areas as part of the rural
development programmes. The other important contributory factor was the privatisation
and corporatisation of utilities which then saw development of new independent power
plants and water treatment facilities to meet the growing demand.96 The privatisation of
some ofthe government services too resulted in the reduced GDP contribution to the state
in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Implementation responsibilities, which were under
the state purview during the earlier period, were transferred to the private sector.
Table 8.8.1 Perak: Service sector GDP contn bution, 1980-2000 (in 1978 prices)
Industry origin 1980 1990 2000 Annual growth rate (%)
RM mil. RM mil. RM mil. 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Utilities 54 173 479 12.3 10.7 11.5
Transport, storage and
communications 212 375 709 5.9 6.6 6.2
Wholesale and retail trade, and
restaurants and hotel 519 771 1630 4.0 7.8 5.9
Finance, insurance, real estate
and business services 456 742 1512 5.0 7.4 6.2
Government services 504 903 1462 6.0 4.9 5.5
Other services 71 108 235 4.3 8.1 6.2
Total 1815 3071 6027 5.4 7.0 6.2
Sources: EPU, Perak (2002c). Address to international participants of Diplomatic Training Course, October 21, Ipoh, p.19 (unpub.);
EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri Perak 1980-1985, p.36; EPU, Malaysia (1996). Pro/ail Negeri Perak, Prime Minister's
Department, Table 2 (unpub.); htrp://www.perak.gov.my/english/ecol.html (12/09/2002).
Within the service sector, segregation can also be made in terms of ownership. The
government obviously owned government services; and the utility sub-sector, although
privatised, still had a 'substantial' government stake. The other sub-sectors as presented
in Table 8.8.1 were, by and large, owned by private bodies. The intensification of the
service sector in Perak was therefore mainly driven by private capital which saw
96For utility privatisation projects involving Perak, seeTables 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 in Section 8.6.
97The government stake in these companies takes the form of a large shareholding or a minority
shareholding, but with special clauses giving veto power to decide policies.
98There was state participation in these sub-sectors, particularly via state agencies and enterprises such as
those undertaken by PSDC. However, their participation was small when compared to the whole industry.
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opportunities created by the positive development in the secondary sector. The
opportunities available saw annual growth rates of between 5.5%-6.2% in these sub-
sectors over the 1980 to 2000 period.
The growth of the service sector can also be seen as the expansion of employment. In
terms of percentage annual growth rates, the overall employment growth experienced by
Perak was not as substantial as that of the GDP contribution, but the growth of labour in
the sub-sectors was an important indicator of the state's capability of providing enhanced
job opportunities. Between 1980 and 2000, the labour strength in the service sector has
increased by about 129,900, expanding at 2.2% annually, with a much faster growth in
the decade of the 1980s as compared to the 1990s (see table 8.8.2). The overall decrease
of a third in annual growth during the 1990s can be attributed partly to the late recovery
from the global economic slowdown and crises in the late 1980s; and again in the late
1990s when another wave of economic crises, this time in Asia, led to a much lower
annual growth rate for the whole decade. These crises also forced the service industry, as
a whole, to reassess its efficiency and productivity, and at the same time exercise caution
in expanding its labour force. In the utilities industry, for example, the capacity to
increase efficiency along with the utilisation of modern physical infrastructure did not
warrant any major increase in labour in the 1990s; the reduction of almost a thousand in
the labour force, when compared to the earlier decade, is evidence of this. It is also
possible that the slower overall labour growth in the service sector in the 1990s was the
result of maximum capacity attained by some of the sub-sectors or the consolidation of
some of them due to the economic changes and demand. This is particularly evident for
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the finance and insurance sub-sectors where amalgamation and consolidation99 forced
them to either 'down-size' or 'right-size' their operations.
Table 8.8.2 Perak: Service sector labour distribul ion, 1980 - 2000
Industry origin 1980 1990 2000 Annual growth rate (%)
('000) fOOO) (•000) 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Utilities 1.7 5.5 4.6 12.5 -1.8 5.1
Wholesale and retail trade, and
restaurants and hotels 72.3 131.4 142.9 6.2 0.8 3.5
Transport, storage and communication 18.7 23.9 28.9 2.5 1.9 2.2
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services 7.6 21.9 22.8 11.2 0.4 5.7
Community, social and personal
services 112.3 99.9 166.4 -1.2 5.2 2.0
Others (inadequately described or
unknown) 23.1 44.5 * 6.8 n.a n.a
Total 235.7 327.1 365.6 3.3 1.1 2.2
Sources: Perak (1981). RancanganMalaysia Keempat NegeriPerak 1981-1985, Table 4-10, p.79; EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri
Perak 1980-1985, p.25; Department of Statistics, Malaysia (1991). Population Report for Administrative Districts, Table 8.2, p.354;
Department of Statistics Malaysia (2000). State/District Data BankMalaysia, Table 8.6, p.252.
Note: * This figure has been included under community, social and personal services.
The decrease in labour growth in the service sector in the 1990s could have been more
substantial had the state not promoted new service sub-sectors such as tourism100 and
tertiary education.1°1 The contribution interms of labour growth bythese two sub-sectors
may not have been large for the decade, but it was at least capable of mitigating the
decreasing labour growth rate in the 1990s.
The intensification of the service sector in Perak during the post-1980 period indicates
that its expansion was dependent primarily on the development of the secondary sector.
"This was largely the result of the federal government's attempt in the 1990s to broadenthe capitalbase of
these compames to face global competition.
I00Stronger emphasis to promote tourism was more prevalent from the 1990s when RM533.3 million was
allocated under the 6MP and a further RM287.7 million under the 7MP to upgrade tourism-related
infrastructure and products in the state. [EPU, Perak (1991a), pp.16-7; EPU, Perak (1995a), pp. 73-77]
101Excluding public institutions, the private institutions of higher learning in Perak alone numbered 38 in
2003 of which most began operating between 1997 to 2000. [see Mohammed Halib (2003). 'Developing
Perak's Third Sector In Tandem With The Rapidly Modernising State and National Economy', seminar
paper presentedat The PerakEconomic Summit, Ipoh, 8-9 September 2003, p.3] At the end of 1999 a total
of4 universities either main or branch campuses, both public and private, were operating in Perak. The first
to be established was the branch campus of Universiti Sains Malaysia in 1989. [EPU, Perak (1991a), p.18;
EPU, Perak (1999b), p.33]
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Although attempts have been made to further accelerate the expansion of the service
sector itself by taking advantage of the state's natural attractions and diversified cultures
to promote tourism, and also the initiatives to promote the state as an educational hub, the
result, at least up to 2000, had not been particularly successful. While more time is
probably needed to allow for these sub-sectors to evolve, more effort is clearly needed to
realise the full potential of these new sub-sectors.
8.9 Sectoral contributions to state revenue
The continuous efforts undertaken by Perak to shift its economic dependence from tin
and rubber to a more diversified economy since independence have taken on greater
energy in the post-1980s period. The post-independence changing economic landscape
presented from Chapter 6 demonstrates that Perak has undergone significant economic
modernisation, attempting to combine both the aspirations as advocated in the NEP and
NDP, and at the same time addressing global economic changes. These changes have
obviously resulted in changes in the respective sectoral contributions to the economy -
the prime reason for the economic diversification strategy by the state in the first place.
This section will examine the extent of these changes during the post-1980 period.
First of all, examining changes in land use distribution, as depicted in Table 8.9.1 below,
shows some significant shifts in the economic sectors as compared to the earlier
period.102 Agriculture, which represented 22.2% of the land in the state in 1974, had
increased to 32.1% in 2000, apparently signifying the continuing importance of this
102Although this section deals with the post-1980 period, figures for 1974 were used in the table for
comparative purposes, as those for the late 1970sor the 1980sare not available.This is evident when state
official statistical documents in the 1980s still use the 1974 figures, e.g. EPU, Perak (1986a), p.39.
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sector to Perak. This large increase in land utilisation in the agricultural sector was
mainly the result of extensive expansion in the plantation sector particularly in oil pahn
cultivation. On the other hand, the increase in the proportion of urban or industrial land in
the state during the same period saw only minimal change, hovering at 0.8% since 1974,
until there was a slight increase to 1% from the second half of the 1990s. The increase in
both agricultural and urban/industrial areas saw the reduction of forest areas from 61.3%
of total state land in 1974 to only about 47% in 2000. Interpreting these data alone, the
assumption would be that the state economy is still very dependent on agriculture, as in
previous eras. However, the reality is far from that. Although the changes in land
Table 8.9.1 Perak: Changes in land use distribution 1974-2000,
selected years (%)
Land use category 1974 1992 1997 2000
Agriculture 22.2 26.4 30.1 32.1
Urban/Industry 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0
Forest 61.3 48.8 46.9 47.0
Others* 15.7 24.0 22.0 19.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Wong (1974). ThePresent Land Use ofPeninsular Malaysia, Vol. 1, Ministry of Agriculture,
pp.394-5; EPU, Perak (1993). BankData Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, March, p.l; EPU, Perak (1998J.
Buku Perangkaan Utama Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan 1998, Table 2.4, p.14; EPU, Perak (2000).
Briefing Note on Economic Development ofPerak State, p.4 (unpub.); EPU, Perak (2002c). Address to
International Participants ofDiplomatic Training Course,21 Oct 2002, p.4 (unpub.).
Note: * Include mining land.
distribution were mostly the result of agricultural expansion, the contribution towards the
state economy was gradually overtaken by urban and industrial activities, despite the
marginal increase in land use for this category since 1974. It was within this latter land
category that expansion in the secondary and tertiary sectors was mainly located.
The changes that took place in the various sectoral contributions to the state economy can
further be demonstrated by the changes in the state GDP during the post-1980 period (see
Table 8.9.2). Within two decades, the GDP of Perak had increased by more than two-
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and-a-half times from RM4,725 million in 1980 to RM12,638 million in 2000, with a
faster annual growth of 6.1% in the 1990s compared to the 4% annual growth in the
1980s. Comparing the three main economic sectors, the secondary sector experienced the
largest annual growth at 8.2% followed by the tertiary (6.2%) and primary (1.1%) sectors
during the post-1980 period. This is significantly in contrast to the situation of the
previous decades when the primary sector was the largest contributor to state GDP,
during the period when rubber and tin were the mainstays of Perak's economy. 103
Table 8.9.2 Perak: Gross Domestic Product by industry of origin, 1980-2000
( in 1978 prices)
Sector 1980 1990 2000 Annual growth rate (%)
RM mil. RM mil. RM mil. 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Primary sector 2,061 2,361 2,542 1.4 0.7 1.1
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 1,307 1,991 2,435 4.3 2.0 3.2
Mining and quarrying 754 370 107 -6.9 -11.7 -9.3
Secondary sector 849 1,584 4,069 6.4 9.9 8.2
Manufacturing 663 1,383 3,664 7.6 10.2 8.9
Construction 186 201 405 0.8 7.3 4.0
Tertiary sector* 1,815 3,071 6,027 5.4 7.0 6.2
Total 4,725 7,017 12,638 4.0 6.1 5.0
Sources: EPU, Perak (1986a). StatistikNegeri Perak 1980-1985, p.36; EPU,Malaysia (1996). Profail Negeri Perak, Table 2 (unpub.);
bttp://www.perak.gov.my/english/ecol.html (12/09/2002); EPU, Perak (1991a). Taktimat Pembangunan Negeri PerakDarul Ridzuan,
14 March 1991, p.6 (unpub.); EPU, Perak (2002c). Address to InternationalParticipants ofDiplomatic Training Course, 21
October 2002, p.5 (unpub.); EPU, Perak (2002a). PembangunanEkonomidan IndustriNegeri Perak, Seminar Sasaran Kerja Tahun
2002/2003, p.5 (unpub.).
Note: * For detailed breakdown of this sector, see Table 8.8.1 in Section 8.8
Examining the growth of the sub-sectors within the primary sector, it is evident that,
despite the large increase in agricultural land use during the two decades as shown in
Table 8.9.1, the annual growth rate in GDP was minimal; in fact, this sub-sector
witnessed a significant decline in the 1990s compared to the earlier decade from 4.3% to
2.0%. The mining and quarrying sub-sector performed even worse with consistently
larger negative annual growth rates throughout the period, which only confirmed the
decline in importance of tin mining in particular. In the secondary sector, manufacturing,
which increased in importance from the 1960s, made even more progress in the post-
103In 1970 the primary sectorrepresented 49.3% of the state GDP. [EPU, Perak(1986a) p.36]
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1980 period, with an annual growth rate of 7.6% in the 1980s and 10.2% in the 1990s.
The construction sub-sector, however, did not perform favourably in the 1980s with only
0.8% annual growth rate, though it recovered significantly in the 1990s with an annual
growth rate of 7.3%. This was largely attributed to the privatisation of infrastructure
projects. As for the tertiary sector, its growth shows a commendable contribution to the
state economy as has been discussed in the previous section (particularly with reference
to Table 8.8.1).
The data clearly indicate the shift in sectoral contributions; the changes can be presented
in terms of the percentage composition of the GDP (see Table 8.9.3). The reduction in
the primary sector is evident in that within the period it decreased by more than half from
43.6% in 1980 to 20.1% in 2000. On the other hand, the secondary sector increased by
almost double from 18% in 1980 to 32.2% in 2000. For the tertiary sector, the rapid
increase in the secondary sector had mainly encouraged the expansion of service
industries which saw an expansion from 38.4% to 47.7% during the same period.
As GDP measures the output produced by factors of production in the respective
economic sectors, the changes and the intensity of GDP growth in Perak obviously
suggest that sectoral contributions in terms of revenue would also change in relation to
changes in the composition of GDP i.e. the tertiary (service) sector would be the largest
revenue contributor to the state in the post-1980 period. However, a specific breakdown
of state revenue according to the economic sectors is not available. Broad revenue trends
do indicate that the changing economic structure did produce positive movements during
theperiod (see Figure 8.9.1).104 It hasto be mentioned that the total state revenues were
For detailed statistics on the annual state revenues and expenses from 1957 to 2000, see Appendix 8.
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Table 8.9.3 Perak: GDP structure by percentage proportions (%),
1980-2C 00
Sector 1980 1990 2000
Primary sector 43.6 33.6 20.1
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 27.7 28.4 19.3
Mining and quarrying 16.0 5.3 0.8
Secondary sector 18.0 22.6 32.2
Manufacturing 14.0 19.7 29.0
Construction 3.9 2.9 3.2
Tertiary sector 38.4 43.8 47.7
Public Utilities 1.1 2.5 3.8
Transport, storage and communication 4.5 5.3 5.6
Wholesale and retail trade, and
restaurants and hotels 11.0 11.0 12.9
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services 9.7 10.6 12.0
Government services 10.7 12.9 11.6
Other services 1.5 1.5 1.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Calculated from Table 8.9.2; EPU, Perak (1998). Buku Perangkaan Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan,
Table 5.2, p.36.
also made up of federal grants; these annual grants, however, were generally small
compared to the revenues raised within the state, except from 1980 to 1983 when the
grants were almost equal to the internal state revenues.1 5 Figure 8.9.1 also shows that
the federal grants, in most years, fall within the RM0-RM100 million category, a
contrasting trend when compared to the internal state revenues. In the decade of the
1980s, the 4% overall state GDP growth had witnessed an upward trend in state revenues,
generating between RM100 million to RM200 million annually. This trend continued in
the early 1990s, and assisted by the global economic boom towards the middle of that
decade, the internal revenue for Perak breached the RM200 million mark per year and
reached its height in 1997. It then generated revenue of RM459.52 million before facing
the impact of the Asian financial crisis. The crisis resulted in a declining trend in state
revenues to RM326.53 million in 2000. Based on the annual revenues raised within the
The revenue figures for 1987 in Figure 8.9.1 have been interpolated due to unavailability.
105From 1980 to 2000 the federal grants represented an average of 35.1% of Perak's total revenues.
[calculated from Appendix 8]
345
state (see Figure 8.9.1), and the changing GDP structure for the same period, the assertion
is that the state had managed to spread its revenue generation across a broader economic
base with emphasis shifting to both the secondary and tertiary sectors. The changes are
also expressed in a changing labour pattern, which will be examined in the next section.
600
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Figure 8.9.1 Perak: State revenues 1980-2000
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8.10 The changing labour pattern in the various sectors of the economy
In terms of population growth, the state witnessed a slowing down in the annual growth
rate from 1.56% during the 1957 to 1980 period106 to only 1.01% per year from 1980 to
2000;107 translated into an actual population count the early period showed a total
increase of about 522,300 people while the latter an increase of about 386,445 people.
Although there was a slowing down in population growth in the latter period, it was the
population born during the former which provided the main labour force component in
the 1980 to 2000 period; it was this group that largely contributed to new additions to the
,06Calculated from Table 6.7.1 in Section 6.7.
""Calculated from Table 8.10.1.
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labour force.
As depicted in Table 8.10.1 below, the growth of the active labour force was faster in the
1980s compared to the 1990s. With an average labour force participation rate of about
62%o of the working-age population, there was a total of 127,815 new entrants in the
active labour force during the 1980 to 1991 period against a falling figure of only 71,111
during the 1991 to 2000 period. In total, there were 198,926 additional people who
entered the workforce during these two decades. With the changing economic structure
that saw the decline in the primary sector and the reluctance of the younger generation to
become involved in agriculture, labour moved into other sectors or migrated
elsewhere.108 Along with the new entrants into the labour market, the competition for
jobs became much stiffer, and failure to secure appropriate employment resulted in
movement to other states.
Table 8.10.1 Perak: Labour force participai ion rate, 191(0-2000
1980 1991 2000
Population 1,743,655 1,995,319 2,130,100
Labour force aged 15-64 969,593 1,144,135 1,307,881
Labour force participation rate (%) 62.7 63.6 59.8
Total labour force 608,340 727,669 782,113
Unemployment rate (%) 7.7 5.3 2.8
Unemployed labour force 47,112 38,566 21,899
Active labour force 561,288 689,103 760,214
Sources: EPU, Perak (1991c), Perangkaan Asas Negeri Perak, p.9; Department of Statistics Malaysia (1991).
Population Report for Administrative Districts,Table 8.2, p.354; EPU, Perak (1998). BukuPerangkaan Utama
Negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan, Table3.6, p.24; EPU, Perak (2002a). BriefingNote on Economic Development
ofPerak State, p.9 (unpub.); Department of Statistics Malaysia (2000). State/District Data Bank, pp. 1, 18,
247.
For the state, the policy of expanding the secondary and the tertiary sectors helped
provide the much-needed work for the growing labour force. Manufacturing industry,
108If the statecannot retain the youngpeople to work in Perak, the older generationwill follow (Hamdan,
interview in October, 2002).
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which expanded in the 1980s, created considerable work opportunities in this sub-sector.
It was estimated that, if all the approved industrial development projects for the state
were to be implemented as planned, the state would be able to provide almost 130,000
jobs in this sector alone (see Table 8.10.2). However, as indicated by the industrial
project status in Section 8.7, only about 63.8% of these projects were actually
implemented bythe year 2000.109 Broadly taking this percentage to also represent labour
requirements, then the manufacturing sub-sector was only able to provide some 82,300
jobs.110 The failure of the state and the industrial investors to pursue the implementation
of the approved projects or to substitute with other viable industrial projects
hypothetically caused a loss of almost 46,700 job opportunities for the labour force in
Perak during the period. Although it was certainly a setback, it was the growth of this
sector which helped significantly to reduce the state unemployment rate from 7.7% in
1980to2.8%in2000.m









1980 34 2,485 1991 74 13,359
1981 46 6,319 1992 50 4,844
1982 32 1,812 1993 44 5,794
1983 33 3,140 1994 57 5,424
1984 62 3,806 1995 65 10,151
1985 46 3,034 1996 43 3,697
1986 32 3,635 1997 50 4,537
1987 12 1,424 1998 52 4,837
1988 43 9,338 1999 56 7,165
1989 37 11,305 2000 57 9,240
1990 68 13,606 Total 993 128,952
Source: Collated from PSDC (2002b). SistemMaklumat Kelulusan ProjekMIDA, Lapuran Statistik
Kelulusan Projek Mengikut Tahun, p.20 (unpub.).
Calculated from Table 8.7.5 in Section 8.7.109
110,These numbers were limited to those new projects that had required approval from the state and federal




On a state macro-level, the changing labour pattern in all sectors of the economy in the
post-1980 period can be illustrated in Tables 8.10.3 and 8.10.4. As the state's economic
structure shifted, the composition of the labour force followed suit. In the primary sector
the labour force decreased from 241,300 in 1980 to 156,600 in 2000, or a reduction of
more than a third (35.1%). The overall decline in this sector which showed a negative
labour annual growth of 2.1% during the two decades was the result of firstly, the decline
in the tin mining industry and the movement of labour towards the secondary sector,
with a small portion moving towards market gardening, particularly in the Kinta area, as
documented earlier.113
Secondly, in the agriculture sub-sector there was a large reduction in the labour force in
Table 8.10.3 Perak: Labour distribution, 1980-2000
Sector 1980 1990 2000
(•000) % ('000) % ('000) %
Primary 241.3 42.3 199.1 29.1 156.6 20.6
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 215.3 37.7 186.1 27.2 152.8 20.1
Mining and quarrying 26.0 4.6 13.0 1.9 3.8 0.5
Secondary 94.8 16.6 158.0 23.1 238.0 31.3
Manufacturing 67.8 11.9 119.7 17.5 181.7 23.9
Construction 27.0 4.7 38.3 5.6 56.3 7.4
Tertiary 235.7 41.1 327.1 47.8 365.6 48.1
Utilities 1.7 0.3 5.5 0.8 4.6 0.6
Wholesale and retail trade, and
restaurants and hotels 72.3 12.6 131.4 19.2 142.9 18.8
Transport, storage and communication 18.7 3.3 23.9 3.5 28.9 3.8
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services 7.6 1.3 21.9 3.2 22.8 3.0
Community, social and personal services 112.3 19.6 99.9 14.6 166.4 21.9
Others* 23.1 4.0 44.5 6.5 ** **
Total 571.8 100.0 684.2 100.0 760.2 100.0
Sources: Perak (1981). Rancangan Malaysia Keempat Negeri Perak 1981-1985, Table 4-10, p.79; EPU, Perak (1986a). Statistik
Negeri Perak 1980-1985, p.25; Department of Statistics, Malaysia (1991). Population Reportfor Administrative Districts, Table
8.2, p.354; Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2000). State/District Data Bank, Table 8.6, p.252.
Note: * Inadequately described or unknown.
** These figures have been included under community, social and personal services.
112See Table 7.4.1. Tm mining labour in Perak had declined from 23,821 in 1980 to only 999 in 2000.
113See Table 7.4.3 in Section 7.4.
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rubber plantation industry. In 1961 there were 391 estates, in 1980, 258 were in
operation, which then decreased to 206 in 1990, and by 2000 there were only 84 rubber
estates still operating in Perak.114 This saw thetotal labour force reduced from 19,553 in
1980 to only 2,832 in 2000.115 While it can be suggested that themovement into oil palm
cultivation could have caused the decline of labour in the rubber industry116 this situation
did not seem to take place. The overall labour decline of 84,700 in the agriculture sub-
sector during the two decades does not seem to support this assertion; and this took place
when both rubber and oil palm cultivation in Perak had cumulatively increased their total
hectarage from 344,405 hectares in 1980 to 530,235 hectares in 2000.
Table 8.10.4 Perak: Labour annual growt b rate (%), 1980-200 0
Sector 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Primary -1.9 -2.4 -2.1
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
Mining and quarrying -6.7 -11.6 -9.2
Secondary 5.2 4.2 4.7
Manufacturing 5.8 4.3 5.1
Construction 3.6 3.9 3.7
Tertiary 3.3 1.1 2.2
Utilities 12.5 -1.8 5.1
Wholesale and retail trade, and restaurants
and hotels 6.2 0.8 3.5
Transport, storage and communication 2.5 1.9 2.2
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services 11.2 0.4 5.6
Community, social and personal services -1.2 5.2 2.0
Others (inadequately described or unknown) 6.8 ** **
Total 1.8 1.1 1.4
Sources: Calculated from Table 8.10.3.
Note: ** These figures have been included under community, social and personal services.
The growth in labour utilisation during the 1980 to 2000 period was greatest in the
secondary sector. The annual labour growth rate of 4.7% in the two decades saw labour
1,4Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, various years 1968-2001.
115Ibid.
u6Oil palmcultivation had increased from 90,367 hectares in 1980 to 319,086 hectares in 1999. In 1980 the
total oil palm hectarage in Perak was only 36% in size when compared to rubber cultivation, see Table
7.5.1 in Section 7.5.
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increase from 94,800 in 1980 to 238,000 in 2000, an increase of 143,200; manufacturing
saw an increase of 113,900 and the construction sub-sector increased by 29,300. The
increase in the construction sub-sector was the direct result of the intensification of
industrial project development, privatisation of government projects and the increase in
housing demands.
The intensification of industrial development in the state, both in terms of the increase in
the number of industrial estates and in investments, has been shown in the previous
sections. The increase of labour utilisation however requires further examination. In
1980, the manufacturing sub-sector utilised a total labour force of 67,800; and based on
the implementation of approved industrial projects, as indicated earlier in this section,
this sector had also provided an estimated total of about 82,300 new jobs.117 The total
labour force in this sub-sector, therefore, would have been in the region of 150,000
people. As statistical figures in 2000 show 181,700 people were employed in this sub-
sector, the difference of some 30,000 workers would either represent those in the
ancillary industries but within the manufacturing sub-sectors, or those residing in Perak
but actually working in neighbouring states. It is more likely that the latter represents a
larger portion, particularly in the 1990s, when manufacturing development in the
neighbouring states, especially those districts in Penang, Selangor, and south of Kedah,
Tin
adjacent to the Perak borders, saw tremendous growth. This circumstance also
emerged as a result of many enterprises in the state during the same period, particularly
multinational compames, reorganising their operations, which either involved relocation,
ll7Between 1980 to 1985 a total of 55 factories throughout the state ceased operation, the majority of them




or downsizing as a response to global demand and competition. The reduction of labour
also took place in the local enterprises either through shutdowns or downsizing as a result
of tough economic competition, especially in the second half of the 1990s. The improved
logistical development, such as the completion of the North-South Highway and better
transportation facilities, had also influenced the movement of workers to those districts at
the north- and south-end of the Perak border.
hi the tertiary sector, labour utilisation had grown from 235,700 in 1980 to 365,600 in
2000, an increase of 129,900 people. The net increase in this sector was close to that of
the secondary sector. Much of the increase in labour in this sector took place in the
1980s when there was expansion in many of the service industries, particularly in the
utilities and finance-related sub-sectors. The emphasis given by the state to education and
tourism in the 1990s did not result in rapid growth in employment related to sub-sectors
such as hotels and transport; this is evident by the slower labour annual growth of 1.1%
in the 1990s compared to 3.3% in the 1980s. The tertiary sector, however, became the
largest employment sector in Perak from 1990.
In examining the labour pattern in the various sectors of the economy against the increase
in GDP during the post-1980 period, some trends have emerged, as presented in Figures
8.10.1, 8.10.2, and 8.10.3. Labour utilisation in the primary sector witnessed a declining
trend despite its increased contribution to GDP. The increase in economic output against
a declining labour utilisation suggests that the use of modern technology and large-scale
operations, particularly in agriculture had, for the most part, resulted in increased
efficiency and outputs. In the secondary and tertiary sectors, the trends were almost
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identical i.e. the increase in GDP was accompanied by an increase in labour utilisation,
although the rates of growth of the sectors were not the same. The trend of labour
utilisation in Perak as a whole indicates that the total labour utilisation growth was in line
with the growth in the state's GDP (see Figure 8.10.4).








































Sources: Tables 8.9.2 and 8.10.3.

































Sources: Tables 8.9.2 and 8.10.3.
Labour force utilisation in Perak has an added dimension. While the overall labour
utilisation pattern broadly coincided with GDP growth throughout the 1980 to 2000
period, the state government's official documents indicate that the state underwent two
different stages of labour utilisation: in the 1980s the state economic environment was
initially slow in creating sufficient job opportunities for the expanding work force but had
begun to improve considerably towards the end of the period with substantial job
creation, particularly in the secondary and tertiary sectors;119 whereas the 1990s was
identified as a period when labour shortages were taking place in the state economy,
primanly m the secondary sector. However, it is contended that Perak was capable of
providing a sufficient labour force during the whole of the two decades; it was the slower
1^1growth in appropriate job creation and the mismatch between available jobs and
available labour, which appear to be the state's predicament. This resulted in the inability
to sustain an increased labour population within the state.
Perak (1981), pp.76-78A.
EPU, Perak (1995a), pp.54-57; EPU, Perak (1996;, pp.3-5.





One consequence of the failure to provide sufficient job opportunities was the movement
of labour to work in the economically faster developing districts in adjacent states while
still residing in Perak. A more senous consequence was permanent out-migration.
Although in the short term out-migration can alleviate the pressure on the state, in the
longer term it can only result in a negative impact on the local economy and, at the same
time, benefit recipient states. The phenomenon of the 'net-loss' of labour since the 1970s
persisted during the 1980 to 2000 period; however, the out-migration rate has
decreased from a high of 15.7% of the total population in 1980 to less than a percent
(0.3%) in 2000.124 Even so, the total number that has emigrated from Perak over the two
decades does represent a loss of labour resources to the state economy.
As mentioned earlier, the mismatch between available jobs and labour also seems to be a
problem faced by the state, which was also caused by out-migration. The reasons for the
mismatch cannot be determined decisively, whether it was due to inappropriate skills or
lower wages offered - all this requires further, separate in-depth research. But the
increasing presence of foreign workers in Perak to fill the gaps in labour needs is
evidence enough that job opportunities were available in the state. Although the
phenomenon of engaging foreign labour is nothing new to Perak, as witnessed during the
colonial period, it seems to have been relatively insignificant during the period of
independence until recently. Only in the 1990s had the subject of foreign labour begun to
re-emerge as a state issue,125 and the government had been indirectly encouraging it by
allowing the recruitment of foreign labour by the industries. The increase in immigration
122Perak hadlost mostof her skilledworkers dueto migration (Hamdan, interview in October, 2002).
123See fh. 106in Chapter 6; also fh. 50 in Chapter 7.
124In 2000 the total net out-migration from Perak had dropped to only 6,945 people. [Department of
Statistics, Malaysia (2001), p.24]
l25For example, seeEPU, Perak(1995a), pp.53-4.
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of foreign labour, particularly from Indonesia into Perak is on a continuous upward trend.
In 1991, for example, the total registered foreign labour working in Perak was only
6,351: the majority (39.8%) was engaged in the agricultural sub-sector; 1,345 (21.2%) in
construction; 683 (10.8%) in manufacturing; and the balance was distributed throughout
the other sub-sectors.126 At the end of 1994, Perak was reported to have 17,000 foreign
labourers of which 1,526 were in the manufacturing sector.1 7 However, in 1999 the total
foreign labour actively engaged in the state economy was reported to be 28,029 people.
Although these statistics did not indicate the precise distribution of foreign labour, it is
suggested that their participation existed in all economic sectors particularly in
agricultural, manufacturing, and the construction sectors. The rapid increase in foreign
labour not only confirms the abundance of job opportunities in the state, but also the
preference of certain segments of the available local labour to seek work elsewhere.
These numbers, however, exclude those illegal immigrants working in the state for which
the total is unknown.129 For comparative purposes, the net out-migration from Perak from
1981 to 1990 totalled 87,043.13° This figure alone far exceeded the number of registered
foreign labourers employed in the various economic sectors in 1999. If the state had
taken advantage of creating employment for the local labour market, the economic
multiplier effect would be much greater compared to foreign labour where repatriation of
funds to their home country limits the effect in Perak. Perak during the two decades
seems to have failed in matching human resources to job availability in order to optimise
returns to the state.
126Department of Statistics, Malaysia (1995), p.354.
127EPU, Perak(1995a), p.54.
128.Calculated from Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2000), p.248.
129It was estimated that the illegal immigrants in Malaysia dispersed in all states numbered between
300,000 to one million in 1998, see Azizah Kassim, 'International Migration and its Impact on Malaysia' in
M.J. Hassan (ed.) (1998). A Pacific Peace: Issues and Responses, Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, pp.273-305.
130Calculated fromEPU, Perak(1993), p.21.
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While the general changes in the overall labour pattern in various sectors have been dealt
with above, the changes in ethnic terms also deserve further examination, similar to those
given during the colonial and the 1957-1980 periods. The most drastic change occurred
within the bumiputera community (see Table 8.10.5). During the period of 1980-2000
the involvement of bumiputera in the agricultural sub-sector as a percentage of its own
total active labour population had decreased drastically from 51.3% in 1980 to 16.7% in
2000. This provides clear evidence that agriculture was no longer capable of attracting
younger workers. As a replacement, large increases were noted in the secondary and
tertiary sectors.
Table 8.10.5 Perak: Labour force distribution by sector and ethnicity, 1980-2000
(percentage)
Sector Bumiputera Chinese Indians
1980 1991 2000 1980 1991 2000 1980 1991 2000
Primary




















Mining and quarrying 2.8 0.8 0.3 6.8 0.9 0.4 3.4 1.0 0.5
Secondary 9.4 18.5 26.4 24.7 27.8 31.2 15.1 29.2 36.5
Manufacturing 7.6 15.7 22.2 16.4 17.4 18.5 11.7 24.7 30.4
Construction 1.8 2.8 4.2 8.3 10.4 12.7 3.4 4.5 6.1
Tertiary 33.0 49.8 52.9 42.2 48.1 54.1 35.5 39.4 45.5
Utilities




















Transport, storage and communication
Finance, insurance, real estate and
business services
Community, social and personal
services






































Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Appendix 7.
The involvement of bumiputera in the manufacturing sector had expanded from 7.6% in
1980 to 22.2% in 2000 or from 19,181 to 70,758 active labourers respectively. In fact,
357
1991 statistics show that the manufacturing sub-sector, which used to be dominated by
the Chinese, had received considerable numbers of bumiputera. During that year the total
bumiputera labour force in this sub-sector stood at 42,212 against the Chinese at
36,490.131 The bumiputera involvement in the construction sector underwent a minor
change from 1.8% in 1980 to 4.2% in 2000.
In the tertiary sector, significant changes within the bumiputera community occurred in
the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, as well as in community, social, and
personal services. In the former sub-sector theirparticipationhad increasedfrom 5.6% in
1980 to 11.6% in 2000, and in the latter from 24.2% to 33.2%. The large increase in the
latter was partly due to considerable recruitment in the state civil service and its agencies.
For the Chinese, a similar trend occurred i.e. there was a decrease in the primary sector
involvement replaced by an increase in the secondary and tertiary sectors. In the primary
sector, agriculture and mining sub-sectors both had decreased from 21.5% in 1980 to
11.3% in 2000, and from 6.8% to 0.4% respectively. Although no drastic changes took
place in the secondary sector, more Chinese involvement was seen in the construction
sub-sector compared to manufacturing. During the period 1980 to 2000 manufacturing
had increased by only 2.1% against the construction sub-sector which had increased by
4.4%.
Two sub-sectors within the tertiary sector displayed significant changes. The wholesale
and retail trade, restaurants and hotels sub-sector shows a remarkable increase from
131See Appendix 7.
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21.4%o in 1980 to 31.1% in 2000, a labour force increase of 16,737 Chinese. In contrast,
however, the Chinese seemed to be withdrawing from the community, social, and
personal services sub-sector which experienced a decline from 14.6% in 1980 to 11.9%
in 2000 involving a reduction of 8,641 of labour in this sub-sector.
The general trend of the Indians is analogous to the bumiputera and Chinese i.e. moving
away from the primary to other sectors. The association of Indians with estate plantation
labour and public works had waned. Among the Indian labour force, their participation
in the agricultural sub-sector had declined drastically from 42.1% in 1980 to 13.7% in
2000 or from a total workforce of35,277 to only 12,543. The significant decline had been
largely counterbalanced by the increased participation in manufacturing from 11.7% in
1980 to 30.4% in 2000. Increased participation in construction is also evident when the
participation rate had almost doubled from 3.4% in 1980 to 6.1% in 2000.
Significant changes in participation amongst the Indians in the tertiary sector were also
apparent during the period 1980 to 2000. Involvement in the wholesale and retail trade
sub-sector had increased from 9.1% in 1980 to 13.8% in 2000. On the other hand, the
transport, storage and communication sub-sector had more than doubled from 4.2% to
9.1%. Similar incremental growth can be seen in the finance sub-sector when it increased
from 1.6% to 3.4%. All these increments resulted in an additional Indian labour force of
11,499 in those sub-sectors.
Therefore, the labour utilisation pattern in Perak during 1980-2000 had changed
tremendously compared to the earlier period of 1957-1980. The primary sector failed to
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attract new available labour force. The concentration of the labour force had shifted
towards both the secondary and tertiary sectors. Along with these changes, the stigma of
attaching certain sub-sectors to a particular ethnic group had vanished. This period saw
the increased presence of all ethnic groups in all sub-sectors.
8.11 Summary and conclusion
During the 1980-2000 period Perak, in the context of national policies, adopted new
approaches towards economic development compared to previous periods. The reliance
on tin as a major revenue earner along with rubber had diminished. Diversification in the
economy as a vehicle to achieve further progress was implemented from 1957 until 1980.
However, the emphases in the post-1980 period included the secondary and service
sectors. But, despite the careful planning for the reorganisation of state economic
development via the introduction of the NEP, progress was not as encouraging as
expected. In pursuit of the 'new' economy, the state began to focus on foreign capital.
The state realised that to depend on limited local capital would only hinder economic
development. The existence of a commendable inflow of foreign direct capital in the
1970s, without any effort by the state to promote it, encouraged the state to further
intensify it. By 1980 and throughout the 1990s, encouragement of foreign direct
investment became a priority.
The policy of promoting and encouraging foreign direct investment also requires an
infrastructure for those investments. Although Perak was known for its good
infrastructural facilities in the past, these needed upgrading and new ones developed to
meet changing times and demand. Encouraging local investors to develop infrastructure
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for industrial activities did not receive a favourable response. Development was therefore
sluggish, and the state began to place more effort in its role as an investor and developer
in establishing industrial estates. In addition, only in the mid-1980s did private investors
begin to participate actively in establishing industrial estates, in partnership with state
authorities and agencies. What was initially a state crusade had then become a joint effort
in developing industrial infrastructure in Perak.
The role of the state as capitalist in Perak gradually emerged during the 1970s. The
involvement, however, was limited to expediting the economic progress of the state as
part of the NEP. Whilst the 1970s had seen the proliferation of state enterprises, the early
1980s saw even more. All these enterprises were established via the state investment arm
either through the PSDC or SADC. However, by the end of 1980s the problems faced by
these enterprises, mainly due to poor performance, forced the state to rationalise its
involvement. The 80 enterprises at the height of the programme were reduced to only 32
enterprises by the end of 1989.
Privatisation became a significant element in economic development policy in Perak in
the 1990s. Anchored by the state, it was through this mode that the state managed to
leverage its resources and at the same time saw better economic progress. The state
succeeded in shifting a major responsibility, particularly in fiscal terms, from the public
to the private sector.
The process of transforming Perak from a resourced-based to an industrial-based
economy was not however without problems. The mushrooming of industrial estates, for
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example, saw the supply far exceeding the demand. Low sales of industrial lots, except
in certain vicinities, and speculative buying by investors left the state with ample
available infrastructure but without fully used industrial space. Although it was a difficult
issue to address, surplus availability of industrial lots also meant that the state had failed
to project, monitor, and control the development of industrial estates.
The strategy of accelerating development of the secondary sector also led to the shift
from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive types of activities. This was
clearly evident during the 1980-2000 period. Although the state had spent a huge amount
of funds in developing the infrastructure in this sector, industrial activities relied
primarily on private investors. The capital needed for such activities tended to be large.
Although local private capital had made a considerable contribution (about half the total
investment in the state) during the 1980-2000 period, dependence on foreign capital
remained an important issue. In addition, the evidence that only about 50% of the total
proposed industrial investment actually took off required Perak to increase its efforts in
meeting its objectives.
In tandem with the development of the secondary sector, the service sector followed suit.
The state's focus in this sector was not only limited to supporting growth in the tertiary
sector but also the expansion into health, tourism and education. Although extensive
encouragement was given by the state to promote these sub-sectors, as far as
implementation was concerned, it was primarily driven by private capital. By 2000, the
success of these sub-sectors had yet to be realised, although progress was noticeable.
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The strong efforts undertaken during the 1980-2000 period enabled the state to spread its
revenue generation activities across a broader economic base. Along with economic
diversification the labour patterns were transformed. A drastic decline in the primary
sector and movement towards the secondary and tertiary sectors were evident. However,
although the intention was to promote the secondary and tertiary sectors, it was never
intended to neglect altogether the primary sector, particularly agriculture. But, as a result
of the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors, the primary sector failed to attract
new labour. At the same time the mismatch between labour skills and work opportunities
available forced a small section of existing labour to migrate elsewhere. On the whole,
the increase in population provided a sufficient supply of labour to the state. It was the
failure to create enough jobs, partly as a result of the failure to implement all the
proposed secondary and tertiary projects that created the excess labour in Perak.
In ethnic terms the changes in labour patterns are clear. The identification of agricultural
activities with the Malays, businesses with the Chinese, and plantations and public works
with the Indians had diminished considerably. In fact, this has been one of the major
success stories of the state in restructuring the society so that the identification of 'race'
with economic function has been reduced.
Finally, on examination of the post-independence period reveals that, although the
involvement of the state (both federal and local) in economic development has assumed
increasing importance, the modes of intervention have changed to meet changing national
needs and to address changes in the world economy. To address the problems occasioned
by uneven and unbalanced economic development during the colonial period, associated
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in turn with ethnic differences, the post-colonial state, of necessity, intervened more
decisively in economic affairs. It has achieved notable successes in promoting growth,
diversification, modernisation and ethnic balance, but, as we have seen, its successes
have been hampered with problems of reaching targets, coordinating the provision of




The present is the pinnacle of the on-going historical process. Therefore, my fundamental
assertion is that each and every occurrence has its historical basis. This statement has
been highlighted time and again by various scholars assessing diverse areas of enquiry.
At the theoretical or conceptual level, one can trace the changes from one paradigm to
another as failings and limitations are uncovered in the process of expounding social
reality. This is illustrated in the movement away from the 'modernization' school that
presumed a universal relevance for its perspectives to more critical approaches that have
focused on the dynamics of specific conditions in the context of the historical expansion
ofmarket forces and wider societal processes. It is with this awareness and understanding
of specific historical conditions and processes that I have sought to examine the
economic transformation of Perak and to ascertain the underlying forces that have given
the state its current economic form and structure.
My study of the economic transformation of Perak covering a period of approximately
200 years during three 'historical epochs' has provided the necessary time-frame to
examine and understand the complexities of the economic processes in relation to state
policies and practices and the impact of the global economy at the local level. Each
historical epoch has its own characteristics which serve the material needs of the
producers. In economic terms, the characteristics of each historical epoch that
differentiate it from others include, among others, factors and means of production,
forces of production, and the associated social relations governing the process of
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production. I have concentrated on capital, land and labour in this thesis as elements
which can be examined using the available historical, empirical and statistical materials.
The 19th century pre-colonial Malay state of Perak comprised a feudal socio-political
structure. Exemplified by an abundance of land and relatively low population, the largely
peasant economy was characterized by the dominance of use-value. Rice growing was
undertaken mainly for home consumption. The predominantly Malay peasantry was also
involved in growing other crops such as vegetables and fruits, fishing, and the collection
ofjungle produce for simple or limited exchange. Tools for agricultural production were
relatively simple and the level of technology low. The material conditions of that
historical epoch served the subsistence needs of the people. Taxes to the ruling class
were made in kind. Production was not for profit. The commoditisation of rice
cultivation only began during the colonial era. Its development altered significantly the
basis ofproduction for rice agriculture.
Apart from agricultural production Perak was also involved in trade. Trading, largely
monopolised by members of the ruling class, was primarily geared to wealth
accumulation to enhance status, prestige, and power. The Sultan, as the supreme head of
state, along with the ruling elite accumulated wealth through taxes, trade, usury, and
financing of small tin mines. It was trade that became the key feature that brought about
change and economic growth for the state. Perak's involvement in the global economy
was expedited through the founding of the Straits Settlements and the British acquisition
of Melaka from the Dutch in 1824. The 19th century also witnessed the increasing
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participation of production capital particularly from the Straits Settlements and the
increasing significance of tin export production. Towards the latter half of the century
Perak already had tin export capacity. Tin mining was carried out under the auspices of
Malay territorial chiefs through Chinese immigrant labour with capital and new
production technology from the Straits Settlements. Certainly, by 1874, the year of
British intervention, the state already had export production in place.
Perak and, later, the other Malay states in the Peninsula, experienced massive social,
political, and economic transformation under British colonial rule (1874-1957). Three
major changes took place in Perak during the colonial era. The first was the clear
distinction which was drawn between the ruler (Sultan) who became a symbolic
figurehead, and the government in the state administration. Second, overriding
prominence was given to a market-driven economy, and finally, the introduction and
implementation of the colonial land system established land as a commodity. Further
changes that took place in the state were either directly or indirectly related to these three
major developments.
Under British rule, the subsistence economy of the peasantry was gradually modified to
suit the economic structures of the new economic order governed by cash transactions
and exchange. As part of the campaign to encourage native agricultural production,
notably rice, a formidable range of policies, legislation and infrastructure was introduced.
The colonial government's assistance, however, was quite limited and lagged far behind
other economic sectors. Undoubtedly, its rice production policy was more strategic than
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economic. It was colonial policy to preserve the status quo of the Malays in rice
cultivation and to produce some, if not all of the state's staple food requirements. It was
indeed difficult to justify the policy in economic terms since the return from an acre of
rice had never been higher than an equivalent area under rubber. The interplay of these
strategic and economic forces eventually impeded the economic modernisation of the
Malays in the expanding market-driven economy.
The primary colonial objective in Perak remained the economic exploitation of tin and
rubber. These two commodities were the major pillars that supported the expansion of
the export economy. In tandem with the export sector was the development of the
secondary and tertiary industries. A substantial amount of foreign and local capital was
invested in tin mining and rubber plantations. Accompanying the rapid economic
expansion was the establishment of infrastructures to facilitate the economic process.
However, the total capital outlay in administration and infrastructures was relatively
insignificant when evaluated against the profits earned and repatriated. Taking advantage
of the opportunities created by the dynamic and expanding economy were the private
enterprises that played a notable role in the continuous growth of the economy. In the
period of more than eight decades of their rule British created the conditions and laid the
foundations for a market-oriented economy to prosper. The new administrative structures,
infrastructures, and the necessary factors of production were directed heavily to the
exploitation of natural resources. Nevertheless, Perak realised considerable economic
growth during colonial rule. This development was, however, uneven in scope and in its
consequences. Colonial strategy was oriented to an extractive rather than a developmental
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course of action. Limited attention was given to the development of heavy industries or
domestic manufacturing. The much needed multiplier effect in economic development,
therefore, was less obvious. Towards the end of colonial rule, tin and rubber began to lose
their premier positions in the world economy due to stiff competition in the global market
in terms of price and substitutes. Compounding the problem was the fast depleting tin
reserves in the state. It was evident that the dependence on the two export commodities,
limited industrial capacity, and an insufficient range of other economic activities
constituted a predicament in terms of economic adaptability, ethnic segregation and
regional inequalities. It was left to the state in independent Malaya to attempt to resolve
the economic and social contradictions generated by the uneven nature of capitalist
economic development.
The lowering of the Union Jack in 1957 marked the beginning of an independent Malaya.
Apart from inheriting the colonial bureaucratic structures and its laws, the new state also
inherited the accompanying social and economic problems created during colonial rule.
The independent government's role in transforming the economic and social structures of
the state was divided into two distinct phases. The first covers the period 1957-1969
while the second 1970-1980. The need to differentiate these two phases is due to the
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 that altered the course and role
of the state in managing the economy. During the first phase, the post-colonial
government's economic policy was merely an extension of the British legacy. In the pre-
1970 period, Perak assumed a broadly non-interventionist approach in the economy
despite significant state involvement in improving the rural economy by way of land
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development schemes. Rural development was the responsibility of the government
while the modest industrial sector was fundamentally left in private hands. The state also
began to move away from tin mining to focus its attention on local agriculture. The
introduction ofthe NEP in 1970 dramatically altered the role of the state and the direction
of the economy in the 1970-1980 period. The NEP, which came with the objective of
redistributing economic wealth and opportunities to all ethnic groups, saw a significant
increase in state intervention in the economy through direct participation in the form of
capital provision, joint ventures, and the formation of state business enterprises.
The change in economic approach during the two phases was also expressed in changes
in the industrialisation policies. Emphasis on ISI policies lasted only until the end of the
first phase. Beginning in 1970 economic policy began to emphasize EOI initiatives which
included the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors. Manufacturing became the
prime mover of the economy. The growth of industrial estates and urban-based
manufacturing was tied in with a major increase in rural-urban migration, hi Perak, the
failure to create sufficient jobs also led to the emigration of a sizeable number of workers
in search of employment.
The two different economic approaches during the 23-year period (1957-1980), were also
reflected in the investment climate in Perak. Even though the government was the largest
investor in both phases, the state experienced an increase in private capital investment by
local and foreign investors especially in the second phase. An improved distribution in
terms of the spatial location of industrial investments was also realised. The rapid
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decline in tin production in the 1970s confirmed the loss of eminence associated with the
mineral. Value-adding initiatives in kaolin, limestone, granite, and clay were emphasized
to offset some of the losses in revenue from tin. Priority was also given to manufacturing
to absorb the labour made redundant by the tin industry.
The change in approach, in due course, had an impact on the growth of the industrial
sector in Perak. However, the rather hasty and ill-conceived decisions in over
emphasizing industrial development in the former "tin districts" still led to an overly
unbalanced development in that the former tin districts received the lion's share of
industrial projects in contrast to the rather limited initiatives carried out in non-tin areas.
The development of industrial projects in the tin districts produced unexpected results.
Apart from creating new opportunities for the ex-mining labour, the move also attracted
new labour to these areas. In the move towards diversification the urban population was
better placed to benefit during the initial shift towards the manufacturing economy.
The reverse fortune experienced in the rubber industry in relation to tin was due to
smallholder involvement. The NEP-initiated rubber replanting schemes and the
encouragement to increase rural income prevented an exodus of rural population to the
urban areas. The 'growth' of rubber productivity was actually realised through a
significant loss of acreage compensated for by higher yields. However, sustaining the
largely Malay rural population into rubber cultivation constituted an ill-conceived policy
when the private estate sector had long diversified into other crops particularly oil palm.
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The state's success in crop diversification was achieved at the expense of the
smallholders.
Perak's over dependence on the primary commodities (tin and rubber) taught her the
bitter lesson ofthe vagaries and fluctuations ofglobal market demands. During the 1980-
2000 period Perak adopted new approaches towards economic development via the
introduction of the NEP. Progress, however, was not encouraging. The injection of
foreign capital became an objective. Dependence on limited local capital would only
hinder economic development. Indeed, by 1980 and throughout the 1990s foreign capital
investment became an economic priority. The promotion of foreign direct investment
came with infrastructural costs in order to attract external capital. However, the response
to infrastructural development by local investors was unfavourable. With pressure to
make the direct foreign investment policy a success, the state took on the new role of
investor and as the developer of industrial estates. Private sector involvement only began
in the mid-1980s through partnership with state authorities and agencies. The state's role
as capitalist did not end with joint ventures and partnerships with the private sector. The
proliferation of state enterprises was highly visible in the 1980s. All these business
enterprises were established via the state investment arms - the PSDC and SADC.
However, the uninspiring performance of these enterprises towards the end of 1980s
forced the state to rationalize its involvement. Operated by government bureaucrats, such
a result is not unexpected. The state government was once again forced into looking for
alternative approaches to economic development. In the 1990s, privatization became a
significant element in state economic policy. It was through privatization that the state
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managed to leverage its resources and succeeded in shifting a major fiscal responsibility
from the public to the private sector.
The transformation of Perak from a resourced-based to an industrial-based economy has
been littered with problems. The mushrooming of industrial estates created a situation of
oversupply. Low sales of industrial lots and speculative buying by investors left the state
with undersold and underutilised industrial space. The state had failed to project, monitor,
and control the development of these industrial estates. The development of the
secondary sector during the 1980-2000 period, which witnessed the shift from labour-
intensive to capital- and technology-intensive activities was also problematical. Despite
the massive injection of capital in infrastructural development, there has been continued
reliance on private investors for industrial activities. Local private capital contributed
about one-half the total investment in the state during the 1980-2000 period, and
dependence on foreign capital remained an important issue. The picture confronting the
service sector was no different. The state's promotion of the service sector generated only
a lukewarm response from the private sector. Some progress however, was noticeable by
2000.
The broad-based revenue generating activities introduced by the state in the 1980-2000
period inevitably had an impact on the pattern of labour utilisation. The most obvious
was the drastic decline in the labour force in the primary sector relative to the secondary
and tertiary sectors. The expansion of the latter sectors was attributed to the failure of the
former in attracting new labour. Added to the labour problem, albeit to a lesser degree,
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was the mismatch between labour skills and available work opportunities in the state that
have forced a segment of the labour force to migrate elsewhere in search of employment.
Again, the failure of the state to implement all proposed projects in the secondary and
tertiary sectors has led to the inability to create job opportunities. The ethnic dimension
in the distribution of labour, however, provides us with a more satisfying picture. The
stereotyping ofMalays, Chinese, and Indians with agriculture, business, and public works
and plantations respectively has diminished.
It is apparent that the state has played a critical role in shaping Perak in its economic
endeavours. More specifically, there has been an increasing level of state intervention
from the pre-colonial, through the colonial, to the post-colonial era. It is not an
understatement to note that a massive transformation of the economy in Perak occurred
during the colonial era. The British colonial administrators in their quest to extract
valuable resources for the global market laid the foundations of a capitalist economy. The
establishment of the bureaucratic structures and the implementation of the associated land
laws created the necessary conditions for the market-driven economy to take a foothold
and prosper. Economic development, however, was rather uneven at best. Economic
underdevelopment, a severely underdeveloped peasantry, and deep ethnic cleavages
along with the associated bureaucratic structures and laws were inherited by the post-
colonial state. Untangling the economic and social complexities left behind by the
colonial administrators saw a much higher degree of state intervention in the economy in
the post-colonial period. Although the involvement of the state in economic and social
development has assumed a more prominent role, the modes of intervention have
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changed to meet the changing needs of the time and the global economy. One thing for
sure is that the post-colonial state has intervened more decisively in economic affairs.
The state now even plays the role of investor and capitalist. Specifically for Perak, the
earnest drive of the state in promoting economic growth has certainly not been without its
difficulties. Among others, problems encountered by the state include the failure to meet
targets, lack of coordination in the provision of industrial infrastructures, and inbuilt
bureaucratic obstacles. The state had and will continue to exercise its role in economic
development. It is difficult to imagine how Perak would have moved beyond its colonial
economy without the involvement of the state in mobilising resources and redirecting
economic activity. Nevertheless, the state's performance will inevitably rely on the
rather delicate balancing act between meeting domestic socio-political and economic
demands and those ofthe capricious global market.
In this thesis I have attempted to capture economic patterns, trends and processes by
piecing together the available statistical and historical materials. In my view, this is the
first study which has addressed the broad sweep of Perak's economic history from the
pre-colonial to the post-colonialperiod. Fortunately access to Malaysian government and
other documents has enabled me to relate recent developments to the past. I recognise
that more could have been done in exploring archival materials and in undertaking case-
study work on current economic activities. One major task for the future is to deepen my
more macro-economic examination of the post-1980 period by gathering case-study
information on industrial estates and companies, private investment patterns and specific
state-sponsored and organised ventures. This will assist us in future attempts to chart the
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economic development and progress of Perak beyond 2000 and into the first decades of
the twenty-first century.
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Appendix 1 Perak: Estates in 1897





Shak Yin Fook & Su Kwong 125
C.R. Ephraums & J.R. Cawford 139
F.D. Osborne 320
F.J.B. Dykes & Leong Fui 337
Eng Hong Estate 191




Kampong Dew Estate 640
Sin Sun Hin Estate 1,000
Gula Estate 2,812
Kuala Kangsar Waterloo Estate (old) 230
Waterloo Estate (new) 3,063
Heywood Estate 462






Sungei Siput Estate 546
G. Elphinstone 1,000
G. Brown 1,000
Krian Sin Kong Hong Estate 832
Sin Thye Seng Estate 832
Lean Seng Huat Estate 508
Tan Kang Hok 250
Seng Guan Estate 1,520
F. Pulsford 280
Ko Huat Estate 2,119
Sin Ju Seng Estate 278
Kui Heng Estate 334
Sin Ju Seng Estate 413
Qui Moh Estate 156
Sin Ju Seng Estate 590
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Appendix 1 Perak: Estates in 1897 (continue)
District Name of estate/proprietor Acreage
Krian (continue) Guan Seng Estate 358
Sin Joo Seng Estate 1,531
Sin Seng Heng Estate 345
Cheang Hang Estate 296
Sin Soon Heng Estate 530
Sing Seng Huat Estate 770
Sin Kong Watt Estate 362
Kwang Huat Estate 553
Kwang Seng Estate 380
Hong Ju Estate 425
Sin Thye Lee Estate 945
Wong Ah Kong 800
Ban Hok Heng Estate 976
Jui Heng Estate 3,232
Hie Kee Estate 385
Heng Aik Heng Estate 787
Seng Yik Estate 316
Jin Seng Estate 388
Sin Thye Lee Estate 122
The Perak Sugar Cultivation Co. 8,554
E.H. Bratt 177
W.H. Tate 326
Kwang Lee Estate 500
Lower Perak Cecily Estate 600
Lim Kong Teow 250
Batang Padang Mssrs. Baldwin & Ford 1,000
Kong Kut Chong 150
Mr. Tait 640
Mr. Donald 640
Larut W.H. Tate 150
Yam Seng Estate 959
Grove Estate 641
T.P. Pethaperumal Chetty 250
Chan Sup Khoon 250
Lee Chin Ho 250
H.H. the Sultan 1,000
Source: Perak Government Gazette1898, Vol. XI, Taiping: Perak Government Printing Office, pp.434-5.
Note: Areas have been rounded to the nearest acre.
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Appendix 2 Perak: Arrivals and departures 1880-1902
Year Arrival Departure Net
1880 27,338 15,969 11,369
1881 32,054 23,952 8,102
1882 45,934 32,854 13,080
1883 50,153 37,941 12,212
1884 44,583 42,440 2,143
1885 49,395 41,665 7,730
1886 54,168 37,961 16,207
1887 63,312 38,391 24,921
1888 81,690 52,561 29,129
1889 72,025 58,952 13,073
1890 67,637 62,188 5,449
1891 64,293 52,417 11,876
1892 76,422 54,859 21,563
1893 93,960 61,316 32,644
1894 71,731 57,262 14,469
1895 78,652 62,688 15,964
1896 61,090 60,078 1,012
1897 50,644 52,975 -2,331
1898 49,694 47,996 1,698
1899 75,139 49,478 25,661
1900 94,728 62,904 31,824
1901 146,536 112,680 33,856
1902 278,483 247,987 30,496
3; PGG 1892, p.459; PGG
, p.525; PGG 1897, p.662;
, p. 59; PGG 1901, App. L,
Sources: PGG 1889, p.393; PGG 1890, p.498, PGG 1891, p.51
1893, p.447; PGG 1894, p.314; PGG 1895, p.365; PGG 1896,
PGG 1898, p.455; PGG 1899, App. L, p.62; PGG 1900, App. L


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4 Perak: Revenues and Expenditures 1875 -1919
Year Revenue ($) Expenditure ($) Surplus/Deficit ($}
1875 226,233 256,831 -30,598
1876 273,043 289,476 -16,433
1877 312,872 292,711 20,161
1878 322,608 291,473 31,135
1879 388,372 369,707 18,655
1880 582,496 521,995 60,501
1881 692,861 652,938 39,923
1882 905,385 918,914 -13,529
1883 1,474,330 1,350,610 123,720
1884 1,532,497 1,481,470 51,027
1885 1,522,084 1,316,625 205,459
1886 1,688,276 1,465,325 222,951
1887 1,827,476 1,550,489 276,987
1888 2,016,240 1,709,260 306,980
1889 2,776,583 2,090,116 686,467
1890 2,504,116 2,555,793 -51,677
1891 2,324,981 3,146,129 -821,148
1892 2,689,565 3,094,855 -405,290
1893 3,034,093 3,401,086 -366,993
1894 3,542,114 3,587,224 -45,110
1895 4,033,611 3,757,007 276,604
1896 3,960,871 3,989,376 -28,505
1897 3,837,558 4,178,238 340,680
1898 4,575,842 5,560,529 -984,687
1899 6,580,305 5,441,691 1,138,614
1900 7,636,126 6,144,774 1,491,352
1901 8,532,594 8,882,578 -349,984
1902 10,320,774 8,040,697 2,280,077
1903 11,667,322 8,082,582 3,584,740
1904 11,322,272 9,630,326 1,691,946
1905 12,242,896 10,141,978 2,100,918
1906 14,282,484 8,776,477 5,506,007
1914 19,338,374 28,361,921 -9,023,547
1915 20,984,824 21,732,145 -747,321
1916 26,094,850 16,126,869 9,967,981
1917 31,923,826 19,897,021 12,026,805
1918 35,175,037 22,725,153 12,449,884
1919 36,181,719 35,333,802 847,917
Sources: PGG 1889, p.388; PGG 1890, pp.473-4; PGG 1894, p.325-6;
PGG 1896, pp.499-500; PGG 1907 (supplement), Appendix H, pp.xx;




Appendix 5 Perak: Import and export 1876-1905
Year Export ($) Import ($) Difference ($)
1876 739,972 831,375 -91,403
1877 1,075,423 965,894 109,529
1878 1,256,163 1,311,140 -54,977
1879 1,465,547 1,781,980 -316,433
1880 1,906,952 2,231,048 -324,096
1881 2,566,592 2,936,893 -370,301
1882 3,267,907 3,866,425 -598,518
1883 5,164,311 4,772,332 391,979
1884 5,393,996 6,047,694 -653,698
1885 6,569,466 5,811,605 757,861
1886 8,674,032 5,586,563 3,087,469
1887 12,249,334 6,951,963 5,297,371
1888 11,799,653 7,998,364 3,801,289
1889 10,812,673 7,048,046 3,764,627
1890 9,985,713 7,173,617 2,812,096
1891 10,655,332 7,913,357 2,741,975
1892 12,387,024 9,628,051 2,758,973
1893 14,499,475 10,188,448 4,311,027
1894 17,184,836 9,262,396 7,922,440
1895 15,596,225 9,581,372 6,014,853
1896 14,289,680 8,713,940 5,575,740
1897 14,442,428 10,075,969 4,366,459
1898 16,702,278 10,769,096 5,933,182
1899 25,707,050 11,615,260 14,091,790
1900 29,190,663 14,741,148 14,449,515
1901 28,264,584 16,219,191 12,045,393
1902 35,295,949 17,106,559 18,189,390
1903 40,041,988 21,170,577 18,871,411
1904 38,228,307 19,866,188 18,362,119
1905 41,187,506 20,153,242 21,034,264
Sources: PGG 1897, Appendix M, p.663; PGG 1903, Appendix M, p.51; PGG
1907 (supplement), Appendix H, p.xx.
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Appendix 6 European Registered Rubber Companies Operating in Perak in 1957
1. Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd.
2. Allagar Rubber Plantations, Ltd.
3. Alor Pongsu Amalgamated Estates Ltd.
4. Amalgamated Bruas Rubber Estates
Ltd.
5. Bagan Serai Rubber Estates Ltd.
6. Banir Rubber Estates Ltd.
7. Batu Matang Rubber Plantations (1932)
Ltd.
8. Bernam-Perak Rubber Plantations, Ltd.
9. Bidor Rubber Estate Ltd.
10. Bruas-Perak Rubber Estate Ltd.
11. Bruseh Rubber Estates Ltd.
12. Central Perak Rubber Co. Ltd.
13. Changkat Salak Rubber and Tin Ltd.
14. Chersonese (F.M.S) Estates Ltd.
15. Cicely Rubber Estates Co. Ltd.
16. Dennistown Rubber Estates Ltd.
17. Dindings Rubber Estates Ltd
18. Eow Seng Rubber Co. Ltd
19. Escot Rubber Estates Ltd.
20. Gedong (Perak) Rubber Estate Ltd.
21. Golden Hope Rubber Estate Ltd.
22. Gopeng (Perak) Rubber Ltd.
23. Gula-Kalumpong Rubber Estates Ltd.
24. Heawood Tin And Rubber Estate Ltd.
25. Holyrood Rubber Ltd.
26. Ipoh Rubber Estates Ltd.
27. Jong-Landor Rubber Estates Ltd.
28. Kamuning (Perak) Rubber And Tin Co.
Ltd.
29. Kinta Kellas Rubber Estates Ltd.
30. Klabang Rubber Co. Ltd.
31. Krian Rubber Plantations Co. Ltd.
32. Kuala Kangsar Plantations Ltd.
33. Lanadron Rubber Estates, Ltd.
34. London Asiatic Rubber & Produce Co.
Ltd.
35. Lower Perak Rubber Estates Ltd.
36. Malay Rubber Planters Ltd.
37. Malaysia Rubber Co. Ltd.
38. Narborough (F.M.S) Rubber Estate Ltd.
39. New Columbia Rubber Co. Ltd.
40. North Malay Rubber Estates Ltd.
41. Padang Senang Rubber Ltd.
42. Parit-Bruas (Malay) Rubber Co. Ltd.
43. Pataling Rubber Estates Ltd.
44. Perak Rubber Plantations Ltd.
45. Prang Besar Rubber Estate Ltd.
46. Pusing Rubber And Tin Ltd.
47. Rambutan Rubber Estates Ltd.
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48. Ratanui Rubber Ltd.
49. Riverview Rubber Estates Ltd.
50. Rubana Rubber Estates Ltd.
51. Sabrang Rubber Estate Ltd.
52. Seafield Rubber Co. Ltd.
53. Segari Rubber Ltd.
54. Sengat Rubber Estate Ltd.
55. Shelford Rubber Estate Ltd.
56. Sogomana Rubber Estate Ltd
57. South Perak Rubber Syndicate Ltd.
58. Straits Rubber Co. Ltd.
59. Strathisla (Perak) Rubber Estates Ltd.
60. Sungei Chinoh Rubber Co. Ltd.
61. Sungei Krian Rubber Estate Ltd.
62. Sungei Kruit Rubber Estate Ltd.
63. Sungei Matang Rubber Estate Ltd.
64. Sungei Siput Rubber Plantations Ltd.
65. Sungei-Timah Estate (Perak) Ltd.
66. Taiping Rubber Plantations Ltd.
67. Tali Ayer Rubber Estates Ltd.
68. Trolak Estates Ltd
69. Windsor (F.M.S) Rubber Estate Ltd.
70. Yam Seng Rubber Co. Ltd.
Source: Collated from Zorn & Leigh-Hunt
(comp.)(1957). Manual ofRubber
Planting Companies, London: Zorn
& Leigh-Hunt.
Notes: 1. The European companies listed
above are limited to those
registered in England and Scotland
only.
2. During the colonial period many
other European compames
operating in Perak had either
changed hands or ceased to exist
through acquisition, sale, merger or
by voluntary liquidation. For
comprehensive details, see source
above.
3. Some of the companies listed
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